

THE AFRICANDER LAND

BY ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN

DT
770
C 72

Cornell University Library

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
FROM THE
SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND
THE GIFT OF
Henry W. Sage
1891

A. 20.4 288 1877/1906.

OCT 29 1915

OCT 4 1914 M P

SEP - 1 2005

HOME USE RULES.

Books not needed for instruction or research are returnable within 4 weeks.

Volumes of periodicals and of pamphlets are held in the library as much as possible. For special purposes they are given out for a limited time.

Borrowers should not use their library privileges for the benefit of other persons.

Books not needed during recess periods should be returned to the library, or arrangements made for their return during borrower's absence, if wanted.

Books, needed by more than one person are held on the reserve list.

Books of special value and gift books, when the giver wishes it, are not allowed to circulate.


Cornell University Library
DT 770.C72

Africander land.



3 1924 028 695 868

oia



Cornell University
Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

<http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028695868>

THE AFRICANDER LAND

THE
AFRICANDER LAND
BY ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN

AUTHOR OF "THE MASTERY OF THE
PACIFIC," "GREATER AMERICA," ETC.

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

1906

D

~~2371F~~88

A. 204288

PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.

AA

DEDICATED TO MY
WIFE,
THE COMPANION OF MY JOURNEYS
AND
COLLABORATOR IN MY WORK

A. 204288

P R E F A C E

My acquaintance with South Africa dates from 1890, when I was appointed by Mr. Rhodes to be the first Administrator of Mashonaland, and spent twenty months in South Africa, partly at Kimberley and in the Transvaal but chiefly in Rhodesia. In 1904-5 I returned, revisited all the colonies, and visited the protectorates.

My thanks are due to so many people in South Africa who assisted me in every possible way that it is impossible to mention all their names, and I must only take this opportunity to assure them that their kindness is not unappreciated. During my recent visit I received hospitality and assistance from people of all classes and several races, and am able to testify personally to the fact that, whatever the national antagonism between the British and Dutch, it does not extend to the individual Englishman. My special thanks must be given, however, to Mr. W. Percy Fraser of Johannesburg, to whose suggestion

and interest I owe the initial idea of the book, to Mr. J. H. Parker, especially for his assistance in the tedious business of correcting proofs, and to Major H. E. M. Leggett, R.E., D.S.O., who, as a personal friend who has spent some years in the Transvaal, has helped me in various ways.

CONTENTS

PART I.—BLACK SOUTH AFRICA

CHAP.	PAGE
I. THE REAL SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM: THE BLACK CLOUD	1
II. RELIGION AND THE NATIVE	19
III. EDUCATING THE NATIVE—TO WHAT END?	41
IV. THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE NATIVE	59
V. POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS AND REALITIES	75
VI. SHALL THE NATIVE OWN THE LAND?	93
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE BLACK RACES	104
VIII. THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE BRITISH INDIAN	128

PART II.—WHITE SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE MAKING OF DUTCH AFRICANDERS: THE TAAL	139
II. THE MAKING OF DUTCH AFRICANDERS: THE RACE PROBLEM IN SCHOOL	162
III. THE MAKING OF DUTCH AFRICANDERS: THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH	185

CHAP.	PAGE
IV. THE DUTCH AFRICANDER: IN PRIVATE LIFE . . .	199
V. THE DUTCH AFRICANDER: IN PUBLIC LIFE . . .	228
VI. LAND SETTLEMENT AS A POLICY	264
VII. RHODESIA	292
VIII. BLACK, WHITE, AND YELLOW: THE LABOUR PROBLEM .	316
IX. SOME DOMESTIC PROBLEMS	338
X. SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS	362
XI. IMPERIALISM, CAPITALISM, AND THE LAND . . .	390

PART III.—ON THE KNEES OF THE GODS

I. NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM	408
II. THE SPIRIT OF AFRICANDERLAND	423
APPENDIX	431
INDEX	435

LIST OF MAPS

EXPANSION OF BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA	<i>Facing page</i>	2
SOUTH AFRICA—PHYSICAL	„	342
SOUTH AFRICA—RAILWAYS	„	364
SOUTH AFRICA—POLITICAL	„	430

FOREWORD

IN calling this book "The Africanderland," I am aware that I am challenging prejudice. The name Africander has as yet a special significance in the land which gave it birth, and would be repudiated by many to whom I apply it. The dictionary definition is "one born of white parents in South Africa," which makes it clear that the two popular superstitions attached to the name, first that it implies coloured blood and second that it is applicable only to those of Dutch origin, are entirely wrong. It is with serious intention that I have chosen this name and wish to place it before my readers as the key to the situation in South Africa.

There is only one hope for the future prosperity and happiness of this great sub-continent, and that is the formation of a nation within its boundaries which will include all the white races and weld them in a body for the preservation of national interests. Like the Australians and Canadians, the South Africans must set up a national type and be bound to their country by ties of race. Hitherto the only section of the population which has realised this ideal of a South African nationality is the Dutch one,

and it is they who have arrogated to themselves the title of *Africanders*, which has come to have a political meaning. The name is the legitimate one for a South African nation; it is euphonious, convenient and expressive. It belongs to every white man born on South African soil equally and should be proudly claimed and acclaimed by all as a birth-right and a national possession.

By ear-marking this name as their own particular distinction, by spelling it in the Dutch and not the English fashion, the Boers have deprived their British fellow South Africans of a place which is theirs by right, have even reduced them to a nameless condition, so that we must speak of “British Colonials” or “British South Africans,” using circumlocution and tautology and failing to convey the position which these men occupy in a country which belongs equally to all the “native-born.”

I appeal, therefore, to my kinsmen in South Africa to take up their birthright and claim their part as *Africanders*.

I must explain my own use of the word “Dutch,” which I have taken (for convenience’ sake) in the South African sense. The European Dutch are spoken of as *Hollanders*.

The treatment of the vast range of subjects which I have collected under the title “*Africanderland*” needs a few words of explanation. I have placed the Black Problem in the front, as being the first, the greatest, and the most pressing of all the difficult questions that arise. I have then turned to the

Dutch Africander and sketched various sides of his life and character. I have not, to my own regret, been able to devote the space which the subject deserves to the British element in Africanderland because their position and tendencies are, on the whole, better understood and have been described at considerable length by other writers; and to reduce a work of this description to readable proportions it has been necessary not only to condense but in many places to eliminate much that is really of interest and importance. For a similar reason I have attempted no geographical descriptions or anything but the barest outlines of the history of Africanderland, since the majority of my readers must be conversant with these subjects, which have been exhaustively and picturesquely treated by other writers.

It has been necessary, moreover, to avoid, as far as possible, purely controversial matters and those which, whatever their local or temporary importance, are not actually vital to the greater issues involved. My endeavour has been to present a picture, brought up to date throughout by personal observation, of the actual conditions prevailing, with brief reference to their historical causes, and to show the relation of each section of political or social life and of each difficult problem to one another and their place in the great current of national and Imperial affairs.

sub-tropical countries where mining, engineering, or agricultural operations disturb a virgin soil. Such conditions are not permanent, and their presence is no evidence that great sections of the country may not in time become perfectly healthy. The malaria of tropical valleys and swamp-lands on the coast is less eradicable, though much can be done in draining and filling up, and by the extermination of mosquitoes. Sunstroke, curiously enough, is singularly unusual in South Africa, where men go about in felt or straw hats, a practice which would court death in India. For certain diseases to which all races are subject it is well known that parts of South Africa are extraordinarily beneficial, owing to the extreme dryness of the air. Speaking generally, the sub-continent enjoys a climate which, while varying in parts from extreme heat to great cold, is both delightful and healthful to the white man.


But more is needed than a good climate to constitute a real "white man's country" in the sense in which we use that phrase to-day. We mean a country where the white man can efficiently and economically fill every grade, unskilled as well as skilled, in the hierarchy of the community, where he is at liberty to carve out a fortune, where his fate is in his own hands, and where he can build up a political and social system on his own model. How far South Africa answers to this description it will be the aim of these pages to describe.

When the British colonists made homes for themselves in America they found races already in possession.

1806

Cape Town
C. of Good Hope

R. Karoo
R. Senegal
Orange R.



London John Murray

Oxford

These they pushed back, farther and farther, since it was impossible to assimilate them to an European civilisation, and a process of extermination was carried out.

First they fell upon their knees,
And then upon the aborigines.

There was no attempt to work them into the social system, and later, when labour was wanted, the more docile Africans were introduced as slaves. The parallel between the conduct of the Europeans in America and South Africa, similar in its earlier features, breaks down, however, since extinction, the policy of the former in dealing with the untamable Indian, has not been practised in South Africa. In the case of the South African natives the situation was less simple. The early white settlers found docile, if treacherous, people (the Bushmen and the Hottentots) who submitted to their yoke. Later on they came in contact with a more virile race, and for a considerable period the Bantu and the European invaders disputed South Africa between them, but eventually the Bantu also submitted. The white possession of the country as a whole rests on a variety of conquests, treaties, and agreements with these black people. In no part of South Africa have they been exterminated; they have been hemmed in but not driven out.

They are spread, with greatly varying density, over the whole surface, and, far from diminishing in numbers, they are increasing with considerable rapidity. Certain parts of the country they inhabit as nations or tribes apart, under protection of Great Britain, a

condition analogous to that of certain native states in India. Here they live under tribal law, subject to their own chiefs, who own allegiance to the British Crown. Basutoland is the best example of this. It must be remembered that many of the Bantu tribes, and more particularly the Zulus, had, and still have to a great degree, an elaborate system of government, law, and army organisation, which gives them a power of resistance impossible to more loosely combined tribes. At the same time, the antagonism between the various branches of the race has always been of great advantage to the European conqueror.

Some of the tribes, or individual units of tribes, have been under the influence of European civilisation for a century, while others have as yet hardly touched its fringe, so different are the conditions of native life in South Africa. Now, it is necessary to look at the question as a whole; it is equally impossible to argue either from the civilised or uncivilised Kaffir. This fact is forgotten by too many people who have the interest of the negro at heart, and who view with grief, as well they may, the adverse conditions under which he labours in more than one continent. I do not mean to suggest that all black people must be lumped together, and that it is impossible for an individual to rise above the level of his race. Europeans are by no means all on the same level of civilisation. But I believe that each section of the black race must work out its salvation as a race, and not as individuals.

Here is the fundamental difficulty in the relations between black and white. Take the British nation.

As a people, as a race, as a nation, we have through long, bitter, and bloody struggles won our way to what are known as representative institutions, to collective freedom and liberty. Our colonies, going a step farther, have claimed, by right of their work done in building up new countries, an even greater degree of liberty, or what seems so to them. But it is by virtue of the long struggle behind the British race that they have come to exercise these rights, and it is as communities that they rise, step by step, in the scale of social evolution. In our expansion we have come in contact with other races, and have subdued or assimilated them. In the case of white races like the French in Canada or the Dutch in South Africa, we met with people whose traditions and evolution are similar to our own. Our policy towards them should be one of assimilation. In the case of the black, brown, or yellow races, however, there is a fundamental difference. Nature has implanted in us an instinct against miscegenation with people of a different colour to ourselves, an instinct which is strongest in the higher races when in an uncorrupted state. We cannot have race fusion with these people, so we must find a footing on which they can live among us.

Is it our duty to allow them to partake fully of those rights which we have won for ourselves? To limit our illustration to South Africa, are we bound, as free men, to say, "Equal rights for all men south of the Zambesi"? Such a suggestion has never been seriously made, but its spirit pervades many arguments on the subject. Granted that we arrogate to ourselves

the right to discriminate (by virtue, presumably, of our own superior achievements in human progress), how shall the phrase run? "Equal rights for every *civilised* man south of the Zambesi."¹

Here we have the root of all evil in this world-wide problem. We set up a standard—that of "civilisation"—and decree that a black man crossing this line shall become even as we are—the *fine fleur* of the ages, the product of centuries of striving towards the light. But what is civilisation, after all? Judged by its outward manifestations in modern times it is a capacity to express oneself by arbitrary hieroglyphics as well as by spoken sounds, to cover one's body with garments of a peculiar and not particularly hygienic type, to possess lethal weapons, to use certain implements in eating instead of those obviously provided by Nature for that purpose, and to inhabit a structure whose capacity to keep out wind and rain is less important than its angular shape and unpicturesque appearance. From the point of view of a South African "savage" this is a very fair statement of the outward and visible signs which betoken civilisation.

With all our superior advantages we have not been able to define our position more clearly. In the Southern States of America there are many white people who find it difficult to reach the standard of civilisation set up to keep down the blacks. They are the descendants of ancient families which came from England at a time when that country had already

¹ This is what Rhodes actually said, often misquoted as "for all white men"—that he did not say.

struggled up from the darkness of feudalism. The sense of the white American is strongly in favour of securing for them, under any circumstance, the birth-right of the free peoples. But they are as much below the standard of civilisation set by arbitrary legislation as many American negroes are above it. In a lesser degree we find this situation reproduced in South Africa, where there is already a class of paupers—landless, shiftless and uneducated—which has actually become in some cases subject to the wealthy natives, ploughing for them on contract at so much cash per acre, and even working for money wages.

Just as individuals may tower mentally and morally above the general level of their race, and are yet bound by its limitations, their eagle wings 'clipped by the essentials of their social and political environment, so others may fall beneath the standard of their age and race and yet not lose its privileges nor forfeit their birth-right. To deny this law of the solidarity of national (and to a minor degree) racial life is to shut one's eyes to the whole trend of history, which has been more and more towards the elimination of independence socially and politically. Our duty towards our submerged blood brothers is plain enough, but is it consistent with our attitude of establishing a standard of civilisation, or with any pretence of making the entrance to our *arcana* of rights a mere matter of education or social qualifications? What we have won as a race we must keep as a race, unless we are prepared to forfeit our race purity. Unless we are prepared to assimilate the native, or be assimilated by him, we

must rule him. There is no middle course, and the attempts to set up an artificial barrier are a cowardly and a futile compromise.

Many white people who are utterly averse to the idea of race miscegenation are oppressed by the idea that we must either rule or assimilate, as presenting to the black race no way of escape from bondage. They may be ready to grant that the efforts to find a *via media* have been so far unsuccessful, but they cling to the hope that, in the interests of eternal justice, it may yet be found. It is, they feel, contrary to the spirit of the age that any race should be considered as permanently under subjection, and the Biblical decree that Ham should for ever be a hewer of wood and a drawer of water seems to them as cruel and pagan a conception as that which says that because the fathers have eaten sour grapes the children's teeth shall be set on edge.

In shaping a scheme of human life in accordance with the ethical conceptions of our age and race concerning justice (conceptions which, be it noted, are not either permanent or universal) we are constantly brought face to face with these ironies, anomalies, apparent contradictions. Democracy, which was to solve so many difficulties in social evolution, has in fact complicated them. With our eyes wide open to the inalienable rights of the individual and the doctrine of equality, liberty, and fraternity, we are compelled to see our fellow beings chained by circumstances, ground under foot by inequalities which are often essential parts of their being, and as far from

the realisation of universal brotherhood as they well can be. And yet it will be said that, inasmuch as we are no longer blind to all this, we have made progress. Humanitarian efforts are on the increase, and the standard of life is rising ; above all, the people are a living force in national life. I grant this and rejoice in it, even while I wonder whether as a nation we have built our foundation securely. The dominant note in our religion of to-day is an increased respect for the sacredness of human life. We are rapidly reaching the stage when we shall regard it as the end of all effort. This being so, the admiration evoked in us by the Japanese exhibition of all the qualities we most admire or profess to admire—patriotism, discipline, forethought, steadiness, reticence—must have given some of us food for reflection. The sacredness of human life is a doctrine quite foreign to the Japanese. Their idea of humanity begins at the other end of the scale, and, although they are not wasteful or reckless in this or any other respect, they place many things higher than the mere preservation of the vital spark. In making this diversion there is no intention of following out the idea to a conclusion, but rather to give weight to a suggestion. Are we sure that we have found the solution of that great human problem—the relation between man and man ? Are we sure that our ethical conceptions of any kind have a permanent foundation of natural law ? If we are not sure that we have plumbed the infinite with our puny line, is it not wiser to work for some definite end, however much it may fall short of the great ideal ?

I am not belittling the idealist, but I regret that the theorist is so common compared with the practical worker. Personally I confess that I give up the problem as to the ethical position of the negro; I am not sure whether my ethics or my estimate of him are wrong. To one belief I am constant, the one expressed so quaintly in the catechism which every Scottish child has learnt: "The whole duty of man is to know God and to enjoy Him"; that is, to be happy and useful in the knowledge that he is part of a universal scheme. I believe it to be our duty to our fellow men to secure them every opportunity for so doing. As an idealist I should like to wave a wand over half the earth and dispel all race or colour feeling and give every one equal rights and liberty. As a practical man I know that no such thing is possible, and I note that the situation between black and white grows graver and less hopeful every year. I attribute this to our attempt to do what, in our present state of evolution, is equivalent to trying to square the circle. We are trying to fit the negro into a scheme of human life which we have elevated into a religion. The scheme seems to be breaking down at several points among ourselves; but, in justice to our theories, we feel bound to go on trying to squeeze him into it, even when our instincts are opposed to such a course. It will be my endeavour to show in the ensuing chapters how this attempt, having as its foundation the revolt against slavery and the theory that equality is a natural law and all subjection immoral, has failed

in every department of our relations with the South African native. In justice I must allow that we have been by no means constant to this foundation, but our backslidings have been largely caused by the revolt of our natural instincts against these very theories, if still more by a sense of expedience, and the result has been a curious mixture of alternating generosity and injustice, while, above all things, consistency is the most powerful influence on the native mind.

That our attitude has conduced to the general happiness or usefulness of the black races no one, I think, who has any acquaintance with the Black Problem can believe; but I may be told that we are still in the transition stage and that the readjustment of racial relations must take time. It will certainly take time—it will never be accomplished if it continues on its present lines. In South Africa we are only on the verge—perhaps just over the verge—of this transition stage, but the situation is the more serious because the European is only a small ruling caste in the sub-continent, in the midst of a virile and increasing native population. South Africa cannot trifle with the situation, cannot afford to make experiments like those which are bearing such fatal fruit in the Southern States of America.

But, if we must feel misgivings both as to our actions and the spasmodic and uncertain morality which guides them, what shall we say of the black point of view? What do they ask of Life and of Us who dictate the conditions of their life to a large

extent? The aspirations of a very few are definite—we have formed them ourselves. They demand equality of opportunity for white and black alike. They accept eagerly our cheap “civilisation” test, but they are, as is natural, keenly aware of the hollowness of our position and they are becoming embittered by the irony of the situation. The great mass of South African natives are still untouched by European sophistries. They have not adopted our standards or views as to human relations; at the same time they have certain aspirations common to all humanity.

At this point it is necessary to give in round figures some idea of the numbers and proportions of the black races. The native population of Africa south of the Zambesi is approximately four and a half millions, the white population being a little over one million, or one-fifth of the total. The area in which the population is distributed is over nine hundred thousand square miles, equal to four and a quarter that of Germany or six times that of California, and in this area there are seven colonies and possessions, each with a separate administration, distinct and independent in character. The blacks are very unequally distributed. Cape Colony is three-fourths black or coloured, the latter designation covering a mixed population, partly aboriginal or Asiatic, with an admixture of white blood, which is two-thirds as numerous as the Europeans, so that the pure blacks are practically only three-fifths the total population, and of these the larger number are

gathered together in certain districts. Natal, on the contrary, has a pure native population of 900,000 odd, which does not include 101,000 Indians and nearly 7,000 odd coloured people, while the Europeans number only 97,000, or one-twelfth of the total. About a fourth of the Natal natives are concentrated in Zululand. The Orange River Colony, lying so close to Basutoland, has only a little over 200,000 scattered natives, but even that number nearly doubles the European population. In the Transvaal we find 300,000 Europeans, 23,000 Asiatics and coloured, and more than 900,000 natives, about 130,000 being imported for labour purposes. Southern Rhodesia has one European to every fifty natives, the total of whites being about twelve thousand. The range therefore in different sections is very great, from one-half to one-fiftieth. Besides these colonies we have to consider the natives of Basutoland, Swaziland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In all these there is a very small population of whites—missionaries, traders, and officials—numbering together less than 3,000, while the total of the native populations amounts to more than 550,000. The natives in the German and Portuguese territories number probably 2,000,000 while the whites are a mere handful in the population. These figures must be clearly kept in mind when we revert to that question at the head of this chapter. In deciding whether South Africa is a white man's country *in posse* we must not forget that numerically it is a black man's country *in esse*.

Among these people there is an infinite variety in

physical and mental character, habits, and capacity, just as there is every stage of social development, from the bead-dressed savage to the educated native lawyer or clergyman in correct European guise. None of these, however, have remained unaffected by the European domination of the country. The great majority, the different tribes of Bantu stock, were themselves invaders, and in very few cases are we called upon to regard the South African native as a true aboriginal living on his native soil, for the Bushman has almost disappeared, and the Hottentot race is fast dwindling. The most vital change in native life has been brought about by the *pax Britannica*. Internecine or predatory wars being interdicted, the chief object and means of existence were taken away from the males, and the whole social fabric was disturbed, because there was no longer the constant drain on the population for which their laws and customs had provided; and lastly, the authority of the chiefs, who had always been military leaders, was weakened and in many cases the tribal life broken up. Despite our relatively small numbers we have thus imposed the first conditions of an alien civilisation upon all these people, even when we have partly encouraged them in the retention of their own laws, habits, and social system.

Some of the Bantu races had brought their tribal organisation to a very high pitch, perhaps the nearest approach to an original, self-resolved civilisation which any black race has attained. Its foundation, however, was militarism, pure and simple. Having sapped this foundation, we must expect some new development.

Both in South Africa and Great Britain it is usual to hear the opinion expressed that all we have to do is to let the native alone, that he is far better in his wild than in his domesticated state. The evidence of one's senses corroborates this. The native who in his own *kraal* in a state of ignorance is polite, stately, honest, and well-behaved will degenerate after a little town experience into an impertinent, careless, bad-mannered and often vicious character. The same transformation can be seen in a very different class of people—the Chinese. Both in China and in South Africa the “mission native” is peculiarly marked out in this unenviable way. What really happens is that, in either case, the native is plunged into an environment in which he misses the moral guides and props to which he is accustomed. The opinion of his friends and equals is one of his greatest safeguards, and both with Chinese and Kaffirs every action of life is hedged round with an immemorial etiquette which it is hard to change. Among people who are evidently ignorant of such laws, and who only attach importance to things which seem to the native entirely trivial, he quickly loses his self-respect, and, learning to despise the rules of conduct in which he was brought up, he fails to assimilate the moral code of his masters. The result is that he frequently compares unfavourably with his former self. Such as it is, this is frequently the material on which the white man must rely to carry out his schemes for the development of the country.

To enter into any detailed consideration of the psychology of the South African native would involve

a length of treatment which cannot be contemplated here, but the essential points must be considered. At present, it may be confessed, we have not penetrated very far below the surface of the Kaffir; his mind is more or less dark to us. Here and there in South Africa one meets men whose lives have been spent among natives, and who have their fingers more or less on the pulse of native feeling in the districts which they have studied. They have given years of patient and unassuming work to the task of trying to understand the people among whom they labour as missionaries, officials, or even traders. This is the sort of task which seems peculiarly congenial to a certain type of Englishman, and one meets him in every part of our varied empire, patiently and generally silently pegging away to acquire a knowledge which must almost invariably perish with him because he has not the faculty for expression. Too frequently his intimacy with this one phase of life has put him out of touch with others, so that his knowledge is valuable only when tapped and collated. In the pages which follow I have endeavoured to compare the opinions of such men as these, but it must be premised that all the available information is fragmentary and often contradictory in its bearing on the inner life of the native and his attitude towards ourselves. The best informed are the least positive, and often qualify their views with, "After all, one never knows!"

It is in this spirit that one must approach the Black problem in South Africa. It is impossible to dogmatise as to the native point of view or the native attitude.

Even our acquaintance with native habits and customs is partial, and scientific observation has gone but a very little way. The importance of our present decision lies in the fact that this is the transition period—we have to lay a foundation now for future generations to build on. While still uncertain of our material we must try to mould the South African native to some enduring pattern. When one considers the vastness of the task and the penalty of failure one is appalled at the casual and careless manner in which it has been approached. It is not too much to say that there has been little attempt hitherto to consider the future of our black South African subjects or their relations with us in any light but that of local or national political expedience. The recent commission on Native Affairs had an opportunity of dealing with this question, but it failed, and spoilt otherwise admirable work, by leaving the crux of the question not merely unsolved but untouched. The data collected should, however, be carefully studied, as representing a strenuous effort to give every side of the complex question fairly and honestly. I may perhaps be allowed to paraphrase the opening passage of their report and close this first chapter of a picture of Africanderland by saying that, in view of the proposed federation of the sections of that country, we will examine the factors now at work moulding the lives of the vast majority of the people—the Black South Africans. The causes moulding both Blacks and Whites may appear at first sight to be independent, but on closer examination they are seen to be inter-dependent.

There is as yet no white national type in South Africa, but the white sections have undoubtedly been influenced in their social and moral development by the black propinquity and numerical preponderance. There must be still more of this influence and counter-influence to follow. The goal in South Africa is to build a sound white nation, and the problem precedent, which ought to and will help in creating the white nation on the best lines, is the black. The blacks must be the means of strengthening the South African national character or they will destroy it.

CHAPTER II

RELIGION AND THE NATIVE

It is hardly possible to overestimate the influence which the introduction of the Christian religion has had on the history of South Africa. We owe to the missionary spirit a great deal of the exploring work which opened the dark continent, and missionary influence has frequently decided our policy, while most of our information has come from the same source. The most distinguished living African missionary, Dr. Stewart, of Lovedale, himself the companion of Livingstone, has divided missionary enterprise in Africa into three periods : the first characterised by hope and great expectations, but marred by inexperience and want of comprehension and marked by events which were rather political or philanthropic than missionary ; the second moved chiefly by philanthropic, scientific, or commercial motives, and resulting in much failure and disappointment ; the third a period of consolidation and expansion.

The earliest missionaries to South Africa were the Moravians, a German sect which appears to be peculiarly endowed for this sort of work. While they do not adopt the principle of self-supporting missions they conduct their affairs very inexpensively, acting as

farmers and artisans. No one who has visited one of their stations can fail to have been struck with the busy, practical aspect of it, and it is certain that no mere lip service is expected from converts but outward signs of grace in purity of life and willingness to work. Dr. Stewart calls the Moravians by pre-eminence the missionary church of Christendom, and draws attention to three remarkable features of their organisation—the skilful and statesmanlike nature of their constitution, their broad-minded tolerance as regards other sects, and the combination of a high spiritual standard and personal realisation of their religion with a strong common-sense appreciation of the value and necessity of labour. In 1901 they claimed only 100,000 converts, a fact which will commend their work to those who know the wide range of their influence as wielded by 450 missionaries in 190 stations.

The next to enter South Africa was the famous London Missionary Society, which has been the advance-guard of our imperial expansion in so many quarters of the globe. Numbering many men of pre-eminent ability, this Society has never been contented merely to remain a missionary body, but has contended for the political rights of the natives, often not very wisely or with very definite views, and has constituted itself their protector and advocate, its efforts in this direction being equalled in other parts of Africa by those of the Church Missionary Society, with the wealth and social influence of the Established Church behind it. The Church Missionary Society has no station in South Africa, but its work in suppressing

slavery has affected the whole continent more or less directly.

The attitude of the Dutch Africanders towards the natives has always constituted a point of missionary attack, and to the extreme divergence of views is greatly due the present unfortunate confusion. They expelled the first Moravian mission from the Cape and in later days imprisoned the French missionary who tried to pass through the Transvaal to the Barotse. Not only were they bigoted enough to prohibit any form of religion but their own for some time, but they were constantly opposed to any attempts to Christianise the heathen, whom they regarded, and still regard, not merely as beings on a different plane, but as something nearer to beasts than human beings. Their policy was the same as that pursued by their countrymen towards the natives of Java and was not considered or intended to be either cruel or unjust. It simply desires to preserve the aborigines on the level which Nature has apparently provided for them, so that they may be useful to the white man, who will on his part provide for them as well as possible. The missionary point of view was that the black man, having a soul and being equal in the eyes of his Creator to any white, though depressed by circumstances, had an equal right to individual freedom and human rights. The European intruded on the native, not *vice versa*, and took away his land, his social organisation, and his mode of government. The Dutch say, "Yes, but we bought the land with our blood." The savage

nature of the warfare which accompanied early colonisation left an indelible impression of antipathy on the Boers, especially the Transvaalers and Orange Free Staters. Then there was the hardship and injustice inflicted in the carrying out of the abolition of slavery, which was the decisive fact in causing the Great Trek. The whole situation rested on a different conception of the possible relations between the two races, and was aggravated undoubtedly by misdirected zeal, which made some of the missionaries act as though the Dutch were actually less to be considered than the Kaffirs. Ignorance and prejudice are to be found on both sides, and the situation was made more difficult by the circumstance that, while the London Missionary Society was, in fact, a political power in England, the Dutch and British colonists were without advocates or influence. While it is correct to use the past tense in speaking of the heyday of missionary-politico power, it must not be supposed that it is no longer a factor in South African political life. I take the following from the report of a meeting held in Cape Town in July, 1905. The Bishop of St. John's said that "the natives were beginning to gain ambitions, politically, socially, and religiously. . . . In his diocese they were doing a great deal politically for the natives. . . ." This is a definite exposition of Anglican methods of propagating the Gospel.

The third Society to bring Christianity to the natives was the Wesleyan, which like other denominations does not confine itself to missionary work. It

has congregations in almost every considerable town in South Africa, and in the native centres as well. Its missionaries have contributed considerably to our knowledge of the natives, but its work is almost entirely evangelistic, although schools are attached to many of its congregations. The most potent force in the religious life of the South African native has, perhaps, been the Scottish Presbyterian mission, which has always been educational in its character. There are also other Nonconformist bodies, such as the Congregationalist and Baptist missions, and others belonging to the Church of England, the Universities mission, and the S.P.G. The Rhenish, the Berlin Evangelical, and the Hermannsbergh Lutheran missions are all active bodies and do a good deal of educational work, their principal characteristic being a desire to instruct thoroughly before admitting converts, and to maintain European supervision. The Paris Evangelical Society, which historically represents the Huguenots, who have exercised so great an influence in South African history, has a strong mission concentrated in Basutoland. The influence of this Society over the celebrated chief Moshesh, and the part played by it in the wars between the Dutch and Basutos, and in the final settlement whereby Great Britain took Basutoland under her protection at a moment when the Dutch considered that they were just getting the best of a long and bloody conflict, are incidents in the history of this mission which illustrate again how difficult it is to separate the spiritual and the temporal. The work of Roman Catholics has been restricted by

the exclusive attitude of the Dutch, who prohibited all save the Nonconformist bodies so far as they were able. Nevertheless some of the most successful work has been done by the Jesuits, Marists, and Trappists, especially in Natal. Their work has been characterised by a broad-minded policy which has sought to teach the native the dignity of labour in the best sense of the word, and they have never encouraged the natives in aspirations to political or social equality. They have the great advantage of being able to inculcate the lesson of discipline which is so necessary to the native.

Having briefly enumerated the principal missionary agencies at work in South Africa, we come to a difficult part of the subject. What is the sum total of the effect that religious teaching has had on the native? What is the trend of missionary influence?

With so many different bodies, inspired by different conceptions of the work to be done, it is difficult to generalise, and the following criticisms probably do injustice to some bodies. Some seem to have confined themselves to religious propaganda; others, as we have seen, meddled with high politics; all, as we have shown, were acting and reacting on the character of the people with whom they came in contact. It is impossible to deal adequately with the historical significance of the missionary movement, and we must confine ourselves to the broad aspect of the situation.

A very unfortunate effect on the native mind has undoubtedly been the accentuation of the race line between their white masters; but in this respect one

feels that it is the Dutch Reformed Church which is chiefly to blame, since until recent years it has made no attempt to reach the native population, and has been content to incur the odium of being the one Christian body which stood aside in this work, thus making the attitude of the Dutch more marked in its uncompromising denial of the humanity of the Kaffirs. The eager partisanship of the missionaries in any case between the Boers and the natives was perhaps only natural when one remembers that the latter were often without any other protection, but when it came to imply that the Imperial Government stood behind the missionaries, and in an attitude unsympathetic to its white subjects, the sore feelings of the colonists went to feed racial animosities. To-day we have to face an accumulation of such feelings, but at the same time missionary work is standing now on its own merits, and is little likely to be supported on political grounds, unless locally. The Dutch Reformed Church has also at last started missions of its own, thus practically acknowledging that Kaffirs have souls to save—which certainly was not a tenet of its earlier belief. Another phase of religious dissension has had its effect on the Kaffirs, as on other heathen. I refer to the unfortunate lack of fraternal spirit among the Christian missions themselves. These disagreements and jealousies are not confined to the purely missionary societies, but may be found even within the borders of the Dutch Reformed Church, as shown elsewhere. Indeed the spirit of contention is as strong in South Africa in religious as in political life, and its ill effects

must cause sincere grief to men of all shades of conviction.

The educational work of the missions must be dealt with separately, and we have now left for consideration the actual effect, morally, of the Christian propaganda. The Native Affairs Commission Report of 1905 speaks with no uncertain note on this subject. "For the moral improvement of the natives there is no influence equal to that of religious belief." Coming at a time when doubt and misgivings are in the minds of many earnest advocates of missionary work this pronouncement was hailed with relief and joy, for it emanated not from Exeter Hall or a Church Congress, but from men of colonial experience—administrators, traders, farmers, but not one missionary. The reason for this belief is based upon an examination of native customs and traditions. These are to a great extent moral in their effect, though not in their origin. They are part of the tribal organisation and laws which are inevitably modified by conditions introduced by us into the country, and which disappear altogether in town life. As we do not, or cannot, protect the native from contact with our own civilisation, it is obviously most unwise to allow him only to see its worst and lowest side. Demoralisation has been the result of this course already, and it is spreading. There may be some among us who do not recognise in our own moral code the result of any direct Christian influence, believing it to be founded on law, order, and self-respect. Such a man must, however, ignore the history of his race if he cannot trace his own superior

position to the age-long struggle between religion and materialism. With this point of view we are not, however, concerned here. The majority of people would not attempt, consciously, to separate religion and morality in this way, and would certainly not, if they only thought about it, expect an untaught native, fresh from superstitious paganism, to accomplish such mental gymnastics. If we take away his moral code we must give him another, and that the best and most efficient we can find. Christianity supplies this, and Christian zeal has also supplied the necessary instruments for propagating this scheme of morality. No secular system, no protective or prohibitive laws, could cope with the serious demoralisation inevitably caused by the first effect of an alien civilisation upon a primitive race. "It is clear," says the Report, "that the native year by year is becoming familiar with new forms of sexual immorality, intemperance, and dishonesty, and that his naturally imitative disposition, his virility, and escape from home and tribal influences provide a too congenial soil for the cultivation of acquired vices. . . . Hope for the elevation of the native races must depend mainly on their acceptance of Christian faith and morals."

We have here the strongest justification of the missionary attitude that could be uttered, and it is the more striking because it is probably at variance with the large majority of (uninstructed) colonial opinion. I have said enough to show that I entirely sympathise with its main thesis. The moral character of the native should be the missionary point of attack.

I am also convinced, by the evidence obtained by the Commission, that religious instruction, pure and simple, has been of benefit, and that the weight is in favour of improved morality in the Christian section of the community; but I am not altogether satisfied that the missionaries, as a whole, are dealing with the question of the elevation of the native in a manner conducive to an extension of these benefits. Certain undeniable disadvantages, certain unsightly excrescences on the surface of this moral regeneration, are to be observed, and cannot be lightly dismissed.

An important feature in nearly all mission work has been the training of natives as religious propagandists in their turn. The Protestant Churches uniformly allow them the right of ordination, after which they are, nominally, on a level with their white fellow-workers in the hierarchy of their particular sect. The Roman Catholic bodies, composed of brotherhoods in direct communion with a head and vowed to the religious life, do not accept their catechumens in this way, though they sometimes use them as lay brothers. This question of discipline has become a burning one in South Africa. It has been said, by that most distinguished and right-minded leader of American negro advancement, Booker Washington, that "the race problem is so real and so present to the negro people that it enters as a motive into everything they do." The South African native, as a whole, has not reached this pinnacle of self-consciousness; but in the more advanced section, the one directly produced under missionary influence, this race feeling has become

morbidly active, and there has been a ferment for some little time which has spread in various forms to every mission sphere. I have no doubt that the process has been accelerated by the visits of natives, in their student or pre-ordination days, and even afterwards as full-fledged ministers, to Europe, where they immediately became aware in missionary circles that their black skin had not the same effect in deciding their social status as in South Africa. It is noticeable that the Moravians entirely disapprove of such visits on the part of their converts, as being likely to unsettle their minds and unfit them for their natural environment. The fact that more than one native minister has married a white woman is also a circumstance which has had weight in deciding the attitude of the colonists towards the missionaries. It appears to suggest on the part of certain Christian bodies an attitude towards the race question which they would, in most cases, repudiate, but the moral effect on both native and colonist is far greater than the actual facts would warrant.

The emotional character of the West African negro, so familiar in the religious services of the American Coloured Church, is not so apparent in the Bantu races, many of whom are trained in habits of reserve and dignity to which such religious emotionalism is repugnant. But every portion of the negro race loves noise, and a quantity of singing seems an essential part of every religious service. Nevertheless there is considerable decorum about their procedure and some warrant for the idea that many congregations could

get on very well with a native preacher in charge. This practice, naturally only possible to the Protestant clergy, and chiefly developed by the Presbyterians and Wesleyans, was the occasion for a movement of secession which has attracted considerable attention because it was suspected of underlying political motives. The first secession was headed by a native Wesleyan minister in Pretoria named Makoné, who founded a Church of which I believe he was still the head when I met him, in December, 1904. Doctrinally and in matters of Church organisation his sect is Wesleyan, its peculiarity consisting in its racial exclusiveness. Makoné himself vigorously denies any animus against the whites or political meaning in his movement, but he practically admits that American missionaries who came amongst the natives imparted a bitter (we may well say seditious) spirit to their conferences. The name "Ethiopian Church," first bestowed on Makoné's sect, whatever its origin, has the merit of being a most telling title. Dwane, a member of this community, was the one to attempt its affiliation with the American Methodist Episcopal Church. He visited the United States for that purpose, and was followed home by Bishop Turner, of that body, who gave a quasi-episcopal seal of approval to all secessionist movements and actions. It is certain that Dwane's motive was to remove the stigma of irregularity and place his Church on a recognised footing, and in this he was probably disappointed. In any case, he severed his connection with the American Methodist Episcopal Church, and offered himself to the Anglican community in Cape Town, promising to bring over a

large body of his followers. His offer was accepted, as well as his condition that he and his congregation should be constituted as a distinct body within the Church under the title of the Order of Ethiopia. The whole transaction was naturally viewed with doubt by many Christian bodies, as it savoured too much of mediæval methods of conversion. The wholesale transference of a body of Christians from one denomination to another can hardly be regarded as a sign of inward conviction. It is only fair to the Anglican Church to say that, having pursued a rather Jesuitical path of reasoning to make the netting of this bag of converts possible, she has done her best to turn them into good Christians, and has probably disappointed the leaders by the slowness with which she has permitted ecclesiastical preferment. By no means all the Ethiopians followed Dwane into the fold.

The Congregational, Baptist, and Presbyterian missions have all suffered in turn from this secessionist movement in their congregations, and no part of South Africa where there are native Christians has entirely escaped the contagion; even the Barotse mission in Southern Rhodesia has felt its effects. My own inquiries have not brought me any evidence of direct secession from Anglican or Roman Catholic communities, though the congregations of both have undoubtedly been affected. The method of employing native preachers and of admitting them to orders does not substantially differ in any of the Protestant Churches, but in practice the non-conforming sects have probably gone farthest in this matter and have therefore been more subject

before him, since more than one colony has declined to allow him to visit it.

The principal charges brought against the members of this Church by other religious bodies are, first, that they are not missionaries—do not preach to the heathen or to those who have no opportunities for religious instruction, but confine their labours to fields where other agencies have been for many years at work. This is not a mere matter of etiquette. It is an essential feature of all successful missionary work that the clash of creeds and the odium of proselytising should be avoided. Then they say, with apparent truth, that the standard of morality in the Church is not placed high enough and has a directly demoralising effect by admitting to Christian privileges people of notoriously loose lives. Here again the matter seems too serious to be put down to professional jealousy. The main objection to the American Methodist Episcopal Church, however, is that it encourages a feeling of independence quite apart from any spiritual needs or convictions. I do not think there is a shade of doubt that the basis of the movement is race-cleavage and that its political tendency is not so much intentional as inevitable. The whole movement has arisen very rapidly, and from the missionary outlook it has enormously increased the difficulty of their work. At any moment and in any quarter they may expect a secession from their native congregations, and the better trained and qualified the converts the sooner this may come.

It may well be asked why all this should arouse

such anxiety. The African native, having received the Gospel, has a perfect right to found his own Church organisations. The aim of Christian missionaries should surely be to enable him to stand alone. The missionaries reply that the movement has been premature, that the seceding Churches are incapable of upholding discipline, and that leading-strings are essential for some time to come.

One is forced to the conclusion that the whole development has taken them by surprise, that they have been hitherto unable to gauge the situation, and that, like the secular authorities, they have in fact pursued with reckless blindness a policy whose legitimate results they are not prepared to face. The Church secession is undoubtedly premature and accelerated by outside influences which the missionaries cannot control; but it is, after all, only a natural and inevitable consequence of conditions which the missionaries should be in a position to gauge. At present they are, generally speaking, in favour of forming an exclusive ring, outside which the secessionists must get on as well as they can. Many of them accept the situation in a spirit worthy of the Church militant here on earth. But to all must come, in moments of clear thought, a vision of a day whose era may have actually dawned, when this work shall no longer be theirs; when they must resign to inexperienced hands the spiritual weapons they have wielded and abandon fields made fruitful by their own self-sacrifice and devotion. Such is the honest and logical conclusion of the attitude taken up by many Protestant missionaries. They admit the

before him, since more than one colony has declined to allow him to visit it.

The principal charges brought against the members of this Church by other religious bodies are, first, that they are not missionaries—do not preach to the heathen or to those who have no opportunities for religious instruction, but confine their labours to fields where other agencies have been for many years at work. This is not a mere matter of etiquette. It is an essential feature of all successful missionary work that the clash of creeds and the odium of proselytising should be avoided. Then they say, with apparent truth, that the standard of morality in the Church is not placed high enough and has a directly demoralising effect by admitting to Christian privileges people of notoriously loose lives. Here again the matter seems too serious to be put down to professional jealousy. The main objection to the American Methodist Episcopal Church, however, is that it encourages a feeling of independence quite apart from any spiritual needs or convictions. I do not think there is a shade of doubt that the basis of the movement is race-cleavage and that its political tendency is not so much intentional as inevitable. The whole movement has arisen very rapidly, and from the missionary outlook it has enormously increased the difficulty of their work. At any moment and in any quarter they may expect a secession from their native congregations, and the better trained and qualified the converts the sooner this may come.

It may well be asked why all this should arouse

such anxiety. The African native, having received the Gospel, has a perfect right to found his own Church organisations. The aim of Christian missionaries should surely be to enable him to stand alone. The missionaries reply that the movement has been premature, that the seceding Churches are incapable of upholding discipline, and that leading-strings are essential for some time to come.

One is forced to the conclusion that the whole development has taken them by surprise, that they have been hitherto unable to gauge the situation, and that, like the secular authorities, they have in fact pursued with reckless blindness a policy whose legitimate results they are not prepared to face. The Church secession is undoubtedly premature and accelerated by outside influences which the missionaries cannot control; but it is, after all, only a natural and inevitable consequence of conditions which the missionaries should be in a position to gauge. At present they are, generally speaking, in favour of forming an exclusive ring, outside which the secessionists must get on as well as they can. Many of them accept the situation in a spirit worthy of the Church militant here on earth. But to all must come, in moments of clear thought, a vision of a day whose era may have actually dawned, when this work shall no longer be theirs; when they must resign to inexperienced hands the spiritual weapons they have wielded and abandon fields made fruitful by their own self-sacrifice and devotion. Such is the honest and logical conclusion of the attitude taken up by many Protestant missionaries. They admit the

possibility that black and white may be equal in Church and State. They deny the right of the European to supremacy. What follows? The setting up in Church, as in State, of artificial barriers over which the native climbs or which he knocks down. The result is no solution of the race question, but a bitter accentuation of it. "We can no longer work with white missionaries."

It is as impossible to say in religious matters, "You must come up to a certain standard of morals" as it is to make political rights the reward of a specified proficiency in reading or writing. Both are parts of that sham "civilisation" test of which I have already written. "All things are lawful to us," said the Apostle Paul, "but all things are not expedient"; a view of Christian policy which, with its blending of the dove and the serpent, may be commended to the missionary bodies of to-day. It is not expedient by any means that the present secessionist movement should spread, and the only thing that can stop it is a careful revision by some of the missionary bodies of their methods of work. The difficulties in this direction appear great on the surface. Christian teaching must cut at the root of tribal life in polygamy and other customs, and so denationalises the convert and places him in antagonism to his chief or head-man, but it does not eradicate his communal and tribal instincts. The trend of missionary influence is to encourage individualism, but after a time the native feels dissatisfied with his isolated position. In America it is noticeable that the Church is often more

of a social organisation than a spiritual agency. The same tendency manifests itself here—communities form themselves round a chief who is chosen by themselves or takes his place by reason of superior attainments. The South African native understands only one form of government—the personal dictatorship of one man. The democratic Churches, with their elaborate organisation, seem to them formless, while at the same time stirring in them the desire for freedom.

This unsettling tendency seems therefore an essential feature to all Protestant mission work ; but here I come back to a point from which we departed some time ago. The elevation of the moral character is, I take it, the legitimate aim of the Christian missionary. He must subordinate every other consideration to this. He may well interrogate himself as to his success when he finds that the most remarkable result of his work is an outburst of spiritual and mental arrogance—a sort of “hands off; we are just as good Christians as you and just as well qualified to run a Church” attitude. The culpability of this attitude is increased if the missionary statement be true (as I believe it is) that the secessionist Churches are not characterised by a high standard of Christianity, and that it is mostly a case of the blind leading the blind. There is a plucky attempt to make the best of things by saying that, after all, this change betokens an awakening in religious matters—a spiritual revival, doubtful in methods but genuine in origin. My own inquiries lead me to believe that this is pure optimism, and that the whole cause of the secession lies not in spiritual advance but,

first, in reversion from an individualistic to a modified communal form of social life; and second, in anti-white feeling, the birth of a morbid sense of injustice which had its origin in American propaganda, for it has no place in South African life. The political sense of the natives is highly developed; they have been accustomed to use their legal knowledge and powers of manœuvre for their own protection and advancement, and they will continue to do so; but unless the iniquity of a foreign rule had been demonstrated to them, the majority, even in parts of Cape Colony, would not have appreciated it. They have never enjoyed the privileges of a free democracy, and their grievances are not at present concerned with political rights. This loose, schismatic, apparently unimportant system of independent Churches is, however, the first successful attempt at any organisation outside tribal boundaries. It is a racial rather than a religious movement.

I have said that the Christian missionary must have heart-searchings as to the result of his work, but I say so only in the sense that he must regard the moral effects of Christian teaching in a new light and be a little less certain as to the development of native character under its influence. It is not to the influence of missionaries alone that the movement may be traced, nor are they the only people who have blundered or miscalculated. Believing with the Commission that Christian teaching alone can supply a necessary code of morals to the natives, one observes that so far the direct outcome of it has been a movement which is in

every sense inexpedient and certainly not conducive to a further elevation of character. This anomaly has been partially explained by showing the effects of Christian civilisation and the way in which it recoils.

It may not be out of place to draw attention to the fact that missionary influence is not entirely confined to Christian missions, for Mahomedanism has already its foothold in South Africa, and is showing signs of activity. There are some 23,000 followers of Mahomed in the south-western districts of Cape Colony, while all Northern and Central Africa hold by the Koran. Not long ago missionary *mullahs* were actually sent to South Africa from the Afghans, and there are other reasons to believe that Islam has an eye on the southern portion of the continent. In West Africa and even in Uganda Mahomedanism is spreading and, whatever its moral influence, there is no doubt that it may constitute a political danger, particularly if it succeeds in uniting various sections of the Bantu races in a bond of fanaticism.

There remains the consideration of a vexed point in missionary work: How far is it possible to separate religious and secular instruction? Is it possible to regenerate a man in sections, so to speak? Is not a true adjustment of the individual to his environment a necessary part of all conversion or regeneration? To take a native to England and bring him up as an excellent body-servant is of no use to him if his future life lies on a South African farm or in a native *kraal*. In Christianising the native, I think the clause in the Church of England catechism which enjoins content-

ment and usefulness in the sphere "to which it hath pleased God to call me" should not be forgotten, and that the building up of character on sound lines should be an essential and should precede any acceptance into a religious fold. This is a recognised policy with some of the most successful mission bodies, but it should be accepted by all, and would be by a majority but for the pressure from home, whence come most of the funds, and where a satisfactory tale of "souls gathered in" is an essential preliminary to a handsome subscription. The policy of placing industrial training in the forefront—almost before religious exercises, and certainly before doctrine—adopted with such good results by the German and Roman Catholic missions, is one that carries the whole white opinion (and support) along with it, and produces convergence, in place of divergence, in the high State aims, to be directed more and more by the people of the country, and not by theorists and idealists from outside.

CHAPTER III

EDUCATING THE NATIVE—TO WHAT END?

THE present system of native education is simply that of mission schools, under the control of the various religious bodies, assisted by grants from Government which are contingent on fulfilling certain conditions as to curriculum and inspection. The conditions, especially outside Cape Colony, are not exacting, and, if we are to believe the report of a commission in 1894 there was, even within the colony, considerable licence. The Government contributions began in Sir George Grey's time, and were especially meant to stimulate industrial training in the Transkei, lately the scene of Kaffir wars. The movement thus begun, although the pecuniary assistance dwindled, was from time to time reinforced by special provisions, as in 1865, when sums were voted to the aborigines and mission schools to promote suitable industrial training. Maintenance grants were given to apprentices in certain trades and to scholars employed out of school hours in some industrial occupation. These facilities for industrial training were increased in 1877 by grants in aid, supplementing salaries for teachers and making allowances for outfit.

At the present time Cape Colony spends over

£47,000 annually on native education out of a total expenditure of £200,000. The disproportion is less than it appears, since the £47,000 does not cover administration expenses ; but on the contrary (it is more marked when we remember that, roughly) sixty per cent. of the school children are classed as “coloured,” a term which covers natives of every shade. The rate per head is 15s.¹ compared with £2 to £4 per head spent annually on white education. The total contribution of the natives in direct taxation for Cape Colony is about £105,000, and the amount spent on their education does not seem therefore in any way unreasonable ; but no true estimate can be arrived at without some study of the comparative taxation of white and black, with which we must deal later. The Cape is by far the greatest spender on native education, Natal giving £7,000 odd, the Transvaal £5,000, the Orange River Colony £1,800, and Southern Rhodesia £154 only. A comparison of statistics shows that the amount contributed by the various Governments bears no true proportion to the number of scholars, the percentage of natives in school, or the taxation paid by domiciled natives, but is decidedly erratic. One fact alone is abundantly clear—no local contributions can be sufficient to support the present educational movement. Few native schools charge fees—perhaps only Lovedale does so systematically—and that because it offers advantages unique in South Africa and attracts natives from remote

¹ According to the Native Affairs Commission, 1904-5 ; the Cape Colony report for 1903-4 gives 13s. 1½d.

parts. Its present income from fees is about £3,000 per annum, and these range as high as £20 per head. Natives have also contributed at times towards their own school buildings, notably towards the offshoot of Lovedale called Blythwood, where £4,000 in voluntary contributions was raised at meetings held in the *veld*¹ almost entirely from Kaffirs who bore no outward sign of prosperity. A few natives have actually started schools of their own, either in connection with the separate Churches or those under Government supervision. But with these exceptions it is certain that the South African black man is contributing little directly towards the cost of his education and, the Government expenditure being obviously inadequate, it is evident that the education of the natives is being largely paid for by people in Europe or America. To the recommendation for making fees or rates compulsory we shall return later. Our next point of inquiry is the number of schools and the comparative position of white and black education.

In 1834 there were fifty missionaries in the Cape Colony, all more or less devoted to educational work; and as white schools of this period were carried on in the most casual manner, taught by discharged sailors and soldiers (with the exception of six Scottish teachers forming the only professional staff, who, with one exception, soon found other work), it is not surprising to learn that the aborigines were better provided for than their rulers. Nor was this con-

¹ The South African expression is "in," and not "on," the veld.

dition rapidly improved. In 1873 two-thirds of the State-aided schools were classed as "aborigines" or "mission," the latter being almost entirely native and the former exclusively so. Ten years later we find that 66 per cent. of the children at the day schools were African or coloured, and that less than one-third of the white children were being educated: a fact only modified by the still lower percentage of school-age natives enrolled—less than one-tenth. The latest Cape Colony reports show that, while the white schools have relatively increased in the last twenty years, there has been a steady falling-off in their proportions in the last ten, and they now form 51·5 per cent. of the total. There are over 33,000 more native than white children in school, and a striking feature is the extraordinary increase in black numbers in the last few years.¹

As for the estimated numbers of natives receiving education in the other colonies, they make a total of something over 28,400, which, added to the Cape figures (60,451), and those for Basutoland and Bechuana-land (11,484), makes a grand total of 100,000 in round numbers. A hundred thousand natives are being educated in South Africa—to what end?

The great fault of South African education schemes is that while so symmetrical on paper, in real life they bear a different aspect. The Cape Government had a

¹ Of a total increase of 6,936 since September, 1899, no less than 6,411, or 92·4 per cent., were native. The present ratio of native ("coloured" is the official expression, but the distinction between the use of the words native and coloured must be borne in mind in the general problems) to white pupils is 60·91 per cent., and the period of 1902-3 shows a distinct improvement, but considerable ground has to be regained to reach what seems to be the high-water mark of 42·00 per cent. of white pupils in 1894.

distinct idea that the native ought not to be given a purely literary training, and provided (on paper) for his industrial education. The commission of 1894 declared these provisions to be wasted, and set forth some of the practical difficulties which nullify them. Industrial training is little more than a pretty theory unless there be land to work on, materials to use, and qualified teachers to explain the use of them. A modified technical course is cheaper and has been partially introduced, but it does not meet the actual need, which is for industrial training pure and simple—a sort of trade apprenticeship. It is the educational value of the latter form of training, even its necessity, which makes the present system, by comparison, so unsatisfactory. Few mission schools have the equipment. The expense is very great, even for material wasted, in this country of dear wood and heavy freights. It is possible at such institutions as the Trappist mission in Natal to meet these conditions by the mixture of skilled unpaid white labour with that of the inexperienced black. Every trade is carried on independently within the mission; the lay brothers, drawn from the artisan and agricultural class of Europe, acting as instructors. A different method obtains at Lovedale, where two hours' work on farm or in shops is demanded from all students, a condition rather perfunctorily enforced. This spasmodic labour is of little use for practical purposes and cannot be regarded as satisfactory for training purposes. A certain number of industrial apprentices are taken in the trade workshops, but this part of the work is more an annexe to the

education system than an essential part of it. Other missions have done good work in agriculture, particularly in the Transkei, but these individual efforts are usually to be traced to the influence of some particularly strong and experienced man rather than to any fixed and general policy. The missions, moreover, are supported by people whose main interest is the spiritual advancement of the native and who are unable to appreciate the close connection between moral and physical training. Yet this connection is the point requiring emphatic recognition.

The general idea among the Afrianders is a vague one that the only education, moral or mental, needed by the native is one that will teach him to work. They remark that the chief aim of the missionary, on the contrary, is to teach him to pray; and the impartial observer, agreeing with neither of his premisses entirely, is inclined to think that the solution of the difficulty is only to be found in the principle "*Laborare est orare.*" But this implies a radical change not only in the native himself, but in the conditions of labour offered him, as we shall see in the next chapter. For the colonist and missionary alike what is most needed is a clear comprehension of the meaning of education and the conditions which make it essential to the progress of the country. The chief charge against the missionaries as educators—that they do not preach the gospel of work—may be true individually or even sectionally, but it must be laid to their credit that collectively they are providing all the industrial training the native gets, and that they

are, in fact, doing work which Africanders themselves ought to undertake. This question is a vital one in South Africa, and yet it is hardly in the hands of the colonists at all; and the fault is whose? Certainly not that of the missionaries who, after all, are responsible only to the bodies that send out and control them. He who pays the piper calls the tune, and if native educational policy in South Africa is largely dictated by the religious public at home who know nothing of local conditions, Africanders have no right to complain, since they have acquiesced in the arrangement and the remedy of making industrial training possible is in their own hands.

But even were they to enforce the recommendations of the 1894 Commission, and enable every native school to devote four hours of every school day to industrial work, while making literary education strictly elementary, should we be any nearer to an answer to our question—to what end?

What is to be the future of these hundred thousand natives who are acquiring in varying degrees the most important element in civilisation? Until that question is settled, until we know what paths are to be open, it is difficult to make any attempt at specialisation in their education. But, if we look at the matter from the broad point of view of character development, we can see our way more plainly.

American negroes have more than one theory as to the best education for their people, but the method which appears to be soundest in principle and happiest in practice is that adopted at Hampton and even more

at Tuskegee, and supported by the coloured leader Booker Washington, who is without doubt the leading man of African descent in the world to-day. It is notable that, so far as can be traced in his speeches, in the publications at Tuskegee, and in the maxims of that institution, he sedulously avoids any introduction of race antagonism, thus presenting a contrast to many men of his race who have become embittered by a sense of injustice. Booker Washington designs to elevate his race as a whole rather than to turn out brilliant individual students, and manual labour is an essential part of the course he prescribes. "We believe," said the 1905 Negro Conference at Tuskegee, "that our young people should be taught the fundamental industries—trades, agriculture, and household economy—regardless of their mental training." The following mottoes, which were put up round the walls of the Conference room, are so remarkable an exposition of negro aims that I quote them in full.

1. Pay your debts. Don't buy what you can do without.
2. Have a bank account.
3. Don't mortgage your crop.
4. Raise cotton, vegetables, pigs, cows, and fowls.
5. Raise meat enough for the year.
6. Don't loaf on Saturday.
7. Women and girls should be kept from loafing in the streets and public places.
8. See that your minister is not immoral.
9. Send your children to school.
10. Have a comfortable home, church, and school.

The most ardent negrophobe could not find any single point of objection in this programme, which simply aims at raising the people to a standard of self-respecting prosperity, not by literary attainment, not by political intrigue, but by industry, economy, and morality.

That all negro education in the Southern States is not based on these principles, and that the political and social problem there is intensely complicated, need not be reiterated here. But I am anxious to show that a section of the African race itself has evolved a system, in the truest sense educational, which bears out my contentions. They perceive that the only sound course to pursue is to elevate the masses of their race slowly but surely on sound economic lines. They look, no doubt, to an end which I am not prepared to grant is yet in sight—equality in the State; but meanwhile they adopt a course to which there is no legal or moral objection to be made, and which, if generally adopted, would eventually revolutionise racial relations in the political and economic world. The process would be slow, but it would inevitably be successful, since it has the elements of success within it. The prosperity and happiness of the individual negro cannot be regarded as complete for many generations, but each successive generation, if brought up on these practical lines, would have a fuller share in this world's goods, which go to make up happiness and prosperity, and would contribute in increasing ratio to the welfare of the community. I hear some cultured negro murmur the words "Unsatisfied aspirations." I must confess at once that,

with a race so naturally unpractical, so full of imagination and idealism as the African negro, it would be impossible to fill up an educational programme with materialism ; but I do not admit that any scheme which has for its basis the elevation of a whole race to a high level of mental, moral, and material civilisation is without opportunities for brilliant individuals, and I look to the establishment of race relations which will give them a wider range of usefulness and possibilities than they enjoy at present.

The South African native is not, as yet, very definite in his ideas. The next few years may mould him irrevocably. The importance of the present era is shown in various ways—by the birth of a spirit of religious independence, by the remarkable increase in school attendance, and by the desire, which is plainly evident in some sections of the country, to get education at any cost. A Cape Colony school inspector told me an instance of this from his own experience. A native family, squatting on a Dutch Africander farm, earned between them a small sum weekly for rooting up the prickly pear—the farmers' pest. Not being near any school, they paid the whole sum, their entire income, to a native teacher (a half-educated man from the nearest *kraal*) to act as tutor to their children, and they subsisted on what they could glean or (it is to be feared) steal. Interrogated on the subject, they were perfectly clear as to their motive, which was to give their children a better chance in the world. In the face of such a strong demand it is useless to make any attempt

to stop the tide of progress. If natives cannot get the education they demand in South Africa, they can and will go to America for it. Even at Tuskegee they are in the centre of a civilisation founded on principles differing from that of South Africa, and they are not qualified to discern the sham from the true. I have read a letter from a negro student to his brother in Cape Colony in which it was stated "black and white are alike here," and a casual acquaintance with a coloured American car-attendant might justify an even stronger expression from an inexperienced observer. A side of the question which has been little considered has been brought forward by a sound educationalist, Mr. Barnett, late director of education in Natal. He has remarked with truth the evil effects on the minds of white children resulting from contact with Kaffirs in a state of heathendom, and has urged that only educated and Christian natives, with some conception of European models of thought and conduct, should be entrusted with children in their early impressionable stage.

I am therefore strongly in favour of extending, instead of diminishing, the scale of native education, and, since a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, should like to see a zealous watch kept to ensure the efficiency of schools. Native teachers are badly needed, and the arrangements for providing them seem inadequate. The Cape Government pays a grant for students taking the teaching course, but it appears that many of them do not complete the necessary three years. A very important and useful

accessory to the elementary and industrial training would be found in a native college, in which all branches of higher education could be studied and standards established, special training for teachers being provided, towards which the student would be induced by academic rewards to attain.

I feel that native education ought to be specialised, that the mental development of the race is different to that of the Europeans, and that therefore a system which tries to assimilate all schools, white or black, to one pattern is doomed to failure. The native college should take the place of the Cape university as an examining body for native schools, and its curriculum as a teaching body should be on special lines. This would not militate against the preparation of students for professional examinations, and in time it might aspire even higher to obtaining faculties. It should be possible for a native to go through any course of education, professional or otherwise, without leaving his native land. A native college has been a favourite project of certain of the authorities, and was advocated by Mr. Sargant, late adviser in education to the High Commissioner. One of the main difficulties (characteristic of South Africa) is, not the decision as to the policy to be pursued, but a sectional jealousy which refuses to acknowledge any one place as most suitable for the purpose of a college for all South Africa. The place marked out by convenience, by the possession already of a large amount of the necessary "plant," and by the fact that it already attracts five hundred students

from all parts of South Africa (exclusive of local day scholars), is Lovedale; but the name stinks in the nostrils of many Africanders, who know nothing about it save through hearsay but are invincibly entrenched behind the barriers of prejudice. I am not sure whether the present political environment of Lovedale does not warrant some caution. The colonies which have not yet raised the Frankenstein monster of the black vote are naturally anxious to keep their folk from contact with their more emancipated brethren in the Cape. Still, Lovedale is there and might well be the foundation of a new departure in native education.

The most crying need as far as this subject is concerned is a more enlightened public opinion. I do not mean in these pages to give the impression that I deplore the efforts of missionaries or despise denominational teaching. The matter was one which would never have been taken up without the self-devotion of religious bodies and could not be carried on to-day without their co-operation. But the state of affairs in which the average white Africander (British as well as Dutch) regards native education with indifference or even with hostility, is unfortunately common and militates against both its success and its efficiency. It is impossible to conceive on what grounds any sensible man can disagree with the dictum of the Native Affairs Commission, that not only is there a "moral obligation upon the State to provide for the intellectual development of all classes," but that "there appear to be very

sound reasons of policy for the adoption of a liberal and sympathetic attitude towards the subject of native education." After showing that the advent of European civilisation has totally altered native life, and has removed the fields of activity natural to them, the commission goes on to say : " No policy can be complete or sound which is limited to political or economical considerations only, and which takes no account of the irrepressible forces within each individual. And it is evident that there is among the people themselves a growing desire for education which cannot and need not be suppressed." Having this clear lead on the subject, Africanders can no longer remain indifferent but must adopt some definite policy.

It is to be regretted that the Commission, probably because of its lay character as regards education, did not see fit to give a more definite shape to its recommendations. The curriculum of native schools, they suggest, should be considered by a committee of experts. An excellent proposal, emanating originally, I think, from an educationist of high standing, is the adoption of the native tongue and text-books in the lower standards, English to be taught as a language. Any one who has heard an elementary native class read, even from the simplest English text-books, must realise that it is largely time wasted as far as mental development is concerned. I heard one class read an "anecdote of Beethoven, the great composer." Hardly a word could possibly be explained so as to form a mind-picture to the unfortunate children.

The only other definite proposal is that natives

receiving education should contribute by rates or otherwise towards the cost. The principle seems right though, as has already been said, it appears almost impracticable in the face of the missionary character of school control. Probably the case will be met by the extension of taxation and by a system such as that provided for in the new Cape Education Bill, whereby if a "coloured" community satisfy the Education Department that they have a sufficient number of scholars and insufficient educational facilities, they may be formed into a school-board with rating powers (over the coloured section only), and will receive Government support in starting a public school. The Glen Grey Act provides the best basis for the financial and administrative control of independent native schools. The main point, however, is the recognition that the natives should not be debarred from educational advantages by any limitation of missionary efforts or abilities. Needless to say, everything depends, first, on the curriculum and second, on the inspection of such schools, and over these the Department must have entire control, as well as over the teachers.

It may seem unnecessary to dwell on details of administration when there is still no educational policy, but the growth of such a policy will probably be as unlike the symmetrical development of Cape education schemes (on paper) as the results of those schemes are in reality. While we are still uncertain what paths in life are to be open to natives, we may at least do the little we can on sound lines. Most Africanders

are confounding education as a theory with education (as they see it) as a fact, and the turning out of a number of half-literate people with the elevation of character—a mistake by no means confined to South Africa. Even the Commission, I think, is hardly justified in its strong language (with which I heartily agree) if its own position as to the meaning of education is as vague as the report indicates. Industrial training is to be stimulated by grants, carried on in workshops or on school farms ; “where possible,” and should receive the same measure of “general support” as elementary education ; but this method of treating the question suggests that industrial training is still to be regarded as a useful adjunct, instead of an essential feature, in any scheme for native elevation.

Compare this with the dictum of the Tuskegee conference, and see how much farther a section of the negro race has gone in understanding its own needs. I would not sanction in the smallest degree any form of education for the native which did not include manual labour, training in an industry or trade apprenticeship, as an essential part of its curriculum. I entertain no designs on the native as industrial material for European consumption ; a study of his character tells me that he needs this discipline just as much as moral and more than intellectual instruction. If this is true in the United States, where circumstances force the negro to work and where he has inherited a tradition of work, how much more in the peculiar conditions of South African life ! We are accustomed, in our own civilisation, to see

men working not only for a bare living, but for an ideal, for an ambition, for love of others, for mere pleasure—for a variety of motives. It is partly inherited instinct. Dwellers in a cold, inhospitable climate, which originally made labour a necessity, we have not been able to live without working. The native has to learn his lesson more or less vicariously. We have introduced him to it rather roughly ; as yet he regards it as a necessary evil. It is only by making it an educational process coinciding with his mental and moral development that we can really teach him the nobility of labour, and he has to begin on the bottom rung of the ladder.

This is an affair for the Africander ! He can no longer shirk the responsibility. He should work through the present system—parts of it are on these very lines—encourage it with a sympathetic and generous attitude, but stand firm on the principles. Very few of the hard-worked missionary bodies would resent a little intelligent interest in their work ; most would welcome it. But the Africander's duty does not end there. He must make industrial training possible and provide a stimulus for it. At present, while he is shouting that the native must be taught to work (and doing very little to provide the means for such instruction), he is actively opposing industrial training in some quarters by his opposition to the native workman. The fatal result will be to drive the educated native from the legitimate paths of progress into the shady byways of newspaper agitation and political intrigue, to create a disaffected, discontented

proletariat, and to stifle the incentive to labour on the part of the native on which the economic future of South Africa so greatly depends.

Education is essential, moreover it is inevitable ; but the method and its influence for good or evil have still to be decided by the Africanders.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE NATIVE

THIS book began with the question, "Is South Africa a white man's country?" We have now to consider one of the main factors which influence the reply to that question. The labour problem is one of the first considerations confronting European occupation. Either a country must be altogether suitable for white labour or it must possess an indigenous labour supply. South African conditions, as said already, are complicated by the fact that the native population, while rapidly increasing, is not to any appreciable extent driven to work by necessity, while the European is. At the same time the obligation to maintain his position as member of a ruling class makes it impossible for the white man, and still more the white woman, to be independent of the Kaffir. Moreover the economic conditions make unskilled white labour too dear—a luxury, in fact. Both on moral and economic grounds, therefore, the white man is forced to be dependent on the black. This situation, together with the character of the black population and their numbers, is to my mind an answer to the question whether South Africa is a true white man's country.

A great deal of abuse is poured on the native for

this attitude of his towards work, which makes him so independent of his white masters and renders them helpless in carrying out many schemes for developing the country. It has frequently been suggested that a "sturdy Dutch governor," like those of Java, would have extracted work from the natives and made the country an agricultural paradise like that favoured island. The Afrianders who use this illustration so glibly do not tell us how they would like to live under Dutch East Indian colonial government, with its autocratic methods, strict officialdom, compulsory military service, minute system of passports, and vexatious restrictions of many kinds. They do not understand the wide difference in the physical conditions of the two countries. They do not appreciate that a treatment which has kept the indolent, malleable Javanese quiet and contented, though poor and ignorant, might not have had the same effect on the more virile Bantu races. Last of all, they do not remember that, whatever may be the case in Java, the enormous numbers of the South African natives renders any attempt to rule them save by moral force exceedingly dangerous. I purposely refrain from giving any but the most practical objections to a theory which is only mischievous because it blinds people to their real interests.

Under the present *régime* the economic value of the native is still enormous. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no pressure sufficient to make him work continuously, he has, in fact, accomplished the vast bulk of the work which has made South Africa a

civilised country. It must also be remembered that, apart from the work done under European control, a vast amount of agriculture and stock-farming is carried on by natives, and that the food-supply of some four millions has to be raised on land which is by no means always fertile. The natural, hereditary occupations of the Bantu were fighting and hunting, and he led a strenuous life. It is well known that, in the case of some tribes, every action was regulated by a strict code of laws; marriage was not permitted until a certain age, and even then proof of vigour had to be given. The work in the *kraals* and gardens was relegated to the women, and despised as unmanly. The sudden change in conditions of life deprived the Bantu of his employment, and he could not immediately assimilate an entirely fresh theory of life. However, he soon became aware that, by bartering his liberty for a few months and working for the white man, he could earn a sum which, if invested in good, strong wives, would provide for the rest of his life the needs of his primitive *ménage*. It is not an edifying spectacle to see three white men contending for one Kaffir labourer, but that has been actually the state of affairs. The system of touting for labourers for the mines was peculiarly evil in its effects, and, though it has been done away with by the founding of a labour bureau,¹ the memory of it lingers with the black population.

¹ The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association controls the entire Kaffir labour supply, and co-ordinates State and commercial considerations, and is also in closest touch with oversea imported labour organisations and can use the latter to influence Kaffir labour, which is preferred if it can be got at a moderate price.

It is a fact worth noting that in certain districts habits of industry have already been formed; and it may interest those who still believe that missionary educative influence prevents the native from working, to know that this is specially the case in the Transkei—that well-worked field of missionary influence. In the year 1902 the resident magistrate of Butterworth reported that three out of every four able-bodied men had gone out to work in one way or another, and had the gold-fields been open more would have gone.

In judging the native we must also remember the conditions of the labour for which he is most needed. These almost invariably take him a journey of days or weeks away from his home, and there is no question of his family accompanying him. He is deprived of the support and companionship to which he is accustomed, is subject to home-sickness, and is often unable to get news from home. Then, if his work is underground, he has fears as well as physical dangers to face. The saying of the people is, "A man should not be put underground until he is dead." Whatever the sanitary or other conditions of this work, it is essentially repugnant to the Kaffir. Transvaal natives, indeed, are of little service as deep-level workers, and only the Portuguese natives, of more fragile build but with the authority of their chiefs to spur them on, undertake this work. It has been, I think, too often forgotten in the past that the Kaffir has very distinct ideas of comfort, decency, and cleanliness. They are not like our own, but they are quite as firmly rooted. A total disregard for them and a general

opinion that anything was good enough for a nigger, were characteristic of early days of Kaffir employment. That has been changed, and there are now mines to which the natives return time after time, while there are still others to which only the "raw hands" will apply.

The case for farm labourers presents different features, and the causes for the shortage in this department are more complicated. Agricultural and pastoral life are the natural conditions of the native, and ought to present no features of hardship. The Dutch claim that under their system they had little difficulty, and that without any actual slavery. It is to be doubted, however, whether some of their methods were economically sound. For instance, they favoured the method of obtaining labour by allowing squatters to settle on their farms who paid no rent, but worked for the owner and received in return the right to graze their animals and cultivate a mealie patch. In this way they probably got far more than the real value of the very desultory work they performed, but the land they occupied deteriorated with slovenly methods. They had no real inducement to improve. A similar system has been disastrous to the poor white population, originally poor relations of the farmers, now a class of town and country paupers.

The great difficulty of the farmer is to get regular and reliable labour at the seasons when he needs it. Few natives will work the whole year round—a drudgery which their character and present state of civilisation makes intolerable—and they probably choose to take

a holiday at the most important time in farming affairs, very likely because they desire to see their own harvest gathered in. The native also needs close supervision in all work connected with beasts or plants, but that he can become a really clever farmer has been proved by success in more than one district. Some experts, indeed, incline to the belief that he is the best all-round cultivator and that his method of "scratching the soil" is due to experience and not to laziness; and, judging from the amount of cattle in native hands until recent years, he must have some skill in stock-rearing.

A third branch of work in which the Kaffir is indispensable is that of domestic labour, and as this is a problem on whose solution depends the comfort of home life, and consequently the extension of European colonisation to a great extent, it is worthy of some consideration. There are the most divergent views as to the capacity of the Kaffir to be trained to service, but a general consensus of opinion that at present his vagaries, judged by European standards, render home life decidedly uncomfortable. I will put the case first from the Kaffir point of view. Probably he is unaccustomed to houses at all, knowing only the tin and wood hut of location life; he has certainly never seen the majority of the complicated implements with which he is expected to work. If he is young enough he picks it all up with a sharpness characteristic of the negro races at a certain age. The "piccaninni" is often a smart little chap. I have seen him wait at table with the gravity and precision of a

butler. But then come two terrible drawbacks. He is expected to keep regular hours—he, to whom time is merely a matter of feeling hungry or sleepy at intervals, and satisfying his natural cravings as they arrive. Location natives frequently dance all night, and those who are in service return to their places next morning as sleepy as owls. He is left alone for the best part of the day, or with another servant, perhaps of a different tribe, whom he detests. Any kind of company is, however, preferable to his own, for he has a terror of loneliness. Then he is liable to be punished and scolded for faults which he does not understand, and altogether he, or she, has many initial objections to get over before settling down comfortably. Exposure to temptation in contact with town life, a repression of natural tendencies which must escape some time—these are even graver sides of the question. On the part of the employer we find that labour spent on training is often wasted; either the servant is restless and leaves suddenly, or becomes stupid (as is often the case when a certain age is reached) or falls into bad habits.

The girls show a natural but objectionable disposition to ape their mistresses, and one is irritated as much as amused by such a spectacle as that of a housemaid airily emptying slops with a pail in one hand and the long train of her dress held up in another. As far as the outside observer can judge, the great fault of Kaffir servants seems to be that lack of self-respect which does good work for its own sake. The history of the Southern States shows that a couple of generations

of domestic training can produce really excellent servants, almost equal to the Chinese, whose marvellous memories are their great advantage over any others. One can therefore only encourage South African housewives with the thought that their work is not wasted, and may promote the happiness of future generations. This result is not assisted, as a rule, by the importation of white domestics, who are supposed to train the Kaffirs but are not qualified for a task which needs both brains and patience. Their example in despising menial work is not lost on their black subordinates and does not conduce to that elevation of labour which one desires to see. While it is natural for all who can afford the luxury to employ trained white servants, it would be much wiser and economically sounder if those who cannot afford the high rates of Europeans were to abandon their attempt to work with white material and try, with a little care and patience, to train native material. I have seen excellent results from this system, and many housekeepers declare that success may be obtained with a black staff where nothing but discord came from the mixture of black and white. Domestic training (needless to say not theoretical but practical), should be an essential part of the education of native girls and, as it is far easier to provide than the male industrial training, it is difficult to see why there is not already wide provision for it. The chief difficulty lies in polygamy, and the consequent value of the native woman, but the practice is on the decline. Why cannot native women be taught to wash?—Indian

coolies do it now, and at preposterous prices. The beginning has to be made in school, because that is the only place where one can "catch" the girl, for very few adult women will submit to a regular course of training. If they leave home it is to earn money. Something is being done in this direction, but not enough, and the results will not be satisfactory till such training is a recognised part of the character-development which we call education. At present the domestic service of South Africa (with the exception of Cape Colony) is almost entirely performed by men and boys, and the training of girls for this work would set free a large number of the male sex for occupations more suited to them.

The economic value of the native as a part of domestic machinery is therefore an undeveloped factor. At present it represents a good proportion of sheer waste. Badly done work is a waste to worker, employer, and State alike; and judging from results obtained elsewhere with similar material and individual successes (for I have met several Kaffir "treasures"), there seems reason to regard the subject hopefully. As a sphere of work which will on acquaintance prove congenial and lucrative, it should assist native progress, while the habits of civilisation acquired increase his economic value to the State as a purchaser, and the actual work done will not be measurable only by money value, since it will represent increased comfort to all classes of people.

These are the three great labour-markets: the mines (with which we may class public works, railways,

and road-making), agriculture, and domestic service. It is impossible to estimate correctly the actual demand in the last of the three, but, as noted elsewhere, the first two require 782,000 men, while the total number of South African natives who may be expected to be in work at the same time is only 474,472, leaving a shortage of 307,528. The deficiency would be much larger were not the mine-labourers recruited from outside British territory. Taking the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia together only twenty-five per cent. of the labourers are natives of the colonies, and in the Transvaal mines actually only fifteen per cent. The number of workers is less than 300,000 out of a population of over 4,000,000; though we must not forget that the non-employed are not necessarily idle but are often small cultivators or stock-farmers.

The great reason for the inadequacy of the labour supply is found in the rapidity of the growth of the mining industry, which has not been met by a similar development of a class dependent on it for daily bread. The demand far exceeds the supply, and while the native remains in his present condition there is nothing to drive him into the labour market. It is the absence of incentive which is the great deterrent, and there are only two ways in which this stimulus can be supplied.

The first method may be roughly called that of compulsion. It includes such steps as increased taxation or labour taxes, restriction on land purchase, the suppression of polygamy and other native customs. These must be considered separately in their bearing on the condition of the native, but there is evidence

to show that from the economic point of view any such method is unsound. The effect of increased taxation in country districts has, ere now, caused an exodus of much-needed rural labourers to city locations, where higher wages can be obtained in more desultory occupations than that of agricultural labour. As for any method of labour taxation, in the form of a remission to workers, it has not been found practical so far, being the one provision of the Glen Grey Act which was allowed to remain inoperative. To work any such taxation effectively there would have to be, first, a system of discrimination between those able and those unable, for physical or domestic reasons, to go out to work ; and second, an elaborate sliding scale, adapted according to local circumstances and rising (if it is to be effective) to a height in some districts which would make collection a matter of serious grievance. The question of land tenure, which is a basic one, cannot be discussed here, but as to its bearing on this particular problem it may be said that the increase in the number of natives who are crowded off the land may add to the urban population, but hardly in the direction of providing a steady, industrious proletariat to feed the labour-market. The principle of compulsory labour, whether directly or indirectly enforced, is in fact economically unsound, because it affords only and artificial an temporary stimulus which might be at any time relaxed and would be difficult and probably expensive to maintain. The second method seems to have more in its favour, and may be described as a policy of

inducement. First and foremost in this policy comes that educational scheme already outlined, in which the habit of work is considered as essential as the habit of wearing clothes or saying prayers. Second, I advocate an improvement in the conditions of native work and attention to the safety and comfort of labourers both in travelling to their work and in performing it. These two measures involve an improvement in the conditions of life of the native, and therefore an increase in his needs, which is the most important factor in inducing him to labour. An essential feature must be the opening of the more skilled branches of trade to all who can qualify.

It is impossible to induce any people to abandon an independent pastoral existence in favour of a dependent industrial one, unless we offer some substantial rewards. In the field of labour the only possible reward is the chance to rise in the scale, and by closing all the avenues to skilled labour we are deliberately losing one of our best aids in creating a steady, industrious black labour supply. The rise in the scale of labour would bring with it increased wants and spending capacity and act as an automatic stimulus to more work. It would also cheapen the cost of production in South Africa and make more possible that dream of local industries which the coast colonies wish to foster as the United States and Canada have done. One reads of the manufacture of furniture, waggon, candles, soap, woollen cloth, and the like, all industries which demand a certain degree of skilled labour but cannot afford to pay such wages as the white artisan must

get in South Africa, if he is to live as one of a ruling caste. In the building trade it is notorious that black workmen are being debarred from any but the roughest work, although the result is to make a decent house a luxury and to encourage an era of corrugated iron architecture. The economic value of native labour will remain an unrealised asset in South Africa until it is given fair play, until the welfare of a majority of the Europeans is no longer subservient to that of an organised few, and until we abandon the fallacy of calling South Africa a true white man's country.

There is, at present, one trade to which the educated negro turns and which is open to him. I refer to that of printing. Natives make very fair compositors, and there is a great demand for them in Cape Colony in this capacity—a somewhat illogical circumstance when we remember that they are not encouraged as stonemasons! From the compositors' room they sometimes go up the ladder till they land in the editor's chair, for the number of native newspapers is increasing. The lower branches of the Civil Services are partly filled by natives or coloured men, and there are some in very good positions. In the professions of law and medicine there is at present little development, for the highly educated native is as yet a *rara avis*. There seems no reason why these professions should not afford legitimate outlets for the ambitious individuals, where they would certainly be more useful among their own people than in forming secessionist Churches or founding native

papers which breathe a bitter anti-white spirit. The pure-bred native is less usual in these professional avocations than the coloured man of many shades, whose position must be discussed later.

A side of the labour question which should not be overlooked is the effect on the native mind and character of the work he is called on to perform. The removal from home influences and restrictions is a two-edged weapon. It lifts him to a different plane of civilisation, in which responsibility, as well as property, is recognised individually, instead of communally, but at the same time it deprives him of moral safeguards and frequently leads to deterioration. Whoever has seen the Bantu salutation, with its free majestic gesture of the arm, straight up before the face, and heard the sonorous accents which accompany it, regulated in form by the strictest etiquette, must regret the laxity of manners engendered by association with a less formal civilisation which exchanges this picturesque greeting for a cursory nod or touch of the cap. Native chiefs complain that their young men returning home treat them with scant respect, and too often the transition-stage is simply from a code of pagan morality to one of no morality at all. Apart, therefore, from the increased value of a native labourer whose character has been steadied and intellect developed by *the right sort of education*, there is a strong necessity that all men who are called upon by economic necessities to step outside their tribal or communal jurisdictions should be given a fresh chart by which to steer their way. It is at once a moral and an

economic necessity, for we want the South African native, in our own interests as well as theirs, to develop on the best and not the worst lines, to be a better black, not an imitation white.

I have spoken of progress already made in certain districts by independent Kaffirs. This has been made evident by the amount of land purchased by them, largely for private occupation, though frequently bought in the name of a syndicate. A quarter of a century ago there were few native land-owners in Cape Colony and Natal; now they exist in great numbers. The capacity to purchase has greatly increased, and they acquire land at prices above the ordinary market value, for they can farm profitably where a European working on a small scale would starve.

A great deal of the present labour difficulty is traced to the war; but although, by offering employment at rates artificially stimulated to a large number of men, the war operations certainly increased existing difficulties, they can hardly be said to have created them. By transport riding and other kindred means the natives gained, by methods more congenial than the ordinary labour offered them, large sums of money. The agricultural districts, especially, were depleted by the army, and the farmers complain that the scant courtesy with which the military sometimes treated them brought contempt upon them from their native workers. These are obviously only temporary conditions. Few natives know how to invest money, and what they earn is soon spent. Wives are getting

very expensive; habits acquired have to be indulged by the use of imported foodstuffs or household gear.

The influence of the Church separatist movement on the labour problem is as yet in its infancy, but already the exhortation is being given to "work only for oneself, not for the white man." The obvious answer is that the native works for wages which he spends on himself and that all this work is voluntary. A higher conception of his own position as an economic factor in South African development can hardly be expected at this stage of affairs, nor have we any right to expect, at any time, a more altruistic standpoint than we are prepared ourselves to adopt.

Cheap and reliable labour is an essential to South Africa. It is being got for a certain industry by importing Asiatics, but this does not solve the problem; it only staves it off for a time. I can see only one legitimate permanent source of cheap labour, and that is the native peoples. In order to induce them to take part in the general development we must either show them that they have something more to gain than a slight increase of income—which does not mean any real increase in their comfort, since they have all they need already—or, failing this, we must reduce them to a state of poverty and misery in which they will be forced to accept any, even the most distasteful, work. The latter course would need systematic pressure, and would lead to discontent and revolt; the former can be effected by a cumulative process, if we set the ball rolling in the right direction, and will lead to stability and contentment.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS AND REALITIES

WE are gradually working downwards in this book towards the bed-rock of the whole racial situation in South Africa. The political question underlies much that we have already considered, but before discussing its probable future it is necessary to understand how lacking in uniformity is the present system.

In the Protectorates (Basutoland and Bechuanaland) the natives have not been disturbed in their tribal form of government, except that legislative power is centred in the High Commissioner. The system is extremely simple and works admirably. A tax is paid, responsibility rests on headmen and chiefs, and the work of education is carried on by missionary bodies assisted by grants-in-aid from Government. In the Crown Colonies (the Transvaal and Orange River Colony) there is a Minister for Native Affairs who sits on the Executive, and in the self-governing Colonies (Natal and Cape Colony) two different systems obtain which illustrate how widely apart may be the views of men who have equal right to settle their own affairs. In Natal the Governor is paramount Chief of all natives and has powers not vested in any other similar official in South Africa. The Administrator

of Rhodesia occupies a similar position, but his powers are more limited, since in Natal alone can the native be called on for compulsory labour. The franchise is open to natives in Natal, with the special qualifications of twelve years' residence, seven years' exemption from native law, a certificate of good character, and the consent of the Governor; but as only two voters have availed themselves of this privilege, it is evident that the provision is practically inoperative. The Cape Colony and Rhodesia give the franchise on a low property qualification and a nominal education test, and there are no special terms for natives; but it is only in the Cape Colony, where the process of education and civilisation has been at work for a long period, that the native voter has become a serious political factor. In 1903, out of 135,168 registered voters there were 20,718 non-European, of whom 1,213 were not South African natives. The remaining 19,000 odd were made up of Kaffirs, Fingoes, and Hottentots, to the number of 9,000, and of 10,000 "others," a term used to cover the many shades of colour not included in the purely native races.

It is seen at a glance therefore that, except in the Cape Colony, the natives have practically no direct representation, and that even there the bulk of native voters are not pure-bred. The political power acquired by the non-European voter at the Cape is such as not only to influence elections but even to turn the balance in certain constituencies and affect a general policy, so that the white people of the Colony may some day find themselves governed by a majority which owes its

election to the native vote. The position is not one to be viewed with equanimity, for it must be remembered that the present voting list represents only a small portion of the potential mass of voters and that the rapid progress of education and prosperity among the natives increases this potential mass year by year.

It is at once evident that such diversity in the political conditions of life among subject races akin to each other is likely, in view of increased communications and improved education, to lead to serious effects. Moreover, the federation of the South African colonies is retarded by their disagreement on this vital question of policy. The late republics made it one of the conditions of surrender that no franchise should be granted to the natives while the period of Crown colony government lasted, having little fear as to what would happen when they once more have a voice in their own legislation. Only one suggestion deserving serious consideration has yet been publicly made as to unifying the system of native government, and that is the one which received the imprimatur of the Native Affairs Commission, but is to be found in outline in a pamphlet published two years ago by Mr. Rose Innes of King William's Town in Cape Colony.

The Commission puts the case in a nutshell. "It is certain that throughout South Africa the Europeans will not tolerate in any legislature a ministry dependent upon a majority consisting of members owing their seats to a native electorate," and therefore in devising

a policy suitable for all parts of South Africa they were obliged to limit existing rights in the Cape and Rhodesia and extend them in other parts, with the design of making extremes meet. The *via media* suggested is based on that adopted by New Zealand as regards the Maories. Natives are to have electoral districts distinct from those of Europeans, and are to vote for their own members, who will sit in the legislatures on the same terms as other members. The number and qualification of members to be so elected is to be settled by the legislature of each colony, and the arrangement is to be adopted as each attains responsible government.

It is claimed that this will not deprive the Cape Colony natives of any rights they at present possess, and will open the path to natives in other colonies without unduly offending the susceptibilities of the white people. This resolution, which was unanimous, is undoubtedly the result of the united wisdom of some of the best-informed men in South Africa, but it must not be forgotten that the object of the Commission, in the circumstances, was to effect a compromise. It is open to doubt whether the results, as published to the world, do not represent rather what was regarded as most possible than most desirable. One of the most objectionable features of the present system is the touting for votes by white men among the native electors. The suggested method may remove that feature from the constituencies, but it will be reproduced in the House itself. The New Zealand experiment is not apposite as regards South Africa,

in the one case a dwindling race numbering only 43,000 against some 800,000 whites, in the other a virile and rapidly increasing population of already over four and a half million natives and only one and a quarter million Europeans. The unequal distribution of the native population in South Africa is a point not to be lost sight of, ranging as it does from one white to three blacks in Cape Colony and the Transvaal, to one to eleven in Natal, and one to fifty in Southern Rhodesia.

A desire has been expressed in many quarters that the Commission had taken itself a little more literally, and had displayed more courage in dealing with the awkward aspects of the question. The spirit of compromise pervades South Africa at the present moment, but what we want in dealing with native affairs is to go to the bed-rock, and introduce a policy which has an element of finality about it. No one who is conversant with South African opinion will believe that there is finality in any scheme which is not founded on certain principles on which compromise is ultimately impossible.

One of these principles—a fundamental one—should be clearly and courageously faced. In a land where white and black live together the white must be the predominant race. There can never, will never, be any question of equality, social or political. Lord Milner has expressed his views on the subject. "I think that to attempt to place coloured people on an equality with whites in South Africa is wholly impracticable, and that, moreover, it is in principle wrong. But I also hold that when a coloured man possesses

a certain high grade of civilisation he ought to obtain what I may call 'white privileges' irrespective of his colour." We must rule the black races or leave them to rule themselves. What student of American history can doubt that this is the truth? It may be repugnant to our theories of democracy, it may not square with that noble sentiment about "equal rights for all civilised men." These are counsels of perfection. With these in view we may invent a series of compromises to deceive ourselves and the people we deal with. We may give them rights with one hand and snatch them back with another; we may present them with the husk and keep the kernel. The root of the matter is whether we can regard the black man as in every way the same as ourselves if he is proved our intellectual and moral equal, and here there will always be a mental reservation. The thing is impossible. We had better face it now, and let him face it too. I am inclined to think that the Commission would have done well to begin from this standpoint, which is the only permanent one in South Africa, and from it to have built up their scheme for the welfare of the natives.

At this point we feel bound to ask ourselves whether the Commission has really been considering the welfare of the natives alone, without regard to existing political exigencies. If so, it is noteworthy that it finds that in the Protectorates and in the Crown Colonies the interests of the natives are adequately protected, an opinion with which most observers will agree. Any one having a practical acquaintance with the conditions of native life and character in Basutoland,

Bechuanaland, or under Crown Colony government in other parts of our Empire outside South Africa, is at liberty to compare those conditions with the state of affairs in the Southern States of America. The greatest enemy of negro progress and happiness is that sham spirit of democracy which has no foundation in nature, and which was allowed to run rampant in the reconstruction period of American history. The best type of American negro to-day is striving hard to eradicate from his race the evil influences and the poisonous principles implanted during that period and kept alive ever since by politicians and demagogues. Driven to extremes, the white population of the South shows us the terrible spectacle of a people who have lost all sense of justice, and even of humanity, in a desperate resolve to redress the balance upset after the Civil War. It is quite impossible to form any opinion on the negro problem in one continent without remembering its development in another, and the more so when we remember that there has recently been a *rapprochement* between the leaders of the negro race in Africa and America, and that the influence of the latter is making itself felt in several ways. It must be supposed that the Commission had some knowledge of the failure of the American attempt to place black and white on a political equality before they devised their present scheme, which practically acknowledges the impossibility of so doing.

The suggestion of native electoral areas and of complete severance of natives and European voters is a half-way house between the democratic principle

and that obtaining in British Protectorates. In Crown Colonies the system varies, and considerable rights have been granted in some of these, though always under the direction and control of Governors and officials appointed by the Crown. The system proposed bears no resemblance to that of any Crown Colony ; but it is conceivable that, had the Commission not already to face the existence of a native electorate in Cape Colony, they might have pronounced in favour of some scheme which, while adequately protecting and promoting the interests of natives, would clearly define their position as a subject race. I hear a cry of horror at such a suggestion, but why not be honest with ourselves ? We feel no such squeamishness in governing India. Having clearly established our position as regards "rights," we could afford to be generous with "privileges"—far more generous than we are at present, as I shall show later on. It is, in my opinion, the acknowledgment that the negro race has a *right* to share in government which is the danger. As a matter of fact it is a conquered race which has no political rights save those we concede it, and despite all fine language this is the basis on which we deal with it. The right of justice, of humanity, of protection from oppression, the right to learn and to apply that learning to the betterment of his position—these are the rights which our South African subjects share with many others of different races. Are we bound to give them more ?

It may be argued that the suggested compromise will satisfy the natives, while the presence of one or

two native-elected (and perhaps native-born¹) members in the colonial Parliaments will be innocuous. But how long will a system which (from the colonial point of view) is innocuous satisfy the natives? Their ambitions will be fed, their views enlarged. They will find a way in the not too clean paths of Parliamentary life to make their influence felt, and there will ever be the temptation open to leaders of parties to secure this alien vote by concessions. We may see one member (the native member) elected by a number of votes equalling the whole electoral strength which went to elect the rest of the House. Will this disparity suggest fair dealing to the native voter, who is encouraged in political ambitions by the mere fact of possessing the franchise? On the other hand, will a solitary member, or even several members, of no particular status in the House be able to exert any real influence for the advancement of native interests unless he sells himself at political crises to the party in power? Will he be able to protect and promote the welfare of his own people?

I have always held that for a subject race no more unfortunate position can be found than to be at the mercy of a political party; even if the general native policy were outside party politics, there are a host of minor matters which require to be dealt with in a spirit of foresight and responsibility, which is notoriously lacking in colonial Parliaments. An inevitable result of the creation of native electoral areas will be the rise of native members. It will be

¹ The Commission does not touch this thorny subject.

increasingly difficult to get good white men to stand as “nigger” members, while the incentive to negro ambition will be strong. The South African native is a born politician. Colonials naturally do not wish to see an Irish vote in their Parliaments; but the position which would be occupied by native members would in more than one respect resemble that of the Irish party at St. Stephen’s, and the result would certainly be inimical to white and black interests alike.

The alternative to any such scheme is to do away with the franchise in the Cape and Rhodesia, or, at all events, to make special qualifications for the native voter on such a high basis as to exclude all but a few. The latter course would be only another compromise. The former has a drastic character, and in the present state of Cape politics would obtain little support from either party, though it would meet with the approval of almost every Colonial as an individual. We have a natural reluctance to tamper with rights already bestowed, although in this respect we have a recent example in the most advanced of democracies, where a State has taken away the whole municipal powers from its principal city and vested them in a Commission. It would not, however, be impossible to ensure the gradual elimination of the native voter, without actually depriving any one of his rights, by simply closing the registration lists. It must be admitted that this course would require courage, but I do not believe it would entail any serious danger at the present stage of affairs, especially if accompanied by the enunciation of a more liberal policy in other respects.

A very important point is the demarcation of colour. In Cape Colony the shading between white and black is almost indefinable. The Commission recommends that the word "native" shall be taken to mean an aboriginal inhabitant of Africa south of the Equator, and to include half-castes and their descendants by natives. The work of a registration officer under this regulation will be extremely complicated, but some such definition, which clearly draws the line between natives and coloured people with a predominance of European blood, was necessary. The Cape franchise is at present extended to Kaffirs, Fingoes, Hottentots, Indians, Malays, Chinese, and "others," the "others" being, as we have seen already, in the majority. Each colony has a different interpretation of the word "native," but that suggested would leave out a large proportion of the "other" (coloured) people, who would thus have political rights among their white neighbours. Without a background of ignorant black voters, whom they can sway, these coloured members of the body politic will be un-influential and harmless; and as they are some of the most advanced and enlightened of those now classed as native voters, the fact that the new definition of the word "native" leaves them undisturbed in their electoral rights is an argument in its favour. It would also smooth the path of him who had the courage to deprive the "native" voter of the franchise altogether. The coloured and the pure native races in South Africa are by no means at one with each other.

Briefly, these are the principal drawbacks to the scheme of native representation proposed. In the first place, the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will never adopt any compromise which concedes the principle that the native should take part in the government of the country. If the creation of electoral areas does not mean this it means nothing at all. Secondly, it is by no means certain that the measure of representation proposed would satisfy the natives, or that it could be regarded as a final solution of the problem, being too much of the nature of a compromise. Thirdly, will the native members, or native-elected members, be strong enough to secure the interests of their constituents while remaining harmless from the colonial point of view? If the native should obtain representation and a share in representative government he will be deprived of certain safeguards he enjoys under the direct surveillance of the Crown, and yet it is not proposed to give him proportional representation or any real control of affairs.

While I am opposed to any extension of native suffrage, and would even prefer to see it abolished, I am by no means desirous of shutting the door of progress in the faces of my black fellow men. I believe that on a basis which would for ever settle the supremacy of the white race it would be possible to be far more liberal and consistent in our treatment of the natives in such matters as education, taxation, the ownership of land, and labour.

There is no question of any hasty decision on this subject, but in the near future the necessity of legis-

lation must arise. The Cape Colony will be the first to feel that necessity. At present a curious condition prevails there. The Dutch party, which under ordinary circumstances would be bitterly opposed to any extension of the native franchise, and has been apt to regard the present state of affairs as the legacy of interfering home politicians egged on by Exeter Hall, is now adopting a negrophile attitude, and the native, believing the Progressive party to be under capitalistic influence and unfavourable to them, is actually turning to the Bond. With the return to power of that body, which will inevitably occur when the disfranchised burghers are restored to the lists, it will be interesting to see what course will be taken, especially in view of the hoped-for federation between the Cape Bond, the Transvaal *Het Volk*, and the Orange River Colony *Volks Vereeniging*. The last two, needless to say, are strongly opposed to any recognition of native "rights."

The attitude of practically all magistrates and other officials living among the natives, of a majority of farmers, and of not a few missionaries, is one of unmitigated dislike and distrust of the present political system in Cape Colony, but all agree that some method of representation in Parliament is necessary to safeguard native interests. The best scheme I have seen formulated comes from a practical Transvaal politician,¹ and probably represents a very general, though vague, idea of a possible solution of the difficulty which escapes the objections I have raised against the proposal of the Commission.

¹ Mr. Raitt, a prominent member of the Johannesburg labour party.

Briefly, this is the establishment of a native Parliament with elected representatives, presided over by a Minister for Native Affairs, who would act as intermediary, and present the views of the native body to the colonial Parliament. Obviously this amounts only to a committee or debating society, with no legislative or administrative functions, and as such would not meet the desires of the small minority of really educated and ambitious natives, while it might have a deleterious effect in rousing political ambitions among the masses. Its weakest point is that it makes no practical provision for safeguarding native welfare, and leaves too heavy a weight of responsibility on the shoulders of the minister, who would presumably be a party politician. This unfortunate person, between his white and black Parliaments, would be between the devil and the deep sea.

All schemes for compromise are equally unsound. That of the Commission is, naturally, the best thought out and most workable that has been presented. It is suggested that it might be adopted in Cape Colony as the lesser of two evils compared with the present system. I consider this point of view fallacious. At present it is always possible by raising the standard to admit to the franchise only natives with some pretence to civilisation, and their number will increase but slowly. The immediate granting of the franchise, even though it could be exercised only for a "native member" and in "native areas," at once bestows on a large population a "right" which will stimulate a desire for more, plunges them into a political arena,

and creates appetites and interests which cannot be as easily satisfied as is usually supposed.

Although it is by no means my intention in this book to devise panaceas for all the difficult problems I am trying to present, but rather to endeavour to show plainly the issues which Afrianders have to deal with, yet I cannot refrain from postulating some of the features which are in my opinion essential to a successful native policy. I have laid down the fundamental principle that the white must be the ruling caste. I do not for a moment pretend to regard this as a final pronouncement on the position of the black races, but it is sufficient for the present. No other basis of racial relations comes within the range of practical politics in South Africa to-day. It lies with the black races themselves whether in a century or so it will be necessary to revise this decision. The second principle I should like to see acknowledged is that native affairs should cease to form part of a political platform.

It has been suggested that to secure this there should be in every colony a department with permanent officials and policy, if not a permanent head. It is possible to secure this in principle even under a party system, as witness our own Foreign Office, where, it is abundantly evident, no change of Government actually affects the continuity of policy. But the case is not quite on all-fours with the one we are considering, since foreign affairs in reality interest the British elector very little, whereas the black question is a domestic and the vital one in South Africa. Still there is strong reason for regarding a permanent native

department as a possibility. Even in the United States, in which a permanent officialdom has been regarded as contrary to the spirit of democracy, it is now being recognised that in certain departments continuity is absolutely necessary to ensure efficiency. The self-governing colonies may therefore contemplate, without fear of belying their democratic constitution, the creation of departments under heads who would not be subject to party influences. The actual position of the Minister of Native Affairs, as chief of this department, would be one of great responsibility, and it would be necessary to vest in him considerable power. Probably he might with advantage hold the position of Paramount Chief to all tribes in his colony. His department would be organised with a special view to giving the natives—what they value and understand far better than any representative system—a personal contact with the man who controls their destinies and full opportunities for ventilating their grievances. Notwithstanding these advantages his position as member of a Government without direct responsibility as to general policy suggests obvious difficulties, and there are objections to a system which would, in effect, increase the departments and officials of colonies already somewhat overburdened by governmental machinery. Moreover, there would remain the purely native territories which are still directly under the Crown, and which would gain little by coming under the colonial departments. Nor is it to be supposed that such a system of government would meet the wishes either of those natives who have

been accustomed to regard themselves as under the direct protection of the Crown, or those who have already tasted political power. It is purely departmental and neither representative nor paternal government, and depends for its efficiency very largely on the temper of the Colonial Governments. Even this alternative would be preferable to the impossible one of giving the natives proportional representation. It is better to have a genuinely capable and zealous department which has a reputation at stake than a nominal representation, not likely to attract men of influence, impotent in Parliament, and having no weight of responsibility because it has no real power.

A delicate side of the subject, and one which must be dealt with later, is the relation of the natives and their minister to the Throne. No self-governing colony would consent to the presence in their Parliament of a minister who held office from the Throne and not from them, and yet in the case of British subjects who are not enjoying representative government the Throne is directly responsible.

A suggestion which has received some attention is that a Federal Bureau for Native Affairs should supersede the colonial departments, and might even precede the federation of the South African States. The Federal Governor, it is suggested, might be head of the Bureau and Paramount Chief of all the natives. This would not, however, meet the objections (already noted) to any purely Africander form of government which arises out of the relations between the Throne and its black protectorates and dependencies. Nevertheless,

with such a terrible problem to face, it ought not to be impossible to devise some means of providing, first, for the recognition of the principle that the white race must rule in South Africa, and, second, that the black race must be granted white privileges as an incentive to rise, and must be secured a government free from party influence, paternal, continuous in policy, simple and direct in form.

I have said that this is a South African question, and Lord Milner has placed it on record as his belief that "nothing could be worse in principle or more unfortunate in its results than to attempt to influence the solution of it, even in a right direction, by external pressure." How is it possible to reconcile this view with the one I have just expressed as to Imperial responsibilities? It must not be forgotten that this problem of the control of subject races is no isolated one, but is exercising the advanced nations in various parts of the globe. It is useless to work out any solution for South Africa which does not take into account this world development and more particularly the future of the empire as a whole. If we derogate any portion of the Imperial duties in bearing the White Man's burden to our oversea kinsmen, we must face the logical conclusion and they must realise what they are undertaking. I have outlined a scheme, which finds favour with many Afrianders, whereby they may fit their shoulders better for the burden, but I reserve for a future chapter an alternative which seems to me to take a longer and a broader view of the needs of the situation.

CHAPTER VI

SHALL THE NATIVE OWN THE LAND?

TAKING a still deeper view of the black problem in South Africa, we find that beneath this question of political rights lies that of land tenure. After all, to a people like the Bantu races the land is the first consideration. Let us see what the conditions of native occupation of land in South Africa are. First, they live in reserves set apart for them, which in many cases are their ancestral lands. In Natal these are vested in a Native Trust, except in the greater part of Zululand, which is dealt with by the Crown. In the Cape Colony, Transvaal, Orange River Colony, and the Protectorates, the reserves are vested in the Crown, and in Rhodesia in the Chartered Company. The tenure on these reserves is (generally speaking) communal, and the land is inalienable, though there is a steady influx of Europeans into these territories for trading purposes. Second, they live on lands privately owned, where they are given locations for which they pay rent in labour or in cash. Under this description must be included a large class of squatters who are also found on Crown lands, and, owing to the precarious nature of their tenure and their haphazard mode of life, are a serious problem. It is difficult, moreover, to make

an actual distinction between a squatter and a labour tenant. Whether on Crown or private lands the former has free water and grazing rights, and is liable to pay rent and poll tax. There are also living in Rhodesia, on land unreserved and unalienated, a number of natives who are liable to be removed at any time. Third, a certain number may hold land on individual tenure in the Cape Colony, Natal, and Rhodesia (under varying restrictions), and in the Transvaal they can acquire land unreservedly on individual tenure, if registered in the name of a native commissioner, while in the Orange River Colony they may not purchase or lease land at all.

It must be noted that only in the Cape Colony is the conversion of communal rights into individual tenure possible, the Glen Grey Act being the instrument effecting this. The special feature of this act was legislation whereby the communal system could be gradually superseded by individualism, and the result has been generally satisfactory and will be the basis of future policy. A check is provided by the necessity for the Governor's consent to alienation, and by the provisions for forfeiture in case of rebellion, conviction for theft, non-beneficial occupation, or non-payment of certain liabilities. Outside these communal areas there is in the Cape Colony no bar to the acquisition of landed property by natives, for, though certain restrictions have been made, they are surmountable. This, however, is not the case outside that colony. The recent test case brought before the Supreme Court of the Transvaal revealed the true state of affairs there. No

legal restriction can be exercised now, or could be under the South African Republic, over land purchase by natives, and the provision as to registration in the name of a native commissioner would be a farce but for the fact that he has in the past undoubtedly exercised (quite illegally) a restrictive discretion. The clear exposition of the legal aspect led to a great deal of alarm among the land-owners of the Transvaal, and an ordinance has been passed (1905) to give authority to the custom requiring registration in the name of the commissioner; but no permanent legislation is possible until the Representative Government comes into being, when the whole question of land tenure must be raised. The increase in native population, as well as the progress of natives in civilisation and wealth, makes it necessary to contemplate some readjustment in the conditions. There is a general consensus of opinion among the best-informed Afrianders that individualism is a great incentive with the natives to progress and also to loyalty. At the same time there is a strong feeling against any system by which land may be bought indiscriminately and occupied by natives, possibly in a district owned almost entirely by Europeans. In the case of municipalities a further difficulty arises, since in offering inducements to men to build houses they give certain guarantees against deterioration of the property. The presence of a black family in an adjacent plot or estate would be sufficient to lower the value of the land at once.

The crux of the question is whether the native should be left free to expand, according to his desire

and ability, or whether he should be for ever restricted. After an exhaustive study of this question the majority of the Native Affairs Commission decided in favour of the last view—probably that of a considerable number of Afrianders—and are therefore in the anomalous position of advising a general extension of the native's political power on the one hand and a diminution of his individual privileges on the other. As the native has never had the franchise—except in a restricted sense in Cape Colony—he would hardly miss it. But he has had land from time immemorial, not on individual tenure but still communally, with every power of expansion if he and his tribe desired, and in certain sections of South Africa—notably the Cape Colony—he has been able under British rule to acquire land freely. The truest welfare of the native races is bound up with the land, and the best hope of South Africa is to make them a successful agricultural and pastoral people and to attach them to the soil.

The proposal of the Commission is, of course, a compromise. Natives are to be encouraged in their individualistic tendencies, so must be allowed to secure permanent rights in the communal areas and to purchase or lease land outside these areas, but they must not have free choice as to the latter. The lands which may be sold to natives must be set apart as reserves by each colony. Existing rights are, of course, to be respected, but the intention is to limit the purchase and leasing of land to areas which will not bring them into contact with the European land-owner. Against this recommendation Colonel

Stanford, the man with the widest knowledge of the subject, provides a powerful minority protest of which every clause seems to the unbiassed observer conclusive. He denies that the safety of Europeans demands this provision, seeing no diminution in the vigour of the Colonials or anything to justify the belief that they are losing ground. He believes that undesirable occupation of land can be prevented by regulations, that Europeans are invading the native locations in greater proportions than the natives have gone outside their reserves, and that finally (and most important of all), as the proposed areas are not to be demarcated in existing reserves they must necessarily affect present European occupation. If, on the other hand, the design be to allow purchase by natives only in localities unsuitable for Europeans (and therefore probably sterile and unfit for cultivation) it must be remembered that the native who desires to become a landed proprietor usually belongs to the civilised class, and that therefore such localities offer him no attraction.

The adoption of the Commission's recommendation, therefore, would amount to a restriction of the native to his present bounds, with the alternative of purchasing land probably unsuited for civilised occupation. The Natal representatives, who also dissent from the recommendation, point out that Asiatics and other coloured races not of African descent may purchase land anywhere, whereas the aborigines of the country would be excluded from this privilege "except in limited areas selected, probably, for their unhealthiness

and unsuitability for irrigation and cultivation and other kindred reasons." They add that the resolution affects and limits the right of free trade possessed by every other subject of the British Empire and enjoyed by the natives of South Africa in every other sphere of business. Other recommendations are made with a view to defining the areas already set apart for natives and securing their possession of such reserves or locations on equitable terms, and a minority are in favour of vesting all such lands in a Native Trust, as in Natal, with a view to securing them permanently and safeguarding their interests in various ways.

Although it is not so much the actual extent to which natives have availed themselves of the privilege of becoming individual landlords as the principle under which that privilege is extended which is in question, yet it may be useful to give some actual facts as to native land-holding. In Cape Colony the figures are difficult to ascertain, but the practice has assumed considerable proportions, in certain sections especially, and some of these suitable for white occupation. In the Transvaal about 854 square miles, or $\frac{1}{130}$ th of the whole colony, is actually owned by natives, and a large proportion of the land which they have acquired has been bought communally.¹ It was part of the policy of the Dutch Republic to allow them to repurchase the lands from which they had been ejected, and such land was frequently registered in the name of a missionary

¹ Nearly the whole has been acquired communally—the expression “bought” is relative only, as the larger areas were reserved under deed of grant by the Z.A.R. Government for very nominal consideration, if any.

or other white non-official. The Orange River Colony has of course never had to contemplate the "location" or "reserve" question, having the great area of Basutoland so near. But there are already signs of overcrowding. In Natal, besides the province of Zululand, which is vested in the Crown and held communally, there are also two million odd acres vested in the Native Trust, as well as other lands set apart for mission reserves, in which the natives are freeholders communally, or hold land on quit rent or long-payment terms. They do not seem to any extent to be availing themselves of their right to purchase land individually, although some cases have occurred, and several of purchase by syndicates. The question, therefore, while in principle affecting the whole of South Africa, does not seem in practice a burning one save in the Transvaal and Cape Colony.

The vital point is the nature of the hold which the native is to have upon the land. In every colony he occupies certain areas specially set apart for him, but in these he has in reality no fixity of tenure, although some are his ancestral possessions. If we grant the premise that individualistic tenure of land on a secure basis is a useful, if not essential, feature in securing the progress of the race, we shall very soon find it difficult to draw the line against further expansion.

At the present rate of increase the native reserves will soon be too crowded to make anything but communal tenure possible—the subdivision would become too minute. It must be understood, of course,

that we are not dealing with the Protectorates, but with the native reserves in the various colonies. These reserves, as in the case of the Transkei, are by no means inferior land, and represent some of the best for agricultural and pastoral purposes. Nevertheless there is every reason to believe that any attempt to lock the door on native expansion would be impolitic and unjust, and at the same time the suggestion of special areas into which they may be allowed to spread does not seem to meet the requirements of the case.

I am in agreement with the Commission in believing an extension of individual tenure essential to native progress in the true sense of the word, and the development of the Transkei supports this belief. Not only have the natives there become prosperous farmers, but their record of labour is extremely good. Surely this is far more for the economic progress of the country than any system which leads to non-beneficial occupation of the soil. The whole experience of the world goes to prove that nothing stimulates a man to work so much as actual ownership of the ground he tills, and our present rural depopulation in England is undoubtedly to a great extent due to the rigidity of our land system and the difficulties which face the would-be small purchaser.

The bug-bear of the Africander is the question of political rights. Allow a native to own land in his own individual right, and how can you refuse him a vote? say they. Not having the pluck to face the true situation, they sacrifice him on the altar of a

false hypothesis. As a matter of fact, if the essential basis of the relations between black and white were once established, there would be little heard of objections to natives owning land wherever and whenever they could buy it. Race antipathy was unknown in the Southern States before the Civil War and the placing of black on a political equality with white. The Englishman or woman who treats with a negro on terms of equality has in his or her heart an instinctive dislike and distrust of the black skin which never occurred to the Southern planters and their families, to whom their house slaves were often second mothers and fathers, life-long friends and companions. I venture to think that Africanders would find it possible to extend far more sympathy and justice to their black neighbours were it not for the Frankenstein monster of political equality which ever stands over them. This question of land tenure forcibly illustrates my point when we find that the Commission which believes that political rights must be granted actually devises a scheme for locking the natives up in their own lands or in specified areas.

My own feeling is, first, that a system resembling the Glen Grey Act should be applied by degrees to all the Government locations and reserves, simultaneously with the establishment of agricultural farms on which natives, as part of their education, would learn a more intensive method of cultivation which would remedy some of the difficulties of subdivision. Strict regulations as to non-beneficial occupation should regulate this provision, but subject to these the natives

should be secured in their possession by a quit-rent title, and should not be merely leaseholders. This would imply their right to lease or sell their land, but in this matter considerable restrictionary powers should be retained, for some time at all events. Second, that no restriction should be placed on the sale of land to natives other than those enjoined by the conditions of municipal holdings, which can be perfectly safeguarded by bylaws. The class of native which amasses sufficient private means to buy a farm is not yet numerous, though increasing. The responsibility of property will act favourably, and provide a legitimate outlet for energy and ambition, especially if accompanied by some measure of local self-government. In a country like South Africa, where European colonisation is a great desideratum, it is impossible to ignore the likelihood of such a provision acting as a deterrent; but, on the other hand, the economic folly of refusing land to occupiers who might make a success of it and condemning them to a life of inertia or worse is equally evident.

The segregation of the black race is not a point for which I would aim. It seems to me a dangerous experiment to lock him up in areas, give him political rights and tell him to go ahead and make a civilised people. It seems to me the height of folly to give him rights and deny him privileges. Although I am negrophobe enough (or shall be considered so) to affirm that as long as the white man remains in South Africa he must form a ruling caste, I do not wish to perpetrate injustice on the black races.

I wish to give them the possibility of happiness, prosperity, and usefulness—the advantages of a sound education, and the chance of owning the soil they cultivate and of bequeathing it to their children. Above everything I desire to keep them on the land, and I see no better prospect of so doing than by offering attractions in the way of land tenure which will divert the stream of educated natives from the towns, where they turn into discontented and probably seditious clerks, editors, and preachers, to the country, where all their energies will be absorbed in winning prosperity from the soil. To this end I would extend to them facilities, would give them agricultural training, would help them as I would the European cultivator. There is no moral, social, political, or physiological reason why the natives (freed from political illusions) should not become as a class prosperous peasant proprietors and a valuable economic asset.

CHAPTER VII

THE FUTURE OF THE BLACK RACES

THE subject of this chapter is one in which the British Empire is peculiarly interested, since it is the arbiter of destiny to a vast proportion of the black-skinned peoples, who may, for lack of a more precise definition, be called the weaker races. She has six groups of Crown colonies in the West Indies, with a population of African stock, besides British Guiana and Honduras, and in her South African protectorates and colonies she dominates most of the native peoples of a sub-continent. A large number of these black peoples have no conception of any civilisation but that of the British Empire. In the West Indies their native language is forgotten in a bastard English. In the long reign of the late Queen Victoria she became to them a sort of supernatural ruler, as much part of their traditions as the hereditary heroes and chiefs of other nations.

Taking the negro race as a whole, no better definition can be found than that of a people still in its childhood. This is just as much the case in the West Indies, after more than two centuries of contact with Europe (albeit much of that time was spent in slavery), as in parts of South Africa where the red

Kaffir in his wattle and daub hut is living his primitive life without white interference. The West Indian negro, coming from the west coast of Africa, differs in many points from the Bantu races which predominate in South Africa. The latter reached, in many ways, a higher point of civilisation, were organised for offence, defence, and administration, and had strict sanitary and moral codes generally directed to the welfare of their offspring. This fact to a certain extent equalises the conditions between them and their kindred race who have been more directly in contact with European civilisation, but both are still, as races, in the childhood period of evolution.

The tribal organisation of the Bantus is on patriarchal lines, the family forming the unit which gradually expanded to embrace a group of allied families or tribe, and a group of allied tribes or nation. The chiefship is to a certain extent hereditary, but in former times was, like that of our own forefathers the Germanic tribes, frequently usurped by military leaders. A great similarity of custom prevails among the South African tribes, although they are frequently hostile to each other. Their system of laws is intricate, and varies considerably in detail, but is thoroughly understood by the natives themselves, and both this and their customs are interwoven with the fabric of their social life.

No abrupt change has been made in these matters, save in prohibiting customs which were contrary to humanitarian ideas or social order. The gradual spread of Christianity and education has taken a certain number

of natives out of their tribal organisation and placed them under ordinary colonial law, and in speaking of the Church Separatist movement we have seen some of the effects of this. The legal position of the native, when resident outside the protectorates or reserves, seems a little complicated, and the whole system is too varied to be discussed in detail. Generally speaking, there has been no attempt to interfere with native law in civil cases, and it is only in criminal jurisdiction that it has been superseded. The situation, particularly in the Cape Colony, is curious and interesting, affording a unique spectacle of two entirely opposed civilisations which frequently overlap. For instance, the principle of communal responsibility, which is characteristic of the native system, is wholly opposed to our own idea of individual responsibility. In endeavouring to work both together some injustice must occur, since the younger generation of natives are perfectly aware of their independence, now that their chiefs no longer possess the right of life or death, and are frequently quite beyond control. The position of women too is inevitably affected by the cessation of intertribal warfare. Not merely are they no longer in such numerical preponderance, but the diseases of cattle have made the payment of *lobolo* (the price of a wife) much more costly. The use of the plough is also releasing women from some of the field labour, so that polygamy, ceasing to be a good investment, is becoming more and more a luxury, and is, in fact, on the decrease even among non-Christian natives.

The decay of the old system may therefore be

regarded as having set in more or less naturally, apart from the efforts of missionary evangelists and educationists. While the inequalities of condition are so strongly marked among natives no general assimilation of law or custom is possible, and it seems far wiser to allow them to grow slowly towards a more uniform code, using the law they are accustomed to as long as it preserves order and decency. The contrast between this method of development and that of the West Coast negroes, who were taken as slaves to the West Indies and Southern States, is interesting in its results, but the points of dissimilarity are so many in the original stock that no very close analogy is possible. In speculating as to the possibilities of the negro races we have so many varying conditions to consider that the task becomes almost herculean. There are South African tribes in which we must suspect a certain admixture of Arab blood. Then we are so profoundly ignorant of their past history. If certain speculations as to the Rhodesian ruins are right, we may find that the sub-continent has seen a higher degree of black achievement than we imagined. There are other races, like the Bushmen, who appear to have sunk from a certain degree of development to one of almost primitive animalism. Although almost extinct as a race, they have mixed their blood with that of other black races, and handed on some of their traits. Obviously it would be a difficult task to estimate the racial possibilities of such people, and the problem is psychologically more involved than any presented in the United States or West Indies. In the latter, too, we lose sight at

once of tribal distinctions or physical differences among the black peoples. As they lost their language and became French or English speaking, so they lost any tribal sense of identity. They are more homogeneous than the South African natives.

When we leave the historical and the speculative fields and turn to actual contemporary achievement we are on firmer ground. Comparing the American negroes with the South African, we find that the former are much ahead in their stage of development, though in point of time they are even more so. They went through an early discipline which had its valuable side, and in their general attitude towards life, their familiarity with the phenomena of modern science, their appreciation of the tenets of Christianity, and, above all, their capacity for self-help, they are now a long way farther on the path of civilisation. Some of them have to all appearances passed the period of childhood, have conquered the irresponsibility and emotionalism of that period and become serious, thoughtful, useful members of society. Every case of this sort represents a force of individual character beyond the usual, since it has many difficulties to contend with. It is of the highest importance in estimating their achievements, however, to remember—what I believe is true, though it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable data—that a large proportion of the men who have risen above the level of their race have owed something to a strain, however small, of white blood. Booker Washington himself is not a full-blooded negro.

The course of development in South Africa is

totally dissimilar. In the first place the abandonment of his tribe (which is ultimately involved by embracing Christianity) is a voluntary act and, unless taken for ulterior motives of gain, means that he has strong convictions, for otherwise he would not turn his back on so much that is interwoven with his life-long habits. In the case of children education works them up to a certain point and emulation does the rest, but the temptations to relapse into heathendom are extremely strong at times. There is much the same difference in their circumstances and those of the American or West Indian negro as between the position of a man who, dissatisfied with his present house, builds him another, and that of one who is shipwrecked and has to construct a shelter at once out of the best materials he can find. Added to the fact that there is no strong pressure from without to drive him into European ways is the circumstance that the conduct of semi-educated or partially converted natives often seems revolting to their heathen relatives, not being in accordance with their traditions. It will be seen therefore that the present backwardness of the race to adopt European civilisation is by no means surprising. It is only economic pressure which will inevitably drive them all into it in time. Without that pressure, without the breaking up of old customs and the going abroad to work of young men, the impression made by actual missionary labour would have been small. One sees heathen kraals and "red Kaffirs" in close proximity to old-established Churches and schools. A heathen dance of the most peculiar

and grotesque description took place as a ceremonial rite a few years ago quite near to Lovedale, the site of native learning. The fact is that, at present, the great body of the people are still in the state of extreme childhood and can be tutored accordingly. The educated and Christian minority are even more childlike in many ways, having abandoned their old mode of life and being hardly yet able to walk upright in the new one. But my own feeling about them is that in proportion as they are slow they will be sure. Having set their faces in a certain direction they will not turn back nor be turned back, and it is advisable that they should have some clearly defined goal to work for. In their native state they were capable of organisation to a certain extent, but very prone to differences and disputes. In their new phase exactly the same tendency is beginning to show itself.

I am not one of those who regard the mental limitations of the race as inexorably fixed. It seems totally opposed to history to imagine that any human race is not capable of variation and of intellectual development, but notwithstanding all this I am unable at present to concede that the negro races have contributed sufficiently to the sum of human knowledge or happiness to entitle them to consideration on those particular grounds. In the not altogether unfavourable training ground of slavery on Southern plantations they showed extraordinary plasticity, developing as house servants and artisans into exactly what was wanted of them by the luxury-loving, extravagant, hospitable, easy-going Southern aristocracy. They

acquired certain virtues which do not seem inherent but are rather a reflection of the society in which they lived. They were as entirely free from commercialism or greed as their white masters. In less happy surroundings, on the plantations, they developed powers of endurance and hard work quite out of keeping with their original character. Contrast this plasticity with the attitude of such people as the Jews, for instance, under slavery. Take such a case as that of the tall fair-haired people found till the end of the last century in little groups in some provinces of the Vosges, living apart and ostracised, believed to be a remnant of the ancient Goths. Compare even the red-skinned races with the negro in slavery, and one is forced to the conclusion that in his mental as well as his moral development he is essentially a creature of his environment.

The hostile attitude of the Southern white man, added to the unbalanced and indiscreet championship of the North, thrust the American negro farther down the scale of true civilisation than he was before the war, and he is still climbing painfully back. True, the race has attained individual successes. It has produced lawyers, doctors, professors, and ministers by the score; but the American negro has to make a bitter fight against the legacy of bitterness left by the reconstruction period, and this is taking one form, not unfamiliar in South Africa, in the exclusion of coloured workmen as skilled artisans. He owes his faults as well as his virtues to the civilisation which surrounds him. He has the characteristic defects of

democracy added to a keen sense of injustice. We must bear this matter in mind in our dealings with the South African native; for although the facts of his own environment render him less susceptible, he will certainly, as he crosses the dividing line, assimilate himself more or less closely to ourselves.

Now, imitation is the sincerest flattery, but is apt to have a shoddy appearance, and it is this shoddiness that prejudices many people against the "educated" or "mission native." Before condemning him, however, they should remember that he is, after all, only following the tide which has set in and is sweeping his people slowly but surely before it. We ourselves set the tide flowing, and it lies with us to direct it before it becomes overwhelmingly strong. At present it would be well for us and for the native if we restricted his intercourse with his American cousins as much as possible. The fact that they are a century ahead of him in evolution is not so evident as it might be on the surface. He knows nothing of their struggles or discipline, but sees their importance and hears their glib talk. They (or at least many of them) are too near him in one sense to be good mentors, while in another they are too far. They have less tolerance for his heathen condition and appreciation of his heathen virtues than we. It is harder for a youth or young girl to enter into the thoughts of a small child than it is for a mature person, whose sympathies and understanding are wider, and it is one of the features of modern education that the youngest class wants the best-trained teacher.

I have inferred that there is little originality or creative genius in the negro race, and that the general level of intelligence is low among people already brought in contact with civilisation. I am aware that in their native state some of the South African races have produced men of considerable ability and force of character. That some of these have been monsters of cruelty is only to be expected when one remembers the stern school in which they were reared and the bloody paths which usually led them to their chieftdom. These things do not detract from the fact of their intellectual endowments, and it seems indisputable that the Bantu races have produced men of strong brain capacity and will power who would have made a mark anywhere. Already, in the very beginning of their career as a civilised people, they have produced one or two very striking men. The Chief Khama is a great ruler, though on a minor scale. The editor of the well-known native paper, *Imvo*, Tengo Jabavu, is a full-blooded Fingo, and a man of real grasp and insight, a most capable politician, and regarded seriously by all sections of the people.¹

In every age and in every clime there have been men who are more or less "sports," so much are they different in capacity or mental power from the race whence they spring. In estimating the capacity of the

¹ The first Kaffir newspaper published was the *Indaba*, printed at Lovedale, which ceased publication after a brief career. This was followed by another paper in 1870 from the same press, and in 1884 was started a weekly paper in Kaffir-English called the *Imvo Zontsundu ne Lisso Lomxi* (Native Opinion and Guardian), which, suspended during the war for an objectionable article, now appears as *Imvo Zabantsundu Bomzandsi Afrika* (South African Native Opinion). There are five or six other papers published in various parts.

Bantu peoples we must not forget this fact when reflecting upon the energy and ability of some of their rulers, or the admirable features to be found in their primitive civilisation. We have also to call to mind the fact that, as far back as history goes, for thousands of years, this sub-continent has been inhabited by people who never wrote a book, built a bridge, invented a machine, or even built a permanent house. They had no spiritual conceptions, and were materialists of the most pronounced type. It is, after all, the general mental level which is the real high-water mark of a race. The European revolt which saw the last of feudalism broke out in France less because the French nobles were more oppressive than any others than that the peasants were better able to appreciate their position, were, in fact, at a higher level than are the Russian peasantry to-day. It is therefore to this point, the elevation of the masses, that I would direct the attention of every well-wisher of the black races, rather than to any cultivation of brilliant individuals. If the latter arise, as the history of the Bantu races may reasonably lead us to expect, they will probably have to share the fate of all men who are born before their time. They may not suffer death like Socrates, and they may lead lives of usefulness which will bring their own reward, but they will not be able, by their own brilliant but individual efforts, to surmount the barrier which race evolution places between them and other peoples. It was with this thesis that I began this book, and I return to it here as the one true basis on which to forecast the future of the Ethiopian.

My position, briefly stated, is this. I do not admit the right of the individual black man to be entirely dissociated from his race, and I do not regard the negroid races as a whole, or as sections, as having reached a stage of civilisation at which it can be welcomed as an equal by white peoples. Whether it will ever catch up in the race remains to be seen. Certainly not if it tries to begin where we leave off, with full-fledged democracy. We worked up through our patriarchal, tribal, communal, feudal, municipal, and constitutional stages, and they have to do the same. We murdered our prophets, burnt our reformers, and generally ill-treated all of our race who were ahead of their times. Such methods having ceased to have any terrors in an age of advertisement, we now treat them to cold oblivion. Negro prophets, reformers, and men of that kidney must go through a similar discipline. But when it comes to denying to the blacks, either as a race or as individuals, what they have actually achieved for themselves; when it comes to robbing them of their ancestral lands,¹ preventing them from educating themselves, from becoming prosperous, from working at any trade they can learn, from owning property, or from following out any

¹ The expression "ancestral" may be taken exception to on the score that the Bantu races were themselves usurpers and conquerors, who exterminated the true aborigines, and that at a comparatively recent period. It must not be forgotten however, that, whatever their original title to the land, we have ourselves confirmed it in various ways, because it has suited us to treat with the tribes as the responsible owners of the soil. The term "ancestral" as used here, and also in the report of the Native Affairs Commission, is correct as implying that many of the lands so designated are inherited communally, and have been handed down for several generations.

legitimate ambition common to all men—then I am entirely on the side of the black races.

With a sensible practical education, one that would aim at giving them habits of industry, I would at the same time increase their standard of comfort and self-respect. I might increase their direct taxation in some districts, but I should much prefer to do it indirectly through their purchase of European commodities, through enforcing the payment of rent and other charges for value received. The hut tax is general and is well understood, and the Native Affairs Commission recommends its increase, as well as local taxation for beneficial purposes. But, as a measure chiefly aimed at stimulating the native to work, this increase would be less effective than might be supposed, because it would be impossible to adjust it with sufficient accuracy. It would entail hardship on one, while leaving another unscathed. Taxation for school purposes seems a reasonable and proper proposal; and my own feeling on the subject is that to teach the native that his tax money actually goes to provide him with certain advantages is to take him a considerable step on the path of progress. He is learning to spend.

This process is cumulative. He will not be able to stop once he has begun, and in a generation or two a large number of natives will be working not only for the luxuries, but for the necessities of life, and so will have reached the first rung in the ladder of progress. Their present prosperity being founded on the smallness and primitive nature of their wants, they have to become poor before they can be rich.

I see no barrier to the grading of this industrial population. Social distinctions already exist and will be reproduced, but it will be an aristocracy of talent. The cleverest boys and girls will rise to the professional class and will find lucrative work among their own people. The colonial Governments, some of which license hundreds of native medicine men every year, could have no objection to see them replaced by properly qualified native medical men. Why should not black people, when sick, have the attention of trained black nurses? Why should there not be black lawyers whose knowledge of native custom would stand them in good stead in their practices? These opportunities would compensate the brilliant individuals for a limitation in other aspirations, and would turn their energies into useful channels. In local government the black man would take a part. If it is said that it is impossible to draw the line between such local rights and those of the franchise, then let Afrianders remember that in Great Britain a large section of the population—land-owners, tax-payers, highly educated, thoroughly qualified—are admitted to discharge any function of citizenship save that one. A well-founded prejudice keeps men from giving women the franchise, although they have practically admitted them to every other privilege in the State. The women of Great Britain outnumber the men by nearly a million, but they are not their political equals. They occupy politically the same position that I contend should be that of the natives in South Africa. The admission of women into local government and their inclusion in all bodies

which deal with feminine interests, such as hospitals, schools, and factories, is a wise and practical step, and we can push the analogy to cover a similar movement in South Africa. The native should be encouraged to take an interest and a share of responsibility in all local matters and all affairs in which the welfare of his race is principally concerned.

This distinction between citizenship of a town and that of a state is not so difficult to reconcile in South Africa as in the United States. After all, the most democratic colony owns allegiance ultimately to the Crown, and the native is more conscious of his position as a subject of the king than as a democratic voter in a self-governing colony.

We are ourselves, under a constitutional monarch, witnessing some of the extreme effects of municipal socialism, while America has for ever demonstrated the hollowness of democratic principles as guiding stars by establishing what is in reality a Crown Colony in the Philippines. All these names are in reality of no importance. Africanders are sticklers for their liberty, but they need not sacrifice on the altar of any particular god. They must see for themselves that to introduce socialism and democracy to the Kaffir is to destroy their strongest hold on him. The conception is not one which can get any real hold of a people just emerging from the tribal state. Class legislation—that abomination of modern social reformers—is as essential to the well-being of the Kaffir as to that of the European who lives in his midst, and when once class legislation has been introduced

it may as well be carried to a logical and efficient conclusion. Prohibition, for instance, is distinctly class legislation in South Africa, yet no one would deny its wisdom. But if you proclaim your right to prevent a man from drinking because it would be bad for him, you may just as well legislate to prevent him voting for similar reasons. He may have the inalienable right of all men to go to the devil in his own way, but you are his superior and it is your business to regulate his progress. In a pathetic attempt to be logical the Cape actually permits native voters to purchase beer—a privilege which, to judge from all available evidence, would be more missed, if taken away, than the vote itself.

I have perhaps repeated myself unnecessarily in these chapters on the native question, in reiterating what I believe to be the only basis for the relations of white and black. I may seem harsh in the place I assign to the latter in the present stage of world evolution (I am careful not to use “the scheme of creation,” a favourite phrase with writers on this subject, because I am far from sure about any part of that scheme—even that which includes the Teutonic races, not to mention the Mongolians). The theory that any negro attempt to set up an independent civilisation founded on our own is for the present premature is founded on personal observation. Hispaniola has seen several mock republics and an attempt at independent development which will probably end shortly in American tutelage, but not before serious incompetence, and even worse, has been revealed. Liberia and other

settlements have languished and shown no signs of vitality. It is for the best interests of the negro race itself that such premature efforts should be abandoned and that all available energy should be turned in the direction of building up the character and developing the intellect of the masses. Nor can this be done without white aid.

The minority of educated and really civilised natives would be soon wiped out without the support of the European; in many cases they have incurred the enmity of their own tribe or people and in others their envy. These men are the leaders of South African native progress to-day, and to them the presence of the Africander is a safeguard and stimulus. They are somewhat given to indulging in seditious language at times and in writing that, broadly speaking, the net result of Africo-European relations have been demoralising and degrading,¹ but if they reflected more coolly they might perhaps be inclined to make the best of their position as pioneers. No stirring up of race feeling will improve that position; and, as a higher grade can only be reached through the goodwill of the white man and by following the paths he has marked out, it is a pity to represent him to their ignorant fellows as a monster of iniquity.

The bitter note in the South African native press comes, as a matter of fact, chiefly from a special class, those who are neither black nor white. No scheme for the future of the native can leave these

¹ Leading article in a native paper edited by Allan Soga, the son of a native minister and a Scotch lady.

men out of consideration. They are a numerous class, and one which deserves every sympathy, and yet the very difficulty of their position makes one unwilling by word or deed to render their increase more possible. In 1904 the coloured class formed themselves into the "African Political Organisation," whose objects are stated to be the promotion of unity, progress, and general advancement of the coloured races, and the defence of their social, political, and civil rights, and they claim to have a membership of ten thousand.

The Cape Colony coloured man or woman cannot be said to have any real grievance. Their political status is decided by their education and property qualification, and there are no restrictions as to their presence in trains, tram-cars, or public places except those imposed by social custom. Nevertheless colour prejudice is strong in the Cape (although some of the Dutch families have a touch of colour), but there is no legal disability or injustice. A very different state of affairs obtains in the Transvaal, whence most of the complaints come; and as the coloured people took part in the war and regarded the victory of Great Britain as the prelude to a better state of affairs, they are naturally disappointed that British domination has not brought them constitutional rights. Many of them are descendants of the Cape slaves freed by the British Government and they are as a class very loyal to the Crown. It is not necessary to go into the details of the disabilities from which they suffer, nor is it possible, in view of the class legislation and colour discrimination which I believe to be necessary, to

devise any method by which entire justice may be done.

A modification in the existing state of affairs would be accomplished by an acceptance of a general definition of the term "native." At present it is differently interpreted in each colony, and indeed different definitions are given in laws passed at various dates. Cape Colony, in every Act referring to "natives," runs through a list of tribes; Natal specially provides that "native" should mean all members of the aboriginal races or tribes south of the equator; the Orange River Colony includes "all coloured persons"; Rhodesia provides for any native of South or Central Africa who is not of European descent; the Transvaal makes any measure of descent from a native race or the slightest touch of colour a bar against being treated as European. The vagueness of these definitions is obvious. There is a case on record in Natal of parties in an appeal case who were non-suited in the Supreme Court because they were not Europeans, and in the Native High Court because they were not natives! The Native Affairs Commission suggests a definition which, open to objection as being difficult to ascertain and involving inquisitorial methods, still deserves consideration. By this the word "native" shall be taken to mean an aboriginal inhabitant of Africa south of the equator, and to include half-castes and their descendants by natives. This does not, of course, meet the hard case of many who are actually the children of white men, and who in some of the colonies are debarred from marrying any but a "native," and

therefore cannot hope to raise their children to a higher level. But it would meet the difficulties of a large section of the respectable and educated population who have perhaps only a slight strain of coloured blood, and who would be freed from "native" disabilities and allowed to rise.

I have said that I do not profess to propound any scheme of ethical perfection in the racial relations of white and black, and I am only too conscious of the many cases where my own principles, logically applied, will produce instances of great individual hardship and injustice. It is part of the mystery of pain that it often seems to fall just where it was least deserved, and no theory as yet devised can explain the phenomena in accordance with our accepted ideas of justice and Divine love. In the present instance one feels that a less rigid and harsh public attitude, an abandonment of the instinct which warns the white races against miscegenation, would perhaps ameliorate the lot of individuals, but would vastly increase the sum of human suffering in the end. It would be, in fact, similar to the charity which, dissipating itself in doles to street beggars, perpetuates for them a wretched existence.

The open recognition of the basis of racial relations which I advocate would render possible acts of justice and even generosity on the part of the ruling caste. This fact I have reiterated, and I repeat it again in connection with this painful side of the problem, for without some such modification in the relations at present existing a large section of people with European

blood in their veins may be permanently thrust from the ranks of loyal and useful citizens, and turned into a band of Ishmaels. This is an Imperial matter, since these people claim the protection of the Throne, but it is far more an Africander matter.

Africanders living in the midst of the Black Cloud cannot afford to lose valuable support. The vast majority of these people represent no modern tendency to miscegenation, but the habits of an earlier and less responsible age. Nothing can be done to relax the moral or social code; but their white blood, together with proved character, should win them exemption from certain legal restrictions. Together with the more precise definition of the word "native," this would ameliorate the condition of many, and for those who remain within the native pale I should hope to see a generosity on the part of the ruling caste which would render the lives of the better class more tolerable. I have already indicated the lines this would take; and for the encouragement of the coloured "native" I may say here that if he wants to see a country where he may ride in any part of the train or tram, provided he is well conducted, walk where he pleases, fill any post save the highest administrative ones, follow any trade or profession and be treated with respect if he deserves it, he must go, not to the Southern States of America where he has the franchise, but to Jamaica where he has not, and where he has actually been deprived of some of the rights he once possessed. On the other hand I may point out to the white Africander that crimes of violence, especially

against white women, are extremely rare in this island, and in its sister West Indian islands. I know that white women in South Africa are afraid to be left alone with their black servants; but on the Southern plantations, up to the end of the Civil War, and in many parts of the West Indies to-day, white women were and are perfectly safe in the custody of their black retainers. A West Indian lady, asked if she was not nervous to be alone sometimes on her estate, answered in all good faith, "Oh no! we get so few white men along this road, and I have plenty of servants always about the house."

It is not safe, as I have said already, to draw too close an analogy between peoples of the same stock but so different in many ways as the Bantus and the west coast negroes, but still the conditions at which I have hinted are too remarkable and significant, as illustrating possible relations between white and black, not to receive attention here.

One of the ideas which recurs continually in the literature which has grown up around this problem is that of entire race segregation. Every now and then it is wildly suggested that the American negro should be emigrated back to Africa *en bloc*; and an almost equally extraordinary suggestion is for a division of the sub-continent between the two races in which the white should take all the high, healthy, temperate regions and the blacks the low, tropical parts unsuited for white occupation. The first objection is that to withdraw the blacks from among the whites, either in America or South Africa, would dislocate half the

machinery of agricultural, domestic and industrial life, while a considerable number of white men would have to throw up lucrative employment in the black districts. Supposing, however, that the suggestion was only to apply to such natives as are still living tribally, or owning ground, then the difficulty would arise of allocating the two spheres. Altitude and temperate climate are not everything in South Africa; there are parts of Bechuanaland, for instance, which fulfil the conditions but where only natives can make a living, while some of the portions of Central and East Africa which are marked out for black occupation already own white communities which would be hard to dislodge. These are only the more obvious and elementary objections to a scheme which is, in fact, outside the region of practical politics. We have not yet succeeded in introducing a successful method of land settlement into South Africa, so that it is in the highest degree premature to talk of moving whole communities from place to place and reconstructing the whole domestic economy of the sub-continent.

The future of the black races is bound up with that of the white. Fate has decreed that they must exist side by side for a considerable period at all events. It is going to be a hard struggle for both. We white peoples must continue to go forward. We must maintain our position by our superior calibre. We have to bear the white man's burden, and as our strength so will our days be. To quote a distinguished Canadian, Dr. G. R. Parkin: "Our success is going to depend on the development in ourselves of a

quality which is not striking in English character, and that is the quality of entering sympathetically and instinctively into the feelings of other nations and races. . . . We have got to have our character stand the strain that is put upon it . . . we have to prevent ourselves being dragged down, and we have to elevate them with this depressing condition—that the closer you lift them up towards the level of our own civilisation the more intense the line of division becomes.”¹

The situation cannot be burked or shirked. We cannot arrest the tide of black progress even if we would—and it is by no means certain that we should be wise in so doing—but we can still direct it if we choose. The choice lies largely with Africanders, but the responsibility rests on the people of the whole British Empire.

¹ Royal Colonial Institute, June 1905.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE BRITISH INDIAN

IN all the tangled web of South African affairs no knot is perhaps harder to unravel than this one of the position of British subjects of alien blood in British colonies. The history of the situation must be given as briefly as possible. The colony of Natal first began it, by importing Indian coolies for her plantations, and on this labour the prosperity of the Garden Colony has been built up and still rests. To withdraw the Indian from Natal would be to dislocate the whole machinery of domestic and economic life. When his period of indenture was up the coolie began to settle down, to hawk and peddle, to trade in a small way and even in a large one. He became the purveyor of fruit and vegetables, he brought out his women, and raised families, and Natal to-day has more Indian than European inhabitants. Their gradual spreading into other parts of South Africa was natural, and they are found everywhere to-day, though not, of course, in the same ratio as in Natal. It is particularly as small traders that they make their way, and in the Transvaal they have by degrees absorbed almost the whole of the small retail trade. In Southern Rhodesia and in

practically all the colonies they are found as market-gardeners, and fulfil a very useful function in cheapening the price of garden produce, otherwise prohibitive. They owe their success to two points in which they can easily beat either the European or the native—their industry and frugality—and it is quite apart from the question to base any argument on moral or sanitary objections to them. These can be easily met by municipal or local regulations.

In the South African Republic they were subject to disabilities, which were the result, not of any economic objection, but of Dutch prejudice on the score of colour. They were, however, allowed to enter the country freely and (in practice) to trade without licences. The principal practical disability under which they lay was the prohibition to hold landed property, which, however, like other provisions, was laxly enforced. One is reminded of an analogous state of affairs in connection with native land tenure. Natives were not legally prevented from buying land in their own names, but custom restricted them and forced them to register in the name of a European. Exactly opposite conditions prevailed with the Indians, who were legally prohibited, but nevertheless succeeded in buying land.

Again, at a period shortly before the war, they were ordered to be confined for residence and trading purposes to locations (a provision never carried out), but this has been proved by a test case to be illegal, and they were, in fact, entitled to trade anywhere. Undoubtedly their chief grievance at this period was to be found in

the attitude of the Dutch in classing them with the Kaffirs, whom they despise. The insults and wrongs heaped upon them, as British subjects, attracted considerable notice, and was one of the ostensible reasons for the war. It was natural that they should expect, as British subjects in a British colony, a generous measure of redress for all grievances, and to be reinstated on an equitable footing.

Far from this being the case, however, a considerable period elapsed before any change was made in the existing laws. The Indians waited, but their expectations were freely expressed. It soon became evident that the enforcement of immigration laws (which were equally stringent as regards all races, and only permitted the return, by degrees, of *bona-fide* refugees) was preventing that free entrance which, as British subjects, they had expected to have, while the more stringent carrying out of other laws and provisions was actually diminishing the privileges they had enjoyed. They were no longer able to evade the law which forbade them to own landed property, and the enforcement of sanitary regulations actually interfered with their vested interests. While the yoke was being made heavier for them, it by no means met the views of the Colonials on the subject, and at this point it may be well to state the Africander side of the question.

The head and front of the Indian's offending, as I have already said, is his power to undersell the white man. As a coolie (labourer) or servant he did not compete with the white man; but there are places in the social and economic fabric which had been ear-

marked by a certain class of Europeans, and among these is certainly that of retail trading. This question did not greatly affect the Dutch, who have no desire to become traders, despising commercialism, and who only wanted to buy as cheaply as possible. Hence the comparative ease with which the Indian trader dodged the legislation which, in accordance with Dutch prejudice, was aimed at him.

The introduction of the Imperial factor into Transvaal politics, and the raising in a new form of the race question, entirely altered the situation. The present predominance of the British industrialist has raised the economic question, while in the regions of high politics a very serious problem has had to be faced. The British Africander and European newcomers view with hostility the Indian, who makes retail selling an impossible affair to a white man; while the British administrators, who see a good opening for British expansion (so necessary for the solution of many difficulties) in this commercial field, are torn two ways, by political expediency and a sense of justice.

This accounts for the apparent anomaly by which the Indians under British rule are on the whole worse off than they were under the Dutch, but it does not altogether explain the prejudice against them, nor the offensive terms in which it is expressed, nor does it elucidate the attitude of the Imperial authorities on this most Imperial matter.

The Indian is conscious (as are the Imperial authorities) of inherent qualities which raise him above the Kaffir with whom, in Africander opinion, he is classed.

To those who know India, with her ancient civilisations and high record of achievement, this needs no insistence, but the average Africander is not so enlightened. As a rule he is provincial of the provincials, and the class which is most clamorous about the Indian corresponds to, and is fed by, that in Britain which is least imaginative and most dominated by the parish pump. Nevertheless the Africander is not to be condemned unheard. The Indians who come under his immediate observation are not, by any means, the pick of their country, and they are also undergoing a process of deterioration inseparable from their condition of life as aliens. My own observation of Indians abroad is that this process is more rapid with them than with Chinese, though both owe it to their removal from the stimulating effect of a public opinion which they understand and value, and from the restraints of family obligations. Then there is no doubt that their standard of living is extremely low, in itself a dangerous economic factor; and while the white man regards this as an advantage for unskilled labourers or coolies, and as likely to stimulate the Kaffir labour-market by competition, he cannot admit the same principle as regards his own occupations. Being unable to make nice distinctions between dark-skinned peoples, all of whom he regards as subject races, the Africander has perpetrated some of the ordinances which are most offensive to Indian feelings, without any ulterior design than to regulate the conduct of people whose civilisation is not, he believes, equal to his own. Being strongly protectionist, as are all young communities,

he is now bent on keeping trade in white hands at all costs. That is the Africander position in a nutshell. The Indian one is equally simple. He cannot believe that rights which he possessed under an alien Government will be refused him by that of a British Crown Colony, and moreover he claims the right of free trade within the British Empire and the privileges of a British subject. The Imperial point of view is extremely complicated. Justice to all subjects of the Crown is the first desideratum, and how to secure this in the case of the Transvaal seems beyond human power to devise. Historically the Indians have the strongest possible claims, and these have been fully recognised and affirmed by the Imperial Government through responsible ministers. Moreover, it is obviously inexpedient to allow a section of our Indian subjects to labour under a grievance, the knowledge of which reaches their own country and is discussed in the bazaars to an extent hardly credible to those who do not know India. Little is known in Europe of the marvellous secret intelligence system of the East, though we are sometimes startled when we hear, for instance, that the fall of Khartoum was talked over in the bazaars of Cairo before the news reached the authorities. Every incident of the South African War was similarly discussed in India, and the news of defeat or victory conveyed with extraordinary rapidity. In such matters as these one is always, in dealing with an Eastern race, on the verge of the inscrutable, and the general feeling of all who, like myself, have administrative experience among

such people is that the strongest hold the European has is his character for straightforward, even-handed justice. That he should fail in that, and fail Imperially, means a terrible shake to his prestige among a people who are far more subtle than he. It must be borne in mind that the Indians claim no political privilege. They accept their position as a subject race, and desire at the most only municipal privileges, which, be it noted, they possess in Cape Colony and Natal. Their main grievance is the arbitrary inclusion of all their race, both for trading and residential purposes, in locations or bazaars—a provision which would undoubtedly affect their trade as well as their personal liberty, and which constitutes an actual diminution of their previous rights. It is the indignity with which the present traders are treated rather than the intention to exclude further immigration which focusses their attention, although the introduction of a clause in the Immigration Acts providing that all must be able to write a European language has aroused much opposition, since it might actually exclude people above the trading class.

The Imperial question is, therefore, how far the British Government can sanction, under the form of self-government, the oppression of one section of its subjects by another. The fact that the welfare of the one demands such oppression does not actually alter the case, nor does the argument that the Indians came voluntarily to a country where they were not invited. Great Britain found them in the Transvaal when she took over the government, and nothing can annul their claim on her for protection.

Lord Milner, taking the broadest view of the situation and sympathising with both sides, confessed himself defeated by the problem. He wished to meet the case by concessions and privileges to the better class Indian, but he found so little support that he was eventually obliged to give his sanction to measures which, while they did not satisfy the Afriander on one hand, were no more successful in redressing injustice to the Indians on the other. He expressed his own dissatisfaction with the result, but it was the best he could do for the Indians and better than any responsible Government would have done. In this case, as in some others, Afriander opinion has been the decisive factor, even though actual legislative power did not rest with the people of the colony. The situation remains in this unsatisfactory condition, and no further legislation is possible until the colony is self-governing. The Indians feel that when that time arrives they have little to hope for; but such interests as they have are safeguarded to a certain extent by the provision that all legislation regarding them must be reserved for the Governor's sanction.

The point at issue is an important one to South Africa, and above all to the Transvaal. If we are ever to build up a white South African nation with British ties and sympathies we cannot afford to handicap the immigrant by pitting him against the Asiatic in such walks of life as he is able to fill. In this respect the Afriander has my sympathy and support. But I feel that he could have attained his object by less harsh measures. The abrogation

of existing rights, which has actually taken place, is contrary to the laws of any nation; it rouses a sense of grievance and ill will which are unpleasant features in any State. The operation of the amended immigration laws would have been sufficient to keep out undesirables, and the Indians claim with justice that they might be applied to white aliens, such as Poles, Jews, or the scum of Southern Europe, who are treated more leniently than the British Indian. Above all they plead, in virtue of the high civilisation of their upper classes, for a differential treatment of such of their race as come to South Africa as professional or independent men, and not as labourers or petty traders. The great difficulty of drawing the line is obvious, but as a matter of fact the number of immigrants who could claim this exemption is very small.

Concessions to the *amour propre* of the British Indian would have reconciled him to economic restrictions, but the Africander would not make them. Could or should Great Britain have forced the situation? The Indian deduction is: "Britain is afraid of her colonists. We have the sympathy of her statesmen, but they are helpless before a handful of Africanders. She is too cowardly to do us justice even though she acknowledges our claim."

This not unnatural deduction needs some correction. Great Britain has recognised certain rights on the part of her white colonies. Moreover, she made peace with the Boers on terms which practically secured to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony a treatment

closely allied to that granted to the self-governing colonies even while they were directly under the Crown. This being the case, she is, in reality, not free in her dealings, and is obliged to acquiesce in a policy which is shaped in Africander moulds. To take a strong line against the wishes of the Afrianders would have been entirely opposed to her established precedent in dealing with her colonies. She was obliged, in a matter which was so essentially domestic, to allow them a preponderating influence. There was no question of strong ministers. Lord Milner as High Commissioner and Mr. Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary were as strong a combination as could be found. Both had recognised the Indian claims, yet in view of the agitation of a section of the Transvaal they were helpless. It seems a case of the tail wagging the dog. It is true that the well-known aim of Lord Milner, to introduce in a short time as strong an element of British as possible, may have influenced him; but there is evidence that he went as far as he could in pressing Indian claims without actually enforcing legislature through the council, in the teeth of opposition by means of the official vote—a course to which his own subordinates were opposed. There is only one explanation. It is quite impossible to impose legislation on a white community without its consent. If it is unreasonable, obstinate, and prejudiced, nothing can be done. In the present instance the Transvaal lost the chance of obtaining a good supply of indentured labour from a source less open to objection and far less costly than China. The

Indian Government, in view of their attitude on Indian grievances, refused to permit the recruiting of indentured coolies. But the Transvaal is quite impenitent, and the Imperial Government is, in fact, helpless, even though it believes Imperial interests to be at stake.

The question is one that should be impartially studied by all thoughtful men, both in Great and Greater Britain, since it illustrates a weak point in our Imperial system to which it would be fatal to be blind.

Part II.—White South Africa

CHAPTER I

THE MAKING OF DUTCH AFRICANDERS: THE TAAL

THE new-comer to South Africa finds great difficulty in understanding the exact position of the Dutch patois which we hear spoken of as the Taal (literally, language). The usage varies, of course, in the different colonies, but in one respect it is the same or nearly so. Throughout South Africa (except Rhodesia and in parts of Natal) the language universally spoken to native servants, farm labourers, or country folk is that form of Dutch which is known as the Taal or Lands-taal, the language of the country. It is even possible to come across English settlers of the second generation in Cape Colony who have forgotten the speech of their fathers, and it is not too much to say that, except in the almost purely English eastern province towns, Kimberley and Johannesburg, every Africander grows up with the Taal on his tongue. The most puzzling feature of this patois is found in the shades or types of vernacular which are encountered. Probably no other language is equally dependent on the range of

ideas of its user. Local circumstances affect it powerfully. The better education of the Cape population makes their Taal superior to that of the up-country Boer; but in the Transvaal, where one might expect to find a typically African form, the Hollander influence has been strong and its effect can be traced.

It is no easy matter actually to define the position of the Taal in the family of languages, though it is of course an offshoot from Dutch. The early settlers brought their language but left their literature behind. Without the latter, and in daily contact with native races unable to master the difficult and complex Dutch of the mother country, they began a process of simplification. Becoming an unlettered people, their tongue was denuded of literary forms and became domestic, rustic, and devoid of inflexion. Brought in contact, moreover, with several races—French, English, Malays, Hottentots—they borrowed terms from them all for the familiar phenomena of daily life, and the Taal became rich in certain directions while it shrank in others. The one book known to the people was the Bible, and its sonorous and archaic phrases were adopted for their private and public devotions and for occasions of ceremony; but, familiar as the Boers were and are with Biblical phraseology, it is not the language they speak in daily life—it is not the Taal.

As the question of the relation of this Taal to its parent Dutch is frequently raised, and has a bearing on its future, efforts have been made to

collect first-hand evidence on the subject. The result convinces one that, although a Hollander or even Low German may partly understand the Taal, the Taal-speaking Africander, unless he has been taught Dutch in school (and perhaps even then) will feel like a foreigner in Holland. This is not merely a matter of enlarged vocabulary or mental vision. Educated English Africanders, speaking the Taal from childhood but never learning it at school, find the spoken language of Holland unintelligible to them. Olive Schreiner, writing on the subject some years back, described the Africander Dutch language as a wall which, erected in the early days of colonisation, has fenced in the Boers from modern thought, culture, and progress, and at the same time from many less desirable features of modern civilisation. It only remains to be said that the Taal has never been recognised as a State language in South Africa or used in examinations, High Dutch and English being the media for all occasions of ceremony.

There is a second type of Taal, used in churches, courts, and newspapers, and taught in schools. This is a modified form, halfway between High Dutch and the domestic or Afrikaansche-Taal. For school purposes it has been provided with a grammar and to a certain extent standardised; but its quality varies greatly both in speaking and writing. As this School Taal is the language round which controversy centres to-day, it is worth while to examine it closer.

The first question which arises is, how far it may

be considered to be the language of the country. It cannot be spoken, written, or understood with any degree of precision or accuracy unless it has been studied at school. It is sometimes asserted that Taal-speaking children (that is, nine-tenths of the white children in South Africa) have no difficulty in adopting this language for their school work. This statement must assume, however, that the children either come from homes where High Dutch is spoken, or pass through an elementary stage in which the use of language is practically their only study, as is, in fact, the case with all elementary education. The small child in an English school must enlarge its knowledge of English before entering on regular school studies; but it has an equipment of simple phrases with which to start, and the accents are familiar. Is this the case with a Taal-speaking child who begins to learn the school Dutch? Not altogether, I believe; the school language is more of a foreign tongue and difficult in proportion, while it presents inherent difficulties of spelling and inflexion which are not present in every foreign tongue. Attempts have been made to simplify these, and to adopt some uniform and easy method, but no satisfactory conclusion has been arrived at; and moreover School Dutch, while not the language of modern Holland, has many of the disadvantages of High Dutch. A little English girl, who spoke the Taal in preference to English in her play, told me that her Dutch schoolfellows (in the elementary class) cried over their Dutch lessons, and wished they had been born English so that they needn't learn the "horrid

stuff." Her elder sister confirmed this evidence in the case of the higher standards. Capable teachers, able to lead their pupils on in the latest approved method of language teaching, which avoids the dry bones of grammar as far as possible, could doubtless make the School Taal an easy complement to the domestic Taal, but then they could do much the same for any foreign language. Such teachers, moreover, are still rare in South Africa. As to the position of School Dutch from the High Dutch point of view, an interesting comment is afforded by the recent report of a Hollander professor who examined a school in the Transvaal, which had been started in opposition to Government institutions in order to give prominence to the teaching of Dutch. It is probable that the professor did not make due allowance for the fact that the school had not been long established; but his report on the quality of the Dutch was so uncomplimentary that it roused some of the directors to wrath, and they retorted with reflections on the indistinctness of his pronunciation (of his own language!). Many teachers have tried to introduce High Dutch reading books into their elementary classes, and various efforts have been made to elevate the vernacular to the level of that language; but this is not only contrary to the Nationalist spirit of to-day but appears to have little sympathy from educationists, either Dutch or British. On the whole we may conclude that the School Taal is neither the domestic language of South Africa nor the language of Holland.

As written in the newspapers this modified or

School Taal varies, of course, with the education of the writer, just as it does when spoken in the courts or elsewhere. The average Boer can spell it out in his newspaper, the mere fact of his being able to read at all presupposing that he has been to school. I have heard an educated Dutch lady in Cape Colony, who habitually spoke the Taal, mention with some pride that she did the translation of a leading article from English into Dutch every week, and that it was "really not very difficult." Her father was a Hollander minister of considerable learning, and he had tried hard while his children were young to correct their Taal into true Dutch.

When travelling in Cape Colony I came across two debating societies in different small towns. One was a young farmers' association; it had been suppressed during the war, which sufficiently indicates what its membership was. As a matter of fact I did not notice one English name, while its agenda were printed in English and the debates carried on chiefly, if not altogether, in that language. The other society numbered young men and women from a small district, all of Dutch birth with the exception of one English colonial teacher. Papers and debate were entirely in English. I do not recollect seeing in any of the little lending libraries, which are to be found in all the principal Cape Colony towns, a single Dutch review or magazine, though they are read, and at Cape Town I believe I saw one published in French.

An interesting phase of the subject lies in the difficulty of writing in Dutch. The man who

speaks nothing but the Taal habitually, says his prayers in archaic High Dutch, and reads his paper in the modified Taal, will probably choose English as the medium for his correspondence. This supposes him to be a Cape Africander or elsewhere a man of fair education. In either case he will have learnt English as well as High Dutch in his school years, and will undoubtedly choose the former for his ordinary business correspondence; he will often even choose it by preference in writing to his own relatives. I have met people in the Orange River Colony who never spoke English, although they had learned it in the higher school standards as a foreign tongue, who still preferred it for correspondence, the fact of the matter being that even the modified School Dutch is most complicated as to spelling and inflexion. A Boer will tell you that it takes three pages of Dutch to express what can be put in one of English. The Taal has still another disadvantage, even in its modified form, in its lack of technical words and want of preciseness.

It is sometimes claimed for the School Dutch that it approximates closely to the language used in church and is therefore familiar to every one; and this must certainly be true when the minister who officiates is educated and colonial born, as is frequently the case in Cape Colony and is becoming more and more common in the Transvaal. Theoretically the Church language is High Dutch, but the Biblical phraseology which colours all church and pulpit speaking does much to make these utterances easy and familiar to

a Boer congregation. They can follow the words with probably about as much understanding as the average bucolic congregation in England listening to its college-bred parson. It may be premised that a Dutch Reformed minister does not introduce many modern allusions into his sermons, nor does he indulge in references to science or history except in a limited and Biblical way. The possibility, therefore, that the average Boer can join in worship and understand the exhortations addressed in a language which is neither wholly the Taal nor wholly Biblical does not discount the fact that he drops that language at the church door, unless his social position demands, and his education makes possible, the continuance of its use—and even then he thinks in the Taal.

For it must not be supposed that the Taal is considered by those who speak it habitually as a polite tongue. In Cape Colony an advance in position or education means that, while School Dutch is acquired, English becomes the ceremonial language. The Cape Colony Dutch are in fact bi-lingual, or even tri-lingual, since they speak a domestic Taal, learn a modified form of it at school, and at the same time learn to speak and write English. English is the commercial language; it is the avenue to promotion in every career. No Dutch father who wants his son to be successful in any path of life save that of an up-country farmer would wish that he should not learn English. Every educated man or woman in Cape Colony knows English and reads practically nothing else. At a private school in Cape Colony, where all the teachers

were Dutch and the greatest desire was expressed to preserve the language, I found a library full of English books. Hollander literature half filled one small shelf and contained among other works some obviously unread books on history. Many (especially the elder) pupils at this school came from the new colonies. A significant little incident which came under my own notice shows the true attitude of the better class Dutch towards the English language. A young lady belonging to one of the prominent "Nationalist" Dutch families, who had just returned from school in Holland, was about to be presented to a distinguished visitor. The *aide-de-camp* who ushered her into the presence gave certain directions, adding at the end, "You quite understand?" This innocent remark roused her wrath. "Did he suppose I couldn't speak English?" she asked indignantly. Even at a girls' boarding-school in the Transvaal, specially founded for the preservation of the Dutch language and traditions, it became necessary to suggest that Dutch should be made compulsory as a general medium for conversation, just as French is compulsory in an English girls' school. While this case is quoted to show that education inevitably brings in its train a break from the simple Taal, so that educated people will not speak it in company, it must not be inferred that the language question is as simple in the new colonies as in Cape Colony, where English and Dutch have been side by side for a century.

Naturally the position is different in the Transvaal, where the language of the State, the courts, and the Church was High Dutch, where Hollander influence,

especially through the Church, was very strong, and where the proportion of quite uneducated people speaking only the Taal was far larger than in any other section of the country. Even under these conditions, however, English made considerable progress. It was customary for well-to-do Boers to send their children to the Cape Colony for better education than they could get at home, and many of these finished their education in Great Britain. Though it has been the fashion with more than one of the Boer leaders to affect ignorance of English, and though many of them prefer to make their public utterances in Dutch, which is a splendid vehicle for oratory, yet as a matter of fact most of them understand it, as did even the late President Krüger. In the Orange Free State this knowledge of English was even more general, owing to the diffusion of British-born settlers and the better education available. Notwithstanding all this, the bulk of the Boer population of the republics, composed as it was of rude unlettered folk, was quite ignorant of English till the time of the war. Undoubtedly that language received a great stimulus at this period. Prisoners of war learnt it who had never had opportunities for schooling; children in concentration camps and afterwards in farm schools were apt pupils; and, as will appear in a subsequent chapter, the Nationalist propaganda has been powerless to arrest the process.

The case has been somewhat different in Cape Colony. The more advanced civilisation of the oldest colony in South Africa and its large admixture of English blood, coupled with the obvious advantages

possessed by English over the School Dutch, would have been enough in themselves to bring about unity of language, and were actually accomplishing this, leaving the Taal merely as a domestic *lingua franca*. This process has been artificially arrested. Whether the end in view justifies the means need not be discussed in this place, but it is certain that since a deliberate policy was formulated by the Nationalist party steps have been taken to force Dutch upon the people. Church services which were held in English are now held in Dutch. A well-known minister of the Dutch Reformed Church asked a Stellenbosch student how he got on with the language, and, being told that it was easier to follow sermons in English than in Dutch, said that his own experience was similar, but he added, "My people shall not be allowed to feel like that!" Members of the Cape Parliament who used to speak in English now address the House in Dutch, which a majority of their hearers cannot understand. These are only a few of the more obvious signs. Among the minor phenomena at the Cape are the adoption of a Dutch pronunciation for their names by people who formerly gloried in their Gallic blood, an attempt to reinstate High Dutch as a society language, and the efforts to speak and write Dutch habitually made by some individuals who had grown up in the English tongue. There has been nothing covert about this; the preservation and stimulation of the (so-called) Dutch language is a plank in an open platform. It has something in its favour, notably the contention that bi-lingual people are notoriously quick

and agile mentally. There is moreover a sturdiness and ruggedness in the Dutch traditions which are admirable, and to preserve the language of the old settlers might do something to conserve these qualities—only it is the Taal, and not an artificial School Dutch, that is their language. But facts are stubborn things; and the fact that English is the avenue to advancement and progress and would continue to be so even if South Africa were at once severed from the empire—this is the strongest argument in the whole question.

Dear, therefore, to the heart of the Dutch Africander as is the Taal in which he learns to lisp his first words, which is the language of his childhood's playhours, of his courtship and family life, and in which he probably *thinks* always, it is abundantly evident that he cannot find it sufficient for all his needs. Living side by side with people who speak a great living language, which, spreading from a small island, has already become the tongue of two continents, it seems natural, apart from political circumstances, that he should turn to this language rather than to a hybrid offshoot of Dutch, which is not the Taal, is not a civilised modern tongue, and does not open to him the portals of literature or the paths of commerce. Even were it possible for him to revive High Dutch as a second language he would still find himself in the same predicament as the Hollanders, who realise that the acquisition of at least two other modern languages is essential to their intellectual or material progress.

Having attempted to sketch what may be called the

social position of the Taal in the family of languages, it is necessary to retrace our steps in order to show how this position was attained. Education has naturally been the paramount influence, but education is a recent growth in South Africa.

The stamping out of the language of the French Huguenots, often quoted as an instance of the linguistic tenacity of the Cape Dutch, was, in fact, not the result of local feeling but the work of the Dutch East India Company, whose decrees were promulgated in Holland. It had a political meaning, for the Dutch company had no desire to leave the door open for a possible future interference by France with the young colony on the ground of its French population or on any pretext which might have been afforded by their presence. The Huguenots themselves, having bitterly renounced their nationality, had every desire for amalgamation with the Dutch, and in the exile so distasteful to a Latin people they quickly lost the courage to preserve their distinctive civilisation, which was of a higher type than the one they found among the Dutch at the Cape. A great stimulus must have been given to the Taal through the acquirement by these people of a language already simplified, and imparted through word of mouth by an illiterate and rustic people. Even in these early days the Cape was the calling-place for ships of many nationalities, and, deserting sailors or discharged soldiers being the principal teachers in the few schools, it is probable that a smattering of other languages was known to the Boers. But as they trekked farther and farther

away from the coast and lost touch with schools or towns, they became more and more ignorant and their language formed itself for the needs of their narrow life. To their study of the Bible they owe the fact that they retained so much of their original tongue.

We have a vivid picture of the time of the first British occupation at the end of the eighteenth century from the pen of Lady Ann Barnard. Cape Town society of that day seemed to her not typically Dutch, with its constant comings and goings of foreign ships, its Indian officers on furlough, and its spirit of commercialism. She visited the real Boers in the back country and found many, even of the better class, who spoke no language but Dutch, whereas at Cape Town she had no necessity to know that language. Some twenty years later we get another bright description of the Cape written by Mr. Bird, then Colonial Secretary. We find Cape Town grown in size and wealth, its citizens, Dutch and English, enjoying every luxury, but apparently keeping somewhat apart in their social life. The frequent marriages of the Cape Dutch ladies with young Englishmen is however noticed, and the introduction of settlers at this time into the eastern districts was another race solvent. It is interesting to find that the nucleus of a library of the "best books, ancient and modern," was already in existence in Cape Town, though the only newspaper was the Government sheet, the *Cape Courant*. While Cape Town was becoming less and less typically Dutch, the language spoken there was more classic than that of the Boers, who, entrenched behind their barriers of

isolation and illiteracy, developed the Africander side of their characters and not the Dutch or French.

It was at this period, in 1822, that English was substituted for Dutch as the language of the schools and courts, six Scottish teachers being brought out to Cape Colony. Scottish ministers were also appointed to fill vacancies in the country churches, according to Mr. Bird as a means of spreading British influence. As the Colonial Government at this time paid the salaries in the Dutch Reformed Church (which was then the State Church) this was quite possible. It is difficult to know how far the language ordinance was carried out, probably only very partially in most schools outside Cape Town, for ten years later it was ordained that English was to be the medium of instruction "wherever practicable." When the Cape University was founded in 1829, however, English was to be the medium of instruction, although a Dutch professor was appointed, and the position occupied from that time by the University as an examining body, whose certificates became the goal of educational effort throughout South Africa, must have had a great influence in deciding the language question. From this period onwards it may be safely assumed that all educated people in Cape Colony learnt to speak English. The number of uneducated and semi-educated remained considerable until quite recently; even as late as 1890 it was estimated that only a little over one-third of the white children of the Colony were getting any schooling, and of these only a small proportion a good education. The uneducated

children were almost entirely those of back-veld Boers, for the English, Scottish, and German immigrants generally were averse from an isolated life and were more alive to the advantages of education. These facts must be remembered when we speak of the prevalence of the Taal even under English education, since it is obvious that a large proportion of the people never came in contact with English education at all.

When the Cape obtained representative government (in 1861) a Parliamentary Commission, under the Presidency of Mr. Justice Watermeyer, considered the education question. It was then decided that English must be the school language in all save third-class schools where latitude was allowed for the first year. It must be remembered that the certificated teacher was then rare, so that it was impossible to secure that the subjects prescribed should really be taught; but a few years later, when an elementary teachers' certificate was established, English was made obligatory and Dutch and Kaffir optional. It is obvious that in the case of country schools, out of touch with the Department except for an annual inspection, the idiosyncrasies of the local managers and the ability (or lack of ability) of the teacher chiefly decided the course of the work done, and it was not till 1872 that any systematic inspection of the schools was begun. In the sixties, although the course of the instruction was carefully prescribed and the functions of the managers were supposed to be only those of investigation and report, yet their influence was no doubt paramount with the teachers, whose employers they practically were. When

one remembers the extremely lax Government supervision of education, the scarcity of certificated teachers, and the power of the school managers (generally presided over by the local *predikants*, and in country districts by a prominent Boer), one cannot suppose that any real pressure was put on the Dutch population to force them to learn English. Any idea that the language was being forced on them would have been deeply resented, and those who learnt it did so because they wished to. It was not till recent times that there was any agitation on the subject; and when political reasons brought the question to the fore in Cape Colony the Dutch language was already superseded in education by English, and it was revival, not protection, that came in question.

Most interesting testimony on the language question is afforded by the action of the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church (in 1878), which showed its concern in education by providing further training for those who already held the elementary teachers' certificate. They established a normal school in Cape Town, and obtained their first principal not from Holland (as might have been expected at a later date) but from Scotland. The certificate of this college did not make Dutch compulsory.

Another Parliamentary Commission reported on the language question a year later, by which time the Cape had full responsible government, the Ministry of the day including Gordon Sprigg and Uppington. A representation was made regarding the obstacle to progress imposed by the presence of three languages

in the schools, with a suggestion that either English or Dutch should be made optional with school managers. The superintendent, Dr. Langham Dale, replied that the existing arrangement which gave English the preference was "never objected to that I heard of," and that it seemed to work well, while to put such a weighty decision in the hands of local authorities would be to sow jealousies and dissensions.

In the year 1881, however, so significant in South African history as the year of the birth of the Bond and the announcement of the Pan-South African ideal—nationalism—there was a reaction in favour of Dutch. It was made a compulsory subject by Act of Parliament, with the qualifying phrase "whenever desirable," and competent teachers were to be provided whose salaries must if necessary be supplemented by Government. The provision of capable Dutch teachers has always been a difficulty, the conditions being peculiar, as will be understood by those who have studied the language question on its own merits. Hollander educationists, not merely in Cape Colony but also in the Transvaal, where Dutch had always been the school language, have frequently commented on the weak character of the Dutch teaching. *En revanche*, a Dutch Afriander superintendent in the Orange Free State left it on record that in his opinion "the children of the cold North" (*i.e.* the Hollanders) did not know how to teach "the children of the sunny South."

A third commission, in 1891, under a coalition Bond Government, which included Rhodes, Solomon,

Merriman, and Sauer, bore testimony to the impartiality of Dr. Dale on the language question. They reported that there was no exclusiveness as to language in the Cape Colony, and that, while more than half the European scholars were learning Dutch, there were none who spoke only that language.

Further recommendations were made. By this time the questions of language, school management, and religious teaching were all burning ones. The Commission desired a bi-lingual form of examination in the Cape University, the only possible course if the two languages were really to be regarded on an equal footing. This was declared impracticable by Dutch witnesses themselves. The suggestion of the Dutch Reformed Church Synod was more moderate : Dutch to be made optional in the school elementary examination (the first public test of school work) with a reward in marks attached. The Taal congress which met to consider steps for the preservation of that dialect asked that Dutch should be made a compulsory subject and its absence penalised. Finally the Commission suggested a compromise which practically amounted to this : that Dutch was to be treated as a foreign language (compulsory) and with optional opportunities for making additional marks in it. In one branch of education this method gives special facilities to the Dutch-speaking student, since he can take that tongue as his foreign language subject, where English boys would take Dutch, French, or German, and with his natural advantages is able to score higher marks than they can hope to get. The commission also enunciated

the principle, which has guided the educational authorities in the new colonies, that parents, and not school managers, should be the arbiters on certain moot points. Of this we must speak elsewhere, but it has considerable significance in the language question.

In the Transvaal one would naturally expect to find Dutch the only school language till recently, but it is noticeable that the first school ordinance drafted under President Bürgers provided that Dutch or English should be taught at the wish of the parents. All schools were subsidised by Government, but until 1891 the management was almost entirely local.

It was only in 1882, the same year in which Dutch became a compulsory subject at the Cape, that Dutch was also made the compulsory school language of the Transvaal. The ordinance as to language was at first interpreted with some anxiety, for there were English schools on the Rand which obtained Government support; but in 1891 a new broom, in the shape of a Hollander superintendent who had been a school teacher near Stellenbosch, Cape Colony, began to sweep very clean. Under his *régime* teachers had to belong to a Protestant Church, all lesson books had to be in Dutch, and three hours a week in lower and four in upper standards were all that was allowed for "a foreign language," possibly English. In response to the remonstrances of Uitlanders that this bill practically turned their children out of school, an Act was passed permitting the use of English in schools provided that the children could satisfy an inspector of their

efficiency in the Dutch language and history. The effect was to reduce town schools forty per cent. and the ward or county schools by one-fourth, and that it affected the Dutch as well as the English is shown by the report of the superintendent, who spoke of the "short-sighted desire" of people to get more English instruction than was to be had in Government schools. The Uitlanders began to found private schools to meet the emergency, and the Transvaal Government launched out into a system of free bursaries and lavish grants by which they increased their school numbers. This was, roughly, the state of affairs when war broke out.

In the Orange Free State the educational policy was marked by liberality and tolerance, especially under Presidents Brand and Reitz, who were more in sympathy with the wide nationalist aims of the Hofmeyr school than with the narrow views of the Transvaal leaders. From the time of the first school ordinance, Dutch was the medium of instruction, except in town or village schools where the parents desired otherwise. It must be observed that the right of the parent to decide this question was theoretically acknowledged, and that it was not entrusted to school managers or left entirely at the discretion of the Department. When Standard IV. was reached, however, both English and Dutch were used, with the simple proviso that half the instruction should be in Dutch. There were always a number of English farmers scattered throughout the country, and the moderate regulations combined with this

fact made the people more truly bi-lingual than any others save the well-educated fraction in Cape Colony. But it must not be forgotten that in no part of South Africa save in Cape Colony and Natal (and there only in recent years) has anything like a decent proportion of people received any education worth speaking of.

In dealing with Government, or rather with State-aided, public schools it must not be supposed that only those intended for the poor are included. The voluntary system and fee-paying have always been features of South African education, and in the new colonies it is only the British Government which has recognised the principle of State education. The new Education Bill of Cape Colony takes practically the same view of Government responsibility, though by establishing a system of school rates it substitutes direct for indirect taxation. There are besides a large number of private schools in Cape Colony and a certain number in the new colonies, nearly all receiving some support from Government; and practically all, in preparing pupils for the Cape examinations, conform to the curriculum of the Department of Education. The language question is naturally influenced in these schools by the idiosyncrasies of the teacher and proprietor, but it may be reasonably supposed that it is one of the first considerations of the parents. Nothing short of a detailed account of the method pursued in each school and of the attitude of the parents in their letters and interviews with the principals would be

sufficient to settle the position taken by the better class Dutch towards this educational problem, but a fair indication may be given in the following instances. A little Boer girl of fourteen from Rustenberg, educated at a private school in Pretoria whence she only went home twice a year, amused me on board ship with her violently anti-English attitude. Her quarrels with an English colonial child, however, revealed the fact that, while the latter spoke the Taal fluently, she herself had quite forgotten it and did not know a word of Dutch. At a semi-private Cape Colony school of superior class for girls, to which some of the best families in the Transvaal send their children, we were told that not one parent had taken advantage of the offer made by the principal to substitute Dutch for French in the curriculum, and that the girls spoke English at their games. The question of examinations was naturally not a prominent one in this school, where ladylike behaviour, culture, and accomplishments were the chief aims.

CHAPTER II

THE MAKING OF DUTCH AFRICANDERS: THE RACE PROBLEM IN SCHOOL

WHEN South Africa was first colonised elementary education was still regarded in Europe as the exclusive business of the priest, and therefore, as a matter of course, Cape Colony began with Church-directed schools, which existed for more than a century before any attempt was made to obtain qualified teachers from Holland. Just before the second British occupation, in 1804, the Dutch governor, Van der Mist, promulgated a striking ordinance (never enforced) which placed all schools under Government, provided for the training of teachers, made education semi-compulsory, and decreed taxation for school purposes. Could the worthy governor have come to life a century later, he would still have been before his time in the view of a large section of South African opinion.

The first real sign of educational activity was in 1822, when a batch of Scottish teachers was brought out and placed in the chief centres, at the time when English became the State and school language. Seventeen years later five more teachers of the same nationality were imported, and the institutions under their direction attracted pupils from the earlier type

of schools taught by church clerks and largely under control of the *predikants*. The school-committee system came into being naturally, as the people of a district desired education for their children. A meeting of those interested in education was held and a committee selected, which usually consisted of the *predikant* and one or two prominent men of the district, who constituted an informal guarantee board. Their representations to Government were met, if they were considered sufficiently responsible, with a grant-in-aid. A teacher was advertised for and selected by the committee; in 1865 this selection was made subject to the approval of the Superintendent of Education, and the pound-for-pound principle became the standard on which Government aid was given. The functions of the committee were voluntary but carried with them great responsibility, although the ownership of school property, the continuity of the committee, and other important details were left in a vague and undefined state, and there was no rating power or fixity of tenure. The result was to make the education of a whole district dependent on the energy and public spirit of a few of its better-class inhabitants.

Naturally the power of the committee was at first only limited by its own energies, not always very wisely directed; but the first Parliamentary Commission, in 1861, recommended that a further check should be provided in the nomination by Government of school managers. In all questions relating to local administration in South Africa it is, however, necessary to keep in mind the sparseness of

the population in all save the districts containing a few large towns. Let the local body which controls the school be called by whatever name one likes, let it be elected or nominated, there is so small a choice of men in the majority of cases that the result will usually be much the same.

The most striking development of the last decade in Cape Colony has been the increase of activity in the Education Department, under a vigorous and determined head, and the introduction of uniformity into the administration. In ten years, despite the interruption and confusion caused by war, the enrolment of scholars has increased by sixty-one thousand, and the percentage of attendance is considerably higher. Up to the time of writing the local management of schools remains the same in principle as already described, being voluntary and at the same time pecuniarily responsible for at least half the expense. Native mission schools, Church schools, and private schools which are State-aided naturally enjoy more complete freedom; but the requirements of a Government code and a far more complete system of inspection than hitherto practised have been instruments to bring these into line. The local authorities and school committees have fought hard for the prerogatives which they believe to be threatened by the activity of the Superintendent-General, and since the war the importation of political bias has even further embittered such questions as those of religious teaching and language. The most formidable weapon retained by the committees has been the power to

dismiss the teachers, who naturally felt that they could not afford, even with the authority of the Department behind them, to traverse the wishes of their masters.

It is unnecessary to dwell on this part of the subject, because the whole system will shortly be revised and education in Cape Colony placed on a firmer footing. The Education Bill which this year passed the Cape House, although introduced by a Progressive Government, was discussed and agreed to by the opposition,¹ and may claim to be a fair and reasonable compromise acceptable to all who have the interests of education at heart. While it contains some flaws, it is a great advance on any previous ordinance, since it establishes the principle that education is not to be left to local caprice, that it must be provided free for those who cannot pay fees, and that compulsory education may be introduced by degrees. Briefly described, the Bill provides for the delimitation of school districts and the erection of school boards, of which two-thirds of the members shall be elected by the ratepayers and one-third nominated by the Governor of the Colony. The powers of the school boards are to found public undenominational schools, to take over the functions of existing school committees, and to supervise the management of schools in their district. The actual management may be by a committee elected by the parents, or, failing this, the

¹ It is advisable to explain that in the Cape the two parties are the Progressives and the South African party (the latter under the inspiration of Hofmeyr and Malan) now in opposition.

board may carry out the work with the sanction of parents. As to the language question, the new Bill makes no change. The Commission of 1891 reported that neither a local committee nor the Education Department should alone decide the linguistic medium, and this provision remains for the present. English is the school language, but as there have always been ample facilities for teaching Dutch, the new legislation makes no special provision for it. The board may borrow money for purposes of improvement, may within a year make school attendance compulsory within its district, and finally must levy rates for educational expenses not covered by fees, the amount so collected not to be more than half the excess of expenditure over receipts, Government paying the other half. The maximum rate to be levied is fixed by law, and any deficiency thereafter must be met by Government. The chief point with which we are now concerned is that of the powers vested in the local boards. They do not have the control of finance, nor can they either appoint or dismiss teachers without approval from the Department, and, as we have seen, they do not as committees decide the medium of instruction, though as parents they have voices in this matter.

Although these features do not meet with general approval, yet they are reasonable and just in a State-subsidised school system and wise in a country like South Africa, where it will for many years be impossible to find qualified men to undertake the voluntary and unpaid duties of school managers. The continual

warfare between town and country, which is so grave a feature of Africander life, and unfortunately, is synonymous in many parts with the racial division, was not forgotten in the debates over the Education Bill, especially the sections which deal with the mapping out of school areas. It is inevitable that the town-dweller should have advantages in such matters over his up-country brother; and the grievances of the latter, arising chiefly from the sacrifices he must make to attend school committees or take part in management, are real and not imaginary. It is a pity, however, that the back-veld Africander, Dutch or even British, has too little acquaintance with the outer world to be aware that these inequalities are inevitable in a country in the making. A little more real enthusiasm for education, some of the spirit of the western states of America, and a less jealous suspicion of political motives would be a gain on both sides. Whatever may have been the charges of political favouritism and propaganda made during the war (by both parties) against the Education Department and its present head it cannot be denied that they have constantly laboured, and successfully, to bring educational facilities to a larger number of children and to raise the standard all round. That some strenuous effort was needed is shown by the figures already quoted for 1891, when only one-third of the white children attended school. The level of attainment has been incredibly low in the rural districts and coloured schools, more than fifty per cent. of the scholars being below Standard IV.; and it must be

remembered that the South African standards are not quite equivalent to those of England. The ignorance and illiteracy of the population have been a stain on Government and people alike, for Cape Colony is no newly settled country and has long been peaceful ; and it is to be hoped that the new Bill, which received the assent of both sides in politics, may be instrumental in enabling Boer and Briton to work together to wipe out this stain.

School management under the Orange Free State Government was in many features similar to that of Cape Colony, the committees being partly nominated, two members chosen by the State President, while three were elected by burghers. One of the main differences in the functions exercised was that for some time they constituted an examining body, and possessed the right to nominate to free bursaries and other privileges. In the Tansvaal the beginning of State education was made in 1874 by President Bùrgers ; but it was not till 1891, the year which saw a determined attempt, initiated by Reitz, to make Hollander influence paramount in the Transvaal, that the State control of the schools became absolute, in theory at least, under the direction of a Hollander superintendent. Before his advent a go-as-you-please course had been adopted ; but his strict adherence to the letter of the law in language instruction, and the enforcement of religious disabilities, are proofs of his authority, since the protests of Dutch as well as English parents were disregarded. It must not be forgotten that, although education was not supposed to be free, a large number of Boer

children were entirely supported by the State; and the expenditure was excessive, considering the results obtained.

Naturally the war made a great break in the continuity of school work throughout South Africa; even in Cape Colony many schools were broken up and the organising work of the Department was so set back that the equivalent of a year's labour was probably wasted. Apart from this, political differences embittered relations between people. Questions which should have been decided purely on their merits as educational problems were dragged into the political arena, and a spirit of antagonism was aggravated between the Education Department, the committees of school management, and the Nationalist leaders.

Very different conditions prevailed in the two new colonies. Before peace was actually declared educational work was in progress in the concentration camps and among the prisoners at Green Point. The heartiest co-operation was afforded by every branch of the public service, and the question of expense was practically set on one side, the aim being to bring without delay the best possible education to the largest number of Boers. The work, done under the most adverse conditions, partly by colonial British or Dutch teachers and partly by trained teachers from overseas, cannot be estimated too highly. By the end of 1901 more children were at school than in any previous period in the history of the Boer republics. With the break up of the concentration camps efforts were made to keep in touch with these scholars, the principal method

adopted being the establishment of farm schools, either in a convenient house or (as was more common at that period of confusion) in temporary accommodation within reach of several farms. The expense was increased by the migratory habits of the people and the unsettled state of the country, and with the creation of town schools and the necessary provision of accommodation further difficulties had to be met. Many criticisms have been levelled at the heavy expenditure in this respect, as well as at other Government departments; but the high cost of living, the universal disorganisation, and the pressing need for immediate action, if a whole generation of Boers were not to grow up illiterate, made economy the last thing possible. *Coûte que coûte*, the work had to be done.

At this juncture I must dispose of another criticism, one of a more detailed character—as to the appointment of teachers. The impression obtains in South Africa that the Education Departments of the new colonies ruthlessly dismissed their Africander teachers and replaced them by others from overseas. It is certain that many of the former employés of the late Boer Governments lost their positions. In the Transvaal, however, a large number of these were Hollanders, many of whom returned to their own country. Up to July, 1903, in the new colonies 752 teachers were engaged from South Africa, while only 475 (including heads of departments) were brought from overseas, of whom 69 left the department, 48 because of marriage. It must be remembered that the two republics were not well supplied with trained teachers, having no

normal schools on which to draw. The modern educational theory of the professional teacher and the importance of trained teaching for even the youngest children was in conflict with the prevailing system or lack of system. The pupil-teaching method, with all its disadvantages, was the only training to be had. Excellent educational work had been done by the late superintendent of the Orange River Colony ; but such an opportunity as now presented itself of placing the whole system on a thoroughly reformed and modern basis had never occurred before, and would never occur again. The first necessity was a supply of trained men and women.

The importation of teachers from the other British colonies and from Great Britain was regarded with distrust because of the suspected underlying political motives. It is hardly possible that these motives did not exist—even a Director of Education is human—but without any such influence he would still have been compelled to fill the ranks of his teachers from outside South Africa if he desired any kind of educational efficiency. There was no local supply on which he could draw, and he exhausted the possibilities and, indeed, accepted inferior material, in order to utilise the services of Africanders. As a matter of fact a greater proportion of Africander teachers is now employed in the new colonies than under the late government. The majority used to be Hollanders who were aliens and by no means popular. As an instance of the material available at the end of the war, we may cite the case of the voluntary teachers in a camp school.

Two of these were old Transvaal head masters, one was a first assistant, and the fourth a visiting teacher, but all alike held no higher qualification than the Cape matriculation certificate. No slur is intended on these particular teachers, whose work was favourably regarded, but it is obvious that such slender qualifications on the part of men in such positions argues a low standard in the ranks. It may be said here that the trained British teachers not only have done well in their work, but have adapted themselves to the conditions of life, and in many cases have become very popular. The general testimony of inspectors is that they do better than Colonials, and, in order of successfulness all round, the English teacher comes first, then the British Colonial, then the Hollander, and last the Dutch Africander. By the establishment of "normal" schools at Pretoria and Bloemfontein the Department now hopes to secure a better supply of trained Africander teachers, and it must be noted that of the normal-school pupils a large percentage are Dutch. It will be a year or two before any regular and continuous supply of teachers can be counted on from this source—at least of men who are really educated as well as trained—since the interruption in school work cut off the higher classes which should feed the normal schools. But the important first step has been made.

The changes made in administration by the new departments were considerable. The vital difference lay in the attitude taken by the Government in acknowledging its responsibility for the education of the people. They had therefore to provide schools

wherever necessary out of Government funds, and the first result was naturally a large increase in the official staff charged with these duties. School committees are a part of the scheme. In the Orange River Colony the committees are nominated and partly elected, and in the Transvaal elected, by a plebiscite called by the inspector of the district, only *bonâ-fide* parents or guardians of scholars being allowed to attend this meeting. If there is no committee, then a parents' meeting can be held, but the functions exercised are in no case administrative. Through the inspector complaints and reports can be made, and the committee has rights and privileges as regards selection of teachers, visiting schools, using school buildings, and so forth. It can influence, investigate, and report, but it cannot act independently of the Education Department nor control the teachers.

Against these restrictions in the power of school committees there have been many complaints and petitions. The fundamental weakness in the position of the committees, however, is the general and deep-rooted objection to the payment of a school rate, which would give them a different status. The fees paid by burghers before the war in either State did not amount to half the expenditure on education, the remainder being made up by grants and bursaries; but still there were fees, and the Government did not shoulder the responsibility of a school without some guarantee as to these. At present education is free, and any attempt to alter this would meet with the strongest opposition on the part of the Boers themselves, who indeed find

the burden of taxation heavy enough. At the same time an effort has been made, by avoiding the creation of small school boards in thinly populated districts, to place education above the influence of narrow local politics, and to secure continuity and stability in all educational work, while it is obvious that schools supported by taxation are fairer to the people than a system of fees or rates.

In May, 1905, the subject of school management in the Transvaal was made part of the bargain struck between the Nationalist party, *Het Volk*, and the "Responsible" party,¹ in which the Government control of the Education Department was confirmed *in principle*. This agreement is of course only a plank in the platform of a party, but as representing a future policy it is of great importance. At present the situation as regards the three most debatable points in education stands roughly thus: Government controls the teachers and finance absolutely and has prescribed the curriculum; parents (either by general meetings or through a committee appointed by them) form advisory boards, with the right to make representations and, in conjunction with a Government inspector, to decide minor points of school policy on the broad lines laid down by the department; English is the school language, but Dutch is to be taught for three hours a week, and two hours' Biblical instruction may also be given in Dutch.

¹ The political parties in the Transvaal are the Progressives (in favour of representative government) and the Responsibles (supporting full self-government), both of these British, and the *Het Volk* (Dutch Nationalist) party, in alliance with the Responsibles.

One of the most difficult points in the education policy has been religious instruction; and although at the time of writing the Orange River Colony has reached a conclusion which confirms the education ordinance, yet a commission of inquiry in the Transvaal has reported unfavourably on it. Robbed of all local significance, the question is precisely the one which has proved such a stumbling-block to education in England; but the situation has a special significance in the Transvaal because the education authorities were anxious to place the new system on a basis which would avoid any appearance of bias to any party, while at the same time conceding—what they believe to be the principle of the majority of the people—the opportunity to secure some form of religious teaching for their children. The ministers of all denominations are given, therefore, the right of entry to Government schools, where for specified times and in certain hours they can instruct those children whose parents wish it. It was the opinion of the majority of the Commission which reported in July, 1905, that this concession was worthless, since the conditions of the country are such that the majority of schools cannot secure the services of a clergyman, the Dutch Reformed congregations particularly being scattered and remote. Moreover, they pointed out that some 7,000 Transvaal children are still in the so-called Christian National Schools, independent of Government, and that both Anglicans and Roman Catholics continue to carry on their denominational schools. At the same time a very small number of children have availed themselves of

the instruction of clergy, even when it was possible to get it. On the whole it does not look as if there was any great demand for sectarian teaching among the people, while the teachers are opposed to a system which increases the difficulties of organisation and makes demands on their accommodation. The bulk of the evidence goes to show that on these grounds the difficulties in the way of providing really adequate religious teaching are considerable, but it is difficult to see what better system can be suggested. The subsidising of denominational schools by Government has not proved satisfactory in England, and would lead to innumerable complications in the Transvaal, for it is out of the question to single out any religious body as the State Church, and the whole educational organisation, to be efficient, must be centralised and placed as much as possible above religious or party dissensions. The suggestion which the Commission seemed to favour was that the teachers should, on lines laid down by a conference of religious bodies, impart the essentials of religion, apart from creed or dogma, and that any further instruction must be given in the home or at the Sunday school. As a matter of fact, except that the religious bodies have not yet (as in the Orange River Colony) agreed on a handbook, this is precisely the course now followed, with the proviso that parents requiring further dogmatic teaching may obtain it for their children. The objections to this supplementary or alternative teaching (it is not yet clear which it may be; it is alternative in the Orange River Colony), on the ground of possible proselytising,

over-zeal, and interference with the teacher's authority, appear to be frivolous and can be easily met by simple regulations, the great merit of the system being that it allows complete liberty and is to be recommended on the grounds of political expediency. It is highly undesirable that the Dutch should be able to say that the Government schools barred out religious teaching, and in many cases it might lead to serious complications if they thought that the only instruction their children were permitted to get must come through the medium of a teacher whose religious creed differed from their own and whose appointment they could not control.¹ As the number of children affected is too small to make any real grievance, and as the subject is essentially a contentious one, the Legislative Council, while agreeing that the "right of entry" has failed in its object of contenting all religious bodies and stamping out denominational schools, has nevertheless decided that, as any alteration of the ordinance would practically inaugurate a new religious policy, the decision must be left to the Representative Government about to be inaugurated.

No special mention of this point was made by the *Het Volk*-Responsible manifesto. Their position on the language question is more clearly defined. The principle is conceded that English should have equal rights with Dutch in the Transvaal—a very important concession,

¹ Smuts wrote to Miss Hohhouse, "The British teachers may be Romanists or Sacerdotalists, and very likely are." This aroused much sympathy in Evangelical and Nonconformist circles, but some of the best families among the Boers have been in the habit of trusting their children to "Romanists," in the convert schools which have hitherto been the only centres of upper-class education.

and one on which *Het Volk* will not go back. Unfortunately the interpretation of this sentiment is less satisfactory, since it is laid down that the school language up to Standard IV. may be Dutch at the discretion of the local management. As the percentage of children above Standard IV. is very small (even in Pretoria only 3·7 in 1903), and as practically none are over this standard in the farm schools, this means that the teaching of English to Dutch children would be almost abandoned for some years at the most critical period of Transvaal history. The situation is, however, not so simple as it looks, since the agreement lays down that, in the case of Dutch being the elementary school language, English shall be taught for an equivalent number of hours or *vice versa*. The difficulty of dividing school subjects neatly in half and making them English or Dutch is apparent to all with experience in these matters. That a child should learn history in Dutch and geography in English, should have half its writing lesson in one language and half in another (when one remembers that both languages have to be made familiar to him through the Taal, or, if he is an English child, that he has to begin half his studies at the beginning)—with a school curriculum already overcrowded and while it is still difficult to get good teachers—is so unpractical a suggestion that some simpler solution will have to be found. Already a substantial foundation of acquaintance with English has been laid, and, despite the political motives which oppose it, there is considerable evidence that the people themselves are not unfriendly to that language.

The Nationalist schools founded in opposition to Government, having in 1904 7,000 scholars, must be referred to elsewhere. It is difficult for them to compete with free schools, but they have not, allowing for that, secured as much support as might have been expected if the feeling against the British system were as strong as is represented. An education official, shortly after the first Government schools had got into working order, paid a visit to one and met the committee of management. As none of them spoke English, he began in a friendly spirit by asking how the Dutch teaching got on at the school. To his surprise he was told that, despite the ordinance which expressly laid down that Dutch should be taught for at least three hours a week, there was actually no Dutch teaching in this school. The committee explained the reason: they did not want it; their children spoke Dutch enough and they wished them to learn English. A similar experience befell me in the Southern Transvaal, where I met a Boer who, as an "irreconcilable," had returned from captivity in Ceylon. He boasted of the proficiency of his little girl in English, saying that she was the quickest in her class and the English teacher's favourite, although she had had no schooling until then. He spoke of the advantages the youngsters of the present day enjoyed, excusing his own roughness and halting speech by saying that he had never attended school as a boy. One must, of course, never make too much of Dutch politeness, but these remarks were voluntary and seemed to be genuine. At the Boer Congress of June, 1905, there was some plain speaking on the

part of leaders as to the apathy and indifference of the bulk of the people on the subject of Nationalist education. One member reported that, having started a farm school where he offered to board children at a very low rate, he was unable to get scholars to support it. The subject was referred to a committee, which decided, in somewhat general terms, to endeavour to promote the cause of Nationalist education and to appeal for funds for the Church National Schools; but the influence of the leaders was rather in the direction of putting pressure on Government and getting concessions from them, and Schalk-Burger pointed to the *Het Volk*-Responsible agreement as giving control over children for the two first and most important years of school life.

There only remains for description the condition in the Orange River Colony, where recently an amalgamation has taken place between the Government and the Church National Schools, which were started by the Dutch Reformed Church. By this amalgamation a real step forward has been taken in eliminating the race question from education, but it was not accomplished without give-and-take on either hand. Perhaps the least satisfactory feature is the arrangement for raising local school contributions, which may be done in any way approved by the school committee except by fees. If the amount raised is not satisfactory, the Government can levy a poll-tax—not a very enviable prerogative and one which, if exercised, may lead to considerable discontent, since the people are already sufficiently taxed. It hardly

seems fair to place the onus of collecting local contributions on the shoulders of the Government, and it is to be hoped that the system will soon be merged into one of local school boards, with rating powers for educational purposes similar to those to be established in the Cape. The financial control given to the local committees seems also rather out of proportion to their responsibilities; but such concessions as these were worth while to secure the acknowledgment from Dutch leaders that English must be the school language, though Dutch and English, as languages, will be taught equally. The State control of teachers—who must be registered and approved by the committee after selection by the department, paid direct by the department and dismissed by it only—is also a valuable concession, making for efficiency and raising the schools above the level of local jealousies or prejudices. The religious question has been solved by the agreement of all religious bodies on a handbook of Bible history for use by the teachers, while the “right of entry” principle is accepted, and some minor difficulties are settled by the arrangement of the time-table. The settlement of these controversial points is the first necessity if the training of young Afrianders is to proceed on lines which make for the progress and prosperity of their country.

To briefly summarise the chief points of controversy about the making of the young Afriander. The political question has become so merged into the educational one that it is not possible for Afrianders to see them apart. The really vital point is the

struggle over language, for the fight over the control of schools and the teaching of religion have their genesis in this question, and there are signs that this has now passed its climax. The leaders of the Transvaal Dutch and the Synodical representatives of Dutch education in the Orange River Colony have grudgingly recognised the principle that English must be the school language, and the attempt to found Dutch-speaking schools has not met with any great encouragement. At the same time the Government has made terms securing a fair treatment for Dutch, which will continue to be taught as a language and even used in school by young children; and the people have been given, as parents, the right to secure this teaching, the teaching of the Bible in Dutch, and the privilege of securing denominational teaching if they wish it. One of the first acts of the Education Department in the Orange River Colony was to appoint a Dutch inspector, and at the Cape examinations the children at Government schools obtained better marks in Dutch than those of the Church National Schools. In fact, the teaching of Dutch under the old *régime* left much to be desired, and under the new it will receive attention and be carefully taught. The first Director of Education for the new colonies engaged that, if the hours devoted to Dutch are not sufficient to enable the children to make a good show in examinations, they shall be increased.

These concessions do not remove the impression that Dutch—the School Dutch of South Africa—is a

hybrid and artificial growth, that the demand for it is artificial, and that the complications it imposes on the curriculum are unnecessary. The Taal is the language round which the sentiments of the Dutch Africander gather, and there has never been a question of teaching that in school, for, as was said in one school committee, the children know it better than the master. The Taal will survive because it is a genuine African growth, with its roots in the soil, and because it has a real value as a domestic *lingua franca*. As for the effect of English education upon the character of the young Africander, both Boer and Briton need to be reminded that one may speak English and yet be anti-British in feeling. The genuine hope of those who see in this obtrusion of the political element into every question a grave obstacle to all progress is not to make Little Englishmen of the Boer children, but that the wider scope, the more enlightened outlook on life afforded by the new system of education and by familiarity with a great modern language, may be instrumental in breaking down barriers and permitting the two races to understand and appreciate each other, so that eventually they may forget race differences on a common Africander platform. The strong resentment felt by the Boers at any supposed attempt to Anglicise them is fading away before the obvious intention of the British authorities, in education at all events, to think first of efficiency. To provide a free, sound education for every white child has been the cardinal point in the British policy, and, while there is still

much to do to realise this ambition, a start has been made, certain root principles have been established, and even in the teeth of the undoubted hostility of the Boer leaders who will lose no opportunity to press for Dutch as their national tongue, there is increasing co-operation among Africanders on both sides of the race line in this educational work, and a growing desire not to permit the future of their children to be handicapped in the race of life.

CHAPTER III

THE MAKING OF DUTCH AFRICANDERS: THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH

THE earliest Dutch immigrants to the Cape brought with them that form of the Christian faith which grew out of the teachings of Calvin, a form settled by the Synod of Dordrecht in 1616. It is interesting to note that the predominant feature of Calvinism, as opposed to Lutheranism (the dominant sect in the Low Countries after the Reformation), was its insistence on the republican principle. Although Luther believed in pulling down the Catholic hierarchy, he was a firm supporter of temporal power and of authority in religion. Calvin, whose doctrines were peculiarly congenial to such rugged, independent peoples as the Scots and Hollanders, was the apostle of democracy in Church and State alike.

The faithfulness of the Hollanders to the reformed faith had been intensified by the persecutions of the Spaniards, and the fact that the Cape was colonised partly from Huguenot stock increased the fanaticism which is often the result of persecution. The Dutch Reformed Church, as introduced into South Africa, is Calvinistic in doctrine and Presbyterian in organisation. From the earliest days it exercised great

influence not only on the minds, but on the lives of its members. The desire for a meeting-place for prayer led to the foundation of many Cape Colony villages, and from the Church organisation of consistories with elders ensued the gradual building up of village communities and towns. Education was for a long period entirely a Church matter, though the wandering teacher, often a broken-down man of superior attainments, played a small part. The character-building which is so important a part of education went on incessantly, however, its principal architects the free, wild country and the stern republican creed of Calvin. These influences were ever at work. It must be remembered that the ministers of the Church in Cape Colony were, until comparatively recent times, recruited largely from Holland; and that they were therefore men of better education and wider views than the Afrianders, taking an active part in public affairs, and being eligible for election to various offices. The Lutheran element in this immigration is largely responsible for the support of and dependence on the temporal power which is so characteristic of the Dutch Reformed Church. No religious intolerance except to non-Protestant sects obtained at the Cape, and the closest co-operation existed between the Scottish Presbyterians and their Dutch brethren. It may be added that their forms of worship are practically indistinguishable.

The question of independence of the Cape in ecclesiastical as well as secular government asserted itself early in the history of the Boer republics, and

was finally decided by the establishment of independent synods. This development was an important one as marking a divergence from the Dutch *Africander* ideal, and in effect the policy of the Transvaal Church in particular has been anti-nationalist in the wider sense of that word. This has been largely due to the influence of a dissenting sect, introduced in 1858 from Holland, which became known in South Africa as the “Dopper” Church. This body has been distinguished for its strong conservatism and opposition to all so-called modern innovations in the religious or social world, and its narrow and bigoted creed has played an important part in shaping the history of the Boers. A second dissension took place in 1881 owing to a question concerning church lands, and the Transvaal now contains three distinct branches of the Dutch Reformed Church.¹

The ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, besides possessing great influence over their congregations, have always taken a leading part in politics. President *Bürgers*, called by the Transvaal to be their President in 1871, was a Cape Colony minister, and members of his cloth are still eligible for election to Parliament; but their political activity has, in less open ways, increased since the birth of what is called the Nationalist spirit in South Africa. This expression is hardly accurate, however, since it would be difficult to fix an exact date for the actual appearance of nationalism in South African politics. But

¹ For a fuller history of the growth of the Dutch Reformed Church, see Appendix.

the upholding of everything that appertained to Dutch nationality as opposed to British was from 1881 onwards peculiarly the aim of the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church. It was preached first by men of ability with European education, and became a propaganda among the students at the theological seminary. The Dopper clergy, mostly Hollanders, preached an open anti-British doctrine; the Cape and Orange River Colony ministers and the best of the Transvaalers adopted a broader Nationalist and constructive programme. It would be inaccurate to say that the point of view was merely selfish. These men began with a conviction that the best interests of South Africa were bound up with the preservation of the Dutch element as a distinct entity. There was, however, a less disinterested side to the attitude of the clergy. With the spread of secular education and Government schools they saw their hold on the people weakening; they saw an economic factor being introduced which threatened to swamp the country; they saw an increasing stream of their people going to England for higher education; and with the growing use of English as the social and domestic tongue they foresaw a falling off in their own Church membership in favour of the English Church service, and generally a great diminution of their own prestige. The situation is in many points similar to that in Ireland, and the people have been nearly as much dominated by their *predikants* as in that priest-ridden country.

The division of the South African Republic on ecclesiastical lines was closely paralleled by its political

divisions. The Gereformeerde or Dopper Church, always repudiating dependence on, or connection with, the Cape and cherishing no wider nationalistic aim than that of an independant Transvaal, drew its ministers largely from Holland, and it is well known how powerful and how baleful was the Hollander influence on Paul Kruger and his political career. The United Reformed Church, on the contrary, for some years past has recruited its clergy from the theological seminary in Cape Colony, thereby securing an inferior stamp of man intellectually and educationally than could be got from State colleges in Holland, but ensuring that he should be steeped in Dutch Africander traditions. This policy was affirmed by the Synods of the United and the Hervormde Churches in 1903, and even the Doppers adopted it.

While resolutions in favour of internal unity and co-operation were being passed by the Synods of the United and Hervormde Churches in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, the Cape Colony Synod, not to be behindhand, announced in the same year a resolution for the unity of all Dutch Churches in South Africa, with the significant exclusion of those not previously united to the Church in Cape Colony. This exception must be read in the light of the refusal, shortly after the war, to consider a proposal made on behalf of the Scottish Presbyterian Synod to discuss measures for drawing nearer the two Churches which had hitherto been on such friendly relations. The refusal was expressly based on the lack of sympathy shown by the Presbyterian Church to the

Boer cause during the war. This example was followed, in 1903, by the Synod of the Transvaal, which rescinded the working union with the Scottish Presbyterians, while at the same time objections were made, on similar grounds, to messages of friendship being sent to the Baptist Synod then sitting in Johannesburg. A definite programme of a political character was even decided on, whereby efforts were to be made to promote schools in which "sufficient justice shall be done to our language and Church," and a vigilance committee appointed with a view to gaining more concessions from the Government.

The action taken by the Transvaal clergy after the war towards the National Scouts, though it may be excused to a certain extent on the ground of sore feeling among the congregations, was too marked to be passed over. The National Scouts were practically excommunicated from several congregations. In some instances their children were refused baptism, and one minister went so far as to say that for such people no forgiveness could be expected either from God or man. The moderator, appealed to by the High Commissioner, declared that these affairs were matters of Church discipline which could only be settled by local *kerkeraads*; but at a meeting of the Synod this attitude was abandoned, and it was decided that the National Scouts must "confess guilt" and ask forgiveness before they could receive the sacraments of the Church.

There is evidence that this high-handed policy was not received with favour by many Boers who were not Scouts themselves. Some of the latter had seceded,

and had been informed that no difficulty existed to their being received into the Scottish Presbyterian Church. Two cases of political persecution occurred at the same time. A Dutch Reformed minister (from the Free State), who had surrendered in 1900 and taken an active part in advocating peace, was driven from his congregation on these grounds and for no moral or doctrinal fault, yet despite this fact the Transvaal Synod refused to recognise his claims to ecclesiastical recognition. Another minister in Cape Colony was dismissed for taking up arms on the British side, although he was only defending himself against men who were rebels to his Government. These men began to minister to the National Scouts in the settlements where they were gathered together. The danger of a considerable secession became evident, a more conciliatory attitude was adopted, and despite the resolutions of the Synod the "confession of guilt" was not demanded, and the local ministers began to endeavour to regain their old position with the people they had ostracised.

In a subsequent chapter the Nationalist programme will be discussed ; it is only intended here to show the significance of the religious factor in political life. The general tendencies of the Dutch Reformed Church to-day are, in fact, the key to the whole racial position. The history of the relations between the rival sects and their connection with their mother Church at the Cape, the drawing together of the people throughout South Africa by means of Church co-operation and propaganda, and the attitude of the Cape Church

during the war and its avowed policy ever since, are all indicative of the growth of the Dutch Afrikaner Nationalist movement. To-day the efforts of lay leaders are largely concentrated on a union which would bring the forces of all Dutch Churches into line. There is nothing covert about this, nor about the end for which this would be the means. There is, however, more than one obstacle in the way of this complete unity, and not least is the somewhat autocratic attitude assumed in the Transvaal by the Synod of the leading sect, the United Reformed Church, which has been growing both in numbers and influence. It has called itself "the People's Raad," and its moderator has been spoken of as the Boer Pope. Personal loyalty and obedience to established authority are characteristic of the Boers, but they are very jealous of any assumption of power such as that of the Synod, and, as has been noted, they practically neglected its resolutions as regards the National Scouts. Even more recently an interesting illustration of this was afforded by the action of the congregations in the Orange River Colony, after the Synod had agreed with the Government to amalgamate their schools with those of the State. Although all congregations save one agreed to this eventually, they required a great deal of persuasion and were by no means prepared to accept the decision of their representatives and leaders. Of this amalgamation we must speak later.

The oft-quoted saying of the Jesuits, "Give us a child till he is nine years old, and you can do what you like with him after," has found an echo in the

politico-religious world of South Africa, but the machinery of a Presbyterian body like the Dutch Reformed Church is greatly inferior for purposes of education to that supplied by the great Catholic orders. The Church schools were never adequate, and the various States, in assuming some of the burdens of education, have taken over by degrees all control. Up to a certain point, however, this did not greatly affect the power of the Church. As is shown elsewhere, the *predikants* retained a voice in school matters through the school committees, of which they were prominent members. Many State-aided schools in the colonies were Church schools and open to denominational teaching, and a strict discipline still obtains in some of the presbyteries, whereby young people must pass an examination before they can be confirmed, and are refused the rite of marriage until after confirmation. As a vast majority of Boers are not living within daily reach of their *predikant*, who travels round and visits his flock, and only gathers them together at intervals for the *naacht maal*, it follows that doctrinal teaching from the village or farm school teacher was a matter of some importance, and yet the first Transvaal ordinance put religious instruction of any kind outside the school curriculum. This must have been due to the influence of President Bürgers, whose views on religious questions gained him a reputation for unorthodoxy so fearful in the eyes of his burghers that they eventually refused to fight under him in a native rising, saying that God was against them. While the Boer republics lasted the Dutch Reformed Church

enjoyed many privileges as the State Church, and in the Transvaal during Krüger's administration no teachers were (theoretically) allowed in State-aided schools who did not belong to one of its sects. But, as he drew his material from the dissenting schools of Holland and not from the well-equipped Dutch colleges, and as the Doppers and the Reformed Church were continually in a state of antagonism, it is not likely that the subject of religious teaching was an easy one even in those days. As a matter of fact, all who could afford it sent their children to the Cape, the Continent, or England for education, the Marist Brothers had about 600 pupils in their charge, there was a convent school at Pretoria by no means confined to Catholics, and denominational education on a small scale was carried on by practically every religious body.

The difficulty encountered by the British at the outset in the new colonies was that of reconciling the claims of rival Churches with the desire for efficiency and justice. Eventually the only plan seemed to be to do away altogether with State-aided Church schools, and to establish undenominational education throughout the State. The decision was repugnant to many of the Boer traditions and feelings, and also to many people not Dutch who valued denominational teaching for their children. Private Dutch Reformed Church schools were started, mainly with funds collected in Europe for relief purposes, some by voluntary contributions, and others with the aid of money paid by Government for schools and lands taken over. To discredit the public schools people were led to believe

that Government was bent on proselytising. The Nationalist leaders undoubtedly used this weapon unfairly, but with a show of reason, since to bring up a child without doctrinal teaching is believed by many people to be equivalent to turning him from the faith of his fathers. The offer made by Government to open the schools to all ministers for teaching purposes, out of hours, does not meet the case from the point of view of the country Boer, since the scattered nature of the congregation would make it impossible for an average *predikant* to undertake these fresh duties. At the same time the people regard with suspicion any Biblical teaching by a man or woman of whose creed they have no guarantee.

These difficulties have been enumerated, not with a view to pointing out errors on either side, but to indicate the strength of feeling which the Government schools had to combat. In the matter of education they had, at first, practically the whole influence of the Church against them, and the strong religious sense of the people. Even in the teeth of these the attendance at undenominational Government schools has greatly increased in the new colonies (nearly doubling in a few years), partly no doubt because the English child now goes to a Government school instead of a private one, as he did before the war, but chiefly because the Boers are anxious to get education even at the sacrifice of prejudice. No doubt, also, a little experience has convinced them that there is no proselytising. The Bible is taught (in Dutch, if desired) for two hours a week, and dogmatic religious instruction may

be given by ministers at the parents' desire, but the nature of religious teaching is a matter still on the tapis.

In the Orange River Colony more success has been attained, since the existing Church schools have amalgamated with the State, the Synod accepting, with certain modifications, the terms laid down. This agreement having been come to between the Synodical representatives and the Government, there still remained the objections of individual congregations. A valuable index to Boer feeling is afforded by the experiences of the Director of Education in meeting local committees and explaining matters to them. The opposition offered shows an independence of ecclesiastical authority in its highest form, but a characteristic submission to it individually, since, as a rule, the local *predikant* could be easily discerned in the action of his congregation. One congregation alone refused to be bound by the decision of the Synod, and the grounds of its dissent were so significant that they must be referred to elsewhere in dealing with the racial question. An equally interesting discussion took place in the Cape House over the new Education Bill on the subject of religious teaching, and the result was practically to confirm the course adopted by British educational authorities in the other colonies. A recent conference on the subject in the Orange River Colony has resulted in an arrangement of the time-table which facilitates matters, definitely permitting denominational teaching in school hours. The subject of religious teaching, still a debatable point, is dealt with later;

but one thing must be noted here, that the Churches are no longer the controllers of education for any of the white peoples.

Undoubtedly the Dutch Reformed Church loses a powerful weapon in ceasing to dominate the education of the young Afrikaner, and in ceasing to be the State Church of the new colonies. The recent Boer Congress at Pretoria was notable for the half-reproachful tone in which the clergy pressed the needs of Christian national education, and for the vague and general terms in which the leaders expressed their acquiescence, while many of the more ardent bewailed the apathy of the people. It will be difficult without the whole-hearted support of *Het Volk* and the people to maintain any distinct Church schools, and, in view of the attitude of the Government towards all denominational teaching, *Het Volk* can hardly expect any but a negative reply to their request for subsidies to private schools. The Church, however, still retains a strong hold on the people, and the position enjoyed by the *predikant* in the education of his flock is strengthened by the abolition of the *veld cornet*, who used to share with him the responsibility of being the oracle of the district on all subjects. The next generation of Boers will be less simple and better able to use their judgment, but the prestige of the Church will not soon wane. The greatest danger for her is the growing tendency to fill up the ranks of her ministry with men of little education or social standing. The minister needs to be a man of unusual character and ability if he is to hold the respect of his peasant congregation,

for he has no halo of consecration round him such as makes the ignorant priesthood of Ireland so potent. With a wider lay education will come a more critical attitude; and if the Dutch Reformed Church chooses to sacrifice the principles of Christian charity on the altar of political ambition, she will inevitably reap her reward in the diminution of her spiritual hold over a deeply religious and mystical people.

well to this upstart "sociologist"
- I suppose it is because he starts
with Cecil Rhodes!!!

CHAPTER IV

THE DUTCH AFRICANDER: IN PRIVATE LIFE

HAVING attempted in the previous chapters to indicate some of the principal factors which have shaped the life and character of the Dutch Afriander—his environment, education, and religion—an even more difficult task must now be essayed, that of describing the result of all these influences. One is obliged, unfortunately, to leave large *lacunæ* in tracing the character-development of these people. Their political history, and more particularly the history of their relations with Great Britain, cannot be dealt with in a work which professes to be nothing more than a picture of South Africa to-day, and which takes no further excursions into the past than those necessary to illustrate the significance of some political or social question. Unfortunately for the Afrianders, their impartial historian has not yet appeared, for the monumental works which are the present classics of South African history are deeply tinged by the personal sympathy of the writer living too near his subject for a truly judicial attitude. Theal's histories must be read by all who wish to understand, however dimly, Boer character and traditions; but they must not be

taken as presenting the whole case or as giving both sides of the question.

In approaching the complex subject of this chapter one naturally turns again to various historical works for the key to one's own observations, and the reflection which is uppermost is that it would have been impossible to produce, by so peculiar a process as that applied to the Dutch Africander, any ordinary commonplace character. It is interesting to note that many salient features were developed early, in old Cape Colony days. The Boer described by Lady Ann Barnard a hundred years ago might in many respects be the Boer of 1905. The Great Trek, however, brought out other qualities and developed new traits, so that the people of the Transvaal and Orange Free State became in some respects different from their Cape Colony cousins. A small instance illustrates this. The long journey in waggons and lack of any fixed abode, and even after a house had been built, the frequent necessity to abandon it and go into *laager* told upon the housewifely habits which the Dutch and French women had inherited. Slovenliness and lack of house pride were the result, while the exigencies of the Trek made the possession of handsome furniture or house plenishing impossible. Even the Cape Dutch have lost their æsthetic sense. The lack of picturesqueness about the modern Boer is a disappointment to English visitors. The fine old Dutch houses at the Cape are for the most part only appreciated by the English, and the home of the Transvaal Boer or Orange Free Stater is always ugly

and frequently squalid, or, if he is well-to-do, is furnished in the worst and' shoddiest taste. This bareness and unloveliness, however, have their historical significance.

While it is impossible here to make more than a passing allusion to the historical influences, it may be said that, roughly, these divide themselves into three currents. First, the relations between white and black ; this question does not confine itself to the effect of continual warfare, but to the whole range of intercourse. Second, the relations between the whites themselves, not only British and Boers, but Hollanders and Boers. Third, the influence of religion and of the language question.

It is possible to refer back any one of the most marked Dutch Africander traits to these currents of influence ; but when we have got so far in our analysis we shall still be brought up short by some inconsistency in the character we are attempting to describe.

The man whose knowledge of South Africa is limited by his reading has two distinct and conflicting conceptions of the Boer, as he has learnt to call the Dutch Africander. As a matter of fact, the word (literally "peasant") is equally applicable to other Africanders of European descent, but for convenience' sake we may adopt it. There are many Dutch Africanders who are as little like the popular conception of Boers as any English professional man ; but to avoid awkward repetition we will, more especially throughout this chapter, speak of the Dutch Africanders as Boers, and regard them as (what they are

not altogether) a distinct racial type. The two pictures of the Boer which the man in the street knows are widely different. One represents a large, lazy, bearded ruffian, very dirty, with slouch hat and large pipe, smoking and drinking coffee on his *stoep* all day long, with a Bible phrase on one side of his tongue and a lie on the other; while his slovenly farm around him is worked on prehistoric lines by Kaffirs. The prosperity of this person, since it cannot be the result of hard work, must be attributed to extraordinary slimness in overreaching other people or to the heavy taxation of the industrious town-dweller, which in some occult manner enriches him. The second picture is that of a lean and bearded man, with rifle in hand, riding furiously on a hard-bitten horse, subsisting chiefly on *biltong*, despising money, caring only for liberty, religion, his native language, and his little paternal property, raising a large family in the fear of the Lord and in the simple life.

It is a homely but honest maxim which says that it takes all sorts of men to make a world, and this is as true in South Africa as elsewhere; but while it takes all sorts of men to make up a Boer people, it is unlikely that either of the two extremes is really true to life. Many Boers are lazy, but the vast majority have had to work. Most Boers are God-fearing and patriotic, but very few are simple and straightforward. In fact, simplicity in a Boer is as unusual as guilelessness, in an Oriental, the truth being that ignorance and rusticity are not conducive to true simplicity. Your truly simple, logical man is the New

York millionaire, with the newest civilisation of the world and the most practical education behind his back. He has one idea, openly avowed, and pursues it with a single eye. When he gets to the spending stage he is equally simple and open, even when he believes himself to be placating both God and Mammon. But the Boer is near the heart of Nature, and in close contact with a primitive people. He is pulled this way and that by natural and primeval impulses which have never been schooled in an artificial self-restraint, modelled after a set pattern, or controlled by æsthetic perceptions. Certain strong leadings are given him. First, his religion, the religion of the Old Testament, which shows him an angry, jealous Deity ready to pounce on him if he does not perform certain ceremonial rites, and providing a man-made moral code which might be interpreted as one willed provided its letter be accepted. Second, the necessity to keep the upper hand of the blacks, to outwit and dominate them. Third, the instinct of the primitive man to preserve his independence of mind and body.

With these ends in view the Boer has shaped himself, without regard to the gods of civilised society—the conventions, social ambitions, and æsthetic influences which run men into a uniform mould. One of the first necessities of a cohesive society is respect for property, and thus we get the worldly old maxim that honesty is the best policy. Public opinion, again, is one of the most powerful social solvents ; but both these factors count for little with the mass of the

Boers. They are, or were till recent developments, several centuries younger in point of evolution than ourselves, and, possessing virtues we have lost, are also armed to the teeth with those protective qualities of suspicion, deception, ruse, and secretiveness which belong to primitive ages and primitive civilisations. What we call the lower forms of Nature are replete with these deceptions—insect mimicry we call one branch of them—and we ourselves, in the pride of our moral enlightenment, have only abandoned the tortuous paths of mediæval policy because we are frankly convinced that honesty pays best in the long-run. That the Boer has not yet perceived this fact may perhaps be partly due to our constant (almost involuntary) backslidings from an ideal which we nevertheless regard as at once practical and elevating, but the narrowness of his own outlook on life is largely responsible.

To give a concrete instance. The Transvaal Boers after the war was over regarded with the gravest suspicion any act of the High Commissioner, however much intended for their benefit, and were unanimous in attributing his policy to his personal bias. It is not too much to say that the idea of disinterested government seemed to them impossible. Although the vast majority remained fixed in their opposition to Lord Milner's policy, which did not square with their own Nationalist aspirations, it is, however, a fact that the honest intentions of the man, as apart from the politician, received a real recognition before he left the Transvaal. De la Rey, the best type of Boer,

came specially to say good-bye, and private messages were conveyed to Lord Milner assuring him that his genuine desire to promote the welfare of all sections of the people had not gone unrecognised. Such a demonstration as this would have been hardly possible in any other part of the Empire, because to thank a man in such a position so pointedly for disinterested motives, and for considering the welfare of the people, would be to suggest the converse. From a conquered people such a tribute was more natural; but, taken in conjunction with the public language of the Dutch leaders concerning Lord Milner, whom they spoke of as "the greatest enemy of our nation," it is interesting and significant.

In South Africa, however, accusations of interested motives, duplicity, prevarication, and even worse, are freely levelled at every public man, and no more unpleasing feature is to be found than the general distrust which exists and the detraction which is the rule of public and even of private life. This can only be attributed to the stage of evolution reached, in which the advantages of honesty and straightforwardness, both moral and practical, have not yet received the consideration they deserve. Moved to frankness by the necessity for explaining a position they could not defend, a school committee in the Orange River Colony, in refusing to allow their school to be amalgamated with those of the State, avowed that although Government had made every provision possible for the teaching of Dutch, religion, and other debatable points, yet they could not change their

decision, because they did not believe that Government would keep its word. Public life is corrupt in many countries, especially in the two extremes of complete democracy and absolute autocracy; but the newer countries might take warning in time, and remember that the best way to make a man untruthful is to tell him you are not prepared to believe a word he says. This failing, be it noted, is by no means confined to the Boers. The aggravation of the situation caused by racial divisions in South Africa is, in one sense, only temporary. With a wider and more liberal education the Boer will be disabused of the idea that the world is full of enemies, against whom he must be on his guard. This attitude of mind is excellently illustrated by the Boer habit of never answering a question with a direct affirmative or negative—a habit common to other races within the Empire, but curious in a Teutonic people. A young man, asked by a lady in our presence whether her son had called that afternoon, answered, “Did you expect him to call?” A laugh from his English hearers brought a blush and the quick admission that the son had not called, there being no cause for prevarication but the ingrained habit of his race. Like a Scot, he answered one question by asking another.

The moulding effects of public opinion and education and an abandonment of the defensive attitude may in time produce a type of Boer which recognises the advantage of mutual trust, for, be it understood, the Boers do not trust, even though they understand, each other. An instance of this is found in the fact that

even in Cape Colony a man wanting a loan will not go to a wealthy neighbour or relative, but rather to a stranger. One of the points most hotly debated in a recent Boer Congress, held to decide the constitution of the *Het Volk*, was the power to censure or expel members, even of the Head Committee, if they appeared to be acting against the principles of the majority. The Head Committee took care to ensure discipline in the ranks, but the ranks were equally desirous of retaining a hold on the Committee. Neither trusted the other. As to commercial honesty, one remembers the curious anomaly on the China coast, among a people by whom the art of deception was far higher esteemed than truthfulness, where the recognition that commercial success could only be founded on honesty and mutual trust has made the Chinaman's word his bond, as far as a trade transaction is concerned. This definite acceptance of the policy of honesty in trade matters was the deliberate choice of a highly intelligent people. Perhaps an improved education will convince the Boer that a similar policy would be advantageous to him in other ways.

It is to be hoped that British Africanders will not hinder this consummation by deviating from the traditional straightforwardness of their race. Unfortunately the system, or lack of system, in dealing with the colonies has rendered possible breaches of faith on the part of Government in the past, and produced innumerable misunderstandings, often interpreted as breaches by colonists who do not understand that in political life we have abolished the principle that power

brings responsibility. Frankly, however, even British Africanders leave much to be desired in the matter of accuracy and straightforwardness, a fact which they themselves openly deplore, and attribute to the exigencies of intercourse with the Boers and the natives. A considerable knowledge of the Oriental and a slight acquaintance with the Boer and Kaffir convince one that it would be better to abandon any hope of dealing with them in any but a plain and simple way. We manœuvre best on open ground, and we should follow our natural bent, making as few excursions as possible into the realms of diplomatic artifice or political intrigue. It is not necessary to expand the argument here to cover the wide range of nationalities in South African life, especially political life. We are not speaking only of the latter; there are many circumstances lying outside politics, properly speaking, in which, as in private life, the Boer is the predominant factor, and his weight at present turns the scale in favour of the statement that South Africa is the Land of Lies. Isolation, slave-holding, the struggle for life, the opportunist Mosaic code of morals, contact with the natives, all these excuse him, but do not prove his wisdom. Cunning and duplicity, the weapons of the weak and oppressed, are not often successful. The strongest policy the Boers have ever found is their openly avowed Nationalist policy, and, despite a somewhat general opinion to the contrary, it is weakest just where it is least openly avowed.

It is at least certain that the removal of children from close association with Kaffirs and placing them

more and more under the influence of educated men and women will have a beneficial effect in eradicating the habit of untruth which is noticeable even in family life. Educated parents could never, as has been done by Boer parents in the past, commend a child for telling a clever lie.

It is to be hoped, however, that no levelling up to more conventional standards will destroy one of the most attractive features of Boer character—the lack of snobbery. Democratic in every fibre, the Boer has, through his removal from such influences as public opinion or social ambition, escaped the infection of a disease which is nowhere more rampant than in nominally democratic countries. There is a native politeness about the Dutch Africander which is not unusual in other peasant peoples, though it is rarely found in an urban proletariat. It arises partly from the supreme assurance of his own worth, which makes him self-possessed, and does not admit of nervousness or diffidence in the presence of others. Although the sociology of the Boers, as we shall presently see, is not so simple as is often imagined yet there is in essentials a lack of social distinctions. Much of this undoubtedly must be attributed to the intercourse with natives. Every white man in South Africa is a *sahib*. The only possible thing to do on entering a Boer house, no matter of what class, is to shake hands with all the white persons present, and your host and hostess receive and entertain you, whatever your rank and their circumstances, with an ease and *bonhomie* which are the perfection of good manners. No apology for

deficiencies will be made and no embarrassment shown. The natural and graceful hospitality offered is of a piece with this. Formal entertaining is not the Boer custom, nor is he effusive in offering "pot-luck," but whoever comes is treated to the best he has, and to pass by the gate without turning in is considered an unfriendly act.

This genuine and informal hospitality may be easily spoilt by abuse or by the example of more sophisticated British colonials who, falling into the extravagant South African ideas, do not care to entertain unless they can do it in style. Unfortunately, this aping of a little-to-be-admired English type of society already finds place among some of the ultra-loyalist Dutch Africander families; it is an echo of Johannesburg, and quite unlike the colonial hospitality of other climes. Long may the genuine Boer escape its contamination! Such cases of Briticization as become most prominent among them usually seize on the least desirable sides of our character, but that is perhaps hardly wonderful when we remember how apt we are to wear our vices like an armour and our virtues like a shameful infirmity. An amusing instance of imitation as the sincerest flattery is told by a young English officer who was calling one afternoon on an old lady. The daughter of the house had remodelled herself and her parents as far as possible, but habit is hard to break. Mamma's tongue, being unused to English, dropped familiarly into the Taal as she chatted on the *stoep*, and presently, as her visitor understood her, she asked, "You will take some coffee, won't you?"

“Tea, ma, tea !” came in an agonised aside from the daughter.

It is interesting to notice how strong are the points of resemblance between the Boers and the Lowland Scots. Not only is their religion similar, but their sturdy independence of character, which was instrumental in deciding their adherence to Calvinism, the circumstances of their struggle against British domination, the course of their Church history, and many other minor points of similitude, are to be traced. Being a peasant people among whom money has always been rare, the Scots enjoy a reputation for “canniness” which is very noticeable in the Boers, who, like every simple people, think they are very smart and clever about money, and are apt to overreach themselves and get grievously cheated. The scarcity of coin in the earlier days has imbued the Boer with a strong dislike to pay anything in cash. Government taxes have therefore, perhaps on this account chiefly, always been a great abomination to him. He prefers to give the Kaffir his wages in kind, and frequently gets cheated in so doing. The Boer’s love for horses and horse-dealing, in which he goes no straighter than any other dabbler in a business which seems enough to corrupt the morals of a saint, his weakness for long stories in which the humour is dry but racy of the soil, his tendency to circumlocution and prevarication, his stinginess and yet his hospitality, his mixture of cunning and gullibility—all these are points he has in common with a type of Lowland Scot which has given many useful, some distinguished, and not a few brilliant

men to the empire. In one respect the Scot has enjoyed a notable advantage—in his educational facilities and the eagerness with which he has used them.

It is often difficult to make a man's religious professions square with his actions, and this is even more true of a people. One must always, of course, acclaim the ideal, however far one falls short of it, and too much has been made of the Boer's so-called hypocritical show of religion. Their religion was taken from the Jewish Old Testament, which they read, not by the light of higher criticism nor in any allegorical sense, but as a literal transcript set down for edification and emulation. They had innumerable examples of the cunning of the serpent receiving its reward, and, as their conviction deepened that they were a chosen people like the Jews, they regarded all outside their pale as the Jews regarded the unfortunate inhabitants of Palestine—as Philistines, enemies of Jehovah, doomed to destruction, every man, woman, and child. They are fanatics more than hypocrites. Hypocrisy postulates a conscious attempt to appear other (and better) than one is. There was an old Scottish lady who went to Canada, and after some years there bewailed to a friend the godless breaking of the Sabbath into which she was being drawn. "Before I left home," she said, "I never thought of writing a letter on the Sabbath without dating it Saturday or Monday, but now I write 'Sunday' and think naught about it!" And yet this old lady was no more a hypocrite before she left home than the Boer who may have sold an unsound horse with a Biblical phrase.

Both acted up to their lights and both are illustrations of how often "the letter killeth," but neither are unique in this respect.

Although the Boers are essentially a country folk, they are not, like many peasants, slow of speech. This they owe undoubtedly to their religious training. At the family worship, which is so great a feature of Boer life, all the children are called on to "put up" a prayer, and they learn to spin phrases adorned with the exalted imagery of the Bible. The vernacular lends itself well to stump oratory. The rolling consonants and broad vowels, the onomatopoetic words, and the abundance of terms for homely and familiar phenomena, make it an easy vehicle for the expression of popular sentiments or for working upon the emotions of a crowd. As an audience the Boers are sympathetic and polite, even when they differ with the speaker. They have been known to cheer impartially the sentiments of two speakers entirely opposed to one another; and the enthusiastic political meetings of which one reads, with their "unanimous agreements," their "hearty votes of thanks," and the like, are as a rule composed of men who, even if indifferent or opposed to the speaker, are prepared to give him a good reception, partly from politeness, but chiefly because they are really enjoying themselves.

A favourite accusation against the Boers is their lack of gratitude, and there is the oft-quoted couplet to the effect that "the fault of the Dutch is giving too little and asking too much." The definition of gratitude, however, as "a lively sense of favours to come" was

made by a man unacquainted with the Boer ; it certainly errs on the side of cynicism, but there is much truth in it. Of gratitude in this sense the Boers perhaps show less signs than most people ; of gratitude in its true and noble form they are as individuals no more deficient than other races. Gratitude between peoples or nations is as impossible as disinterested friendship. But while the individual Boer is quite as grateful for benefits conferred as any other man—and that does not imply much—he is, from his ignorance and suspicious character, more inclined to scrutinise the gift closely. His experience has been dearly bought ; he always suspects a Greek gift. What he cannot understand is exactly that form of generosity and altruism which is most highly lauded in Europe. Justice he recognises, firmness he respects, but concessions he suspects : if they seem to be genuine he will try for more. An English colonist who had dipped his sheep as a prevention against scab, having some of his mixture left over, wrote to his well-to-do Boer neighbour and offered to dip his flock, hoping that their immunity would induce him to repeat the process next year, so that the countryside might be clear. The offer was accepted, and the following year a note came from the Boer saying that the sheep were quite ready to be dipped again ! This shows one side of the shield ; on the other it has been one of the hardest tasks of the British Government to combat the suspicious attitude of the Boers against all innovations on the one hand and to resist the encroachments to which the slightest concession would

encourage them on the other. With a more liberal education and a wider outlook on the world, however, the Boer will feel more sure of his position, will be able to discriminate between generosity and weakness, and, *pari passu*, may be able to take an even more adroit advantage of the latter.

A side of Boer character which is frequently dwelt upon is the contempt for worldly wealth and position, illustrated by such stories as those of men who, knowing that gold was on their land, sold it for a small price and trekked away rather than be contaminated. An instance is frequently quoted of a man who bought three farms in succession, selling each in disgust as prospectors revealed to him the presence of gold. Such stories as these reveal a very partial acquaintance both with the Boer and the mining industry. It is quite true that the Boer does part with his farm to gold-mining syndicates or companies, but in this he does far less violence to his feelings than might be imagined, for he has not the affection for one particular plot of ground which we associate with peasant-farming in Europe. Moreover, the gold laws and the conditions of the mining industry have made it impossible for private individuals to become mine-owners. It is therefore necessity and not a contempt for riches that drives a man to part with valuable property for the best price he can get, however disproportionate. Another more genuine tale is of a farmer who always cultivated a certain extent of his farm until the price of mealies doubled, when he immediately cut his fields in half and only cultivated one. On being remonstrated

with he remarked that his means were exactly the same as formerly, so he could not see what was wrong. Probably they only limit the output, like wise manufacturers who do not swamp a market. Such men as these belong to a type of Boer which can hardly survive the contact with European civilisation. By reducing their wants to a minimum they have found the way to be rich, but no people could long survive under such stagnant circumstances. Ambition and the struggle to improve one's condition are essential to progress, and the coming generation of Boers are not likely to produce many types as free from "the last infirmity of noble minds" as these. Simultaneously with this extreme of unworldliness one frequently finds the paradox of cunning and avarice ; but the attachment of the Boer to the soil, the simplicity of his habits, and his freedom from snobbishness and commercialism are factors in his mental make-up which always lifts his character as a whole above the ignoble level of mere money-grubbing.

Although the spiritual side of his character is not often uppermost, the Boer possesses, or rather is possessed by, a strong vein of mysticism. His communion with nature in her moods of solitary grandeur, and his grim religion, with its pagan conceptions of embodied deities, spirits, and demons, have helped to confirm him in that strange, half-unconscious relation to things unseen, dimly felt, yet moving some spring within the breast that nothing else can touch. The spirit of the Covenanters, some of the fire of a forgotten age of spiritual revelation, lives in these rude country

people, and speaks now and again through the gathering veil of twentieth-century materialism, speaks in a wild blue eye or the brow of a seer under the shade of the rough slouch hat and a tangled mat of hair.

With the passing of the old *Taak haare* the little bit of picturesqueness will be gone. At Krüger's funeral, which brought people from all parts of the Transvaal, only the older men were in the least suggestive of local colour. The younger generation wore straw hats, white shirts, and ready-made suits, and were hardly to be distinguished from an ordinary English crowd on a football field. The better class Boer in his Sunday broadcloth is a larger and finer specimen of the well-to-do Nonconformist at home. There is some variety in the physical type, which ranges from the lean, wiry, medium-sized to the tall, powerful, and florid one. Lady Ann Barnard speaks of the giants who came in with their teams to Cape Town, and whom she visited in what was then the "back of beyond." The impression made on me personally was that the Cape Colony Boers are some of the finest of their race, but that they are no finer than some English and Scottish colonials. A family of the latter class in the eastern provinces remains particularly in the memory. The eight members of it, including a mother of average height, measured together nearly fifty feet. Another family of six brothers averaged six feet, and there are many English families which number some of the finest specimens of manhood it is possible to see anywhere in the world.

The diet of the early Dutch settlers was probably

more wholesome than that of the present day, and they undoubtedly had more art in the preparation of food than is found nowadays, except in a few of the old Cape families in which recipes and culinary skill are traditional. The Transvaal Boers, after the hardships of the Great Trek, settled down to a regimen which became more and more monotonous with the gradual extermination of game. The use of vegetables is restricted almost entirely to the inevitable mealie and the essential onion, and the vegetable and herb garden so dear to the French peasant is practically unknown. Boers grow very few vegetables even for market, this lucrative business being carried on in a small way by the Indians, and on a larger scale by Italian or Portuguese gardeners around Johannesburg, and by growers at the Cape or in Natal. The diet, as is well known, has a good deal to answer for in the way of infant mortality, and the healthy appearance of the Boer people as a whole must be attributed to the survival of the fittest, in an open-air life and a glorious climate. That they are extraordinarily prolific is well known. Early marriage is the rule and not the exception, and the patriarchal tradition which still survives is conducive to carelessness and improvidence about the future. The Boers say that a large family is a poor man's wealth, for the children are a valuable help.

It is difficult to form a true estimate of the intellectual capacity of the people as a whole, since only a small proportion can be said to have had opportunities for development. In native wit and perception they

are notably keen. Such a man as Paul Krüger would have been remarkable anywhere. The fine qualities of such a character and his mental power are discounted by his bigotry and ignorance; but, despite the vital mistakes he made in later years, he displayed qualities of statesmanship which would have distinguished him in any country or position. It does not seem, however, that there are many Krügers among the Boer people, and indeed their finest hero, Pretorius, belonged to an even earlier age. The mental ability of the average man is chiefly singular in the direction of ratiocination. The legal profession offers the most congenial openings, and the Dutch Africander has produced some eminent lawyers, especially at the Cape; but it is noticeable that a great number of leading men have been foreigners. The general testimony of teachers as to children is that they are quick and able enough, but lacking in application and ambition—two qualities undermined by home conditions and by climate. On the whole, there seems to be little doubt that the growing desire for education, combined with the great improvement in methods of teaching, will soon bring the Dutch Africanders to a higher intellectual level than they occupy at present, and that, with their improved mental outlook and inherited strength of character, they may hope to produce some striking results. It is of the highest importance, however, that their development should take the form of increased sympathy with the highest phases of modern thought, and that they should be freed intellectually (and therefore politically) from the bonds of parochialism, which

are at present a stumbling-block in the way of all progress.

After these generalisations as to character, it is necessary to give some idea of the social system of the Dutch Africanders. In the main, of course, they are a pastoral people, and their sociology is simple in accordance with their pursuits, republican theories, and lack of social ambitions. But there is an upper and a lower stratum to this pastoral and agricultural backbone, and it is not correct to picture the Boers as entirely a peasant people.

From the first the typical Boer has avoided town life ; but at the Cape there are many Dutch families, descendants of early colonists, who have from the beginning formed part of an urban population. It is singular to find that a century ago the traditions of the Dutch East India Company made trade an honourable occupation and a social distinction, so that every one desired to prefix the word *Koopman* (merchant) to his name. Early in the nineteenth century well-to-do ladies used to send their slave maids out to sell the products of slave labour, so deeply was the instinct implanted. It would be interesting to trace the beginnings of the dislike and scorn for trade which is now characteristic of the Dutch Africander. The families who are prosperous send sons into the professions—until recently they went into the Church, and now they go mainly to the Bar and medical profession ; but the commerce of the country is in English, German, and Hollander hands, so far as wholesale trade goes, and in the lower branches is monopolised by the Malays in Cape Town

and its vicinity, by the Hindoos in Natal (gradually spreading all over the country), and latterly everywhere to a large extent by Jews. The *winkel* or little local store, in Cape Colony especially, is becoming almost entirely a Jewish property, money-lending being combined with more legitimate business.

There is a great deal of family pride among the best Dutch Africanders. The number of Trekker families who went north was comparatively so small that the Boer *Almanach de Gotha* is no difficult matter to carry in one's head. Little spoken of, their descent and their position in the Cape Colony before the Trek are yet matters for pride, and the new-comers, especially the Hollanders and Germans, find it difficult to get inside the charmed circle. So many Englishmen have married into the old Cape families that the race distinction there is only artificially maintained, and where preserved it is chiefly by the fact that the men usually become more Dutch in sympathies than their wives. But in the Transvaal particularly, where pressure from outside caused the people to form a close social combination, there is an exclusive little aristocracy, in close touch with the "best families" of the Cape. Here, as in the East, and more particularly in India, one sees the inevitable mistakes made by British officials in dealing with men, inevitable because they are not able to appreciate social distinctions between people who appear to be on the same level. The same argument, however, is true in both cases. The official, if he be a gentleman, is often able to do better than any local man, who may be better informed

but, by reason of his connections and predilections, is likely to offend still more and cannot be excused on the score of ignorance. This is no plea against the employment of colonials in many departments, but for some time to come there may be posts which can be better filled from outside.

The professional class of Dutch Africander is best seen, of course, at the Cape, where he is several generations old. As a doctor, lawyer, or even an ostrich farmer or wine grower on a large scale, he is outwardly in no way distinguishable from the middle class Briton. He may, and frequently does, send his boys to an English public school; he may own a motor-car, his wife sends to London or Paris for her frocks, and all the family go to Europe at intervals. The first cousin to such a family as this may, however, be a genuine Boer, farming his own land, dressed in rough "ready mades" and the inevitable slouch hat. He may believe in the verbal inspiration of the Old Testament, and even in witchcraft, and be in many ways as typical of the seventeenth century in his ideas as his relations are of the twentieth.

The most striking element in Boer sociology, however, is the *Byrwoner*, or poor white squatter, found now not only on the land but in increasing numbers in the towns. The *Byrwoner* is literally the poor relation of the successful Boer; but his presence in a country where the white man is theoretically a ruling caste, and where land is supposed to be plentiful and was originally the property of every white settler, is a subject deserving the most serious consideration.

Originally every white man was legally a land-owner. The Dutch particularly cared for little else save to secure as large a tract of land as possible and to hold it securely. The Trekkers divided out their new territory imperially and impartially, and it is a well-known saying that a Boer cannot bear to see another man's smoke from his *stoep*. The origin of the *Bywoner* under these circumstances is undoubtedly to be found in the system of land tenure; for although there are a few British *Bywoners*, descendants of unsuccessful immigrants and deserters in the war of 1881, yet the majority of the families bear good Dutch names and are descended from land-owning families of repute, who followed without exception the Dutch method of dividing their property. By the Roman-Dutch law the paternal land descended to all the children in case of intestacy; and ignorance and apathy among the Boers prevented them from any definite method of division, with the result that by degrees a number of kindred families clustered on the farms with rights which were generally fractional. Enterprising members bought out others, and in the Cape Colony many English settlers have gradually bought up whole farms in this way. The complications as to water rights, an essential feature of land tenure in South Africa, were innumerable, and by degrees there grew up a class of landless Boers, contented to squat on the ground of a neighbour or relative, paying him for the right in service. The natural result was a slothful, thriftless manner of life, since improvements were not the property of the squatter, and he lacked the strong incentive of living on his

own land. Some *Bywoners*, sunk to a depth from which their forefathers would have recoiled in horror, even work for neighbouring Kaffirs, sometimes receiving wages, but more commonly being recompensed by the right to use the Kaffirs' cattle for ploughing their own land. Certain of these poor white families have sunk so low in a coast district of the Cape Colony as to be living in a state almost of nakedness, hiding at the approach of strangers, and eating raw roots. These are the extreme, but it cannot be too clearly understood how grave is the danger in the degradation of white people in a country where the native population is black.

In the Transvaal the *Bywoner* problem is no new thing, and many suggestions were made for the improvement of the condition of the *arme Boeren*. President Krüger brought many of these people to Pretoria and one or two other urban centres, giving them strips of land and burgher rights on terms which secured them as a compact body for voting purposes. Their poverty-stricken homes may be seen to this day. In the Cape Colony they are most numerous in the eastern and south-eastern districts. Despite a certain amount of disease, caused by miscegenation and dirt, it is not possible to trace signs of physical degeneration in any of the *Bywoners*, and they do not seem to have lost the pride of race which kept them from mingling their blood with the Kaffirs. Another point of pride will prevent the *Bywoner*, however poor, from taking up occupations which are considered "Kaffir's work." His wife and daughters will do needlework at home, but will not go out to service, for that is Kaffir's work.

So strong is this prejudice that cases are known of orphan girls who, comfortably placed in homes as "helps" by their own *predikants*, have been forcibly taken away by their nearest relatives, who, without being prepared to support them, were nevertheless determined that they should not "lower the family." An English lady of our acquaintance, whose near neighbours were a family of Dutch *Bywoners* who came frequently to beg, offered food and a small wage if one of the girls would come by the day to help in the lighter housework. The offer was indignantly declined. While retaining this sense of racial pride, the *Bywoner* sinks every other legitimate source of self-respect, and his daughters even take to the worst of all trades to support the family. The life of shiftless, landless poverty soon demoralises men and women alike.

The war, which broke up families and disorganised the whole social fabric, offered, so long as it continued, congenial employment and keep to a large number of *Bywoners*, who were among the most obstinate of the burgher troops. Their families being provided for in the camps, they had little to lose and much to gain by a continuation of the war, and the Peace of Vereeniging and the subsequent repatriation threw them literally upon the charity of the Government. They drew rations until the end of 1903, and when these were stopped were face to face with starvation. Numbers drifted into the towns, where there are now estimated to be some two thousand families, a number which at 4·5 souls for each family aggregates some eight and a

half thousand people. One thousand such families have been placed by Government in settlements on the land, not including those who left the settlements from one cause or another, and five thousand repatriated families are living on small holdings as tenants or squatters, and depend on each harvest to make both ends meet. A bad summer would plunge them into hopeless difficulties, as they would have to sell their only assets, the animals and tools provided by the Repatriation Department. One of their accustomed means of earning a livelihood, transport riding, is rapidly disappearing under new conditions, and while stock remains dear the prices of crops are declining.

The presence of such extremes of social life in a new country, among people of such traditions as the Dutch, is remarkable. The social phenomena are usually of older growth, and are developed out of natural causes. The most unfortunate feature is the mental and moral degeneracy among the poorer class of Boers, especially when thrown into the vortex of town life, for which they are temperamentally quite unsuited. The British Government is alive to the dangers of the situation, and has tried, so far without much success, to induce a return to the land. It seems worth while to try seriously if industrial training would not fit the next generation for skilled trades, so that they might become useful citizens, and help to redress the balance of town *versus* country—South Africa objects to the Kaffir becoming a skilled craftsman, then why not train the *Bywoner*?—but here arises the difficulty which is found in every

country with a black proletariat. How can the "mean white" be worked into an industrial system of which the Kaffir is the base?

Enough has been written to show that neither in character nor in circumstances is the Dutch Africander an easy problem to solve; but we must remember that, whatever his shortcomings, he is the backbone of the agricultural and pastoral population. He increases as fast as the black, and in his hands will ultimately largely lie the future of Africanderland.

CHAPTER V

THE DUTCH AFRICANDER: IN PUBLIC LIFE

IN the preceding chapters, in which we have dealt with some of the machinery of Africander life—the Church, education, and social system—I have had frequently to refer to the Nationalist ideal of propaganda. Put in a form already familiar, this is simply “Africa for the Afrianders,” a form of sentiment which, being well known to us in other parts of our empire, does not rouse any special feeling on our part. It does not, as it stands, imply any dissent from the Imperial tie. When we examine the special circumstances, however, and the underlying meaning which has come to be attached to the word “Africander,” we shall feel less confident.

The actual expression dates back beyond the foundation of the Cape Bond; it was foreshadowed by President Bùrgers, and since his time more than one attempt has been made to weld the Dutch portion of the community into some form of Nationalist cohesion. There were, as we have seen, political and religious splits in the Transvaal, where the influence of Paul Krùger, moreover, was always exerted towards a restricted Transvaal nationalism and obtaining for his own State a headship in a Boer hegemony which

neither the Cape nor the Orange Free State was prepared to allow. In 1882 the Bond was organised, but it met with little sympathy either from Brand or Krüger, who opposed it for very different reasons. The most powerful figure in South Africa soon after that time was Cecil Rhodes, from whose own lips we know that he was "under the influence of the Bond" at one time. The ideal set up by its founders was frankly anti-Imperial and anti-British; and although this side of it was remodelled by Hofmeyr before Rhodes had any part in it, yet its political trend was distinct. "Eliminate the Imperial factor" was a cry in which British and Dutch were both concerned. It becomes necessary, therefore, to disentangle the Nationalist propaganda from the anti-Imperial propaganda. The former was naturally impossible to the British element, but the latter enlisted many of them. It must be remembered that Imperialism had not then become a cult in Great Britain, though it was warmly held by a small section of the best thinkers. We were still at the stage of meditating whether empire was "worth while," and Froude told the South Africans plainly that all England wanted was a naval station at the Cape. Small wonder, then, if Cape politicians used language which at a later date would have stamped them for ever as disloyal, pro-Boers, and Little Englanders.

The Progressive Nationalists at the Cape had a different propaganda to that of Krüger and his Doppers, and in the Transvaal itself was a small party in sympathy with their views. A confederacy of Dutch

States, with the most backward of all at the head and in a commanding position by reason of her gold fields, would not have suited the rest of South Africa at all. At this period the influence of Rhodes became the predominant factor. Exactly when and how he recanted his anti-Imperial creed does not need to be told. The broad lines of his policy are sufficient for our purposes, and it is certain that, probably under strong influence from home, he pondered and chose to become an empire maker rather than an empire breaker. The proposed establishment of fresh British colonies to the north of the Transvaal and the accounts of fabulous wealth which was to be found there—a second Rand—had a deep effect on the Nationalist party. Their calculations were much upset by the appearance of Rhodesia upon the South African scene, and they began to realise the rise in Great Britain of an Imperialist spirit quite inimical to their ideal of independence and of Dutch predominance. The Raid, that monumental act of folly, and the so-called defection of Rhodes from his Dutch friends embittered their feelings and made them irreconcilable.

It must not be forgotten that there were two divisions among the Dutch. Krüger headed the one, which was all for exclusion, for damming the stream of progress, for retaining the Transvaalers as a seventeenth-century nation by means of artificial restrictions, and for the oligarchic form of government essential to such a programme. The other had the same ideal of a country predominantly Dutch in race, traditions, and customs, and wholly so in matters of government,

but extended its views to cover all South Africa, and was prepared to attain this end by more intelligent means, meeting the English on their own ground and beating them eventually on a democratic basis of government by sheer weight of numbers, tenacity of purpose, and skilful management. The Cape was naturally the headquarters of this party.

The preservation of the Dutch element as distinct from the British *versus* the gradual assimilation or subjection of the latter by the former—these are the two different forms which the Nationalist ideal assumed. It is quite unnecessary to trace the evolution of the last few years before the war, but on one vexed question a few words may be said.

Was war inevitable? It seems of little practical use now to ask this question, but it is, in fact, essential to an understanding of South African affairs to have a distinct idea on the subject. On general grounds I was personally opposed to the policy which led to the war, a policy which, as I always felt, sacrificed real, tangible, and vital interests in other parts of the globe to an empire-building on the African continent not confined to South Africa, and has so far done little save paint the map red. I felt that we were not intelligent in our expansion and that we were building without a solid foundation, but on the journey which prepared the ground for this book I took an open mind to the arguments I heard from all sides.

My conclusion is a simple one. The race problem was at the bottom of the whole situation. The Dutch conception of the word *Africander* and their Nationalist

ideal preclude all idea that they would ever have worked in harmony with the British one. It was a case of the Imperial factor *versus* Dutch Nationalism, and it is perhaps fortunate for the former that the latter was opposed in its most uncompromising form. The racial affinity and the social bond between the colonies and the republics were too strong for their fates to be separated. Either South Africa might become a congeries of armed States—the Cape, Natal, and Rhodesia garrisoned with British troops—or the empire must look forward to lose all South Africa, or she must vindicate her position by the appeal to arms and make a fresh start. At one period a compromise might have been affected, but when one remembers that so uncompromising a thing as a national ideal was in question it seems unlikely that any permanent basis for understanding could have been found until Great Britain had vindicated her right to an ideal of her own. It is idle to say that without Johannesburg we should have had no war—without the gold mines the bankrupt Transvaal republic would have been gathered in years before. All sorts of motives played their part in this drama, but as far as the two main players were concerned—Paul Krüger and Alfred Milner—the issues were finally narrowed down. The former believed in the ascendancy of the Dutch in South Africa, the latter stood for Imperialism, and played the only game which he believed could give the Imperial ideal a chance of success. It is this consistent anti-Nationalist policy that has won Lord Milner so much unpopularity among the Dutch

Africans. His behaviour to them individually, they admit, has been kind, and his actions in the main materially beneficial, "but as regards us as a nation his policy has been *devilish*!"

It is not yet possible to gauge the effect of the war or of Lord Milner's administration. Travelling throughout the country, even so late after the war as the winter of 1904 and spring of 1905, one heard one long dirge. "Who has benefited by the war? Who is the better for all this bloodshed? Race feeling that will never die has been stirred up. Everywhere there are graves and grievances." War, however, could never settle any question so delicate as this. It is the reconstruction on ground cleared by war that is the decisive factor. How hard it is to gauge the work of a reconstruction period can only be estimated by the historical student. The Civil War of the American States did not at once settle the national question (which was more the fundamental cause than slavery) but it demonstrated which factor was the stronger; and the American nation, composed of two halves previously more antagonistic even than Boer and Briton, arose from the ashes of conflict. The reconstruction was slow, infinitely slower than that in the new colonies, already finding their feet, despite the fact that the country has passed through a period of economic depression caused by exceptionally bad seasons, plagues, and every conceivable form of difficulty. Such bad times are frequently the prelude to a period of growing prosperity if only the government of the country can

be settled on a firm basis ; and all Africanders must remember that they have now, what they might never have got without war, the union of all sections of South Africa under one flag—the essential first step towards progress and prosperity.

Forced to fight, while they would have preferred to intrigue, the leading progressive Boers joined with the more ignorant majority of their countrymen in making as long and arduous a defence as possible. When that defence could no longer be continued, and all hope of foreign intervention had died, they bent their energies to making the best terms possible. That they should, in the desperate straits in which they were placed, have succeeded in making terms at all is one of the most striking circumstances in their history. In another three months an unconditional surrender would have been the only course left open to them. As it was, the British people have never understood how far the peace of Vereeniging saved the *amour propre* of the Boers, who call it their “charter,” have ordered copies to be printed and circulated among burghers, and will never cease to insist that they were not conquered but made terms. After the conference of Boer leaders at Vereeniging the indomitable Dutch spirit became evident. The Dutch ideal was not crushed ; the Nationalist spirit was only watered with Boer blood. A fresh campaign began the day after peace was signed ; only, as this campaign has for its head not Krüger and his Hollanders and Doppers, but the progressive, educated Boers—Botha, Smuts, Schalk-Burger, Fischer, and

their friends—it is conducted on different lines to the old one. Krüger's attempt to dam the stream failed; the new scheme is in accordance with modern principles, and time, the leaders believe, will fight for and not against it, as was the case with the old method. Constitutional agitation; the pen, not the sword—these are the weapons; and the goal is "Africa for the Africanders," an independent South Africa ruled by the sons of the soil.

Now, as I said before, this aspiration is not a novel one, even in a British colony. Nor can there be any valid objection to it theoretically, since Great Britain has adopted the course of giving the most complete self-government to some of her colonies and exacts very little in exchange for the privilege of remaining a part of the empire and enjoying its prestige, commercial advantages, and protection. But the crux of the question lies in the composition of Africanderdom. The Dutch know that they are numerically predominant and that they increase with extraordinary rapidity. They count on their numerical superiority in the future as one of their surest and strongest weapons, and their present leaders have not been slow to perceive that, if they can only keep alight the fire of Dutch nationalism, they will be able before long, under the free institutions which Great Britain never denies to her colonies, to turn the scale so that the Dutch majority will rule South Africa as surely as, more surely than, if the Transvaal had conquered and annexed the Cape and Natal. Once they have accomplished this they desire nothing more than to follow

the example of the American colonies and "cut the painter." They look on the connection with the empire in an entirely different light to that in which we view it. There is no tie of sentiment, no social ambition, no commercial advantage which influences them as it does a British colonial. On the other hand there is nothing mean or ignoble in this ambition. The Dutch Africanders believe in themselves. Like many sturdy primitive peoples, they err on the side of self-righteousness and self-confidence. They love their country passionately. They see abuses which they believe would disappear under their own *régime*. They deprecate violence, being a law-abiding people. They desire to seek peace and ensue it. They have taken an oath of allegiance which they mean to keep to the letter ; but they (or at least the leading spirits among them—able lawyers, be it noted) think they see a way out by which, strictly within the law, they can gradually place themselves above the law. The leaders of *Het Volk* are genuine in their desire to bring British Africanders to co-operate with them. "We desire no race line," they say, being convinced that the strength of their own racial traits and their numerical superiority are enough to protect their idiosyncrasies. They speak with real enthusiasm of a united South Africa under one flag, and (after a gulp or two) they have even swallowed their feelings about *what flag*, and add bravely, "Under the Union Jack," adding as a mental reservation—"for the present." The flag question, they say, is dead ; the race question is dead. "Most of the things that divided us," said

Smuts at the banquet to Lord Selborne, "are swept away. But the great point we can all strive for remains." That point in the mind of every true Africander, Briton or Boer, is the welfare of South Africa, but there is a reservation with the latter. He does not believe, he will not allow, that South Africa can be great within the empire. His ideal is the same as ever, and he is working towards it with all his might.

While Englishmen halt between two opinions, while they preach Imperialism and act parochially, while they too often lose sight of the main point in a mass of details, and spoil half their acts by short-sighted greed, selfishness, or indifference, let us give its due meed of admiration to the Dutch ideal which knows no defeat, is single-minded and dogged. But let us play, cards on the table, for our own game, and convince the Dutch Africander that Imperialism does not necessarily mean the sacrifice of South Africa to the mother country. As we shall see later, we are in no way bound to regard South Africa in exactly the same light as Australia or Canada, but we wish her, all the same, to feel the true meaning of British Imperialism.

Having broadly defined the racial position, some details and side-lights must now be given. I have spoken of a Dutch Africander ideal; but with the Boers, as with every other people, it is the leaders who frame the ideal and direct the footsteps of the masses towards it. Read the history of the Boers from their earliest days and one cannot but be struck with two facts. First, that the number of their leading

men has been astonishingly small compared with the noise they make in the world; second, that the Boer leaders, the chief politicians on the Dutch Africander side, have been largely foreigners. It was a German, Borckenhagen, who was one of the three originators of the Bond, and that body numbers among its elect another German and a fair proportion of Englishmen and Hollanders. All the political intrigues of the past twenty years can be traced to a small group largely made up of non-Africanders; and it is certain that the average Transvaal and Free State Boer, keen politician though he is, has no clear idea as to why he fought and why he lost his country.

The Boers, as has been said, are easily led but hard to drive. Custom has taught them to take their political as well as their religious faith ready-made from the hands of men whom they trust and respect, but any attempt to coerce them in either they are quick to resent. Having lost the leverage possessed through the domination of a State Church, and the outward appurtenances of supreme power in the country, the Boer leaders feel that there is a danger lest the people should absorb British ideas and cease to work for the purely Boer ideal. It is therefore important to gauge how far they are capable of adopting as their watchword an abstract principle, a lofty conception. The principle of preserving their national peculiarities at all costs is very well in theory, but in practical life it means the rejection of material advantages. The Boer, who is intensely practical, has seen that, and has not backed his leaders as they hoped—for instance, in

their demands for denominational teaching or for the supremacy of the Dutch language. English education being the means for advancement, he has taken it, grumblingly and with a strong feeling of distrust, but still in increasing numbers. A striking instance of the practical side coming uppermost was revealed, a few months ago, when the amalgamation of the Dutch Church and Government schools was being explained to the local committees in the Orange River Colony. One committee refused on the grounds of principle (Christian and Nationalist) to hand over their school or accept the Government terms, and this although the synod of their Church had consented. In the course of debate it transpired that one of the stalwart members of this committee had already two children attending a Government school, other two being at the Church schools. The Boer will not, as a rule, compromise on matters of principle, but this incident shows that his traditional slimness enables him to square his conscience to his material needs.

The reader of this book will be aware that a great difference in mental and moral development is to be found in the various classes of Boers. The vast majority in the Transvaal are extremely ignorant, and, owing to their hard and isolated lives, are lacking in the finer perceptions. Their own leaders confess to finding indolence and apathy among them. These are the people who went to fight the British with the certainty of victory, relying on their own favourable position in the eyes of the Almighty and on lies told them as to their opponents' lack of courage. The

realities of war reduced them to dull misery and often to fierce resentment, but the prevailing desire now is to keep out of politics, to settle down, and run no more risks. They go, therefore, to public meetings, and applaud impartially; they listen to officials and make cautious promises; they take counsel with their *predikants*, but do not always follow their advice; and, talking over matters among themselves in the interminable gossips on the *stoep*, they finally decide—to do nothing as far as possible. Having to accept an alien Government, they are anxious to make as much as possible out of it—a fact clearly set out in the little programme “What the Boers want” after the recent Congress. Hence they will not refuse the benefits of education, the efforts in agriculture and stock-farming to improve the country, or any other scheme which does not fall directly on their pockets. Above everything, however, they desire for, the present to be let alone; and this very reasonable wish gratified, they are easy to govern. Now, although we should be deceiving ourselves if we imagined that this class of people will become “loyal colonists,” yet as political material they are hardly more satisfactory to the Boer leaders, since they are too likely to follow the line of least resistance, which may, as will be seen later, lead them away from the Dutch ideal.

Besides this class there is the substratum of Boerdom of which we have spoken. These *Bywoners* are a difficult feature in the situation. A spirit of dependence has been engendered in them—first by the paternal solicitude of the Krüger *régime*, then by the

unsettling period of war, and later by their position as a pauper class living on Government rations or repatriation loans. Easily swayed, demoralised by their precarious existence, these people will be the prey to political agitators, and their vote may be a determining factor quite out of proportion to their true position in the country; for it must be remembered that the majority, having been on the burghers' lists before the war, will have the right to vote. One of the Boer leaders told me plainly that the votes of these people could be bought in many cases for a five-pound note, a fact which he seemed to regard as giving undue chances to the capitalists. Since then he seems to feel less apprehension. Among the leaders themselves two distinct bodies of opinion must be distinguished. The first, consisting of the better educated men, mostly ex-generals, are working with all their might for political influence, and would not favour any appeal to violence, although they are too well aware of the value of such a card to throw it away altogether. The opposite camp is composed of a few old-fashioned generals and supported to a great extent by the old *veld cornets*, who still exercise great influence.

At this juncture it is plain that much depends on the personality of the Boer leaders, who have so great a task in hand as to keep the flame of Dutch Nationalism burning brightly until time gives them the opportunity they seek. It must not be forgotten that without the Nationalist propaganda, if South Africa were to mature on ordinary British colonial lines, the aim of the Dutch leaders would be lost. No progress

and prosperity will satisfy them unless they are to free South Africa from the trammels of Imperialism, and from British theories and traditions. The republican spirit is an essential feature of the case. Who are the men who are pushing this great scheme?

To take the Transvaal leaders first. Joubert, the protagonist of Krüger just before the war, is dead. Krüger, the embodiment of reactionary Boerdom in its striking phase, is also dead. The mantle has descended chiefly on two men—Louis Botha and Smuts. The former married a lady of Irish descent. He belongs to the “united” section of the Church, and is of the most aristocratic and progressive party among the Boers. An eloquent speaker in Dutch, he is in touch with European thought, and is as far removed from the “peasant farmer” type in mind as he is in appearance. He is a great ally of the Dutch Reformed Synod, and is constantly called on to perform such services as laying foundation stones. His faults are curiously un-Boerlike. He talks a great deal in public, being apparently unable to resist the temptation of making a speech; he is a little too anxious to fill the public eye. One is constantly reminded that he is practically a *parvenu* in politics, having gained his present position as leader of the Boers chiefly by the elimination of stronger personalities during the war. He is drawn into inconsistencies by the desire to say the telling thing on every occasion and by the fact that, with one reservation, he is a political opportunist. We shall see his inconsistency presently in his attitude towards Government.

Smuts, who remained behind to work the machine, while the three ex-generals—Botha, de Wet, and De la Rey—visited Europe just after the war, is a different type. Coming from Cape Colony, and educated at Cambridge, he has outwardly nothing to distinguish him as a Boer. His countrymen, when he first joined them, distrusted him on account of his English ways and ideas. He is a lawyer, a man of books, no sportsman. His exploits as a daring leader of flying columns are among the most extraordinary incidents of the war. He is far better able to gauge the situation than any of his contemporaries, and his natural acumen, combined with the prestige he gained during the war, make him potentially the most important man in Transvaal politics to-day. He is young and is prepared to wait. He keeps in the background, utters generalities, works a lucrative law practice in Pretoria, and is on friendly terms with the British officials. There are one or two other men of this modern type. Esselen, for instance, who apparently believes that he can emulate the achievements of Krüger in 1879 and tries to work on home politics, cultivating the Liberal party. He does not realise that the Liberalism which gave back the Transvaal after Majuba is as dead as the dodo.

Schalk-Burger and De la Rey are men of very different calibre. The latter enjoys throughout Dutch South Africa a reputation for straightness. His genuine fineness of character, self-effacement, and homely simplicity make him the most attractive of the Boer leaders; but he lacks the knowledge of the

world to be able to follow his progressive friends in their flights. The extreme type is illustrated in such men as Beyers and Wolmarans, regular old-fashioned Boers, with the sturdy independence, strong hates, and invincible ignorance of their great president, though without his vein of intellectual subtlety. A speech from Beyers is like a fresh north wind blowing through cobwebs of intrigue and illusion. He will hate the British flag till he dies, and he says so. Other names, familiar during the war, have disappeared since. Andreas Cronje and a few others, who surrendered before the war was over, have apparently not been accommodated inside the Nationalist tabernacle. They retired quietly to their farms. Viljoen and Piet Cronje of Paardeberg sealed their political fate when, with a band of Boers and British irregulars, they joined a circus at St. Louis to give a representation of the Boer War.

There are some promising men of the modern school, but the Transvaal leaders to-day are, in fact, not statesmen, not men of great position, but merely distinguished generals in an unsuccessful war. They have to prove themselves, and to be tried in the fire of political life. They are now bound together by a voluntary association which has received no mandate calling itself *Het Volk* (The People), and claiming to speak for the Boer population. In June, 1905, its constitution was formally discussed at a Boer conference of delegates, and a system resembling the American "machine" was adopted for the nomination and control of candidates for Parliament. The laws as to party discipline were firmly defined, and, despite much

discussion and some dissension, the power of the head committee is to be supreme in the organisation. *Het Volk* and the Dutch Reformed Church Synod combined have, in fact, constituted themselves a Boer party, with thorough organisation; but it is not yet certain, as has been suggested, whether they can carry the people with them in any question where local considerations have to be weighed, since this kind of party control and discipline is little liked by the Boers. *Het Volk* represents at present a compromise for the furtherance of an aspiration rather than an accomplished fact, and its true significance will only be manifested to the world on the day when it accomplishes the feat of uniting with the Bond in the Cape and the Vereeniging in the Orange River Colony.

The active policy of the party began directly war was over. One does not wish to disparage men who are fighting for an ideal, but ethically their methods leave much to be desired. Peace signed, terms made, the oath taken, the work of reorganising the country began; but at this critical stage, when the aid of every influential and experienced man was needed, the Boer leaders went to Europe. There they collected relief funds, badly wanted to repair the ravages of war. Government, blundering badly no doubt, but anxious to help in this task, offered to co-operate in any scheme of general relief. Rations were given, it must be remembered, to all who required them, and to some who did not, down to the end of 1903. The Boer leaders refused co-operation, and declined to give even such an account of their own disbursements as would

have prevented overlapping. Later on it was announced that the relief money collected in Europe was to be spent partly in starting orphanages (in competition with those of Government, opened free to every child) and partly in educational schemes, thus confusing "relief" with Nationalist propaganda; for the one and only valid objection to the Government scheme of education and care of orphans was its denationalising effect on Boer children. It may be said that the money was subscribed for Boer needs and that the leaders judged the need of national schools and orphanages to be of the first importance. This is plausible, but, in view of the later attitude taken up by *Het Volk* on this question of the care and education of children, one can only regret that they did not gauge their own necessities better. Their present policy, as shown in the Boer Congress of June, 1905, is not to set up independent institutions, but to bend their energies to wringing concessions out of Government and utilising Government schools and institutions.

The truth of the matter is that in this, as in other respects, the Boer leaders deliberately kept aloof from Government, doing nothing to help it even in its best-intentioned moves. It is more than suspected that they were not above intriguing to set the repatriated *Bywoners* on the Land Settlements by the ears, and, despite their oft-repeated wishes for the prosperity of the country and the dirges they sang over its sad state, there were few who contributed practically towards its reorganisation. One hears so frequently the complaint in South Africa that local experience is never

consulted, and that the man on the spot is ignored or snubbed, that one is willing to give the Transvaal leaders every credit possible. They made promises, it is true, as did Hofmeyr at the Cape, and like him exhorted their countrymen to work with the British for the welfare of South Africa; but, just as Hofmeyr discounted his proclamation by retiring a few days later from political life, so Botha advised his followers to stand aloof from all affairs of Government. He, Smuts, and Schalk-Burger declined places on the legislature, and Smuts frankly acknowledged to the present writer his intention of keeping aloof as long as possible from all co-operation in Government. Although it is well known that the leaders, seeing a more practical way of securing their ends through combining with a section of the British, have abandoned this no-coöperation-with-an-unjust-Government attitude, yet at the Congress to decide the constitution of *Het Volk* this question was skilfully left open. Had the question been decided by a vote, as desired by De la Rey, an overwhelming majority would have voted against co-operation. The people had still the words of Boer leaders in an earlier stage ringing in their ears, and the delegates, with few exceptions, had been instructed to vote for standing aloof. The head committee, however, managed to have the matter left for future consideration by a special committee or conference, which gives them time to spread their new views of expediency. The incident is important, first, as showing that political motives and not a sense of injustice have been the factors in the case; and second, as illustrating the

relations between the astute Boer politicians and their future constituencies.

Their earlier attitude could be better explained if, at the same time, they had refrained from damaging criticism of a government which they were bound by their oath to accept and by their reiterated desires for peace and reorganisation to assist. De la Rey did his best; he went to Ceylon and persuaded the irreconcilables to return. Since then, on his own farm and in his own way, he has worked to restore order and prosperity to his district. It would have been making too large a draft on human magnanimity to expect such conduct from all the Boer leaders. Some of them felt that a more strenuous attitude was needed for the preservation of their national ideal. But, in their zeal to foment discontent with the Government and to present it in an unfavourable light to Europe, they lost all regard for accuracy, and, not contented with enumerating the real short-comings and grievances, exaggerated and enlarged them. It is quite impossible here to enter into the question fully; but any one who cares to rake up an unpleasant subject can read Louis Botha's letter to Mr. Courtney in *The Times* respecting the assistance given (or not given) to destitute burghers, and then turn to an official account of the work and expenditure of the repatriation department. Official accounts are not always the best criteria, but figures and facts are given in blue books which cannot be discredited, and Botha himself in the same letter remarked, as a testimony to the industry of his countrymen, that as much land was ploughed in the first season

after the war as ever before. Now, the Government found the cattle and most of the implements and even did much of the ploughing, but Botha does not mention these facts. To take another instance of unfair criticism. No subject has been more fruitful of grievances than that of the compensation promised to certain classes of burghers under specific conditions. The wisdom or unwisdom of any such promise is neither here nor there; but when we remember that the claims sent in by the two new colonies amounted to £82,000,000 we can understand that even had it been possible to sift them justly—a herculean task—there would have remained a permanent sense of grievance in the minds of all who were not satisfied. As it is, the whole subject bristles with difficulties, mistakes, and misunderstandings, and has provided splendid capital for the Boer leaders in pointing the moral of British injustice and ineptitude. It is a fact, however, that their own relief work, even with their superior opportunities for knowing the conditions, was frequently at fault, and that they added to our difficulties by telling all applicants for relief to apply, as a right, to Government, which was bound to help them out of compensation funds. Two blacks do not make one white, and such work is full of pitfalls to the most experienced, but one could have wished that the hard task of setting the new colonies in order and restarting the business of life had been the scene of a real and cordial co-operation between the Boer leaders and British officials.

With the introduction of a constitution into the

Transvaal came a new phase. Since the war the Nationalist platform had had only one real plank—the conservation of the elements which it was and is hoped to use, to create a Dutch nationality—for one cannot regard the programme of detraction and aloofness as a plank. Now a fresh plan was adopted. A considerable party among the British in the Transvaal desired a full responsible form of government. It is an open secret that Johannesburg as a whole never sighed for the Imperial yoke, and the class of men who shouted most against the Krüger *régime* are now loudest in denouncing the autocratic rule of Downing Street. *Het Volk* suddenly abandoned their non-committal attitude, plunged into the arena, and became allied to the Responsible Government party. The opportunity to create a split in the British camp was good, but this altogether sordid view was not the only one. As has been said already, the leaders of *Het Volk* are aware that the policy of isolation is against the spirit of the time. The new doctrine for the Boers of co-operation and progress has been preached by Malan, one of the Bond leaders and an influential personality in Cape Colony politics, of whom more hereafter. *Het Volk* now begins to strike out boldly into the political ocean. Her leaders come forward and announce that they accept “union under the Union Jack”—the phrase, repeated by Botha, is Malan’s. They even angle for, and partially secure, the Labour vote; and, having announced formerly that none of them would lend themselves to the travesty of a semi-repre-

sentative government, they now decide to run for certain seats. In order to obtain the co-operation of the Responsible party they have had to compromise on the education, language, and religious questions; but they have realised that the force of circumstances has rendered their original attitude on these subjects unpractical, and they hope by verbal quibbles and by force of local influence to secure in detail much that they have renounced in bulk. They have no intention of compromising on principle—a course quite foreign to them—but they are changing their tactics, and of course the shorter the road to complete self-government the nearer they are to a vindication of their guiding ideal.

Although the Bond is more firmly established, stronger, and contains more distinguished men, there is nothing approaching in simplicity of organisation and clearness of policy to *Het Volk* in either the Orange River or Cape Colony. The former, despite its grievance in being denied representative government, and, despite the heavy burden imposed by an elaborate and expensive government in a country which had always been peaceful and prosperous under the simplest *régime*, is not the scene of such political conflict as either of its sister colonies. The society which is to be organised there on the plan of *Het Volk* seems to owe its initiation largely to the Transvaal leaders. There is no Johannesburg to complicate matters, nor is the division of town *versus* country as marked as in the Cape. British and Dutch in the Orange River Colony are more homogeneous, more absorbed in their own practical affairs,

and less given to politics than any of their contemporaries. The progressive character of the people makes it more likely that, as the country is opened up and education spreads, they will lose some of the outward characteristics of their race and become assimilated to the British Africander, but how far their political aspirations will be modified in this process it is impossible to judge. Cape Colony does not afford a criterion, for there has been continual tampering with natural evolution in that State, and the conditions under which the Orange River Colony starts its career are in every way unprecedented. It is noticeable that no steps towards a political organisation on purely Dutch lines has ever existed in Orangia until this summer. The genuine grievance of the colony as to the granting of self-government has stimulated matters, and a "Union" has been formed which, it is hoped, will sooner or later be affiliated with *Het Volk* and the Bond, and complete the chain.¹

The racial position in Cape Colony is the most delicate of subjects. The terms "loyal" and "disloyal" have been bandied about with a freedom that begets contempt, and a bitterness even exceeding that found in the new colonics has been engendered. There is no useful point to be attained in going back to the war

¹ Since this was written the news comes that, on the strong recommendation of Lord Selborne, the Orange River Colony is to be granted representative government immediately. The colony enjoys a peculiar position and may become the centre of South African nationalism, being homogeneous, intelligent, and devoid of many of the political difficulties of other colonies. Her leaders—men like Fischer, P. de Wet, J. G. Fraser, and T. Brain—are likely to adopt a broad nationalism, in alliance with the best school of the Cape.

and pre-war days and their effect on Cape Colony politics ; but one thing must never be lost sight of—the difficult position in which the Dutch subjects of Britain were placed when their own relatives, in arms against the Queen, came to them for help or with menaces, and when, as frequently happened, no adequate protection was afforded them by British troops. The condition of military law was one which offered great opportunities for abuses, and war is no kid-glove affair at any time. Cape Colony is willing and ready to bury this mournful past, but certain noxious weeds are growing on the new-made grave. The worst of these is a soreness in the hearts of British Africanders, sometimes caused perhaps by super-sensitiveness or by misunderstanding, but very real to them. The feeling that the man-on-the-spot has been once more treated cavalierly by Britain, and that in her desire to placate her enemies she has cold-shouldered her friends, has had the effect of drawing together British and Dutch Africanders ; but, desirable though this may be, it is unfortunate that the bond should be cemented by a sense of common grievance.

The Dutch ideal in Cape Colony is enshrined in the Africander Bond and, although the history of this association has been frequently told, it is necessary to outline its real meaning here.

It must not be forgotten that the birth of the Bond was before the era of Imperialism as we know it to-day. The Little Englander was strong in the land, and among British colonists the idea of following the example of the American colonies was regarded as

quite open for discussion and sure to come in time. The incorporation with the original Bond of the Farmers' Association complicated matters. This society was not purely or even chiefly political in its aims, and it remains to-day as the solid body of the Bond, genuinely occupied with legitimate ambitions for the encouragement of the farming interests, while the leaders indulge in wild flights of political imaginings and more practical schemings, all directed to the original point—the supremacy and independence of the Dutch. Hofmeyr, who claimed to have remodelled the Bond, struck out the seditious clause relating to the flag, and the constitution of to-day may be interpreted as a harmless one, having for its ostensible aim the preservation of the best traditions of the people and the confederation of the South African States. But, if one likes (as many of its members do) to read more meaning into it, it may be regarded as a manifesto proclaiming the preservation of the Dutch nationality as opposed to the British and the union of South Africa outside the empire. To either form many men of differing views subscribe, in sympathy with one aspiration or the other, and yet not realising what Dutch dominion throughout South Africa would really mean. Others again join the Bond because it stands for agricultural interests, which have been undoubtedly neglected in the past.

The Englishman who believes in his country may well ask himself how it is that she has apparently so failed in South Africa, that in one of her oldest colonies half, if not more, of the population are openly

anti-British and the principal political organisation is freely accused of disseminating the rankest disloyalty. Most Cape Colonists will tell you freely that this race feeling is an affair of yesterday, caused by the Raid and by the British attempt to crush the Boer nationalities. They point to an undeniable fact, the *ante-bellum* close social intercourse and frequent intermarriage between English and Dutch, which, they say, was obliterating the race line. It is true also that the Transvaal Dutch, inferior in education and refinement to their Cape Colony relatives, and living in a condition of constant dissension and lawlessness, had lost touch with the Dutch of the old Colony. But there remains the fact that in 1874 we find Bürgers, a Cape Colonist who had been educated in Holland, enunciating the anti-British doctrine with the utmost vehemence, and calling upon all Africanders (Dutch, of course) from Table Mountain to the Magaliesburg. He declared that hearts throbbed even more warmly for the Republic at the Cape than in the Free State.

Out of this propaganda and the influences of the time, especially the first Transvaal war and the retrocession, the motive of which was so little understood, grew the Africander Bond, and there can be no doubt, that in its conception it was fundamentally anti-British. Notwithstanding this fact, it is notorious that some of the best British talent in the Cape has joined this association. John X. Merriman, an Englishman born and without doubt the cleverest, wittiest, and most cultured man in South Africa to-day, after denouncing the original Bond ended by coming, for

a time at all events, within its fold. Cecil Rhodes was in close touch with the Bond at one time. "I have been under the domination of the Bond myself," he said in 1899, in the Claremont speech. Sir Richard Solomon, now Attorney General in the Transvaal, born in South Africa of English parents, was a member of a Bond Government. Mr. Schreiner, of German parentage, ex-premier and a man of extreme ability, and Sir J. Rose-Innes, son of a Scottish schoolmaster who came to the Cape, now Chief Justice of the Transvaal, have worked with the Bond and at times have justified its aims and character. It is ridiculous and idle to call such men and their followers disloyal because they were or are in sympathy with the Bond. One needs to find a more rational explanation of their attitude than to attribute it to original sin or ineradicable dislike for the institutions of their own homeland. Some of them may have coquetted with the idea of Republicanism, but most have a genuine desire for the preservation of the Imperial tie, and none, I believe, would subscribe to a South Africa in which the Dutch element would predominate at the expense of the British.

The official explanation of the Bond is that it is a necessary organisation, to represent the land-owners, as opposed to the townspeople, the division thus made coinciding with the racial line without "malice aforethought," and that loyalty to the Crown is an essential feature of its programme. Within every such organisation there are, however, men of widely differing views, many of whom use their party as a cloak. Despite

the modification by which Hofmeyr contrived to save the Bond from an appearance of open hostility to British government, it has undoubtedly been the organ for many expressions of opinion which do not come strictly within its constitution. The attitude of such colonial statesmen as have been mentioned must not be judged without reference to that of Imperial statesmen at home at contemporaneous periods. The cult of Imperialism is still a new one, and the most rabid Bondsman has not gone farther in the enunciation of principles which we now deem "disloyal" than some of our home-grown politicians. At the bottom of the situation in Cape Colony, as in the Transvaal, lies the fundamental difference in the political ideals of the two white races who are side by side in South Africa; but it is unfortunate that the dual aspect of the Bond has blinded many people to this fact and made them imagine that in joining the ranks they are doing a service to the country, whereas the sacrifice of a great principle is involved, and the end does not justify the means. The Dutch have shown plainly that they feel an appeal to ancient prejudices necessary to keep their people sound in their national traditions—the appeal to principles is not enough. Political exigencies have been the ruling factor in the game played; but although the game is the same now, the tactics are changing. One of the new leaders of thought already mentioned has been largely responsible for this. Malan perceives that to try to fence the people round with artificial barriers of creed and language prejudices would be to retard their material and mental

progress without achieving any political end. He perceives the incongruity of a republican nation in which the leaders are to be enlightened and the great mass of people ignorant. He has tried to draw his countrymen after him on a broader road towards a higher national ideal, and he is laying the lines which the Progressive Boers of the Transvaal will eventually follow. Under this enlightened teaching the racial tension in Cape Colony has been relaxed. The session of 1904 saw two important measures—the Workmen's Compensation and Education Bills—passed with amicable feelings on both sides of the House. The Ministry which began so inauspiciously under the leader of the Raid has held its way much more successfully than was hoped. Social intercourse between the two races, which was for a time interrupted, has been resumed to a great extent, and a strong desire is expressed on all sides that the racial question should be allowed to die. Deeply as one must sympathise with this attitude, it is essential that there should be plain speaking on this point. There is a danger, and more than a danger, that in the joining of hands the British element, less homogeneous and far less certain of their political creed, should lose sight of one fact. If the British Africander becomes persuaded that the best future for South Africa lies outside the empire, he will be yielding to an influence skilfully wielded, often silently, by a numerical majority in the country, but he must not cherish the illusion that he can keep his birthright at the same time. The South Africa of Nationalist dreams is not only indepen-

dent of the empire, but it is Dutch—Dutch in ideals, Dutch in language, Dutch in methods. Where else would be the reasonableness of the Nationalist propaganda? If the ordinary self-government of a British colony, with a subsequent breaking of Imperial ties, were all that the Nationalist party aims at, its methods seem roundabout and ineffective.

Let the aims and hopes of the Nationalist party be once more clearly stated. Of the white population of South Africa, roughly speaking, seventy per cent. of the Cape, eighty-five per cent. of the Orange River Colony, sixty per cent. of the Transvaal, and twenty-five per cent. of Natal are Dutch by descent, and the influence of Dutch mothers over their children by Englishmen is another sure addition. The best of the land is owned by them, and they are the permanent and rapidly increasing population of the country. There are two schools of thought in Dutch Africanderdom. The first aimed at conserving the seventeenth-century character of its people as a bulwark against the spirit of the times, and creating in South Africa an oligarchy of the elect to rule the country for its own good. The second is a far more specious one. It aims at preserving the essential features of the Boers and their Republicanism in their full integrity, while urging their people to take every means of putting themselves on an intellectual level with their British neighbours. The language must be kept alive to feed the flames of Nationalism, but the outward and visible signs of Boerdom will not be cherished so much as the inward and spiritual grace. Moreover, on the principle of

nothing venture nothing have, the isolation policy must be abandoned, and the Dutch Afriander must try to influence the British, and must not be afraid of contamination. And the end? What can it be but the triumph of the Dutch ideal in political and social life—the treatment of the native races, the republican form of government, the development of the country as a close preserve, and, in a word, the elimination not only of the Imperial but of the British factor as a dominant note in South African politics. True patriotism is not lacking in this programme, since it takes far wider views of the welfare of the country and substitutes a constructive for an obstructionist policy. To decline to meet the Dutch on these grounds would be as cowardly and churlish as it would be futile. They are now playing an intelligible game, and, as was said before, they can best be met by frankness. Britain and the British Afrianders have to prove to them that the ideal of empire is neither an empty dream nor a weapon of oppression. There is already within the Nationalist tabernacle a growing appreciation of the true value of the Imperial bond, and the Bond is less firmly separatist than it was in the eighties. The growth of Nationalism should temper the bitterness of party conflict. The race line and the party line to a great extent coincide, but there are many domestic questions, at the Cape especially, which should and could be fought or discussed on party lines without any introduction of race feeling, and there are many more which, if race feeling were not imported into them, could be amicably

settled without party disputes at all. Above all, as one whose sympathies are with the British on broad Imperial grounds, but are also enlisted with the Dutch as the chief representatives of the agricultural interests of the country, I must deprecate the efforts made, often by men who are neither British nor Dutch Afrianders, to keep open sore places and make co-operation impossible. Is it not possible that we can frankly avow our hostility to the Dutch ideal and work for our own without resorting to detraction and mud-throwing? Neither side is free from this deplorable tendency, and the first step towards a better state of affairs must be an increase in dignity of tone on the part of the press, and of confidence and respect among public men.

There can be no attempt to deal in these pages with the details of internal politics in South Africa, more particularly in the Cape Colony, where there is already a fully responsible government. But I am anxious to set the broad issues clearly before my countrymen, Britons and Afrianders alike. At this point in our inquiries it may be naturally asked why the Dutch party, if they are, as has been said, the permanent population of South Africa and in numerical superiority to any other white race, should not be permitted to achieve their ideal. Why should we oppose these people, whose political principles are all on the side of liberty? We could never govern them by force, say some people, and why should we govern them at all? This brings us to our original question. Why should not "Africa for the Afrianders" be

considered a legitimate aspiration, to be interpreted by the majority? Because, in the first place, South Africa is no ordinary colony. It is a strategic position essential to the empire, and we have bought every inch of it with our money and our blood. The Africander must not forget that the Imperial Government has rights in South Africa, the rights of the conqueror, just as he himself has rights—the rights of citizenship and occupation. But there is yet another reason. South Africa is British, but the majority of the white population are Dutch. If they persist in pushing their Nationalist propaganda, the Imperial Government must consider how she can protect the minority—the British Africanders. In a homogeneous country the minority can take care of itself—the swing of the pendulum will bring it into power to-morrow—but Great Britain must not be blind to the claims of her own children if they are to be placed in a perpetual political minority. She has been blind before, but she is awakening to the true facts of the case.

It is true, as said before, that the Boer Nationalist propaganda is strongest where it is most open. When the leaders combine in promoting the amalgamation of the two races, and rely simply on natural evolution and the assimilation of interests to bring their British brothers into line, they are playing an open game, an unassailable game, and a strong one. When they plot and scheme to prevent any amalgamation or assimilation they are defeating their own ends. The British, if they are to be set apart, may remain a minority, but, owing to their position in the country,

a powerful minority, and South African progress will be retarded. I do not expect to see eradication of the race line, as a political factor, in this generation or perhaps the next, but, if there is ever to be peace in this distracted country, it must eventually come. If only Briton and Boer alike would sink their differences in a common platform of Africanderdom I should be willing to leave Imperialism to be considered by the Africander people, convinced that if our empire is worthy to endure she will find the true relation for each of her colonies and for all the peoples, whether of kindred or alien race, who dwell beneath the British flag. To this subject I must return, but before closing this necessarily condensed review of the racial position in Cape Colony and the two ex-republics I must summarise briefly my conclusions.

The fundamental question is whether the British element or the Dutch should be the dominant factor in South Africa. If the latter, then the Imperial factor will be eliminated, and not only that, but the Dutch ideal of government will be set up. If, however, the races amalgamate and form a real Africander nation, as they must do if South Africa is to progress, there will be no "minority question," and the connection with the empire will be decided on grounds of policy and not of prejudice. It is to secure this freedom from prejudice, to place the issues clearly before them, and to set an Imperialist ideal before the young Africander nation that our efforts should be bent,

CHAPTER VI

LAND SETTLEMENT AS A POLICY

FOR the purposes of this book it is not necessary to consider in detail the various schemes of land settlement which have been applied to South Africa, but rather to give a comprehensive view of the subject from the broad and practical standpoint.

The question of filling up the spare places in the colonies, and thus assisting their development, has recently become inextricably confused with a natural desire to relieve the congested areas of our own country. This is the philanthropic view of land settlement. For such experiments, however, South Africa is the least favourable ground. Apart from the difficulties which beset the farmer, of which we must speak later, it must never be forgotten that the presence of a large black population imposes special conditions. The presence of the blacks produces the fact that the whites have no scope as agricultural labourers—only as independent farmers. The gravest difficulty, however, is that the immigrant finds an already established body of whites of an inferior degree of energy and intelligence and entirely satisfied with a lower plane of material civilisation as we Europeans understand it. It is one of the strongest conclusions arrived at after studying

the subject in every South African colony that a high type of colonist is needed, both morally and mentally, to uphold at once the traditions of his country and his own moral standpoint under conditions so trying and novel. It is the invariable experience that contact with races in a lower grade of civilisation has a deteriorating effect on individuals unless they are of superior calibre. South Africa wants no failures, no weak-kneed brothers, no degenerates, but the best, and only the best, type of British manhood; self-reliant, capable, well-educated men with some farming experience.

This becomes more than ever evident when we consider a second phase of the land settlement question—the politico-philanthropic scheme which combines the attempt to relieve congestion at home with that of serving a political purpose by “driving in the British wedge.” It is one of the most unfortunate circumstances in South Africa that the division between town and country should in the main coincide with the race line, and the attempt to put British on the land is a natural sequence of ideas; but unless the British, thus chosen, are carefully chosen their influence will be nil. They have to contend with too solid convictions and prejudices, and a very ordinary fate for the average unmarried British settler, unless he be a superior man, is to enter a Dutch family by marriage and usually become violently anti-British in sentiment. I know of a soldier settler who, after fighting all through the war on the British side, took up Government land and became engaged to a Dutch girl, and was distinguished

at a Boer Conference by the violence of his attacks on the British Government. The better types become rather British Afrianders, of South African nationalistic proclivities, but not of an anti-Imperial tendency in any sense. It is not out of place, therefore, to suggest that any one who is trying to kill three birds with one stone—to relieve pressure at home, to fill up “waste places” in South Africa, and to provide a nucleus for a political propaganda—should for this complicated task choose only those fitted to fulfil these requirements; men of good standing, character, and education, who have already given hostages to fortune. After this preamble we may now proceed to regard land settlement in South Africa on its own merits.

What are the attractions of South Africa as a country for British colonists? That, after all, is the crux of the situation. Philanthropic and political schemes come and go, but the economic factor remains. Great Britain continues year by year to send abroad her sons for whom she has no room, and why should they not go to South Africa and settle on the land?

The plain truth is that there is no white man's country within the empire which offers such a precarious existence to the farmer. Conditions vary, climate and soil are vastly different in the various regions, but Nature has been constant in one thing—her inconstancy. The South African farmer can seldom rely on regularity of seasons; in many parts his rains come at high summer and may ruin his harvest, while in others early or late frosts may upset his calculations. There is an inequality in the soil too which makes

anything but the closest local experience useless. It seems to be spread about in patches, of varying richness and differing constituents, some extraordinarily rich (the alluvial pockets), while close by may be a poor infertile patch. The aridity of the climate in many parts is well known, and the dried-up river beds are proverbial. Irrigation on an extended scale is in parts already practised, but much more is needed and is feasible; this, however, would not insure against droughts or against the denudation caused by torrential rains. The farmer's life is one continued struggle with these problems, and it is not possible to compare the country where such conditions prevail with the rich, unirrigated stretches of agricultural country in Canada, Argentina, or Australia. Such was the confession of two of the most experienced and successful South African farmers after a visit to Australia.

It is not soil, climate, or water supply, however, which form the farmer's greatest anxiety, but the number of plant diseases, insect scourges, and animal diseases which are continually present. Some of these are partly due to climatic influences and unscientific methods of agriculture. Time may mitigate these, but others, due to the conditions of water supply, are probably more or less irremediable. The value of experimental farms will undoubtedly make itself felt by degrees; at present, excepting some earlier foundations at the Cape, these institutions have not had sufficient time. There are difficulties in the way of scientific farming in a country where, owing to the difference in the respective soils or other circum-

stances, the experience of one man may be falsified by that of another, and agriculture as a science has not yet been fully recognised, although valuable work has been done on experimental farms and by the Agricultural Departments. Until this state of affairs is more general it is impossible to judge the possibilities of Cape Colony fairly, and the same may be said, in varying degrees, of the other colonies. At present, however, the agriculturist may expect to do battle with rust in his wheat, insect pests in his vines, caterpillars in his fruit trees, Australian bug and peach-fly in his fruit, and locusts everywhere, to mention only a few of the ills that South African husbandry is heir to. As for stock-farming, equal trials must be faced—almost every kind of animal disease known in other parts of the world and one or two which are probably peculiar. There is little doubt, however, that these can and will be eradicated if common-sense measures for prevention are taken all over the country. A combination of the various Governments to secure this unanimity should be followed, in the opinion of experts, first by fencing the country (an enormous task, but not greater than that effected in Australia), and second by a strict watch on imported cattle and a system of inspection and segregation, made possible by fencing.

There has been lately a movement in all the colonies towards increasing the number of farmers' associations, the first step towards breaking down the suicidal selfishness and isolation of the farmers in former days. The creation of land banks, referred to later, with a view to breaking the domination of the

traders and finance brokers over the land, is under consideration. If these associations could only become general, and avoid all politics, the few progressive men in each district might be able in time to gain a general acceptance for more enlightened views of stock-farming and eradicate the impression held formerly that disease is spontaneously generated and is the hand of God. That there are progressive and enlightened farmers in South Africa every one who has visited that country knows, and the best instances may be seen in the eastern provinces of the Cape and the Orange River Colony; but the bulk of the rural population, consisting of the back-veld Boer, is intensely averse from co-operation, and without combination among the farmers themselves any reforms from above are practically useless. Mention must be made, however, of praiseworthy attempts to rouse intelligent interest by the establishment of stock farms and the importation of valuable stock for breeding purposes in the Orange River Colony and Transvaal. Useful though such measures are, they have been greatly wasted while diseases have swept unchecked (or hardly checked by partial and imperfect measures) through the country, carrying off thousands of stock.

One of the foremost difficulties of the South African farmer is the scarcity of labour and the irregularity and irresponsibility of the Kaffir when he can be induced to work. The traditions of South Africa are against a white man labouring with his own hands, but even if this were not the case (and many British

farmers ignore it) the conditions make a cheap labour supply essential to success.

If Nature is capricious and man careless in providing the essentials for successful farming in South Africa, it may well be asked how one can account for the former prosperity of the Orange Free State, that pastoral idyllic country, or for the many contented and even fairly prosperous farmers of Cape Colony or the Transvaal. It must not be forgotten, however, that in the early days of colonisation land was plentiful, and the settler could pick and choose. The Boers moved from place to place until they found the exact spot they liked, and took possession of practically every one of those alluvial pockets which are the cream of agricultural land. Notwithstanding this fact, agriculture pure and simple has never been a short cut, or even a sure road, to prosperity. The Transvaal was bankrupt when the mines were found; and Cape Colony was facing a financial crisis, on more than one occasion, when fresh mineral discoveries up country gave new life. The Cape ostrich-farming, one of the most paying industries, is largely speculative. One of the essentials for successful pioneer farming is cheap land, but though since the war many farms have come into the market, some as Government lands and some by reason of the depressed circumstances of private owners, prices have been raised all round,¹ artificially inflated in the hope of a great wave of

¹ This refers to freehold out and out purchases, but some large grazing areas can still be rented (surface rights) for comparatively low rates—the apparent paradox being due to hopes of mineral discoveries.

prosperity. A notorious instance may be taken from one of the best farming districts in South Africa, where land bought some years ago for ten shillings a *morgen*,¹ and unsuccessfully farmed by two experienced colonials, was sold to an English settlement syndicate for £2 10s. per *morgen*. In the Cape Colony the best Government land is all taken up, and cannot be had at a reasonable price, while even the cheap and often arid land, inconveniently situated, costs from two to five shillings a *morgen* and is dear at that price. Natal does not seriously compete for settlement by white farmers. The greater portion of it is tropical or semi-tropical in climate, and such lands as are not reserved for natives are largely in the hands of land companies, which prefer to let them to native tenants. Market-gardening is done by Indian coolies, and the tendency of the whole white population is to gravitate towards towns. There are one or two conspicuous and successful exceptions to this rule; but a newcomer, anxious to emulate their example, would have little choice of good land.

In the Orange River Colony, which is entirely divided up into farms and possesses no back country, the Government is offering easy terms to settlers; but the Government bought in a dear market at an average price of thirteen shillings a *morgen*, and, though land has gone down since then, it may be imagined that there is now no cheap land of anything like fair quality to be had. Nevertheless, nearly all the land purchased by the Government has been allotted,

¹ The *morgen* equals $2\frac{1}{2}$ English acres.

amounting to over 1,100,000 acres, while of the land inherited from the late Government a good deal consists of dry farms, some of which it is hoped to irrigate. About 200,000 acres still remain unallotted. There does not seem, therefore, any possibility of obtaining cheap land in the Orange River Colony; and, even if these Government lands were rendered desirable by irrigation, their price would necessarily remain high, since the cost of such works is very heavy. In the Transvaal a similar boom in land has sent up the prices, and the locking up of considerable areas by mining companies has aggravated this, but not to the extent usually supposed, since the land companies' areas are mainly in the low veld, not suitable for white settlement, and used by the late Boer owners for winter grazing only, with a few native tenant squatters. It must be remembered that, except under exceptional conditions, small farms are not practicable in South Africa. Although the conditions vary so greatly, it may be said that no new settler is well advised to take up less than 2,000 acres. Very few Dutch farmers were content with less than 5,000 acres. Before dealing with other practical considerations for the farmers we must briefly recount what has been done by the Governments of the new colonies to promote land settlement.

The Government of the Orange River Colony has reserved lands for its experimental farms and forestry purposes, and 153,000 acres have been set aside for a land settlement experiment under the auspices of the Imperial South African Association. Besides

this scheme there are others, differing in their detailed organisation but having in the main the same object—to place British settlers on the land, by eleemosynary aid if necessary. The Duke of Westminster has an expensive little settlement of a dozen farmers run on these lines. They are his tenants, but the principle of their tenancy is not the payment of rent, but a sort of tithe system on their profits. The average size of their farms, situated in the conquered territory, which is one of the best farming districts, is about 700 acres, and they are supplied with many necessities for their start in life. The great drawback to their situation is the fact that they are not free men, and do not own the soil or even the improvements they make—a condition quite contrary to the colonial spirit which has caused differences of opinion already between the Duke's agent and the tenants.

A second settlement scheme is that of Lord Lovat, who has secured a block of ground some 12,000 acres in extent as a training-ground for intending settlers, each of whom must possess a minimum of £500 capital. By the agreement the land is to be divided into eight parts eventually and sold to the settlers, who will then come under the usual terms of Government land settlement. Their share of the land, if so divided, would be about 1,500 acres.

Up to June, 1904, the Land Settlement Department reported to have received 656 heads of families, of whom 83 were Dutch and 138 British Africanders; some 250 brought wives (69 of these were the

Dutchmen's wives), and these with their families brought up the total to 1,549 souls.

Now, these figures are bald and uninteresting to look at, but they tell a story. Up to June, 1904, some six hundred men had been placed on the soil of the Orange River Colony, seven-eighths being British. Of these registered settlers a fair number were independent farmers from other parts of South Africa, with capital which placed them in an independent position; they merely bought Government land. Others were counting on the loans which they were entitled to obtain under the settlement ordinance, and forty-seven were given assisted passages from home. Now, the expenditure of the department for the year ending June 30, 1904, was £222,259. Of this part is recoverable. Advances to settlers amount to £32,000, while the value of the land, of which only £900 had as yet been paid up, amounted altogether to £124,000 odd. If we set this on one side, and allow (generously) £33,000 for recoverable expenditure (this practically allows for no bad debts), there remains a year's out-of-pocket expenditure of £65,000, a heavy burden for a little agricultural country like the Orange River Colony with only eighty thousand white inhabitants. The net result is not visible in the figures, since they represent only those who took up farms, and of these a fair proportion have proved unsuccessful. The bad seasons which followed the war proved a great strain on all new-comers, especially those possessing little or no capital; and although, trusting to the well-known powers of recuperation of the land, many held on

bravely, even when reduced to eating nothing but mealie meal, yet others undoubtedly have given up in despair and swelled the Government expenditure with bad debts. Additional loans and grace of time for payment of instalments due had to be granted in many cases, so that many of the unfortunate settlers start life with a burden round their necks, while the scheme has involved a heavy outlay on the part of Government.

While this is the case, there were at the time of my visit to the Orange River Colony, in January, 1905, some six thousand applications for land filed at the Government Office. It would have been interesting to know how many of these came from Afrianders (British or Dutch) with some capital at their backs. The colony possesses a great reputation as a farming country, owing largely to the thrifty, peaceful character of its burghers under the Republic and the lack of political disturbances, which made them one of the happiest and best-governed people in the world. It has naturally attracted most attention from would-be settlers and promoters of settlements. But the economic future of the Orange River farmer is as yet problematic, and his political future even more so. These reasons incline one to the belief that the solution of the problem lies in the quality and not the quantity of the settlers, and that independence, experience, and some capital are more important qualifications than any others.

Land settlement in the Transvaal presents some features quite unique. In the first place, it has been

used as part of a Poor Relief machinery for the benefit of the landless Dutch who had drifted into the cities and at the end of the war were flooding the refuge camps, from which finally some of them had to be removed straight to the burgher settlements. This attempt to deal with the unemployed problem in the cities is specially interesting at the present moment, resembling many of the schemes which are advocated in England; but the *Bywoner*, or poor Boer, is a more difficult subject in some ways than even his European prototype, being incapable of steady work, from which his life of semi-dependence and his inherited pride have made him averse until he has almost lost the capacity for it. He has in very few instances learnt any trade, and his wife and daughters will not go out to service. It is not possible here to follow in detail the interesting attempt that is being made to take this degenerate descendant of the *Voortrekkers* and place him on the land with a prospect of owning it and becoming a self-respecting, industrious citizen. The total number of families repatriated under the various settlement schemes—some run by private syndicates on “business principles” and the others by Government—was fourteen hundred, of which some eight hundred odd remain. Unfortunately the private syndicates have broken down and their estates will be sold, while the net result is that a large proportion of the money which was regarded as invested in reproductive works must be written off as repatriation expenses. The system will probably have to be entirely controlled by Government, and cannot be expected to be altogether

self-supporting. In other words, it is a form of poor relief.

Apart from this eleemosynary scheme, the development of land settlement in the Transvaal has been interesting. It began in 1901 with a "department for the preservation of cattle," which was succeeded by a Land Board in the early part of 1902. This was an active body, largely concerned at first with repatriation, which was afterwards handed over to the special department for that work, and with the buying of land on which several hundred immigrant settlers were planted out, at first in camps. This was all, of course, in the nature of relief work. After peace came the organisation of departments, and an Australian was appointed as Commissioner of Lands, who still holds office. The settlers who, at enormous expense¹ (something like one million sterling), had been already planted out were discovered in many cases to be unsuitable for permanent settlement, only two hundred being selected. Another £200,000 was spent on settling them, it was hoped, permanently. A certain number of soldiers who took their discharge were presumably among this number; but it is difficult to get any precise idea of the work done or the actual figures. The Commissioner of Lands, speaking in the Legislative Council in July, 1905, gave the clearest view of the work of his department when he admitted that no real land settlement had

¹ Of the million sterling said to have been expended on this account something like three-fourths was disbursed on land purchase—not very wisely selected and bought at high prices—much of it probably incapable of occupation by white families.

been attempted, as during the two years of its existence it had been sufficiently employed in organising a system of examining would-be settlers. Of the latter some five hundred had applied for land, of whom thirty or forty per cent. were thrown out, and in his opinion it would be many years before anything substantial could be done in land settlement. This is straightforward, if unsatisfactory, and should give food for reflection to optimists who regard the dumping of British on the soil of South Africa as a sort of panacea for her troubles.

A considerable portion of the large tracts of land in the Transvaal held by land companies and mining syndicates, despite some sporadic cultivation to gain the advantages given by the laws, is at present idle.¹ Under the Boer régime irrigation had been neglected, roads had to be remade or laid out, and the whole country was in a state of chaos. In the best districts the price of land went up, and that of irrigated land is almost prohibitive under present conditions. With the near neighbourhood of the Rand one would expect farm produce of all kinds to be extremely profitable; but the fact remains that, while prices steadily decline, the expense of production increases. It is said that, owing to unscientific treatment and denudation, some of the soil is failing in productivity, and, while the price of artificial manure is raised by heavy rates of carriage

¹ The Australasian colonies have found it necessary to legislate to secure the compulsory purchase of large estates for closer settlement. This could only be imitated in South Africa with improved irrigation and intensive cultivation.

to something like £12 a ton, this cannot well be remedied. Notwithstanding all this, there is much to be hoped from the activity of such departments as those of agriculture, forestry, and irrigation, if properly and consistently supported ; while the improvement of stock, the establishment of experimental farms, and the investigation of disease will in time make settlement on the land less precarious. This is, however, an affair of the future, and it is hoped that the far-seeing policy which established these measures will not be balked by any premature interference on the part of full responsible government when that comes. It was of these that Lord Milner spoke with real pathos in his farewell speech, when he said, "Defend my works when I am gone. They are expensive works, but the investment is sound."

While the actual conditions of pastoral or agricultural farming in Cape Colony and the new colonies must be acknowledged to be extremely difficult, while the country has been handicapped by Nature, by a lack of labour, and by unprogressive and unscientific use on the part of man, while land is no longer to be had cheap, and water rights are becoming prohibitively expensive, what is the position of the farmer politically? We have seen that the Imperial Governments in the new colonies have been willing to lavish money in getting men on to the land, although their efforts have not been particularly successful ; and we might expect to find the farmer the petted *protégé* of the State. Let us take Cape Colony first. She has been a fully self-governed colony for thirty-three

years. Her farming population is large and well distributed. Although the majority are Dutch, there is a strong progressive British element. The Dutch section, we know, is politically organised and extremely powerful. Although at the present moment a Government is in power which does not fully represent the farming population, it is certain that for a great portion of the past twenty years the agricultural interest has been fairly and fully represented, has enjoyed periods of power, and has had ample opportunities for protecting the agricultural interests of the colony. We find, therefore, that Cape Colony gives certain privileges to farmers—special rates on the railways for live stock, produce and manures, and artificial manure supplied by Government at cost price. The wine and spirit farmers have been protected by heavy duties, and until the war reduced the stock in the country there was a duty on imported meat. Several irrigation schemes, not always well considered, have been carried out. A Customs Union secures the main South African ports. Notwithstanding these measures, there has been till lately a general feeling in Cape Colony that agricultural interests have been allowed to go to the wall. The Cape Government now in office (1905) has done something to remove the stigma by introducing an important agricultural measure, the main feature being that of district council work on which local and central representatives find seats, expert advice being given by the department of agriculture.

Here one is brought again face to face with the unfortunate race division. The great towns of Cape

Colony are on the sea-board. Their population is practically British, Cape Town itself being to some extent the exception to this rule. Their influence in the Cape Parliament has usually preponderated in such matters as railway construction, in which, one is forced to observe, the best agricultural districts have been frequently neglected. The incidence of taxation in Cape Colony does not seem on the surface to bear out the charge of unfairness, since there has been little or no direct taxation; but the Progressive Government, being forced to retrench, and casting about for sources of revenue, fixed on the trade in brandy as a legitimate victim for pseudo-moral reasons. The Cape has always grumbled at "Dear bread and cheap brandy," but the farming population did not view the measure with any degree of favour, because it makes both items dear. They ought to be placated by the subsidy of £150,000 recently granted to wine farmers' co-operative associations with a view to assist them in allowing their wines to mature, and improving the brands. Just complaints are made of the high railway rates; but if, as at present, they are to provide a large proportion of revenue, any reduction which might further benefit the farming population would be counterbalanced by some different form of taxation. The panacea invariably suggested by the farmer is that the towns and their industries should be taxed more heavily and directly, since the burden of indirect taxation falls less heavily on a coast population, and they naturally do not contribute their share to railway revenue. But the coast industries and trades would retaliate by

raising their rates, and the observer who is not a political economist gets bewildered in the vicious circle of increasing cost which is presented to him. It is necessary to go back to the simple fundamental conditions which govern the situation.

The population of South Africa is sharply divided into two sections—the industrial (which includes the commercial) and the farming populations. The former is concentrated in some three or four coast towns, on the Rand, and in Kimberley; the latter is thinly and unevenly scattered over the whole surface, their location having no relation to communications. The sudden growth of the huge mining industry threw the whole natural evolution of the country out of gear. It is indisputable that South Africa could supply the whole of its industrial population with food if there were no question of anything but supply and demand. The white population of Africanderland, including Southern Rhodesia, is 1,135,016, and of this three-fifths directly and three-fourths indirectly may be put down as engaged in farming. But the absence of natural means of communication by rivers and the peculiar method of colonisation followed by the Boers have put country and town out of touch to an extent quite unknown in other new countries, where the farmer has always had an eye on the markets for his produce. The rise of the mining industry has accentuated the division. Moreover, with the irregularities of soil, scarcity of labour, and uncertainties of climate, it is extremely difficult for South African produce to be put upon the market at rates which compete

with those of countries like the Argentine. It is cheaper in many districts to buy imported flour than to grow corn.

The industrial population cannot depend on spasmodic and unorganised local supplies, and turns for regularity and fixed prices to imported food. It wages war with protective tariffs at the coast, and threatens Cape Colony and Natal with the adoption of a shorter route or routes. Meanwhile, even in the heart of the agricultural country, one eats imported food-stuffs. Fruit rots on the ground while jam and marmalade are brought in tins from Europe. I have eaten Californian peaches even in Cape Colony, tinned Canadian salmon on the sea coast, and New Zealand mutton on many a South African farm. There are parts of South Africa where eggs are always five shillings a dozen, and there is at least one town in Cape Colony where they fluctuate from five shillings to sixpence a dozen. I have tasted a Natal-cured ham that was equal to any English one, but it was a rarity and a luxury. One could go on multiplying the instances of what seems an unreasonable state of affairs, but it is not necessary—South Africa has already a reputation for expensiveness of living only too well deserved, and while food is dear the farmer is poor. It is noticeable that there has recently been in England a revival of agriculture (which seems to have fallen hopelessly into discredit), chiefly the result of co-operation, both for buying and selling purposes, among the farmers themselves. Such combination is an essential part of successful farming and is far more

potent than any political measures or artificial stimulus. So far there has been practically little among South African farmers, even for prevention of disease, though some of them are alive to the necessity.

These questions, and kindred domestic problems, the Afrianders must themselves solve. At present there is a tendency to refer every sort of misfortune in some mysterious way to Imperial mismanagement, but as far as agriculture in Cape Colony is concerned this can hardly be said to be the case. She has had her fate in her own hands for some time, and neither her unfortunate railway policy nor her attitude towards Customs dues are due to Imperial interference. She does not tax diamonds, for the theory that the income tax is a fair equivalent need not be discussed. Why not? Because the Imperial element is too strong in the Cape Parliament, say the farmers. The reason lies deeper. The farming interest in Cape Colony, British and Dutch, would be able to carry any measure if only united; it has been numerous enough at any time since the Colony got responsible government. No Government, even at the present moment when many Dutch are disfranchised, is strong enough to ignore this interest. At present farmers will not co-operate with Government even in the small details of measures to prevent disease, and there is no serious attempt to formulate any policy for dealing with agricultural problems, if we except some small irrigation schemes in which Government is assisting. The society which nominally protects farmers' interests is crippled by its political character, and the drawback

to progress lies not so much in the ascendancy of one party over the other, but in the machinations of a small section, which views the whole subject from the standpoint of Dutch nationality. It is the political question which swamps all economic progress in Cape Colony and, unless it can be shelved by all honest and moderate men joining hands in thinking first of the material welfare of their country, will end in the old colony being left behind, stranded and derelict.

The conditions are naturally different in the new territories. The Orange River Colony, now as always, shows the best signs of settling down to a career of steady progress. The railway lines built and projected by Government are of real advantage to some of the richest districts, and the work of restocking is going on steadily. When this colony obtains self-government agricultural interests will come first, and I am inclined to agree with Mr. Chamberlain that the experiment of self-government would have been safer there than in the Transvaal. This colony, however, is bound to be later on the future centre of the Nationalist movement, and unless that movement can be led into material rather than "heroic" channels, the curse of politics, as well as its blessings, will centre there also. The land settlement schemes, however, will take some years to work out; and this fact, with the popularity of the Governor and the lack of agitation (except that stimulated from the Transvaal) undoubtedly furnished some excuse for what looks like an unfair treatment. The unsatisfactory financial condition of the farming industry in the Transvaal

must be attributed to bad seasons, to damage wrought by the war, to the confusion and mistakes of the repatriation period, and to the locking up of land by mining companies. The last, it must be remembered, was not the work of any Imperial Government but was accomplished under the gold laws of the South African Republic. The interests of farmers were ill protected by Krüger's *régime*, under which such large areas passed irrevocably out of the hands of the farmers. The methods employed in dealing with landless Boers, the railway administration, and many other characteristic features of the old *régime*, showed remarkably little real care for the permanent agricultural interests of the country; and nothing was more inimical to these than the neglect of public works, roads, and bridges, and the creation of an army of civil officials numbering one-third of the Boer population. These men, often unfitted for the posts they nominally filled, were spoilt as farmers. If there was a fictitious prosperity among the farming population it was because, under a system fatal to their permanent interests, they were selling their ancestral lands. Until the exploitation of gold began, the State was bankrupt and the farmers lived in primitive ignorance of money or of the progress which we identify with prosperity. More than this, the few years of their national existence had already seen the evolution of a pauper class.

These *ante-bellum* conditions are too little reckoned with in estimating the work done by the Imperial Government in rehabilitating the population. Despite

the undoubted predominance of Johannesburg as a political factor—a not unreasonable predominance, after all—there has been far more done for the welfare of the farmer under the British *régime* than under any previous one. The strenuous attempts to make education accessible to the rural population, the improvement of communications, the establishment of experimental and stud farms, the creation of departments of agriculture and forestry, the organisation of municipalities in the smaller towns, and the attempt to remove the landless Boer from the towns on to the land again, have all been distinct benefits to the farming population. They are recognised as such by many of the people themselves, but the division between town and country, British and Boer, is reproducing the state of affairs in Cape Colony, and the political question swamps all others. It is never quite accurate, and is gradually becoming less so, to assume that the division referred to is synonymous with British and Boer. The Briton must hold to his Imperial ideal, but that does not prevent him from being anti-Johannesburg in the narrower sense and Africander Nationalist in the broader sense. The Government of the new colonies, as already noted, has received no help from the Boer leaders in their genuine efforts to improve the conditions of the agricultural and pastoral population. On the contrary, these efforts have been damped by the constant imputation of interested motives, and no acknowledgment can be found in any Boer public speeches of benevolent intentions, though mistakes have been

eagerly seized upon and canvassed. The Boer leaders, in fact, still decline to separate their political and material interests; and in the new colonies the farmer must consequently suffer, because his co-operation is essential to the success of any scheme for his benefit. The situation is undoubtedly aggravated in the Transvaal by the transient character of much of the Rand population, which increases the sense of grievance on the part of the rural population when their wishes are set aside. But if, instead of making deep schemes for controlling the political destiny of South Africa, in which the Boer leaders are to play the part of thimble-riggers, and the Imperial Government is to be the dupe, the organisations of *Het Volk*, the Bond, and the Dutch Reformed Church Synods were to give their support to projects for protecting and stimulating the farmer's material interests, they would be doing more for the welfare and prosperity of the country. They have at present no constructive policy except that of welding their own race, for good or for evil, against British oversea influence; but not against the influence of British individuals who accept the South African national policy, which bars out no man who adopts the country. It may be said that they despair of the true prosperity of the country until they can control the political machine, which is at present in the hands of the capitalists. But are there any signs that they have tried? They have certainly made no attempt to strengthen the hands of the Government in any of the beneficial measures enumerated, and have even intrigued to prevent the

success of some of them. It may be the pursuit of their ideal, as set forth elsewhere, which dictates their conduct ; and there is something heroic in the rejection of material benefits rather than sacrifice a political principle—that is, if the sacrifice is individual and not vicarious, as in the case of some of the Boer leaders who are prosperous men. But the upshot of this attitude is that farming in the Transvaal is likely to remain in a backward state, and will probably drift still farther when the clash of parties begins in earnest, and the direct Imperial control is withdrawn. *Het Volk* is organising the Boers for political purposes and seeks to include the entire rural population. If the same influence would only establish farmers' co-operative associations throughout the country — !

In dealing with land settlement in South Africa the picture drawn is, I fear, far from cheerful. My original contention was that the best kind of man, with capital at his back, is needed to make a real success of farming in this country, and that it is not suitable as a dumping-ground for failures, undesirables, or unemployed. It may well be asked, Where, then, shall we find British settlers? Who will come to wrestle under so many adverse conditions and with such problematic chances of success? Only those, surely, who have no choice, or are subsidised to come? As to the latter I have nothing to say, so long as they are privately subsidised ; but as a Government policy, I deprecate the creation in South Africa of a class of agricultural paupers, or of small land-owners who are fettered by debts from the start, and who will act as a drag on agricultural progress.

As for the attractions of South Africa I have (apart from Rhodesia) not dwelt on them, because they need no advertisement. First and foremost is the climate, which presents no great extremes of cold, with a long hard winter, as in Canada, or of tropical heat, as in the Argentine or part of Australia. Then there is a fascination about the very uncertainty. There is a gambling element about South African farming, and a sporting spirit about its people which are attractions to a man of brains and resource. There are opportunities of a political career which appeal to an ambitious man. One may begin as a farmer and end as a prime minister. The country is in the melting-pot and life is full of possibilities. All these attractions appeal legitimately only to the man who has brains, education, pluck, and some capital to back him, and that there are still home and colonial would-be settlers of this type I believe. The Governments of the new colonies would, in my opinion, do well if, instead of spending thousands in the actual work of settling and bolstering up a few men, they devoted themselves to the task of making the country more attractive to the best class of settler. Improved communications, irrigation, forestry, fencing, prevention of disease, the establishment of markets, the regulation of labour, rural schools, and laws relating to non-beneficial occupation which would open large areas now locked up—these are the most important aids to land settlement. None of them have been altogether overlooked, but more concentration of energy on them is possible. Technically the country is unreservedly opened to the independent settler, and

Government can do little more in that direction ; but something can be done to reduce the cost of living, and thus make the new man's capital go farther. At present a man with a fixed sum to lay out on plant, stock, and land, and to cover his living expenses till he can get his first real returns, can do better in many another country—within the empire in Canada, New Zealand or Western Australia. It is with regret that the admission must be made, but the fact remains, and many obstacles have to be overcome before South Africa can attract the only class of settlers—the best—which can make her agriculturally or pastorally prosperous.

CHAPTER VII

RHODESIA

It was with very mixed feelings that I re-entered Southern Rhodesia, which I had left thirteen years before. The fact of having played a part (as the first Administrator of Mashonaland) in the birth of this youngest British colony naturally gave it a special interest in my eyes, and I remembered the plans and hopes in which I shared during several months' preparation at Kimberley before we started, in June, 1900, on that march of occupation into Mashonaland. It is too soon yet to write the inner story of Rhodesia, and by the time it has become possible the few men who know it from the inside will be gone. Only the great man after whom it is named could have given the whole story, and much of it lies buried with him in the Matoppos.

The general feeling must undoubtedly be that Rhodesia has not justified the roseate expectations of its early days. There are to-day not more than seven thousand able-bodied white men in a country 144,000 square miles in extent, about seven-tenths the area of France. The "boom" cities Buluwayo and Salisbury are desolate and dead-looking. In the former the commanding figure of Rhodes towers over deserted

streets and empty piles of buildings. There is an excellent club and a monster hotel, and there are banks, offices, exchanges, and chambers, and only a handful of people to fill them. The actual trend of the population is actually outwards, and the numbers are only maintained at the present figure by the presence of the "remittance man," for Rhodesia has always been the country of the younger sons, and one meets in its charming and cheery society hardly any but public-school men, the great majority being, naturally, young and unmarried. Out of the five hundred original pioneers of 1900 only about forty remain in Rhodesia, some of them, sad to say, because they have not the means to get away. "Fifteen years after," I might have expected to find my pioneer comrades established as leading citizens, or at least in comfortable homes with families growing up round them. If so, I should certainly have been disillusioned. The very few who are financially flourishing are, almost without exception, connected with gold companies and company promoting. There is one successful farmer. This is brutally plain speaking, but it points the difference between Then and Now ; and, to quote an untranslatable phrase, *donne furieusement à penser*.

There can be no doubt that, apart from its political significance, which appealed to Rhodes in his rôle of Empire-builder (only one side of that remarkable character), the main idea in the Rhodesian occupation was to control what was then believed to be a vast mineral wealth—a second Rand. At this period the public imagination was inflamed by the first boom of

the Rand and by travellers' tales. Whatever view may be taken of Rhodesian mines on the Stock Exchange, it cannot be maintained that they have so far brought wealth to the colonists, while, as a matter of fact, only two or three mines are paying dividends. The amount of capital sunk by the public has been colossal. The Company itself has never paid a penny of dividend, and the value of imports into the country has vastly exceeded that of the export of gold.

This, roughly and briefly, is the situation, without any reference to future possibilities, by the mention of which the most gloomy situation can be gilded. Is it the fault of the country, the colonists, or the Company? We will take them in turn.

Rhodesia, north and south, is 750,000 square miles in extent, equal in area to nearly four times that of Germany. For all practical purposes, however, we may confine ourselves to Southern Rhodesia, the portion south of the Zambesi. The north-eastern and north-western divisions, containing a white population of about two hundred, almost entirely made up of officials and missionaries, do not belong to South Africa. The southern territory varies in physical characteristics from the beautiful wooded hills and valleys of Mashonaland on the east to the somewhat bare or scrub-covered plains and rocky *koppies* of Matabeleland on the west. The climate has no great extremes and is excellent, except, of course, in the pestilential Zambesi valley and the local river-beds and valleys, which at this latitude are bound to be somewhat unhealthy. It is the elevation and dryness of the

atmosphere that make the climate in many parts so exhilarating and delightful; and though, as on all high inland plateaus, the Englishman or woman brought up in a damp-saturated atmosphere feels a certain nervous strain, yet Rhodesia is a true white man's country from the climatic point of view.

Rhodesia also enjoys an advantage over many parts of South Africa in being well watered and, though subject to droughts, even in summer there is a refreshing green in the landscape. The polite visitor is not reduced—as happened to a lady in Bechuanaland when invited to express an opinion on the scenery—to saying, “there is plenty of horizon!” Indeed, some of the finest views I remember in South Africa are to be found in Mashonaland, while Matabeleland enjoys the distinction of possessing the most wonderful waterfall and gorge in the world. The country is undoubtedly rich in minerals; indeed, it is impregnated with them from end to end, and the real extent and variety of its riches are not yet known. But it has not yet been proved to possess consistent gold-bearing reefs of high value, alluvial diggings, or the *banket* formation of the Rand. It has, however, coal and iron in abundance, copper of unproved quality and quantity, and a great extent of low-grade gold reefs, besides less precious minerals and some of the semi-precious stones.

In the early days alluvial was eagerly hoped for, to bring about a sudden inrush of people; then reliance was placed on the vast extent of gold reefs—“mineralised from end to end; a great mineral-producing

country," were among the assurances of Rhodes—which were followed up almost entirely from the ancient workings. The results have been unsatisfactory. The gold reefs are numerous—so numerous as to be an *embarras des richesses*—but the ancients seem to have extracted most of the payable gold, with the result that to-day only one or two companies of some two hundred registered pay a dividend! The ancients prospected the country for gold thoroughly, and took out the best that could be got by the primitive process known to them. "So well did the ancients prospect" said a leading mining expert to me, "that no gold mine of importance has been discovered except on their old workings." "A plum-pudding with all the plums taken out," was the opinion of another mining engineer. It is noticeable that no mining engineer of standing, such as Rolker, Perkins, or Hammond, who has visited the country, has reported favourably on the gold prospects, so far as is known.

From time to time there have been reports of the discoveries of alluvial and *banket* (the Rand formation)—discoveries, needless to say, made at the psychological moment—and the bait has seemingly been swallowed eagerly in England, the supply of human cupidity and credulity being inexhaustible. It is true that the gold production is gradually though slowly increasing—last year it was 267,000 ounces, exceeding all former records, and in nine months of 1905 269,000 ounces—but the rate of increase can hardly be called satisfactory, considering the greatly improved conditions as regards mining regulations, which now enable small

properties to be worked (the character of most reefs only admitting of light expenses), and the provision of railways, which were wanting before. Until these railways were made, it was formerly said, the country could not go ahead, the promised El Dorado could not be realised. To the reputed resources are now added diamond fields (containing also other precious stones), and the discovery of pearls in the affluents of the Zambesi and in that river itself, on which I venture no opinion. In view of the inexhaustible supply of will-o'-the-wisps so far, caution seems to be called for.

The fact is that Rhodesia has been built from the apex downwards. Companies innumerable have been floated (often on quite undeveloped properties), towns have been created with all the paraphernalia of a prosperous city—each company had to provide a big office—before the gold was proved to be there, far less was being exploited. The country was boomed and colossal sums of money were sunk which might as well have been thrown into the sea. The mining has been till recently amateur both in engineering and control, while the management in London of the companies has not been a lesson in efficiency. The deficit of Rhodesia is about £280,000 per annum (of which over £100,000 is for Northern Rhodesia), and the total indebtedness about £8,000,000 to date. The Chartered Company owns shares and debentures of a nominal value of £2,517,023 in companies. Everything, unfortunately, has been subordinated to the mines, of which there has been little real development, while there has been a vast deal of company promotion. As

an agricultural country the potentialities are uncertain, though, with a good supply of water (in Mashonaland especially) and, in parts, timber, there ought to be prospects for the farmer. There is, however, one redeeming point in the situation. As a pastoral country Rhodesia is pronounced by experts to be unrivalled in South Africa, while it is suited for forestry in many parts and in others for plantations of semi-tropical produce, and the absence of prosperity among the farmers so far must be attributed to causes not inherent in the country itself.

Here we undoubtedly have a country which Nature seems to have endowed with unusual liberality. Let us now look at the case against the colonists.

I confess to being surprised, remembering the careful choice made of the first pioneers and the hundreds of applications for inclusion in that body, to hear it so frequently said, in explanation of the failure of Rhodesia, that the early settlers were not all that could be desired. That is a favourite theory with those who wish to explain matters. It is true, of course, that many went in the speculative spirit. Rhodesia was to them an El Dorado, whence in a few years they would emerge with fortunes. There were too many encouragements for this gambling spirit in the early days. After entering the country prospecting was not difficult. A blanket or two given to a native were enough to induce him to show some of the old workings, and in those days it was not suspected, far less had it been demonstrated, that the ancients had taken all the cream and left only the skim-milk. Then,

later, there was the hanging round the Salisbury and Buluwayo clubs and offices, till the company promoter came along, and the business of dabbling in syndicates began—all of it no genuine part of real colonisation.

But undoubtedly a great number of the men to whom special facilities had been offered were anxious to make homes in the country. The Mashonaland pioneers were given farms of 3,000 acres, and at the time of the 1893 campaign in Matabeleland the volunteers were promised grants of land in that country in lieu of payment. In addition special grants were made to companies, syndicates, or individuals, either for services rendered or with a view to capital being introduced into the country. These grants have disposed of all the best and healthiest farming land in Matabeleland.

The policy adopted for attracting capital has been most unfortunate in its effects on Rhodesia. It has led to speculation in land by companies which have squeezed out the individual settler and have locked up great areas in blocks. It has brought the evils of absenteeism, which has had a bad effect on both the white settlers and the natives. The latter do not understand the system of collection of rents by an agent, without powers, representing an invisible authority in London, though they do understand a personal master or chief—a master like Rhodes—and they are unsettled and dissatisfied, while their occupation of the land is rendered less beneficial than would be the case if they were under proper supervision and had some guarantee of per-

manence. The farmers' complaint, here more than elsewhere in South Africa, is that the interests of the gold industry have alone been considered. As Rhodesia has been regarded from the first as little more than a mining proposition, there is nothing remarkable in this view, but as long as Cecil Rhodes was alive every Rhodesian felt he had something to rely on, some one to go to ; for, however much Rhodes depended on gold to boom the country, to give it the initial impetus, he was never blind to the advantages of a permanent land settlement. Therefore, while he constantly urged the rapid exploitation of the gold industry, saying that until the mines were working people at home would not believe in the country, he was always ready personally to listen to farmers' grievances, and followed out his Cape policy of establishing model and experimental farms. It is not true to represent him as a fountain of benevolence whose pocket was opened on all occasions—he was too keen a business man to deplete his private fortune by a system of doles—but where he had an object in view he stopped at nothing, and in forcing the artificial stimulation of the country he had such an object. The colonists relied on him, his cheque-book, and his weight with the British public, by which alone fresh capital was continually obtained—a reliance which was not advantageous for their own initiative, and which led to a decided slump when his strong personality was no more there.

Very little of permanent value has actually been done by the Chartered Company to promote the

interests of the farming population. It is true they have at times expended considerable sums. Stock has been imported; and when transport became scarce by reason of the ravages of rinderpest, they imported donkeys and then camels. They brought out Dr. Koch at great expense to examine into the so-called red-water—African coast fever—and rinderpest, for which he found a preventive, and they have also recently employed an expert to advise the tobacco-growers. The settlers complain that most of these measures are curative rather than preventive, and that a clear and consistent policy would have been more useful than spasmodic efforts to meet crises. They claim also that not merely the neglect, but the political mistakes of the Company, or its officials, have been the cause of much of their troubles—the Raid, for instance, being the prelude to the Matabele rebellion, with the result that the settlers were fighting when they should have been coping with the rinderpest. Stock-farming is generally considered to be the most promising of Rhodesian interests, but without fencing it is impossible to cope with disease; the eradication of disease, they maintain, with reason, is the first duty of a Government in such a country. Tobacco and cotton are now showing signs of development, but until the recent importation of an expert for the former little had been done to stimulate these industries in their initial stages. One of the main grievances is the fact that railways have been run in mining interests and give no facilities to the farmers. This is naturally contrasted with the policy

adopted in Western America, where lines were run at a loss for years, carrying artificial manures, implements, and the like, and recouping themselves after a time by the carriage of produce.

The possibilities of Rhodesian farming are, like those of other South African colonies, largely dependent on conditions apparently outside control. The tobacco industry is a good illustration. There are districts in the Cape Colony, the Transvaal and in Rhodesia, where a fine grade of leaf may be grown. In the Cape an expert was obtained by Government who demonstrated this to some of the farmers. But it also turned out that the expense of producing such a leaf was greater than could be recovered in the price. While labour remains dear (and it is as dear in Rhodesia as anywhere), and imported food-stuffs are consumed in large quantities at enormous cost, the cost of living and production will remain high; and in the absence of co-operation and communications (to make markets regular and accessible) the local farmer cannot compete with imported food, although away from the railway line the local products, meat and vegetables, are cheap, and only imported luxuries are dear. It is the same vicious circle, and it seems impossible to put one's finger on any really vital reform which would do justice to all classes; but at the same time the Chartered Company must bear the onus of a policy which, in the teeth of other South African experience, has landed the country in a condition of such economic unsoundness.

It is claimed that the recent "hard times" have

weeded out the less desirable class of colonists, and that men must now go on to the land and work. Here we have a glimpse of the fallacy which has cost so much money in other parts of the sub-continent. There are countries where a man can go with a few pounds and a few implements, and, given cheap land or free land, can work his way to prosperity with his own hands. Emphatically it must be declared that South Africa is no such land. Experience and capital are essential to success. Rhodesia is an ideal stock-farming country, but what man will be rash enough to put his money into stock while he has absolutely no protection for them against disease? The few, very few, prosperous farmers in Rhodesia are eloquent in praise of the land, but shake their heads gloomily over farming prospects under the present *régime*. One thing is certain; whatever the merits or demerits of the early settlers, it will be impossible to attract a really valuable class of men under present conditions. Before turning to some of the schemes for artificially stimulating the population, let us take the third of our queries. Is the Chartered Company responsible for Rhodesia's failure?

The British South African Company, under Royal Charter, is the owner of Rhodesia, subject to control by the Imperial Government, which is represented by the High Commissioner. Since the Raid the Imperial Government has also kept a Resident Commissioner in Rhodesia. Government is carried on by an Administrator, selected by the Board, with the help of an Executive Council of six officials and a

Legislative Assembly of fourteen, half nominated by the Board and half elected by the colonists, the Administrator having the casting vote. The administration of justice, under Roman Dutch law as at the Cape, is in the hands of magistrates and native commissioners, and there is a full judicial staff. The legislative body, with its imitation debates, cumbersome and costly machinery, is an anomaly. The civil service of Rhodesia is extraordinarily expensive considering the functions it exercises, and even at this early stage of affairs it possesses a comparatively large and steadily increasing pension-list. Like everything else it was hastily organised on a model far too elaborate for the needs of the country, with a resulting multiplicity of officers and abundance of red tape. The fact that all real initiative rests with the Board in London, and that all questions of any importance, especially those connected with expenditure, must be referred to them, renders this method of government peculiarly pointless. While Rhodes lived every question was referred to him, and he decided it first and then nominally consulted the Board afterwards. The colonists were not by any means convinced of the wisdom of all his decisions, but they knew what to expect and they got their answer quickly. Now they are referred to a rudderless, amorphous body composed chiefly of men who know nothing of the country and care less. Since Mr. Beit practically withdrew from active intervention in the Company's affairs there has been none of the strong personal touch which Rhodes and (in a minor degree) his partner established. Several men

have been recently recruited who have, at all events, a working acquaintance with Rhodesia. But the colonists do not know them or trust them—they themselves know nothing of the “burden and heat of the day” which Rhodes had shared and could appreciate—and the steadily growing antagonism between the Rhodesian colonists and the Chartered Company has been aggravated by their feeling that, since the “old man” was lost, they have been the playthings of a body without a head—a mere money-getting machine.

The last sentence needs to be elucidated. Money-getting in Rhodesia is an extremely roundabout process. The Chartered Company pays no dividend, and, as already noted, the deficit in its annual administration expenses over revenue (though yearly decreasing, it is true) is about £280,000 per annum, while the indebtedness of the country is about eight millions. This debt, which is of interest to Rhodesians as a potential self-governing community and to the British public who may be called upon to guarantee Rhodesia’s “national debt,” is composed of expenditure in connection with native wars and settlement and accrued deficit in administration accounts. The interest of the Company in the gold industry is not represented, as in other parts of South Africa, by a percentage or a tax on the production, but by a system of participation in “vendors’ shares,” by which each company promoted must allocate thirty per cent. (till recently it could be made fifty per cent.) of their scrip to the Company. Rhodes defended this policy in 1898, but he added, “I do hate to read

the lists and see at times when people have gambled the shares up without any warranty for it." As a matter of fact, while stimulating in earlier days a certain inflow of capital, the system has proved advantageous neither to the shareholders at home nor to the people of the country. It has encouraged and made possible the wholesale flotation of companies and those manipulations of the markets which have brought discredit on the Rhodesian Government and weakened the public faith in the country, and has thus in the long-run prevented the natural and steady inflow of capital. Naturally the system is more favourable to the flotation of big companies, regardless of the actual value of the property taken up, than to the small but sound efforts of individuals. It is necessary to speak strongly on the subject of the methods by which at crucial moments the public at home has been deceived. An instance occurred while I was in South Africa which I had an opportunity of personally investigating. On a certain stream alluvial gold in small quantities has been worked for some time; it was known long ago. The limitations of this "alluvial" digging were the subject of reports many years before. What happened is not very certain, but seemingly a rather better washing than usual was obtained, whereupon the resident official of the nearest township, who deals with mining claims, sent in a glowing report to the Administrator. The report went home, and arrived at a useful moment. It was not mentioned that it came from a non-expert official, and was taken as reliable, coming from an official of the district. The mining expert

adviser to the Government, whose opinion should have been first obtained, was then sent to the spot, when he was unable to confirm the high expectations raised. Before his opinion could be made public, however, the boom had done its work, and two or three hundred miners from various parts of South Africa, and indeed some from other parts of the world, had started for the "new alluvial fields." I saw some of these tramping away, having sunk everything they possessed. One man trundled his wheelbarrow with all his possessions for hundreds of miles across country—I believe from the Northern Transvaal. I saw another, ill with fever and practically destitute, living on charity of men who had little more than a rough shelter to give him. No wonder that strong language is used in Rhodesia over such transactions as these. But they have been going on for many years. Rhodes deliberately closed his eyes to them, saying that he could not believe that the engineers and other experts, men of honour and probity, were all mistaken in their estimates. This was not the point. Expert opinion is not infallible, but it is fair and just to rely on it as far as it goes. The mischief is that, while independent and unbiassed reports of the Company's own engineers have been withheld or, at any rate, have not been made public, irresponsible and unqualified people should have been allowed to give fictitious views of Rhodesian prospects, not in general but in particular cases.

The land policy of the Company is also open to criticism, having become complicated by onerous and unworkable regulations, many contrary to the

agreements under which the land was granted. The different methods by which the grants were made have rendered it difficult to establish a clear and consistent rule as to title, such as is now required ; and although Rhodes promised that no further conditions should be attached to any contracts, such, it is maintained, have actually been introduced. The conditions attached to land purchase to-day are a bar to land settlement. Land can be obtained in three ways—from the Government, from the land companies, and from private owners. The purchaser from the Government, after obtaining a permit, is required to occupy the land for a period of five years in a beneficial manner, either by cultivation or with stock. A quit-rent is payable at the rate of one shilling per twenty-five morgen or part thereof, payable locally in advance. The average size of farms in Mashonaland is 1,500 morgen (about 3,000 acres) and in Matabeleland usually twice that amount. The rent to be paid during the term of occupation is fixed at five per cent. of the price at which the land may be purchased at the expiration of the five years' term. Should the settler not complete the purchase, the land may presumably lapse to the Company with all improvements. Private farms may be had at varying prices from private owners, usually from £200 to £800 for 3,000 acres. The prices asked by the so-called land (really mining) companies vary greatly, some at rather fictitious prices, due to the over-capitalisation already referred to. Farms can be had on lease, one is told, at rentals varying from £50 to £100 per annum, with

a stipulation that permanent improvements to the value of £250 per annum are to be carried out. In the present condition of the country, however, with an undeveloped and uncertain mining industry and a sparse population, and therefore an absence of markets, it is clear that the intending farmer cannot afford to pay anything but a very low price per acre. The companies, here as elsewhere, seem to be waiting for developments which eventually will enhance the value of their properties.

Another debatable point is the railway policy, already noted with reference to its effect on the farming industry. The railways were cheaply built and opened to traffic before completion, the cost of putting them in order being charged against revenue, so that the earnings were free to pay off debentures. This policy has been pursued consistently, so that despite expensive freights the railways show very little earned ; as a matter of fact they do not pay. The desire to maintain the link with Cape Colony, which, at one time, had much to commend it from a political point of view, is naturally not altogether consistent with the needs of Rhodesia, which point to Beira as the natural outlet or to a connection with Delagoa Bay. The friendship of the Cape has been secured by excessive rates on the Beira route, although the latter was built expressly to give access to a large portion of Rhodesia. The recent promised reduction of these rates has for the moment ended a controversy which must be discussed elsewhere in its bearing on the future of the Cape. The situation in Rhodesia is

almost similar to that in the Transvaal, with its alternative routes to Natal, Delagoa, or the Cape, the longer lines claiming on sentimental and political grounds, for past services rendered, a consideration which is economically detrimental to the present and future interests of the inland communities. The situation is of course aggravated in Rhodesia by the increased distance from the southern seaboard, and it is not too much to say that it enjoys the distinction of being the most expensive section of the most expensive country in the world in which to live with any paraphernalia of civilisation, a condition due to a great extent to its dependence on the long and costly connection with the Cape Colony ports.¹

The foregoing criticisms of the rule of the Chartered Company form the gravamen of charges brought against it by the colonists. They may be summed up under the following heads: extravagance of administration, want of sympathy and personal touch on the part of the Board since Rhodes's death, and the lack of a head; the farcical nature of the costly Legislative Council masquerading as a representative assembly; the mistaken policy of the Company regarding certain points in the gold industry, the land question, the interests of the farming population, and the railways.

The case for the Company is certainly not without strong points. In the first place, it accomplished an occupation of vast territory which would have been

¹ Cape Town to Buluwayo 1362, and Port Elizabeth to Buluwayo 1200 mile

impossible in any other way. It has built some two thousand miles of railway, provided public buildings and administrative machinery, carried out a native "war," and put down a native rebellion without calling on the Imperial Government for help, and accomplished on the whole far more in the development of the country than would have been done under a Crown Colony system with its lack of initiative and dependence on a party Government. The failure and difficulties are, say the Company, very largely the "hand of God." Cattle disease, bad seasons, and turbulent natives are not to be avoided, and moreover, as has been hinted before, the Company is inclined to declare that the settlers have only got themselves to blame for many of their misfortunes. Then, as regards the financial exploitation of the country, the Company has a duty to its shareholders, though, considering the fact that no dividends have been paid, this does not seem to have weighed, so far, very heavily. Be it observed that it is not the shareholders who benefit by manipulation of the markets. The Company, however, argues truly that it establishes no monopoly and does not exist to trade, but it cannot rebut the charges brought against it of dealing with the shares of Rhodesian companies in a manner which has brought discredit on the country.

As for the future prosperity of the country, the officials of the Company are still optimistic. We have already said that they speak of bad times "weeding out" their settlers. They do not dwell on a sadder feature of the weeding process by which the

flower of Rhodesia, after exhausting their resources in the country, went to the late war and in many cases returned no more. The pressing need for population is, however, not by any means ignored. There is more than one scheme for land settlement. The railway company is prepared to give free grants of 160 acres to *bonâ-fide* settlers, no piece of land to be more than three miles distant from the railway. The scheme is to be put into operation first on the Buluwayo-Salisbury line, later between Buluwayo and the Zambesi, and eventually north of that river. The capital required is put at £100, the idea being to produce cotton and tobacco on these small farms. It is to be feared, however, that any one who attempts farming on such a small area and with so little capital will not remain long in Rhodesia, if he be lucky enough to be able to get away. The company is said to have in contemplation another land settlement scheme, for which capital has been provided privately; but, in view of the fact that the best lands are taken up already and of the failure of such schemes elsewhere, it is difficult to see how this project can be successful. The future of the country depends, after mining, on stock-raising, and nothing can be done in this direction until measures preventive of disease have been carried out. I have already given my reasons for believing that artificial stimulation of land settlement is not desirable in any part of South Africa, and that the money spent on assisting settlers would be more profitably expended in rendering the country free from diseases of plants and stock and in other attractive measures.

The strong point in the Company's position lies in the lack of any workable scheme for the better government of the country. The suggestion that it should be handed over to the colonists for self-government is, apart from the paucity of the population, fraught with inevitable difficulties in the difference of opinion as to terms. It is unnecessary here to discuss the details of the bargain proposed, since it seems almost impossible to decide on the merits of the case. What terms would compensate the Company for their initial enterprise? What burden could the colonists bear without being crushed? The two propositions do not seem to be reconcilable, nor is agreement brought nearer by the belligerent attitude on the side of the colonists and the obstinate *non possumus* of the Company.

It is a common experience that government by a Chartered Company is only successful during the initial period of a country's development, and I am strongly inclined to believe that the British South Africa Company has done all the useful work possible to it. It declares its intention of withdrawing its control when the community is stable and strong enough to shoulder the task of government, and also presumably the heavy burden of its indebtedness. An alternative is that of Imperial intervention and establishment of Crown Colony government, but this would not be favoured by many of the settlers, who would regard it as a retrograde step. It would certainly not be favourably regarded in Great Britain either, if it involved the shouldering of Rhodesia's indebted-

ness. The present form of government is, in fact, merely a stepping-stone to fully representative self-government, for which Rhodesia, with only some seven thousand adult white males and fifty blacks to each white, is hardly yet qualified. While this is undeniably true, there is a feeling that the stability provided by the Imperial ægis would help to reinstate Rhodesian credit, tend to the development of the mines, and so help the British shareholder to get back some of the money he has sunk. As a final argument the Chartered Company point to certain reforms recently accomplished ; the lowering of their interest in vendors' shares ; the encouragement of small-battery mines with four or five stamps, which are far easier and cheaper to work and can be moved about, thus rendering mining more possible to small companies or individuals ; the reduction in the cost of administration ; the lowering of rates on the Beira Railway ; their land settlement schemes ; and the encouragement of new industries. The proposed reduction of the police force, established by Imperial direction after the Raid and costing some £200,000 per annum, would of course improve their position financially. The strongest point in the position of the Company is their inalienable hold on the mineral rights and, with the sensational discoveries which have been made from time to time in other parts of South Africa, it is perhaps not to be wondered at that, in spite of all drawbacks, the Company continues to enjoy, to all appearances, the confidence of the British public.

The potential value of the country is constantly

referred to by the Company, and not without good reason. Rhodesia is in some respects the finest part of South Africa, and is free from the political and racial problems which retard the progress of other sections. But there is much to be done before its value can be realised. If some means can be devised by which there would be another Rhodes to control the development of the country its future would be a bright one, and it might yet justify the hope of its founder—to make it, if not a British crown Colony, still a great State, animated with the British spirit, which would exercise an important influence on the evolution of Africanderland.

The possibility of a federated South Africa is one which should be carefully kept in mind in dealing with Rhodesia and, with this in view, it may well be questioned whether Northern Rhodesia—a tropical country administered by a handful of officials—should not be separated entirely from the southern territory, which alone can ever come into an Africander federation. It would, in my opinion, greatly facilitate the growth of Southern Rhodesia to be released from the burden of empire building north of the Zambesi.

CHAPTER VIII

BLACK, WHITE, AND YELLOW: THE LABOUR PROBLEM

IT seems a little puzzling, to one who has watched the importation of Chinese coolies for special purposes in several different parts of the globe, to read the floods of literature which have been poured out on the subject of Chinese labour in the Transvaal. Well-meaning persons have obscured the issues, which are real and serious, by raising a cloud of objections and difficulties on different scores. There are, it seems to me, two aspects of the subject—the commercial and the political. I am not prepared to allow that there is also a moral side apart from these, since it is in fact bound up with them. The time is passed when it could be regarded as sound business to spend thousands of pounds in perpetrating an outrage on humanity; and South Africa, on which beats a search-light of criticism, is the last place for such an experiment.

It is necessary, however, to deal with the so-called moral aspect first, so far as it is concerned with the Chinese attitude towards what some British critics describe as “slavery.” The Chinaman is as fond of his family as any European, probably fonder; he certainly

feels the family tie more strongly. He is, however, accustomed to seek work away from it, since his own village or district does not offer him opportunities. He does not experience the same difficulty in leaving his family as would a British artisan, since the various generations are all bound closely together, probably live together, and are certain to support and protect each other. Leaving his wife and children in this family circle, the Chinese labourer goes contentedly to work in foreign lands, certain that he will find his home and his ancestral graves waiting for him six, or sixteen, years hence. The idea that any self-respecting Chinese would contemplate the desecration of the family hearth by taking away his wife and children to a barbarian land, thus leaving the tombs of his ancestors unworshipped, is only possible to those ignorant of Chinese life. Similarly the best Chinese, those drawn from the country uncontaminated with half-digested European codes (as are the treaty ports), will desire to return after a fixed period, during which they hope to amass a little fortune which, with frugality and management, will keep them comfortably the rest of their lives. As for their sufferings as "slaves," they are too much accustomed to contract-work to find that galling, though undoubtedly there are many who would like to break the terms. The same is true of most contracts and most contractors. Their confinement in the compound is not of a rigorous character, the "compound" being merely an enclosure within which their dwellings are grouped, and to a people accustomed to live in crowded

communities it is not specially irksome. They are not actually enclosed in a big wire cage, as are the Kaffirs in the Kimberley diamond mines. The accommodation to which each man is entitled was settled by Government, and the coolie barracks were inspected carefully before they were passed. I have only personally visited two of these compounds, where the men seemed to be far more comfortably housed than would be possible in their own country; but I do not base any argument on this observation or on the quality of the food, which seemed excellent—from a Chinese point of view extravagantly liberal. The strongest argument in favour of fair and even liberal treatment of the coolies is the fact that each man placed on the Rand represents an outlay in hard cash which can hardly be recovered unless he is willing to sign on for a second term after the period for which he is bound.

As for the feelings of the Chinese towards their work I must own that, knowing the Chinese dislike for darkness or underground work, I was surprised that they had not made more trouble over it. It must be uncongenial to them; but there is a strong vein of philosophy in Chinese nature, and the hard school in which they are trained predisposes them to make the best of any employment which brings in good pay. In one respect the Transvaal is specially suitable for Chinese labour—in its climate, which nearly resembles that of Northern China in dryness, brightness, and extremes of temperature. Nevertheless, any one acquainted with Chinese character could have foretold, from the first, that there would be some

trouble with them. The causes are simple. No one is so amenable to law and order as the individual Chinese, but no people are more seditious and sometimes unmanageable in groups or crowds. The Chinese from the North, who form the bulk of the coolies more recently imported—finer fellows physically and morally than most of their Southern brethren—are in some ways more difficult to control. They do not possess the same wonderful network of associations as the Southern Chinaman, and their societies are not so highly organised. Wherever he goes, the Chinaman from the South finds himself among friends. He is in touch with powerful communities of his own people. For good or evil he is not so much isolated as he seems. This is an element of danger in some ways, as is well known to English officials in the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong, for instance; but in the case of an isolated community like the Rand labourers it may be useful, if the European in charge is sufficiently in touch with Chinese affairs, to make friends with the leading spirits in the societies. Difficulties are smoothed in an extraordinary way when an *entente* has been arrived at with these men, and it is easier to deal with them than with individuals. The coolies, speaking to their European overseers through interpreters (however competent the latter may be), finding themselves isolated units in a strange country, unaccustomed to Western ways, and suspicious by nature, have a tendency to brood over grievances and to attempt to assert themselves by acts of rebellion against authority or by

taking the law into their own hands. No one is more easily ruled than the Chinaman if his ruler understands him, but such knowledge is hardly to be expected from the average mine overseer or "boss" of a gang. For the initial stages of the enterprise the services of a competent official as Protector of Chinese Labour, with great knowledge and experience of the Southern Chinese, were secured. This gentleman resigned for private reasons, and although his place was filled by a man with Chinese experience there is reason to believe that the staff has not been large or strong enough. The chief reason, however, for the troubles which have arisen in the last seven or eight months, and which were not characteristic of the earlier periods of the experiment, is the lack of sufficient care in recruiting in China. The cash advance of thirty dollars proves an attraction to men who are not genuine workers—beggars, gamblers, and thieves, who with true Chinese opportunism rely on their own ingenuity to evade the conditions of hard work attached to their contracts. These men form a nucleus of discontent in the compounds, but they are not, as seems to be imagined, an aggressive or bloodthirsty crew, and the "attacks" on farm-houses, outrages, and similar occurrences which are striking terror into the heart of the Rand are probably predatory raids by famished, fugitive coolies, who, like the British burglar, only use force when driven by fear. All who know Chinese character are aware that, while they will strike wildly in their terror, they are not actually given to aggression. The great danger lies in the natural nervousness of the farming, and some

of the mining population, added to the fact that they cannot understand the Chinese speech. If the Chinese are allowed to move about the Rand *contretemps* will be of frequent occurrence, and the expedient has been adopted of authorising any white man to arrest a vagrant coolie. The strictest supervision is therefore necessary in the recruiting department, and the smooth working of the scheme depends so largely on the personnel of the supervising staff at both ends that no economy in this matter should be permitted.

There should certainly be vigilance to secure that the conduct of the white miners brought in contact with Chinese labour is such as will uphold European prestige. This side of the question was well brought out by Lord Selborne when approached by a deputation of the Miners' Association, whose point appeared to be the possibility of the Chinese corrupting the morals of the Europeans. Their obscene language was particularly mentioned: but "Where," asked Lord Selborne, "did they learn that language?" Nevertheless, considerable trouble has been caused, especially in the last few months, by lawless acts on the part of Chinese on the Rand, and special measures have been necessary for the protection of people living on isolated farms or mine buildings. From my own knowledge of Chinese character, their keen desire to make money, their adaptability and docility when properly dealt with, I should be inclined to say that these outbreaks on the Rand are not due to ill-usage, to a sense of "slavery," or to any such cause, but to the presence among the coolies of a lawless class, the riff-raff of

the northern cities, and to the removal of restraints to which the better class are accustomed—family obligations, communal responsibility, and public opinion—to the feeling of strangeness and lack of security felt by the men in unwonted surroundings, and to the absence of Europeans accustomed to deal with them, who can speak to them in their own language, reassure them, and allow them to ventilate their grievances. The outrages and acts of lawlessness should be put down with severity. The Chinese understand no other method of punishing crime, and are quick to take advantage of any signs of weakness or sentimentality. As a warning to those who might form hasty conclusions as to the feelings of the Chinese themselves, I may instance the sensational charges brought by a Chinese ex-interpreter against the management of the mines, published in a London paper. The writer was proved to have attempted to blackmail the general manager of the Rand mines, and by his own showing was a most unreliable witness. One of his charges, however, is worth referring to, because it is so palpably meant to mislead the British public. He stated that there had actually been two suicides among the coolies from despair at the conditions of life. To any one acquainted with the appalling frequency of suicide in China, and the variety of reasons which seem to the Chinese all-sufficient to excuse it, the fact that there have been only two suicides on the Rand speaks rather well than otherwise for the well-being of the men.

While I believe that great exaggeration and misrepresentation has been practised in connection with

this so-called "moral" side of the question, I have been convinced, from my personal knowledge of the Chinese, that many people who supported the Chinese Labour Ordinance did so in ignorance of the very serious issues involved. I have already mentioned the difficulty of dealing with the Chinese as communities, which is always aggravated when they are transported to a foreign land. The individual Chinese has, moreover, a genius for evading the law when it is opposed to his private enterprise, and in South Africa he is not breaking entirely new ground, since there are people of his race scattered throughout the country. However careful a system of registration was adopted the actual supervision of so large a body of men involved great difficulties, which were immensely complicated by the fact that the coolies are by no means the only Chinese in South Africa. The ordinary provisions for securing law and order were too weak in this alien community, a fact which has recently been recognised by giving the Director of Chinese judicial powers, and it is evident, in view of the outbreaks already mentioned, that a more rigorous system of compounding is necessary. I have already said that this does not involve any real hardship on a Chinese coolie.

It is possible that these difficulties would have been more carefully weighed had not the whole scheme been put through in hot haste, which was partly due to the fact that it had become a strong party cry at home. It cannot be denied that the sense of South African feeling was against the Ordinance, and in putting it through the Imperial factor was associated with a small

though powerful group of capitalists who practically dictated the terms on which the main industry of South Africa could be set once more in working order.

There are two much-debated points which must be considered in relation to the economic aspect. First, as to the possibility that black labour could have been had and the natives of the country employed in preference to aliens. I am inclined to think that if the iniquitous touting system had been done away with sooner, and some of the attention which has been devoted to the comfort and convenience of the Chinese miner had been exercised for the benefit of the Kaffir in former years, mining would not have become so distasteful to the latter. I recollect mining compounds in earlier days which were not show places by any means; the journalist in search of copy did not see them. But under the most favourable conditions the compound system presses more heavily on a primitive, untutored race, accustomed to open space and freedom, than on a people like the Chinese, accustomed to live in crowded houses and teeming villages, where space and privacy are unobtainable luxuries. Then the Kaffir is far less accustomed to regular work and discipline, and enjoys more comfort, not to say luxury, in his own home, where he lies on a dry floor in a warm hut while his women folk wait on him. He has, moreover, a childish fear of the underground, and is physically susceptible to all diseases specially incident on mining life.

These are fundamental difficulties in the way of obtaining a supply of Kaffir labour, but they have been aggravated of late years. First and foremost, the *pax*

Britannica has caused the natives to grow rich. Their cattle unmolested and their gardens untouched, they have also been able to get good wages for services on farms or in towns, not to mention the money brought home from the mines. A very small minority of the South African natives is compelled to work by stern necessity, and when we remember this fact we should be less intolerant of their laziness—for, after all, if we ourselves were immune from hunger, nakedness, or homelessness, how many of us would spend our lives in toil? Our complex civilisation has taught us to labour for what we could do without but think we should like, but the Kaffir is simpler in his scheme of life. Before the war there were some 90,000 Kaffirs on the mines. During the war many of these returned to their homes and earned large sums as transport riders. In the Transvaal and Orange River Colony they frequently took possession temporarily of abandoned farms, and by the time peace was made there is no doubt that a great number had “waxed fat and kicked.” But the bulk of the mining Kaffirs was drawn from Central Africa and Portuguese territory, where a less benevolent rule keeps them from becoming too prosperous, and the chiefs see that their young men go out and earn before they settle into family life, thus increasing the communal wealth of their tribe.

It seems unfortunate that the Rand took the opportunity of the close of the war to lower its rates of pay ; but although this has been construed into a deliberate attempt to force the situation, I do not think it actually had that effect. For some time previous

wages paid went out of the country already. But the farmer all over the country, unable to compete in wages with the mines, was (and is) crying out for more agricultural labour; and there is no reason to suppose that the Chinese are taking bread out of the Kaffir's mouth, since there is ample work for both. There is a good deal to be said in favour of keeping the Kaffirs out of mining compounds, though I do not suppose that these high moral considerations were determining factors in the case. People who champion the cause of aborigines must remember the deleterious effects of mining life on the health and morals of the Kaffir, who often returns to his kraal despising the moral codes of his own people and having picked up European vices. Essentially an agricultural and pastoral people, the Kaffirs should remain on the land where their labour is needed.

From the farmers' point of view, therefore, the situation seems to me by no means unsatisfactory. Supposing the mine-owners had offered higher wages and inducements to the Kaffir, it is possible that the full tale of black labour might have been obtained, but certainly at the expense of denuding still further the agricultural districts of possible labour and of sending up the rate of wages. It is doubtful whether the supply, even under these conditions, would have been permanent, because the increase of wealth among the natives would place an increasing number of them on a pinnacle of prosperity from which it would be ridiculous to expect them to descend to work which is fundamentally distasteful to them. Moreover, the higher

the pay the less time a Kaffir would feel inclined to work, since his idea of affluence would be soon reached. Extended recruiting in the regions outside South Africa would meet some of these objections ; but it must be remembered that the natives of tropical Africa are quite unable to stand the climate and the work, the high rate of mortality having practically stopped this source of supply, while the long distances to be traversed by the native labourer from other parts of South Africa and the chronic nostalgia which impels him to return home after a few months' work, are serious drawbacks in the way of obtaining anything but a constantly renewed supply of raw material. From the general Africander point of view any measure would be deprecated (1) which would increase the wealth of the Kaffir without corresponding responsibilities or burdens, (2) decrease the stock of agricultural labourers, (3) break down the too rapidly disappearing native moral code without providing any substitute. The favourite alternative of people who oppose the mine-owners on principle, but are too fair-minded to adopt the "Chinese slavery" cry, is that the Kaffir should be forced to work by legislation—a suggestion which is considered elsewhere ; but as that policy has not yet been adopted, and as in any case there are two sides to it, it is only just to acknowledge that the labour question in the Transvaal is not created by capitalist greed alone.

It is difficult for one who is not an engineering expert to form an opinion on the relations of Chinese and white labour on the Rand. The objection of

the Labour party to the Chinese has been based, here as in other colonies, on the assumption that they will take the bread out of the mouths of white workmen. To justify this assumption, however, one must be convinced that the Transvaal is really a white man's country, in the sense that he can perform any task that may be necessary for economic development. The question is referred to elsewhere,¹ with regard to the whole of South Africa. The fundamental difficulty lies in the presence of a large native population, among whom the Europeans live unmolested more by reason of their moral and mental superiority than by any show of force. I believe that this condition prohibits South Africa from ever becoming, in the true sense, a white man's country, and that the white man's functions there are distinctly those of a ruling caste. It is this fact which renders the presence of a pauper white population so serious a danger—one that can never be overlooked by any one conversant with the Eurasian problem in India or the "poor white" problem in the Southern States of America, and which renders unskilled white labour undesirable, as likely to feed this stratum of society. There remains a considerable amount of skilled, or partly skilled, labour which the white man can and should perform, in addition to the work of overseeing the coloured workers. The proportions of such work in the Rand mines is difficult to gauge, and statistics, which are freely quoted, are inconclusive in the absence of any standard by which to judge them. The latest figures available on the

¹ Chapter I., Part I.

subject show an increase in the past year in the number of whites employed on the mines amounting to three thousand ; and Lord Selborne, in a useful note on the use of hand drills—which is said to reduce the number of white miners—shows that not only are hand drills safer, less insanitary, and cheaper than machine work, but that an equal number of Europeans are employed by them. Notwithstanding these satisfactory declarations, it is certain that the growth of white labour has not increased as fast as was anticipated, and that the figures of unskilled labour, yellow and black together, bear a larger proportion than formerly to skilled white labour.

When one gets into the region of technicalities, however, one feels insecure of one's ground, but on general principles certain conclusions may be drawn. The native labour supply was inadequate and had to be supplemented. Even if it were, on sociological and political grounds, possible to employ unskilled white miners, either exclusively or in company with Kaffirs, it would remain an economic impossibility. The white man, working at the lowest possible rates for unskilled labour, would cost three times as much in wages as the coloured labourer. At such rates the European artisan would be hard put to it to live as befits a white man in South Africa. Labour-saving appliances might reduce the cost, but it would remain extravagant. On the other hand, the interests of skilled white labourers on the Rand are not to be lightly treated. From an Imperial point of view it is highly desirable that these men should

have ample protection; for, although more than half of them are not of British extraction, all are British citizens, and as the nucleus of a great white industrial population, part of which may permanently settle in South Africa, they are a factor to be reckoned with in our future colonial history. It is indisputable that many of the Chinese coolies are capable of being trained to perform skilled labour, and undoubtedly the fact of their superiority in this respect to the Kaffir weighs with the Rand miner when he regards them with distrust. The Imperial Government sanctioned their introduction as unskilled labourers and on special terms, and it is its duty to see that those terms are rigidly carried out, and to keep a close check on the system. On no account should the Chinese be allowed to spread into the country. They should be strictly bonded, compounded, and returned to China.¹ If the mines cannot comply with every regulation necessary to safeguard the experiment, it should be abandoned, and some other method of recruiting labour evolved.

The only other source of Asiatic labour supply available is British India, and that source is unfortunately closed through the attitude assumed in South Africa, but more especially in the Transvaal, towards the Asiatic. The rights and wrongs of the subject are discussed elsewhere at some length;² but here it must be pointed out that, if 250,000 labourers for

¹ There is no necessity, in the gold industry, for any system of compounds like that of Kimberley, which is rendered necessary by the ease with which diamonds can be stolen or secreted. But a semi-military discipline is necessary to ensure that the coolies remain in their quarters, especially at night.

² Part I, Chapter VIII.

the Transvaal were brought from India, the gain to the Empire would be nearly £1,000,000 per month, or £12,000,000 per year. In fifty years' time—the life usually estimated for the mines—the gain would be £600,000,000, which would be kept in the great Imperial family.

The political side of the Chinese labour question is bound up with the subjects of Imperialism and Federation, which are dealt with later on. Considered only on its so-called moral side, and in sublime ignorance of its true character, "Chinese slavery" has become a party cry in England. The British South African, who is a little too apt to exaggerate the importance of his domestic concerns in their bearing on British election politics, and who frequently fiercely denounces the state of affairs in which colonial matters are dragged up and down the floor of the House of Commons, must be relieved to discover that, after all, the Leader of the Liberal party, at all events, has no very strong convictions on the subject of Chinese labour. By obscuring the true issues in a cloud of sentimental nonsense about slavery the anti-Chinese politician has done real harm. The colonial feeling, which throughout South Africa was strongly against Chinese labour, was founded on apprehensions which are far more justifiable; but the efforts of the mine owners seem to have been chiefly bent towards meeting the sentimental or "moral" objections by providing expensive accommodation and food, while neglecting to provide against possible abuses and dangers which were evident to people with knowledge of Chinese

labour, both in China and abroad. Were I a colonial I should pray to be delivered in my domestic affairs from the interference of the British party politician, but I should also, I hope, refrain from intriguing with him, or counting on his rather uncertain support, to attain my political or private ends. South African politicians on both sides of the race line have to learn this lesson.

In the Transvaal the question has become acute during a period of Crown Colony government, a section of the population believing that their interests and desires were deliberately slighted in favour of a smaller but more influential group. Could the whole situation have been reduced to its purely economic aspect it is probable that Lord Milner's policy would have been found the only possible one. The task set was to start the Transvaal as a going concern once more, and to bring order out of chaos; and the High Commissioner decided that, as Indian labour could not be got, Chinese labour would facilitate this task. Amid a multitude of details, cross currents, and underground workings, this is the main fact which will stand out when history comes to be written. The attitude of the High Commissioner towards this or that section of the population is a side issue. The broad lines of his policy will be judged by results which it is too early to see, but that he acted with a genuine desire to promote the prosperity of South Africa as a whole no one has the least reason to doubt. Of course, in arriving at such convictions, the representations made by interested

parties have to be borne in mind, and the relations between Imperialism and capital, which are considered in Chapter XI., give force to the representations of the latter. But any one who has gone carefully and impartially into the question must agree that, on its own merits, as a factor in the economic development of the country, there is something to be said for Chinese labour in the Transvaal. The class of person who regards the mines as a curse, and the fostering of the mining industry as a direct interposition with the decrees of Providence, cannot see the reason of this; but any one who has studied South African development and the conditions of life there must be convinced that the welfare of the whole country is inextricably bound up with its mineral resources.

Any measure which is for the benefit of the industrial will react on the farming population, and it is impossible to establish between them that artificial barrier which the coincidence of the race line has helped to build up. There are special circumstances in the gold industry of the Transvaal which have given colour to this theory of the antagonism of interests, but they are due to a transient phase and are not inherent in the situation. Chinese labour might have been asked for and granted under similar economic conditions without the intervention of any such special circumstances. It is a domestic economic experiment, and as such will have to run the gauntlet, its future lying at present on the knees of the gods. As a self-governing colony the Transvaal will in the near future have the power to decide upon it for good or evil—not, it is

to be hoped, on the grounds of its political complexion, but of its practical result ; first, as aiding the general economic development, and second, as providing the unskilled nucleus of an industry in which the upper ranks only can be filled by white men.

A crucial question, from a political point of view, arises in connection with the recent developments in the Far East. The United States is suddenly being forced to observe that the Chinese is not always to be the victim in international relations. He is asserting his dignity and rights as the citizen of a great empire. The policy of exclusion which is observed towards him in the United States and several British colonies, including the South African ones, is beginning to wear another aspect in view of Japan's new status as a world power and her evident influence on her big neighbour. The whole subject of race discrimination in international relations will inevitably arise before long, and may be complicated by the presence in British territory of large communities of Orientals who are denied any political privileges. For this reason, if for no other, I do not regard the Chinese labourer as a permanent institution in the Transvaal ; but, while regretting that Indians were not employed, I regard it as probable that his temporary presence might tide over a difficult period, until the whole question of unskilled labour is placed on a sound basis by a rational adjustment of the relations between white and black, and by a step forward in the evolution of the latter. If, as one hopes, South Africa is ever to become a great industrial country, fed by a prosperous farming com-

munity, the black races must eventually fall into line, and such artificial measures for providing the labour market with aliens while there are teeming millions of unemployed blacks will be gradually abandoned. The development of South Africa has been abnormal, spasmodic, and unnatural, and as a consequence its people have not yet been adjusted to it. There is no permanent economic basis in a country where the higher races must work or starve while the lower ones can live without physical effort. In the proper adjustment of all the forces in South Africa, among which its native population must be reckoned as by no means the least, lies the greatest hope of the future; and while I think there are grave political dangers in the question we have been discussing, while I admit that abuses are possible and have occurred through lack of foresight and understanding, and while I am not convinced that the experiment is even economically sound, yet I believe that it can be justified on more than one score, and more particularly in restoring balance to the native labour market.

A very pertinent and vital question is whether the control of the Labour Department would not be better if entirely vested in Government. The question is, of course, a national one and, in connection with Chinese labour on the Transvaal mines, has already come on the carpet. The Protector of Chinese has been given judicial powers and has a staff of specially selected Imperial officers, paid by the Transvaal Government. The principle of State control is also acknowledged in the Transvaal diamond mines, since Government has

the right to place a director on the Board. When the difficulties of dealing on a fair basis with native peoples are increased by the importation of alien races, and the domestic labour problem is interwoven with international relations, it does not seem unreasonable that the Government which takes the responsibility, and incurs the odium if mistakes are made, should also exercise full control over the administration.

CHAPTER IX

SOME DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

THE problem of how to develop agriculture in South Africa is one that has long puzzled the few people who have given any attention to the subject; and it still remains a debatable question.

With the changes wrought by communications during the latter half of the past century and the increased competition from new fields, modifying the conditions under which agriculture was pursued, all progressive Governments in Europe have changed their attitude, and now bestow much attention on the subject, doing all in their power to advance agricultural interests. Concurrently there has arisen a system of co-operation among the farmers, to which reference is made later, which has revolutionised the agricultural, and even the pastoral, industry generally.

In South Africa the whole subject is still in an embryonic condition. Until the discovery of diamonds (in 1869) and of the Transvaal gold-fields, especially the Rand (in 1885), South Africa was entirely dependent upon agriculture, stock-farming, viticulture, and fruit or vegetable farming. Although the Cape was occupied by the Dutch—a nation of farmers—more than two and a half centuries ago,

and although to-day so large a proportion of the population of South Africa is Dutch, comparatively little has been accomplished to further agriculture. The early Dutch Governors and some of the first settlers did a good deal—they cultivated the best portions of the Cape Peninsula, introduced new crops and plants, and improved the methods of cultivation: the stately farm-houses, the avenues of trees, the vineyards and fields, are a proof to this day of what they accomplished. But after this period of intelligence and enterprise a prolonged period of inertia ensued, with the result that agriculture fell into a very primitive condition, little attention and less support being accorded it by the State. The reasons for this anomalous condition of affairs may be told in a few words. The early settlers found the agricultural conditions favourable, for the available coast-lands were arable and they were closely settled, the Cape being at first a replenishing station for the Dutch East India Company's ships. After the British occupation of the Cape the general condition of affairs altered completely; there came the advance into the interior, the collision with the natives, and the opportunity for adventurous spirits, less given to habits of industry than the first settlers, to acquire large tracts of land—in a word, the pioneers became pastoral and nomadic in character. The difficulties confronting those—the very few—who attempted to devote any share of their energies to agriculture were so many, and the absence of communications and markets so great, that the pastoral habit became

confirmed. These obstacles in the way of accomplishing anything to improve agriculture must of course not be lost sight of, and with the constant recurrence of native wars it is not to be wondered at that the Governors—military men without the special knowledge or foresight of some of the Dutch Governors—should have neglected agriculture. With the rise of the inland mining industries, however, one might have expected from their stimulus a considerable advance in agriculture, and it is difficult to account satisfactorily for the present state of affairs, in which it is clear that agricultural interests have too often been sacrificed to those of the industries which control the political machine so greatly. The abnormal growth of the gold and diamond industries, however, partly accounts for this position. They wanted at once, and at as low rates as possible, supplies which South Africa, with its unorganised farming industry, could not provide, and to this day the home-grown product, from its unreliability, deficiencies in packing, and other drawbacks, is often dearer than that imported. Be the reason what it may, South Africa, except as regards its gold, diamond, and coal mines, has remained stationary to an extraordinary degree. It was a pastoral country fifty years ago, importing cereals, dairy produce, and even hay, and it does so largely to-day; the huge farms then needed to maintain a family are still the rule.

The impression created by my recent journey, including as it did a personal visit to every important section of South Africa, is that there is no considerable


opening for agriculture under present conditions. The growth of local markets, incident on the mining industry, does not meet the case altogether. A good deal that is now imported could undoubtedly be grown locally; but how can the farmer of South Africa ever hope to compete with oversea markets like Argentina or Canada? The opinion of agricultural experts sent by Cape Colony to Australia has been quoted elsewhere: "to expect to compete on level terms with the great wheat-producing territories of Canada, Northern America, Argentina, is madness." The fact is that agriculture is still abnormally precarious in South Africa, and the future of the land lies chiefly with stock-farming, itself not without its special difficulties and dangers. Nevertheless, the enforcement of remedial measures against disease, and the adoption of fencing, agricultural banks, co-operation among farmers, intelligent land laws, irrigation and afforestation, would improve the conditions; and, if only common action among the different Governments could be brought about, there is no reason why South Africa should not have, concurrently with her great mineral development, a considerable agricultural and a great pastoral future.

Among the chief stock diseases in which South Africa is "particularly rich" are African coast fever, ordinary red-water or Texas fever, biliary fever of horses, malignant jaundice of dogs, tsetse-fly disease, rinderpest, horse-sickness, catarrhal fever, and heart-water of sheep, goats, and cattle. Rinderpest and swine-fever have been eradicated, and in the case of African coast fever,

though remedial measures are costly and bring disabilities on private individuals they work for the general good. Ultimate eradication of disease is possible by restricting the movement of cattle and carrying out the policy of fencing the farms. In some parts—for instance in the Pretoria district, formerly a hotbed of disease—great progress has been made by means of fencing. Much has been done to stamp out glanders, lung-sickness, and scab in the Transvaal, and a little progress has been made elsewhere, but the absence of a common system and of co-operation is everywhere encountered. Drastic measures are necessary, and should be carried out, but in the absence of any central authority are impossible.

Among the subjects to which Lord Milner has given a much-needed stimulus is that of irrigation. His residence in Egypt doubtless strengthened his belief as to the value of irrigation for South Africa, although the conditions of the two countries are so very dissimilar: Egypt, the huge plain dependent on the great life-giver, the Nile, a few inches' rise or fall meaning prosperity or famine; South Africa, with its inland plateau and broken scarp of mountains through which few rivers force their way—the one uniform, monstrously so; the other a land of diversity. But, while South Africa is not a country like Egypt or India, where vast schemes can be applied to an immense fertile flat surface, the importance of irrigation is one that cannot be over-estimated.

The report submitted by Sir W. Willcocks, after an experience in India and Egypt which is probably



unique, though founded on a rapid survey at a time when a close examination of all the chief districts was impossible, is one that deserves recognition. Derided by many as optimistic and superficial, this bold survey of South Africa, though open to criticism in some respects, contains the principles upon which irrigation schemes should be made. The chief of these is the nationalisation of water, which is more important for the permanent prosperity of the country than even railways, gold, diamonds, or coal. The provision of water, however, can be accomplished with the existence of minerals, which can supply the means for carrying out the necessary works. Part of the financial resources of the country should be devoted to irrigation works to ensure the permanent prosperity of the country. The mines have in all probability only a limited existence, and while they last the opportunity should be seized. The land is permanent, inexhaustible.

Sir W. Willcocks's picture of the present condition of South Africa is true in its main features :

“Except in the extreme south-west corner of Cape Colony, agriculture has scarcely been attempted except on the most primitive lines and on most insignificant areas. Farmers still trek from high veld to low veld and back again with the seasons, just as the wandering Arabs have done for centuries. The reason for this want of development of the agricultural wealth of the country, and the consequent acute stage of the poor white question, lies in the fact that the rainfall of the three Colonies, with the exception of the extreme south-west corner, is not only erratic and uncertain at the times most opportune for sowing, but is constant and heavy in autumn. Autumn, again, is quickly followed by a very severe and frosty winter, without a particle of moisture in the air. When rain is wanted it is generally

not there ; when it is not wanted it is invariably present. For countries so situated the only possible means of development lie in the storage of water when it is present and not needed, and its utilisation by irrigation when it is needed. Agriculture without irrigation is generally impossible in the new Colonies. In the face of such a state of affairs we find the irrigation laws of the three Colonies framed by Englishmen and Dutchmen who came from wet and foggy countries, and who considered the accumulation and storage of water as public nuisances, and the transfer of water from one valley to another as a public evil. If these countries are ever to develop the immense agricultural wealth which is to-day buried many thousands of feet beneath impenetrable strata of unwise and unsuitable legislation, the first step must be to proclaim the countries themselves as arid or semi-arid regions, and legislate accordingly."

The conclusion arrived at is that all rivers and torrents must be proclaimed as public domain if irrigation is to succeed. The prosperity of modern Italy is shown to be largely the result of the action taken by Victor Emanuel under the influence of Cavour. Old irrigation rights of thousands of years' standing stood in the way, but order was evolved under a strong central Government. Good reasons are advanced that irrigation works should be carried out by the State, which alone can deal with works of such magnitude ; and experience everywhere, even in America—that land of individual enterprise—seems to support this view. The adoption of irrigation, which would increase the agricultural lands and make possible the support of a larger population, would help to solve the dangerous "poor white" problem, for the whites would not lose caste by working on agricultural farms.

The higher the altitude in South Africa the less

the value of perennial water, except under special conditions. The prices which could be paid for perennial irrigation, according to Sir W. Willcocks, are: up to 1,000 feet above sea-level, and situated in the arid or semi-arid region, a water-rent of £2 per acre per annum, where near a railway; in the semi-arid regions between 1,000 and 2,500 feet, a rent of £1 10s.; over 2,500 feet a rent of £1 per acre.¹ Near cities and important centres a higher rent could of course be paid. Allowing for perennial irrigation in nine years out of ten on the whole area, and in years of drought on only half the area, Sir William considers that, with labour-saving machinery and a capable man to design and direct the works, the cost would vary from £7 10s. to £15 per acre; and as the value of an acre not provided with perennial irrigation varies from 2s. 6d. to £3 per acre, while the price of good land provided with it varies from £20 to £100 per acre, he is of opinion that irrigation works might be undertaken without any misgiving. It is understood, of course, he adds, that perennial irrigation would be provided for none but the best soils.

With the exception of the south-west corner of the Cape Colony, the "Conquered Territory" of the Orange River Colony, and the high veld of the Transvaal, the agricultural development of the whole country depends entirely on irrigation. The high-lying plateau of South Africa has by its situation a rainfall suited to tropical countries, and, owing to its altitude, a climate which belongs to a temperate zone. The autumn rains of February and March, which are monsoon rains, would, in a country like India, be of infinite value; but followed, as they

¹ Probably too high an estimate.

are in South Africa, by a severe and biting winter, they are of little value indeed for agricultural purposes. The long winter and spring drought and the uncertain summer rains absolutely prohibit agriculture of any advanced kind.

In about four-fifths of the Cape Colony, and in one-half of the Orange River Colony, no crops can be grown without irrigation if there is to be any certainty of reaping a harvest. In one-fifth of the Cape Colony, half the Orange River Colony, and two-thirds of the Transvaal, Indian corn, potatoes, roots generally, and pumpkins, for feeding stock in winter, can be grown with the aid of the rainfall and matured in all but years of heavy drought. In these more favoured tracts an intelligent application of crop rotations, suitable manures, and good tillage would do much for the country, and in ten years out of eleven suffice for an agricultural development of no mean value, especially if taken in conjunction with stock-breeding, which will always be the principal industry of the country. But even in such tracts the unfailing recurrence of famine in India has taught us that in countries where the rainfall is by nature tropical and confined in great part to a few months of the year, there is no assurance other than perennial irrigation. If such is the case in the best-favoured parts of South Africa, what shall we say of the rest of the country, when year after year millions of cubic feet of water roll away uselessly to the sea. The water comes when it is of no value, and is absent when it would be worth untold gold.

The extraordinary fertility of all those localities where nature has provided springs of perennial water, and where the farmers have been able to utilise it, in spite of the laws which are as harassing as they are ridiculous, points the way to the true road where lies the permanent regeneration of South Africa. We have only to imitate nature and impound on the surface of the ground the same water which she stores in caverns and fissures, and we have put the permanent prosperity of the country on a sound basis.

In the Cape Colony a good deal has been done by individual enterprise in the way of irrigation; the

fertility of the Outshoorn district, with its thriving ostrich industry, is a striking object-lesson. Something of a practical character has been done recently by the local Government to aid irrigation projects. Loans can be raised, for the actual construction of works, up to £500,000. Farmers can be given engineering assistance in the preparation of surveys and in various ways. It is also proposed to grant subsidies to the owners of established works and money for the extension of such works. In the Orange River Colony the dams constructed have not all been successful, but still something has been accomplished, and a joint survey of the Vaal River is being carried out by the Governments of the new colonies, while an Inter-Colonial Commission is to deal with the whole question of irrigation, in its legal as well as engineering aspects. Apart from large schemes of irrigation much can be accomplished by the sinking of boreholes and the creation of small dams for the purpose of conserving water for stock purposes and for the cultivation of smaller areas. The damage done by torrential streams carrying off their waters to the sea can be partly remedied by small weirs, which need not be costly, and in some parts of South Africa—in Basutoland, for instance—such works have been carried out on a small scale with success at considerable cost.

In general I am in agreement with the opinion expressed by Colonel Owen Thomas that South Africa must for the present be regarded on the whole as mainly a pastoral and not an agricultural country.

The sums expended upon the Agricultural Departments in the scientific study of agricultural problems, the dissemination of information, object-lessons by means of experimental farms, and so forth—not very popular measures, in the new colonies especially—should not be grudged, and their scope deserves to be enlarged in a country whose permanent interest must be the land.

A question of the deepest interest is that of the afforestation of the South African colonies. Every one who has visited them is aware of the bare, shadeless impression created on the mind's eye, and of the gratefulness of the green leafage when one returns to Europe. In Cape Colony the present farmers owe much to their early Dutch forerunners, who planted oaks, sometimes noble avenues, in front of their homesteads; but the indigenous trees, growing in sheltered kloofs, are generally stunted, such as the mimosa-thorn and acacia, with their fragrant yellow blossoms. The exception worth mentioning is the pretty, park-like forest of the Knysna, on the south-east coast of Cape Colony, where elephants still inhabit their old haunts, and whence a more or less thinly wooded region stretches up the coast to the mouth of the Zambesi, for the so-called "teak forest" of Matabeleland has little claim to be included. And yet the deposits of coal and fossil remains testify to the presence of extensive forests in former years, and from the success attending recent small attempts there seems no reason why some of these should not be re-created. The Knysna and east coast forests have

some useful and beautiful timber, such as yellow-wood, South African teak, ebony, and ironwood, and it is possible that some portions of the low veld would be suitable for the mahogany. ~ Returning to Johannesburg after fourteen years, and remembering that city set on a bald, bare spot in mid-veld, I gazed with surprise on the wooded slopes that sweep down from the Parktown suburb of Johannesburg towards the Magaliesberg, and on the green-embowered suburbs that stretch along the edge of the Rand. ~

The value of afforestation is perhaps little appreciated by the average Englishman, who has become accustomed to the destruction of the trees of his native land. The forest wealth of England was thrown largely into private hands by the confiscation of the monasteries under Henry VIII., and from that time it was doomed. A similar confiscation took place in France at a much later date, when the lands belonging to the Crown and nobles passed to the people, but as a national property and a source of national wealth they were preserved and fostered. In Germany there has been no actual process of confiscation, but in the transition from feudalism the forest areas, whether State property or owned by nobles, came to be regarded as national sources of wealth and safeguarded as such. One-fourth of the total surface of the German Empire with a capitalised value of one hundred millions sterling represent this forest wealth, and four millions of people, some of the finest of the peasantry, are employed directly and indirectly in industries arising from it. It is natural that an education in Germany and India

should predispose one to enthusiasm on the subject of forestry, but the practical experience of Great Britain in her Indian experiment is alone ample excuse. Forests will do something to solve the problem of denudation and desiccation which is so serious in South Africa.

Here, as elsewhere in new countries, the pioneer has recklessly drawn on capital for his daily wants, cutting down and burning, but rarely planting. Very high prices are paid for timber for mining purposes, and in countries like Rhodesia the timber has sometimes proved the most valuable asset on a farm. The only remedy for individual carelessness is Government control, and there are two reasons why forestry is essentially a State work. In the first place, while it is bound to be reproductive in time, and is indirectly beneficial to the country in many ways, it is not an investment upon which immediate and tangible profits can be expected; moreover, continuity and regularity are necessary in scientific afforestation; and, secondly, it is work which the State, working on a large scale with a low rate of interest for the necessary capital, can do more cheaply than individuals. Thanks, very largely, to Lord Milner, a stimulus has been given and a real beginning made in the afforestation of the new colonies. There is an arboretum at Cape Town, another is being formed in the Matoppos on the Rhodes estate, and all the colonies have good Departments of Forestry and are doing sound work, though unfortunately obliged, in a policy of general retrenchment, to cut down their grants. Both the

Transvaal and the Orange River Colonies have started Government plantations, and have already sold a respectable number of young trees from their nurseries. Before leaving this subject I feel bound, as a tree-lover, to protest against the too widespread devotion of the individual South African tree-planter to the Australian blue-gum. Its rapid growth makes this tree a favourite one for shade purposes ; but it has a ragged foliage, long and thirsty roots which suck up the goodness from the soil, and the commoner variety is not valuable as timber. Both for æsthetic and practical purposes the farmer should plant other trees as well, and now that he has in all the colonies Government nurseries on which to draw he need not be so conservative in his choice.

Among the measures urgently needed are co-operation of the farmers and the establishment of agricultural credit banks. In South Africa legitimate credit is difficult to obtain, and the terms of accommodation are exorbitant. The increase in farm mortgages is enormous, and the number of farms which have changed hands is a striking feature of South African land-history. The store-system, with which is connected the practice of usury, is responsible for much of the evil of this system. In return for goods and money-advances the farmer carries his produce to the storekeeper, and is compelled to take the price offered. As Colonel Owen Thomas points out, this means paying the highest price for his goods, and receiving the lowest price for his produce.¹

¹ *Agricultural and Pastoral Prospects in South Africa.*

It is difficult to devise a remedy. Co-operative stores have been tried on a large scale in the Transvaal under the late Government and were not successful, but this may well be due to causes other than their unsuitability for the needs of the moment. As part of a system of general co-operation they have, in other countries, proved most useful in enabling the farmer both to buy and sell at reasonable rates, but they do not, of course, answer the question as to where he is to secure credit. The solution has been found in Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, Finland, and other countries by the establishment of agricultural credit banks. The system varies, but one principle obtains. The security is based on the co-operative principle; the farmer, his family, and usually his neighbours, become security. Profit-sharing means better quality of work, better economy of force, more vigilance in regard to common interests, more incitement to industry and thrift. The rise of these institutions, which are adjuncts to the commercial banks, has been extraordinary in Germany, Italy, and France. In Germany, for instance, there are over 8,000, with a membership of about 1,500,000. Co-operation has been extended in many other directions, and there are special agricultural societies for purchase, production, and selling; societies for dairy produce, drainage, irrigation, reclamation of land, and for the use of machinery; and agricultural missions for improving the general condition of farmers.

Left to his own resources there is no hope in South Africa for the pure agriculturist. Effective combination, of some sort, and the establishment of

credit banks, are absolutely necessary. If countries like France, Germany, Britain, Finland, and many others find it necessary to follow the trend of the times in making agriculture an organised industry, South Africa cannot afford to reject their experience.

Among the products of the soil not the least important is tobacco, which is indigenous in South Africa, and is grown at present chiefly for local consumption. It varies greatly in quality in various sections of the country and in different districts, according to the soil, the Cape Colony and Natal tobacco being inferior to that of Rhodesia, and even more so to that of the well-known Magaliesberg valley in the Rustenberg district of the Transvaal. In the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies so-called experts have been introduced by Government, but without any signal success; the pay of a reliable tobacco expert is prohibitive for Government, and should be left to private enterprise which has already done good work in this direction. Scientific methods have been introduced in the selection and grading of the leaf before it is sun-cured, and the tobacco from the Magaliesberg district in the well-known little grey sacks enjoys a deservedly high reputation throughout South Africa, to which climate it seems specially suited, particularly in the high veld, where it can be smoked all day long. The development of the tobacco industry may assume important proportions, and already Messrs. Hartley, of Hekpoort, manufacture 1,000,000 lbs. yearly. In Europe it is already known, but is not likely to come into general use, as the tobacco at once loses its delicate

flavour in a damp climate. Some of the Rhodesian tobacco is also excellent, and with improved methods should compete some day with the Transvaal.

Great hopes are entertained concerning cotton, and experiments are now being made in Rhodesia with both the Egyptian and American varieties, while the Transvaal Government has an agent now in America examining into the question of cotton production, and arrangements are being made to import a large quantity of suitable seed. The wild cotton is found in Rhodesia, and is spun by the natives into a rough but lasting material. Large areas in South Africa could be put profitably under cotton cultivation, in the opinion of experts who have examined into the conditions. The primary difficulty is that of obtaining the very cheap labour which is necessary for this work ; but cotton might be grown at first by the simple expedient of providing every native woman with say a handful of cotton-seed, and inducing her to plant the seed next to, or with, her patch of mealies. A large cotton-crop could be produced, which might help to feed a manufacturing industry such as is projected in the Orange River Colony. The woman and her picaninnies could pick and gin the cotton when ripe, without interfering with the labour-market. The local storekeeper—and there is a store near every kraal—would buy the cotton as readily as he buys wool and mealies. The quality of the cotton and the lack of skill in collecting it would have to be improved as time went on ; but the suggestion, as forming part of a scheme to stimulate industry and fresh forms of earning among the natives,

deserves a practical trial. There are, besides, many valuable indigenous plants in South Africa whose protection is worth consideration. Rubber, aloes, ground nuts, sweet potatoes, some varieties of the prickly pear which can be used for fodder, and other plants which need not be enumerated are all hardy, and are apparently not affected by the insect pests or vagaries of rainfall.

From agriculture to education is a far cry on the surface of things but, in criticising the increase in the burden laid upon the new colonies, as is done later, it is necessary to remember how much is being done by the Government in the interests of the latter, and that they have made education free in all their schools. Cape Colony is working in this direction through her new Education Bill, which erects school boards for rating purposes, and a few years at the present rate of progress will place South African elementary-school work on a very fair level. That strenuous efforts were needed is shown by the figures as to illiteracy, and this part of the subject is discussed in Part II., Chapter II.

But in a country where the white people are a ruling caste elementary education by no means covers the whole field, even at an early stage, nor should South Africa be a second India, whence children are sent home to schools and universities. At present this is very largely the case, especially among the British Afrianders, with results that are not wholly satisfactory. The theory that the culture inseparable from university training can only be attained in the

historic surroundings of an old civilisation is now discounted by the success of American colleges; and though one may still cling to a belief in the broadening and refining influences of "atmosphere," which is more easily attained in Europe, yet there is much to be said for education in the country of his birth to fit a man for a career there. The only university in South Africa is that of the Cape which is, in fact, only an examining body. An extension of its functions should not be ultimately impossible, but there is an ever-present difficulty in the sectional jealousy of South African states or towns; and as there are several teaching institutions with the title of college it is likely that these will by degrees be formed into the constituents of a teaching university. A most interesting and important development is the establishment of the Johannesburg Technical Institute, to which justice is hardly done by its very dull title. It owes its genesis largely to the Witwatersrand Council of Education, which was formed by some public-spirited Johannesburgers in 1895 to provide for their children those educational facilities of which in his later years Krüger deprived them.¹ A large amount was subscribed and vested in the Council for this purpose, and the Chamber of Mines agreed to help by drawing up assessments, while the mines were recommended to assist with funds.

Several schools were founded and others subsidised, although the unrest and disturbance caused by the Jameson raid was not conducive to a full measure of

¹ See Part II., Chapter II.

usefulness. In 1899 an appeal to the mining houses brought further subscriptions and guarantees, and the Council was engaged on fresh plans when the war broke out. The conclusion of peace found a considerable fund in hand and a ready-made committee, and it is expected that a large proportion of the money will become available for the present institute. Although the primary aim of the Council was to provide elementary education, it had assisted technical training in connection with mining, and this was the beginning of the technical education movement which, with Government aid and supervision, is now being developed at the institute. The merely technical training for mining does not, however, limit the desires of the Council, who are anxious to build up round the institute a real university, with faculties of arts, law, engineering, medicine, and agriculture. For this project a large farm, five miles from Johannesburg, has been handed over to Government by Mr. Beit, but a very large augmentation of funds is necessary. The president of the British Association in his recent visit to South Africa pointed out the distinction between the education given in a strictly technical institute and that of a corresponding department in a teaching university, and this should be borne in mind in all schemes for higher education in South Africa. The gradual rise of the sub-continent as an industrial country is one of the essentials of her future prosperity, and the experience of Germany shows that the higher and wider training of a university is essential

in bringing the forces of education to bear on all the greater industries.

Elsewhere I have spoken of a plan for a native college, to be merged in time into a university. The crux of the question, both for black and white, lies in the expediency of bringing the best in education to them, instead of forcing them to go to Europe for it. As a race solvent between British and Dutch I believe this policy, carried downwards through the whole range of education, will be of real value.

It frequently happens—has happened in Great Britain—that, while the highest and lowest branches of education engage attention, the intermediate or secondary education is neglected. The experience of British universities is that it is hard to get students who are sufficiently well grounded to take an academic course with profit. While the whole system in South Africa is still in the making it is to be hoped that adequate provision will be made for this. At present there is a lack of uniformity about the method which makes it difficult to generalise, but the arrangements familiar to English people are unsuitable to a colony where there is less social gradation. A beginning in one direction has been made in the new colonies in founding normal schools; and as it is desirable that these should be recruited from colonial sources, it is to be hoped that in time provision will be made to enable the students to take a university course and qualify for the highest branches of a profession which is not yet on the footing it ought to enjoy. An interesting question has been raised, whether it would

not be possible to reproduce in South Africa some of the essential features of public-school life in England. The object of this is chiefly to prevent the exodus of so many sons of the well-to-do classes to Europe for education. There is no doubt room for thoroughly good private schools in South Africa and some already exist, while others offering equal advantages are partially under Government supervision. The English public school, however, possesses features which are not to be reproduced in new countries—their historical associations and traditional *esprit de corps*, for instance—and to secure these a suggestion was made by Mr. E. B. Sargant, late Adviser on Education to the High Commissioner, that the great schools should imitate the monastic houses of old and repeat their own history by sending out daughter houses.

There are practical difficulties in the way of such a scheme which need not be discussed in detail here; but one very real objection is that, after all, South Africa must develop on more or less original lines, as Canada and Australia have done. I should personally favour far more a pushing on of the university schemes, together with every possible encouragement to secondary schools of a superior type, since the possibility of taking a full educational course and qualifying for a profession in their own country will attract an increasing number of young Africans, and would even, I believe, draw a number of British-born boys. It is becoming more and more evident that an education on the spot fits a boy better for his life-work, and the one real

justification for our own English system is that it is peculiarly suited to our social conditions, which are in a way unique. An Englishman without a public-school or university education is at a disadvantage in England of which he is not conscious in other countries; he is out of touch with an important side of his own national life. But for life in the colonies this education, though it may make him a better man in some ways, does not give him touch with his environment and equip him specially for the battle of life, unless, of course, he happens to belong to one of the learned professions. Even in the latter case he might do as well without his public-school experience, as is shown in the success of many distinguished men who have been educated in South Africa and have only gone to England for a professional course.

It is notorious, at present, that for all professions which are either scientific or technical it has been necessary to go outside South Africa, since the proportion of qualified Afrianders is extremely small—a not surprising fact when one remembers that they have had to be sent abroad for the most important parts of their training. The engineers, electricians, mechanics (both railway and mining), the higher civil servants, educationists, and every kind of expert, including those on farming, are sought in Great Britain, America, Germany, or even in other colonies. This state of affairs is not unnatural in a country whose industrial development has been so far in advance of its increase of population and whose growth has been so rapid, but it should not be allowed to continue.

The first step has been taken in the new colonies and the Cape, and what is now necessary is public-spirited conduct on the part of the people in co-operation with Government. The golden city should lead the way. Spurred by the example of American capitalists, who, whatever their faults, make education the first call on their munificence and never fail to endow a school or build a library in their native towns, the Rand millionaires should follow up the work done through the Council of Education and should provide, in the Transvaal at all events, those educational facilities which will prove the greatest attraction for a white race and the best guarantee of their progressiveness and efficiency. I do not say that they have not already done something towards this object, but their contributions hitherto have been singularly inadequate in view of the wealth extracted from Transvaal soil, while of real interest and generosity the only examples (apart from the action of the Witwatersrand Council, which was not a millionaire body) are those of the late Cecil Rhodes in his will and the gifts of Mr. Beit to the Transvaal and to Oxford University.

The mention of Rhodes's legacy leads one to note the objection frequently urged against the policy of building up an educational system outside the mother country, since it seems to be contrary to Imperialist interests. A certain number will always desire, however, to return to the cradle of their race for historical inspiration and insight into their own history, and Rhodes's legacy will reach this few, and is hardly capable of expansion. The South African universities

should be linked with those of Great Britain, just as the whole educational system of the Empire might well be linked through a union of the teaching profession.¹

It is with regret that I omit from these pages a fuller account of a most interesting phase in the field of higher education, because during my visit to the various colonies I made acquaintance with several excellent institutions and schemes, private and otherwise, and found a growing interest in the subject. I am here obliged to confine myself to the one point—the advisability of providing South Africa with such educational equipment as to attract a high-class and permanent white population of British blood, and to confirm these as patriotic Afrianders with a true understanding of the Imperial bond.

¹ Owing, no doubt, to the haste with which Rhodes's will was drawn up, no provision is made for the Transvaal and Orange River Colony—an unfortunate omission. The proportion of scholars allotted to the United States (two to each State and territory) while Canada only has six and South Africa twenty-four, seems to indicate further haste.

CHAPTER X

SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

THE most important of the immediate measures initiated by Lord Milner for the restoration and development of prosperity was the vigorous prosecution of the railways in the new colonies. The finances of these railways are placed under the control of the Inter-colonial Council, now some two and a half years old, as are also the South African Constabulary, the administration and payment of interest upon the guaranteed loan of thirty-five millions, the winding-up of the work of repatriation, and other minor services; but its chief purpose has been the amalgamation of the railways of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony as one common property under one management. Should the surplus revenue be insufficient for the common services, each colony has to contribute proportionately to its Customs receipts, but each can develop its railway system without interference from its neighbour.

The intercolonial system rests on the principle of a common railway system, at first for the two new colonies. Lord Milner, who realised the value of the machinery, also realised the intense opposition it would encounter, and has put it on record that quite possibly

ninety-five per cent. of the people of the two colonies would vote for its dissolution, with a view to engaging in the inter-colonial and party rivalries and conflicts which afford so great an attraction in South Africa. This unpopularity is not diminished by the fact that the contribution to the Council is not placed within the control of the lately elected Legislative Assembly. The narrow view obtains in this, as in other things, and each colony thinks that the other gets the best of the bargain. The Transvaal objects to railways being made in the south of the Orange River Colony, and that Colony would like to control its own railways and of course tax (indirectly) the Transvaal, as in the olden days.

The economic development of South Africa *as a whole* is the goal aimed at, and it is satisfactory to note that at the last Railway Conference (held in February, 1905) a resolution was unanimously carried that the only satisfactory solution was to be found in the common management of at least the through lines, and the pooling of their receipts, with a division of profits on a fixed basis. Though so far merely an academic opinion, it is a step in the right direction. The last report helps to establish the economical working of the railways already under the Council. The Orange River Colony, however, is to construct the Bloemfontein-Kimberley line at its own cost, and a railway (the Springs-Witbank Railway) is to be made by the Transvaal with the assistance of a loan from the Postal Savings Bank. The railways made by the Government in the new colonies so far are 310 miles in length,



London John Murray

and there are 328 miles under construction and 693 miles projected, 500 of which it is hoped may be completed within a reasonable period. Within a short time there will be 2,500 miles in the system, or about double the amount existing before the war.

Among the economic questions coming to the front in South Africa the most important is undoubtedly that of railways and railway rates, and the general view seems to be that railway amalgamation should be the first step towards federation. But endless difficulties stand in the way, and, after all, an actual organic amalgamation need not necessarily precede the federation of the different colonies—it has not done so elsewhere. To bring this about a highly developed Central Government, like that of Germany or France, is required: a system opposed to the spirit of the English-speaking peoples, certainly opposed to the Africander spirit. The railways in South Africa are mainly in the hands of the different Governments—in the case of Rhodesia in the control of the Chartered Company, the governing body—and therefore the path to amalgamation is rendered more feasible than if they were privately owned, as in America. The present railway rates generally seem excessive and on the surface opposed to the best interests of the country. It is not easy, however, to decide what these interests are. Lord Milner, who took the long view, declared that the reduction of rates would bring relief only to a limited extent and to a few middlemen, while it would deprive the country at large of revenue sorely needed for public works, more especially the improve-

ment of communications. On the other hand, there is a school of thought, much favoured in the United States, which believes in building railways in new districts and running them at a loss until the land is filled up. This policy is inextricably involved with heavy protection in various forms, and moreover it is less applicable to a country which, like the new colonies and the Cape, is already settled to a great extent and has all the more advanced problems of government to deal with, which do not press so heavily on infant communities. The opening of the Western States or the great North-West of Canada does not, therefore, offer a complete analogy. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that the railway policy of the United States, so successful in its earlier stages, has had the effect of putting a lasso round the necks of various states, a condition from which it seems likely that they can only be delivered (as suggested by Mr. Roosevelt in his southern campaign) by the Central Government control of all the lines. There is, however, a tendency in South Africa to use railway rates as protective tariffs against sister colonies, as shown by the revision of the Cape rates, whereby its produce is carried at a lower rate than that of other colonies. A proposal for a similar policy in the Transvaal was recently vetoed by Lord Selborne.

The chief railway question now agitating South Africa is the question of rates between Delagoa Bay on the one hand, and Natal and the Cape Colony ports on the other. Both the Cape and Natal, largely dependent for the revenue of their railways on the

transit trade to Johannesburg, are suffering from the competition of Delagoa Bay, the natural approach to the Transvaal. Although the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, as owners of the expensive line from Aliwal North to Pretoria, cannot afford to see this route fall into disuse, the competition is likely to increase because, notwithstanding many disadvantages—penalties enforced by the shipping confederation, lack of proper harbour facilities, restrictions of various sorts, and dilatory, irritating Portuguese methods—the harbour is certain to be improved all round owing to the great interest of Johannesburg companies in the port. In return for advantages in connection with recruiting native labour, the pre-existing preference was confirmed to Portugal on railway rates, and in consequence of this trade has drifted to Delagoa Bay. The Cape has been the most severe loser in the loss of railway carriage—the present amount carried by the Cape lines (about 10 per cent.) being just enough to pay for maintenance and the interest on capital expenditure.

In February, 1905, the Intercolonial Council proposed to reduce the preference enjoyed by Delagoa Bay by lowering the rates from Durban and the Cape Colony ports, guaranteeing the Portuguese about one-third of the traffic to the Transvaal, a proposal that would reduce greatly the cost of goods in that colony. The Portuguese, however, failed to see the advantages which would accrue to them and refused to accept the proposal. The coast colonies thereupon began an agitation in the matter, and now call for the denuncia

tion of the *modus vivendi*¹ concluded with Portugal, by Lord Milner in 1901. But the Transvaal is not likely to throw over a railway route which is shorter than any other, is about to be still further shortened and improved, is nearly entirely within her own territory, is on her own railway system, and which, moreover, is the chief means of securing solid advantages in the matter of recruiting native labour—the permanent source of supply, as I have already indicated. Moreover, ere long there will be another direct line through the Eastern Transvaal and Swaziland to the coast. The result is a serious conflict between the interests of the inland and the coast colonies.

A suggestion was recently made that no line competing with the existing main lines should be constructed or sanctioned without the consent of all the signatories ; this with a view to safeguard the vested interests existing at the present moment. The proposal, it is hardly necessary to say, did not meet with approval in the Transvaal, as it would cripple its communications with the seaboard, and especially the new short line from Delagoa Bay. The Cape and Natal claim the right to have a say regarding the *modus vivendi* with Portugal, which they declare is an Imperial question, and the Transvaal disputes their right to intervene. At the back of all is the old rivalry

¹ The following is the principal clause of the *modus vivendi* : Article 1.—The engagement of the native labourers from the Province of Mozambique for the Transvaal and Rhodesia shall be established from now, and shall be allowed by the Governor-General of the said Province while the present *modus vivendi* is in force, or until the said *modus vivendi* shall be denounced by one of the parties, in conformity with the terms of Article 13.

between the Cape and Transvaal for the hegemony of South Africa. The Cape sees the railway traffic slipping away, and opposes tooth and nail, further steps tending to increasing independence of the Transvaal, a feeling shared, but in a lesser degree, by Natal.¹ The Cape and Natal naturally urge the claims based on the vested interests in railways built to "rescue the Transvaal from barbarism"; the Transvaal says the older colonies wish to cripple its development by artificial measures. The situation is complicated, but the very difficulty of finding a solution under present conditions—intercolonial rivalry, jealousy, and race-feeling—may prove the necessity of coming to some arrangement to avert the recurrence of such disputes, which have a paralysing effect on the progress of the country as a whole.²

It must not be forgotten that distance is by no means the only consideration in estimating the cost of traffic per mile and that the height which has to be scaled is the principal factor. In this respect Port Elizabeth, for instance, is nearer to Johannesburg than Durban, since the Natal Railway, with its ups and downs, has to conquer altitudes nearly double the actual difference in height of the two termini. It is evident, therefore, that the economic side of the problem is not so incapable of solution in accordance with Imperial aspirations as appears at first sight.

A minor example of the rivalry of routes, and of

¹ In July, 1905, the figures were: Cape ports, 10 per cent.; Durban, 32 per cent.; Delagoa Bay, 58 per cent.

² Since this was written a Conference has been summoned to meet in London in order to discuss these questions.

the effects of artificially interfering with the normal conditions of railway competition, is to be found in the case of the railways to Rhodesia, from the Cape and from Beira respectively. The diversion of traffic from the Beira route by the Chartered Company (which is interested in Cape politics) to the long and costly Cape route has had an unfortunate influence on the development of Rhodesia. There is no need here to emphasise this point, which has been alluded to in dealing with Rhodesia, as the matter has been, for the present at least, placed on a more satisfactory footing by the reduction of rates on the Beira Railway. The port of Beira is the natural one for Rhodesia, the towns of Salisbury and Buluwayo being respectively 1,125 miles and 523 miles nearer the sea by this than by the Cape line. But, of course, the value and importance of the great All-British Route cannot be estimated by purely economic results.

The general railway question in South Africa, however, is a much wider one than that of the various existing routes to the Coast colonies and Delagoa Bay. The developments which are taking place and those which may occur in the early future may bring about (what seems under present conditions unlikely) railway communication from the west coast, at Swakopmund or elsewhere, to some point on the main line. A glance at the map will show that a serious competitor would arise in such a line, for the passenger and lighter traffic at least, by reason of the saving in time that would be effected in transit from Europe to the Northern Transvaal and Rhodesia, and it is

certain that ere long there will be trans-continental communication established from the western to the eastern coast. Already a line is projected from the Portuguese harbour Benguella to the mines near Lake Tanganyika, from which a branch could be constructed to join the Cape to Cairo Railway north of the Zambesi. These developments are still in the air and do not enter into practical politics in South Africa as yet, but they deserve to be borne in mind by any one who looks ahead.

The shifting of the centre of gravity northwards has been a serious matter for the Cape Colony, and the rise of the Transvaal, already so greatly in the ascendant, and the great future assured to Rhodesia, if that territory be only governed on broad-minded lines, must add to the grave misgivings felt at the Cape on the subject. That colony, if its true interests were followed, would try to develop its own Hinterland and cease to work as if its whole existence were dependent on its connection with the north, by means of railways and in other ways. Whatever the gain to general Imperial interests by present developments, it is evident that, with the increasing prosperity of the inland colonies and the consequent improvement of railway communications eastwards (and eventually westwards), the economical and political importance of the Cape Colony, especially of Cape Town, must inevitably diminish relatively. There seems no reason why the old colony should not make progress by development of its own resources, chiefly agricultural, and its position on the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean—on a great

highway to Australasia and the Pacific—must be remembered ; but still relatively the Cape is being left behind and its fate in that respect is sealed unless it can be averted by the federation of the South African States and the rise of an Africander nation which will be broader in its conceptions than the present generation.

The industrial possibilities of South Africa are the occasion of much controversy in the Cape Colony where, finding the ground slipping away, people are wildly clutching at any nostrum that will serve to galvanise the enfeebled body into renewed life. The favourite panacea is protection of industries. There is some difficulty in approaching the subject, as the census report of 1904 does not tally with that of the Select Committee on Cape industries. The latter declares in the most uncompromising fashion for protection.¹ The Manufacturers' Association goes further

¹ The Committee recommends :

- (1) *Candle Manufacture and Stearine Industry*.—That a duty of 1*d.* per lb. be added to the present 7½ per cent. *ad valorem* tariff.
- (2) *Colonial-made Furniture*.—That the 7½ per cent. *ad valorem* tariff on imported furniture be raised to at least 25 per cent., and that the raw material come in at as low a duty as possible.
- (3) *Confectionery and Jam Trade*.—That there be imposed an additional duty over and above the present 2*d.* per lb.
- (4) *Biscuit and Cake Manufacture*.—That in addition to the *ad valorem* duty of 7½ per cent. and 10 per cent. (as above), 1*d.* per lb. be placed on sweetened and ½*d.* per lb. on unsweetened biscuits. (The duty on the raw material is 22½ per cent.)
- (5) *Milling Industry*.—That in addition to the 2*s.* per 100 lb. on flour and 1*s.* per 100 lb. on wheat, 1*s.* per 100 lb. be placed on wheat and 2*s.* per 100 lb. on flour.
- (6) *Printing Industry*.—That raw material be imported free, and a duty of 33½ per cent. on all imported printing, stationery, etc.
- (7) *Tinctures, Dutch Medicines, and Spirituous Preparations*.—That instead of 3*d.* per gallon the duty be 15*s.* per gallon, the same as on the ordinary imported spirits.

in demanding protection for industries like zinc and galvanised iron, engineering and woodwork—of problematic value and infinitesimal proportions. But this demand for protection and the proposal that the Customs Union should be revised on protectionist lines (a demand made by Cape Colony but supported also by Natal) combines the two coast colonies against the inland colonies, which naturally are prepared to fight the proposals to the utmost. The Transvaal especially, situated 1,000 miles up-country from Cape Town, dependent for its prosperity upon low cost of production, affected by railway rates, frontier charges, or littoral duties which regulate the cost of supplies and of raw materials, is bound to oppose these measures, as well as the proposals concerning Delagoa Bay. The attitude taken up seems reasonable. The principle of protection within reasonable limits, for building up a colony in the making, is not objected to, but exception is taken to alterations which are for the purpose of artificially bolstering up coast industries or withdrawing advantages given to raw materials from the coast. The policy of the Cape is reported to be the protection of “legitimate manufactures, not bastard industries,” but can the measures proposed be called “legitimate”? Incidentally it may be said that these proposals are not in the direction of further preference to the mother country. The wish to protect local manufactures against outside competition cannot be objected to, provided articles can be manufactured under favourable economic conditions, without heightening the cost to the consumer and generally raising the cost of living.

With a certain measure of protection¹ the Cape Colony has not hitherto been successful in her experiment. Apart altogether from the effect on the Transvaal, it seems probable that, in view of the fact that the Cape industrial districts are confined to the coast, the proposed protection would put additional burdens on the inland districts of the colony itself, where living is already heavy, although the taxation would partly fall on British manufactures. Pastoral pursuits and agriculture, the staple employment of the colony, seem to need protection more than the small and scattered industries, though some of the latter might be encouraged by bonuses. According to the census, five out of nine industries do not need such encouragement, as they have considerably increased the number of hands employed since 1901, while other trades are depressed entirely because of the war and the agricultural depression.

It is not only in the Cape Colony that the wave of protection is felt. In the Orange River Colony, hitherto associated merely with the pastoral industry, an attempt is being made to create local manufactures. An Industrial Commission has recommended bonuses to foster new industries by which the raw material produced in the colony can be made into finished articles. The principal industries to be supported are woollens, leather, preserving, cement, tobacco, pottery, and basket-making. Something has been done by

¹ At present $\frac{1}{2}d.$ per lb. on candles, $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* duty on furniture, $2d.$ per lb. on jam, etc., $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on bakers' "raw material", $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on English or Colonial confections, and 10 per cent. *ad valorem* on foreign goods, 2s. per 100 lb. on flour, and so on.

private enterprise to start similar industries in the Transvaal, particularly in wool-cleaning, carpentering, brick, tile, cement, pottery, and glass-making.

The period of depression which has hung over South Africa is at last beginning to show signs of passing away, although a great deal of poverty and distress still remains, and the extraordinary spectacle, in a British colony, of respectable artisans and even men of education out of work and subsisting on charity is not yet a thing of the past. In 1903, under the influence of an anticipated boom which never came, the country was filled with material of which much was unsaleable. The fall in imports between 1903 and 1904 was £18,000,000, and it says something for the recuperative power of the country that within so short a time a return to something like normal conditions should have been possible. The mining industry, on which so much hangs, is prosperous and agriculture, if given fair play, should now make progress. The process of paying for imports almost exclusively by the export of raw gold and diamonds cannot, however, be said to be a healthy condition of trade.

A comparison of trade in the years 1898 and 1904 (before the war, and two years after respectively) shows that the value of the principal exports from Britain increased over twenty-eight per cent., while the imports from South Africa increased by nearly £2,000,000; but this increase is due to gold, the other chief items showing a substantial decrease. South Africa therefore is living on capital to an extraordinary degree, paying chiefly in raw gold, and insufficiently in raw

material such as wool, hides, feathers, or other products of the soil. A considerable proportion of imports is paid for from the working capital of companies, from money provided in Europe. If the proportion contributed by gold and diamonds in the total volume of South African exports is so considerable, what is to be thought of the figures for the Transvaal, where these two items in 1904 actually counted for nearly £17,000,000 out of a total of £17,770,000. On the other hand, the amount paid for imported food-stuffs—no less a figure than over £2,000,000—proves conclusively how unsatisfactory is the agricultural condition of the country. The account of revenue and expenditure shows a serious deficit in Cape Colony and Natal, and an excess of imports over exports in Natal of nearly two millions sterling.¹ Only in the Transvaal will the revenue more than suffice for expenditure; but this is partially due to the heavy taxation, which might with advantage be lightened if any reasonable economy in Government expenditure could be devised.

One of the results of the war is the greater attention paid to South African commerce, and consequent increase of competition—for instance, the number of firms supplying the mines has doubled since the war.

¹ REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE

	Revenue	Expend.	Deficit	Exports and Imports	
	£	£	£	£	£
1903-4 C.C.	9,910,142	10,815,156	905,015	26,568,882	21,824,309
(Estimated) 1904-5 "	8,500,000	9,231,696	731,696		
1902-3 Natal	4,334,175	5,039,003	704,828	1904 9,010,389	10,991,301
(Estimated) 1904-5 "	3,342,000	3,924,000	582,000		
1904-5 Transvaal	4,423,211	4,378,203		17,770,988	13,627,377
1904 O.R.C.	771,700	760,667		2,264,000	3,841,000

The British share of trade (sixty-three per cent.) is practically stationary, while that of Germany (three per cent.) decreased slightly in the period 1903-4, and the United States increased from twelve to fourteen per cent. The American development of trade is partly due to cheaper freights than the shipping conference allows to British goods. The advantages enjoyed by American firms is clear from the fact that the cost of rail and shipping transport to Johannesburg for British goods is about forty per cent. of their original value, while that of American goods is only thirty-three per cent. The American share of trade lies chiefly in agricultural and mining machinery, petroleum, doors and windows, and barbed wire, some of which would come from Canada under reciprocal treatment. Even in mining machinery where America is easily first Britain holds her own; where she fails is in connection with agriculture. On the east coast route Germany underbids British firms, largely due to the German steamer lines, the hold which German firms have established along that coast, and the general advantage of cheap rates by rail to the port of embarkation. In the Cape Colony the position of Germany is inferior though not so much as might appear from the returns, as a good deal comes from Germany *via* England, cheap rates for German goods being quoted by British shipping lines. The general complaints made in South Africa concerning British manufacturers are the same as elsewhere—insufficiency of information, ultra-conservative methods, want of adaptability, and lack of proper price-lists.

There is seemingly considerable depression and there certainly is serious discontent in the Transvaal and some dissatisfaction in the Orange River Colony on account of excessive taxation, which in the Transvaal is said to amount to about £11 or £12 per head per annum,¹ and the cry is not likely to be diminished as the time for the elections draws near. It is claimed, however, that this is far too high an estimate. It is unfair, of course, to press the comparison too far, as is frequently done in South Africa, between the expenditure of the new colonies under British rule and the former Governments, for a large proportion of this is on reproductive and development works, with a view of laying securely the foundations of future prosperity—work which cannot be checked without serious injury to the country. Before the war the Orange Free State had a revenue of about £450,000, of which three-fourths came from its railways. Now the railway revenue goes into the intercolonial pool and the Orange River Colony draws about £600,000 in taxation (from Customs about £400,000 and the balance from other minor sources).

The same condition of over-taxation obtains in the Transvaal, but the effect there is less evident on account of the mining industry, providing ready money and capital. Still the productivity of the land is falling off because no one can afford artificial manures

¹ After making deductions for the revenue from native taxes, postal and telegraph services, receipts from diamond mines, rents, and other similar sources, this is said to represent the taxation per head of the white population (300,000) including as taxation a portion of the net profits on the Central South African Railway lines.

at £12 per ton, of which no less than £5 5s. is for railways and customs after the article has been landed at the coast. The excessive revenue on these accounts, so far as drawn from the people on the soil, is holding back the development of the country. About two-fifths of the farmers' income, it has been calculated, goes in contributions to railways and customs, thus maintaining the cost of food and preventing the creation of small industries. The Government view is that, if taxation is to be reduced, it is development work that must suffer as, apart from minor economies, the ordinary allowance for administration is not capable of any serious reduction. The windfall which has come to the Transvaal in the contribution from the wonderful Premier mine brings in annually £550,000 new revenue,¹ but half of this is ear-marked to pay off the Selati railway debentures. Making due allowances the general impression created on one is that there are too many officials for the present state of evolution. Something simpler, with less routine, would have been less costly and more effective. In the old days the magistrate of a district combined many functions which he was able to fulfil—connected with prisons, roads, treatment of natives. Now there are inspectors of everything, even including inspectors of "drifts"—local inspectors of police and prisons, inspectors to report on horse-breeding, stock improvements, cases of distress, and so forth *ad infinitum*. So much of this subdivision of duties is there that the magistrate becomes a superfluity; he

¹ According to the 1905-6 estimate of the Government (six-tenths) share.

can only fine up to £5, must send important cases up to a higher court, and generally has no scope for his energies. In Basutoland the few officials exercise all these functions well and cheaply.

It is impossible to pass over this part of the subject without mentioning the very strong feeling in South Africa regarding what was facetiously termed Lord Milner's *kindergarten*. Himself essentially a product of university life—the *fine fleur*, in fact—he had the strongest belief in the power for good of men trained in Oxford traditions and imbued with the special form of patriotism which is connected with our ancient scholastic foundations. That many of the men so selected to fill important administrative posts in the new colonies were young and inexperienced is undeniably true, and some of them, in ignorant zeal, proved as costly as they were inefficient. The work they were called on to do, however, did not call for any specialised training, and their youth and academic education were not so much the reason for want of success as a lack of knowledge of men, of sympathy and insight, and of other qualities which can only be acquired by experience and acquaintance with a wide circle of affairs. On the other hand, oversea-colonials placed in various positions, because of a supposed acquaintance with similar conditions, have been even less successful in winning the good opinion of the Afrianders, and there were obvious difficulties in filling up the administrative ranks in South Africa, which could only have been done from the Cape. The consideration which undoubtedly weighed most with Lord Milner

was his desire to introduce an element upon which, in a period of intrigue, stress, and confusion, he could rely as to their Imperialism and loyalty to his own ideals.

The cost of living in the Transvaal still remains abnormally high. High taxation is, of course, only one of the contributory causes, among which the chief are the cost of transport and the shipping and railway freights on imported goods, of which only a small share comes back to the Transvaal out of railway profits on its own lines, much remaining as gain to the railways of the coast colonies. Taxation, however, is the chief factor. The Customs duties, estimated this year at £1,600,000, or one-third of the whole revenue, amount to about twelve per cent. on the value of imported goods. The proportion borne by the mining industry is difficult to ascertain. The capitalist view is that in 1904 they contributed £1,345,900¹ out of a total revenue of about £4,500,000, or about thirty per cent., and that, moreover, they pay indirectly forty per cent. more through Customs, post and telegraph services, licences, stamp and transfer duties, not to mention the railway rates; in all they claim to contribute eighty per cent. of the revenue. The reduction of the former dynamite duty more than covers the profit tax on mines. The Transvaal Treasurer's opinion that a largely increased

¹ Diamond mines	£550,000
Profit tax	415,400
Base metal royalties	9,000
Licences, etc.	345,000
Foreign labour passports	26,500
	<hr/>
	£1,345,900

revenue from the mines is not to be expected in future years has been challenged, and it is asserted that the Rand has not by any means reached its limit of productivity.

It is unnecessary to retell the oft-told tale of the rise of the great gold industry which has sprung up on the Rand or to give any detailed description of it. But the chief features must be noted before giving briefly an impression of the present condition of the gold and other mineral resources of the Transvaal. We are not concerned here with the various theories current as to how the great Rand gold-field originally came into being, how the gold found its way into the sedimentary deposits in past ages; enough for our purpose that the discovery of the great deposit of conglomerate known as *banket*, consistent and persistent throughout, revolutionised the prevalent ideas of gold-mining, for till then the world had known only quartz and alluvial mining. Work on the Rand was begun in earnest only some seventeen years ago, and already the field is known to extend to sixty-one miles in length and over three miles in breadth, and can be worked to a depth of four to five thousand feet, while the output has risen to a value in 1904 of over £17,000,000, and will certainly exceed £20,000,000 in 1905.

The salient feature of the Rand *banket* formation is its consistency, which removes the gold industry from the realm of speculation and makes it an essentially "business proposition." Contrary to general opinion the formation is not abnormally rich—indeed,

it is low-grade compared with other fields—but it is sufficiently so to warrant profitable extraction and to enable steady dividends to be paid, provided the business management is highly organised in every detail. The labour involved and the appliances required to extract the gold have been reduced to a fine science and have engaged the abilities of some of the foremost mining engineers and chemists of the day, many of these Americans. The average yield on this field, which has been steadily declining for some time, is about 35s. per ton, and the mines generally are not nearly so rich as some in other countries; for instance in Queensland, Western Australia, India, the United States, or Venezuela. Under the adverse conditions in which the mines have to be worked—the difficulty and cost of labour (the wages paid to the whites are the highest in the world) and the general rate of living—they can only be worked successfully by means of a highly developed organisation utilising all scientific processes and by extreme economy in all departments. In the early days, when the boom came, a wild wave of speculation swept over Europe and an immense amount of capital found its way from the pockets of the confiding public to those of the company promoter. Undeveloped and untested properties, mines that existed frequently only in the imagination, were floated by syndicates using the reports of “mining experts” whose knowledge had been acquired largely on the race-course or in the bars of Johannesburg. The speculative period of development is entirely

passed and gold-mining has now settled down to a humdrum existence as an industry, but the manipulation of "the market" remains a feature of the situation. There is great confusion in the public mind as regards the industry—a genuine fact and a vitalising influence—and the market, open as the latter undoubtedly is to many criticisms. It is "the market" that is at the bottom of much of the public distrust of "the industry," and that distrust will continue as long as the market favours the flotation of bogus companies. The policy of the mine owners is to employ the least number of skilled white workmen earning high wages and supplying the brains, while the muscle is obtained from the Kaffirs and Chinese. The change that has come over the character of mining is illustrated by the fact that under the conditions existing fifty years ago these mines would have been worthless. The problem now is to keep on lowering the cost of production and to reduce the time within which the desired results can be obtained, so as to utilise the vast capital employed to the utmost advantage.

The probable duration of the Rand cannot be estimated with any accuracy, but the dimensions already given, which may yet be increased, open a prospect of work for an indefinite period, even with a considerably increased rate of production. The mining districts outside the Rand have been much neglected since its success was fully established, but as the great *banket* industry becomes more and more highly developed, and with the constantly decreasing yield to be gained from the average main

reef mines, a larger share of attention will be paid to the outlying districts of the Transvaal and to gold-bearing fields elsewhere, especially in Rhodesia, where speculative spirits must look for fresh openings, and indeed have already from time to time found the opportunity to repeat—*longo intervallo*—the illegitimate methods of the earlier Rand days. These fields have suffered from the fact that the energies of the great capitalists have been absorbed by the Rand, where indeed many properties are still held in reserve, to the dissatisfaction of shareholders, who fail to appreciate a policy which is sound enough from a capitalistic point of view. Gold discoveries continue to be made in various new districts of the Transvaal; but so far, although conglomerate reefs are found in various parts of the Witwatersrand formation outside the Rand, they seldom carry payable gold and in not a single case continuously. The chief of these fields are in the Heidelberg, Klerksdorp, Lydenburg, Barberton, and Murchison districts. The first has so far been a failure, notwithstanding rich patches in places, and the vision of a second Rand seems to have entirely faded away. The Klerksdorp field is not so unsuccessful, and some of its mines have in the past been worked at a profit, when the conditions were less favourable. In the Lydenburg district work has been carried on in narrow quartz veins by two companies which, notwithstanding the heavy charges incurred for transport and difficulties connected with labour, have paid dividends. In the Barberton district, the scene of early gold-pioneering,

the Sheba mine is still the main venture, the endeavours to revive the field made from time to time proving so far unsuccessful. The Murchison field, where gold occurs in quartz veins in rich patches of very small extent, is only suitable for the individual miner who can work his own five-stamp mill, and the climate is very unhealthy during the summer season, while the transport rates are excessive. The companies, controlled from London like those in Rhodesia, have done little to develop their properties.

But the mineral wealth of the Transvaal is by no means confined to gold. Coal-fields of great extent are found in various parts of the country, aiding materially towards making the gold industry profitable. The output for the year 1904 in the Transvaal was two and a half million tons and the production is increasing so rapidly that the year 1906, it is expected, may see an output of about four million tons. The coal is not of a high average quality, the calorific power being only about two-thirds of Welsh coal. The demand comes from the gold industry, railways, and Delagoa Bay for bunkering purposes, but in time there will grow up a demand for cooking purposes and for working the baser metals. Excepting Witbank (Middelburg) most of the coal is deposited in basins, and several of the East Rand collieries are already worked out. The Middelburg district has not merely the largest coal supply but is well situated with regard to Johannesburg and Delagoa Bay, and will shortly be more effectively opened by a new branch railway, reducing the distance to Johannes-

burg by twenty miles. Should the collieries round Witbank amalgamate or pool, the industry will occupy a more solid position. As the other sections of South Africa are better known than the Transvaal it is only necessary to make a passing reference to their resources in coal. In Natal coal-mining has been developed into a very important and valuable industry, and in Rhodesia coal is being mined at Wankie and is to be found in various parts of the country. A great reduction has already been effected there in the cost of working railways and mines, which has done much to help forward the general development of the country. In the Cape Colony the amount mined is trivial and the quality very inferior.

Among the surprises of which South Africa is so prolific (some of them not altogether agreeable) have been the discovery of diamonds, more especially the wonderful Premier mine which began work only three years ago. This mine, situated some twenty miles north-east of Pretoria, is the only serious rival to the De Beers combination, with which, however, if report says true, it has a working agreement preventing any injurious competition. The Transvaal Government already receives about £550,000 per annum from the Premier (the equivalent of sixty per cent. under the new diamond law), and when the permanent machinery in course of completion is in full working order the profits earned will, according to estimates, amount to no less than £2,000,000 per annum, which represents a Government income of £1,200,000 annually. The mine, it is claimed, may last for fifty years when

worked as intended. As the world's demand for diamonds shows no sign of repletion and indeed seems to grow with the increased supply, on the principle of *l'appétit vient en mangeant*, the future of this marvellous mine seems to be assured, and promises to be a great asset for the Government of the Transvaal.

Iron is found in many districts in large deposits, and much has been hoped from the presence of the metal in such quantity, combined with coal; but the exploitation of the ore, containing a large percentage of titanium, is reported to be unprofitable. So far no attempt has been made to lay the foundations of an industry, nor, in view of the character of the ore and the fierce competition from other iron-producing countries, does there seem any very brilliant prospect. Hopes are entertained of the oil shale, of which there are seams said to be equal in quality to those worked in Scotland. Copper is at present much talked of as likely to be developed on a large scale north of the Zambesi—the Tanganyika concessions are said to contain the largest and richest deposits in the world—but optimist views require to be received by the public with caution, not only on account of the remoteness of the fields and the cost of transport to the coast (there can be nothing to go the other way for a long time) but because in no branch of mining perhaps are judgment, experience, and reliability more needed than in considering copper deposits. No matter how great the deposits might prove to be it is difficult to see how these fields could compete with America or Europe, and the establishment of self-supporting

centres in South Africa itself is a will-o'-the-wisp, at least at the present stage of evolution. The water-power of the Victoria Falls will doubtless some day be utilised in various directions, possibly in connection with the copper industry, but that is not yet in sight. Meanwhile, copper ores are being worked on the border of Zululand and Natal and Namaqualand (in the Cape Colony), which already turns out £500,000 worth annually, can probably extend its present output. The attention of capital, however, is so centred on the gold and diamond mines, and on the industry (coal) auxiliary to these, that it will be a long time before the baser metals are adequately dealt with.

Notwithstanding the lack of harbours and water communication the abundance and variety of her mineral resources and potential labour supply may yet enable South Africa to overcome physical and political difficulties and start on a career as a manufacturing country.

CHAPTER XI

IMPERIALISM, CAPITALISM, AND THE LAND

It is often urged against the capitalists that they are not entitled to the great fortunes amassed or the large dividends earned by some companies, but the risks run when the future of the Rand was still uncertain must be taken into account. I myself recollect how, early in 1890, when I first visited the Rand, the future was regarded generally with grave misgivings, and the investment of capital was considered a very risky business. The men who were successful consider themselves entitled to special privileges. Contrary to general opinion, a number of these men are British or Dutch Afrianders. There is undoubtedly a bitter prejudice in South Africa, as well as in England, against the capitalists as a class—the result, to a large extent, of misunderstanding and envy, but also arising from their being almost entirely absentee and not having any permanent tie to the country.¹ Wherever I went in South Africa, among British as well as Dutch, I found the sentiment deeply rooted.

¹ It is only fair to add that there are exceptions. For instance, Sir George Farrar (whom I do not personally know) has never been an absentee and he fought through the war, only coming to England for six months' holiday after many years in South Africa. He is generally regarded as an Imperial South African Nationalist.

“Birds of passage, mainly non-British, what do they, what can they, care for our land?” was the universal cry. Now, while I do not subscribe to the wholesale abuse or distrust of the capitalist, who is represented as the incarnation of all evil—he is very human and on the whole not unlike other people—I do feel strongly that this prejudice has a sound foundation and will never be overcome so long as the men who live on South African gold do not make their homes in the country, establish ties there, and interest themselves really and thoroughly, and not by mere talk, in the land. It is all very well for some of them to use fine language about “love of the Taal” and concern for the “moral and material progress of our country,” but fine words butter no parsnips, at least in South Africa.

The dangerous side of capitalism in South Africa is that its representatives, being aliens or birds of passage, wield such inordinate power and are free from the corrective influence of a wide public opinion. It remains to be seen whether the filling up of the country and growth of subsidiary industries will enhance or decrease this potential corrective influence.

The connection of capitalism and the press, in South Africa and Europe but of course especially England, is a delicate one, but it would be absurd not to speak frankly on the subject. It has been said that the capitalists do not own certain papers, and the statement may well be perfectly correct, but that they influence or control four-fifths of the press of South Africa and influence a considerable section

of the press in Europe cannot be open to doubt. The manner in which these matters are managed is a subject on which only those in the inner circle could throw light. A thousand-and-one circumstances convince any one who remains some time in South Africa that the press is generally "solid" for capital, though of course one sees a good deal of sympathetic writing, as one hears a good deal of sympathetic talk about "the interests of the permanent industry," "the welfare of the country," and so forth. The Dutch Afrianders of course have their own papers, of which *Ons Land*, of Cape Town, *The Friend*, of Bloemfontein, and the *Volksstem* (the People's Voice), the official organ of the Dutch party in the Transvaal and a powerful influence,—are the chief.¹ The "country" papers which may still be counted as independent are very few and have little power (those which have any influence have been "salted"), and there is *The South African News*, the organ of the South African party, in opposition to the Progressives in the Cape Colony. The fundamental difference between these two parties—there are many nominal ones—is the fact that the Progressives are believed to be under capitalistic influence, Kimberley being regarded as the connecting link between Johannesburg and the Cape. The fact that several members of the present Cape Ministry are connected with De Beers lends colour to this view, which is generally held throughout South Africa. That the Prime Minister should be

¹ *The Friend* and *Volksstem* are bi-lingual, part of the policy for absorption of all sympathisers to the Nationalist cause.

the man who was chief actor in the Raid (largely engineered by capitalistic influences, unknown to many of the actors themselves) adds to the conviction and strengthens the bitter prejudices of the majority of the people.

The "more brains to the square inch" theory of Johannesburg does not seem justified on the grounds of any superior culture or intellectuality, but is certainly evidenced in superiority of organising power. One reason for the recent return to South Africa of many leading men connected with the mining industry is the realisation of the fact that the policy which had grown up of directing from London, and leaving the local business management to subordinates of no particular capacity, was not a good one. It was found that brains were still needed on the spot to work the industrial machine effectively, as well as to exercise a sufficient influence on politics. The ramifications of capitalism and the close connection of the inner circle between Johannesburg, the Chartered Company, and De Beers (from which the motive force under Rhodes originally came) need not be further laboured here. A cursory acquaintance with affairs reveals the curiously complicated, interwoven character of the connection, reaching from Johannesburg and Buluwayo to Cape Town but radiating out in many directions, to Natal, Delagoa Bay, and even to Madagascar.

A feature in the situation not usually understood is the comparative smallness of the British share in the ownership and control of the capital employed on the Rand and the magnitude of the Continental stake.

Emanating from De Beers, the industry was at first mainly British but, encouraged by Rhodes for reasons of policy, Continental capital was more and more introduced, with the result that, while this averted interference from certain quarters, the capital and control passed in an astounding degree to Germany and other Continental countries. The share of that country in Johannesburg is remarkable. Not merely is German capital largely embarked in all the British companies managed by German Jews but there are purely German houses, whose headquarters are Berlin and Hamburg, such as Goerz & Co. This feature in the situation, in connection with the presence of Germany in South-West Africa and the many interests established by individual Germans throughout the sub-continent, is one deserving the closest attention of the British people. A heavy price may yet have to be paid for the non-intervention of Germany at an earlier stage, and it remains to be seen whether she may not some day, as recommended by serious Pan-Germanic writers, openly espouse the establishment of Dutch Africanderdom, whereby first her economic and later her political interests might in their opinion be served.

The growth of Johannesburg has been phenomenal. On revisiting it in 1905 I thought of the place I had seen in 1890, and rubbed my eyes in surprise. Instead of the dirty square, the sordid hotel, with a field of wooden and tin shanties, a few brick buildings, and hardly a tree in sight on the dusty, suffocating Rand, there is now a city, hideous in itself, but with lofty American-type buildings and other "imposing" struc-

tures, offices and hotels alongside wooden and iron erections of the earlier kind, magnificent clubs, gorgeous shops, theatres, and all the paraphernalia of modern mushroom cities in new countries. No claim can be made to architectural beauty, but Johannesburg is possessed of one thing which in this erst brick-red, dust-covered veld is the greatest surprise of all—beautiful suburbs, well wooded, and plantations stretching towards the Magaliesberg, changing the landscape from one of bare hideousness to one of restful charm and even beauty. A dozen years ago there was only one house on the site of Parktown, now the fashionable suburb of Johannesburg and closely covered with residences. The suburbs stretch out great distances, and the cab-fare from the city to one of these is a costly business, 20*s.* to 25*s.* being no unusual price for a dinner engagement. The area of the municipality has increased in eight years nearly three-fold and the urban population about sixty per cent., while the ratable value of municipal land and buildings is close on £40,000,000. These brief notes are necessary to give the reader an idea of the stronghold of capitalism—Johannesburg the Golden.

I have had reason, more than once, to mention the wide gulf which appears to be fixed in South Africa between Capitalism and the Land. It has become almost a shibboleth to speak of these as rival interests, as if there was an essential incompatibility between the two main industries of the country. The division has been accentuated by the race line. The sympathies of the Dutch are all on the side of the land; and the fact of their solidarity makes it too often

forgotten that a respectable number of British Africanders are on this side too, and these, especially in the Cape Colony, the most prosperous and stable of the farming population. No one reading the history of South Africa will believe that the country would have made much progress had there been no finds of gold and diamonds. Probably the Dutch Africander element would have been perfectly satisfied without this progress, but as pastoral and back-veld States the position of the Republics would have become impossible in time, next door to powerful States and for ever threatened with black invasions which a poor farming population could not hope to cope with. The prosperity, pastoral and arcadian, of the Orange Free State is often quoted to show what can be done in South Africa without mining, but, apart from the fact that it enjoyed exceptionally wise and economical government under President Brand, it must be remembered that its prosperity was largely due to the transit trade for the mining markets that went over its railway lines, which provided over three-fourths of its revenue. Without the mineral interests which drew men north these lines, even if they could have been built at all, would have been of little value, as merely giving access to another poor pastoral State. It is, in fact, impossible for any part of South Africa to dissociate itself from participation in the results of the mineral discoveries. I have said, in the chapter on Land Settlement, that as an agricultural and pastoral country South Africa cannot compete with Australia, the Argentine, or Canada. It is

a country whose fortune had to be built up from a variety of resources, and of these the only ones of really striking possibilities were the gold and diamond industries. In other gold-bearing countries it was the finding of the precious metal in rich reefs or alluvial which brought white men in large numbers to the spot. Once there they developed other industries by degrees. In South Africa the pastoral and agricultural population preceded the diamond and gold diggers, and were far from prosperous as communities when the mineral deposits, requiring vast capital and high organisation, came to their rescue. The more one studies the question the more one is convinced that, far from being a usurper and interloper, the mining industry is the prop and stay of South African prosperity and that, although its unique character may have unduly dwarfed other promising resources of the country, yet it would have been impossible to develop them without its aid. If there were any district in South Africa which could conceivably become a wheat-growing country like the Argentine (wheat grown without expensive irrigation and with unfailing regularity), or produce wool and cattle in quality, quantity, and steadily increasing ratio like parts of Australia, then I should regard the Witwatersrand as far from an unmixed blessing, since I am fully convinced of the advantages possessed, morally and physically, by an agricultural and pastoral community over one living in the surroundings inseparable from industrial development.

Given the gold and the diamonds, however, a new

era dawned. No one is more aware than I am of the objectionable side of that era. In many cases the Africanders (of British blood) threw down their ploughs and flocked to the mines; a speculative spirit was born, cupidity was excited, and political complications of the most untoward description have been the result. The course of events has not been similar to that in other countries, for reasons already given; but the feature which differentiated the Rand from other gold diggings was not, as was generally supposed, its richness but the (comparatively) low grade of its ore. The growth of prosperous communities of individual miners, the process by which these men, full of the true pioneer spirit, became by degrees land-owners and farmers, and with their nuggets built up other industries—all this has been denied to South Africa. A vast amount of capital had to be sunk to make the Rand a paying proposition, and so the process began by which the main industry of South Africa is, with two or three exceptions, worked as an estate for the benefit of absentee landlords, a process accentuated by the locking up of vast areas of land. Africanders, in consequence, do not find themselves deriving as much direct benefit from the gold as they expected. Indirectly they owe it a great deal but, exploited by capital from outside, it naturally returns a share of its profits¹ to a similar source, and, as Lord

¹ The mines get from the earth annually 20 millions sterling: available for shareholders, $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions; direct and indirect payments to the State, including railway profits (75 per cent. of 6 millions) yearly, $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions. Actual *net* cost of working, if no taxation whatever, 11 millions, or 55 per cent. net working cost; $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. net taxation, *i.e.* contributions to the State; $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. net dividends, *i.e.* inducement to capital.

Milner clearly perceived, South Africa is benefited only by a sort of transit trade. Meanwhile the gold exported represents actual capital taken out of the country and no adequate return is made in the purchase of foodstuffs grown in the country. South Africa is, in fact, living on her capital and, whereas Australasian gold was largely distributed among the population and went to build up the wheat, wool, and meat industries, Afrianders feel that the African diamonds and precious metal are passing out of the country without increasing its permanent resources. It is not an unreasonable attitude by any means, but those who hold it frequently confuse cause with effect. The actual exploitation of gold and diamonds is essential to South Africa, which is agriculturally and pastorally poor (compared with other countries), but some features of that exploitation are, without doubt, injurious to the permanent interests of the country.

I do not see that the blame lies entirely with the capitalists who, after all, are business men bent on making a good bargain. I have always felt that the severest critic of capitalist methods would probably modify his views if he suddenly found himself, say, a director of De Beers. The industry is a legitimate one. It is worked with high intelligence, employs a large number of men, and benefits the entire country indirectly by payment of transit dues, by providing revenue, and in more indirect ways. The fact that it is controlled by a small group of men, who in different combinations repeat their organisation so as to hold the gold and diamond industry of practically the whole

sub-continent in their hands, is not in itself discreditable to them. But their policy is undoubtedly selfish, and in being selfish it is short-sighted. Rhodes was the capitalist *par excellence* ; he organised, combined, controlled, and got his last pound of flesh but, having done this, he was neither selfish nor short-sighted. He saw to it that a good proportion of the money that came out of African soil went back into it in the form of railways, experimental and model farms, improved estates, and a thousand other ways. His Imperialism, which undoubtedly was of a strongly personal and autocratic type, alienated from him the feelings of the Republican Africanders, and his political intrigues plunged him into a quagmire from which he never extricated himself ; but he was the one man who, having been instrumental in building up the capitalist industry in South Africa, tried to bridge the gulf between capital and the land, and in part succeeded. The gulf has widened more and more—it may never now be bridged—but it is not due to any inherent viciousness on the part of capitalists, to any circumstances inseparable from the gold industry, or to any essential incompatibility of temper between two industries which ought to be happily married. The first fatal mistake was made, largely through ignorance in the beginning, by the South African Republic under Paul Krüger. He not only permitted but encouraged the enactment of gold laws and land laws which placed unbridled power in the hands of the capitalists, and tried to get back his own by oppression and taxation. The second mistake is made by the capitalists

themselves—again with two or three exceptions—and is also perhaps the result of ignorance, but also of a lack of imagination. They do not know South Africa—only Johannesburg. They are not Afriander in spirit, they are *nouveaux riches*, they are too confident of their own position as controlling such grand resources and pulling so many strings. Not being, by any means, all British they do not take Imperial interests into consideration. It is notorious that many did not desire the British flag over them. Therefore they go on their way to a great extent without thought of the future and are earning the undying dislike and suspicion of the permanent population of South Africa. Much would be forgiven them if, as already said, more of them would spend money in the country, not only on fine houses in Johannesburg but on such beneficial schemes as those of Rhodes. But this is not enough. Their use of political machinery is too obviously selfish. Why do not diamonds pay adequate taxation in the Cape Colony? A contribution through the income tax can hardly be considered an adequate share. The incidence of gold taxation in the Transvaal is another patent illustration. At present it is collected not directly on output, but on claims, registration, and (since 1895) on a percentage tax on profits. The whole system is too complicated for detailed discussion here but, briefly, the taxation is so arranged as to fall most heavily on the initial stages of mine development and to bear unfavourably on poor districts and practically exclude all but large corporations. One of the most unfair points is the privilege obtained by “owners of

farms" (who may be, and often are, financial corporations) on account of "cultivation." The result is a loss to the exchequer, while the small tax paid on this reserved land enables the corporation to hold it up indefinitely and squeeze out the individual claim-owner. Many mining lands which have never been worked at all continue to pay such revenue yearly, the owners holding on in the hope of future enhancement of values.

These are only the briefest and least technical notes on a very complex subject which will come up before the Representative Legislature. Undoubtedly there will be changes made, and the "return to the Rand" indicates that the capitalist does not intend to be unrepresented. Will he show himself fair and just in considering the welfare of the whole country and the equitable distribution of the wealth gained from natural resources, or will he exercise his power to maintain his own privileges at the expense of the rest of the community? If he chooses the latter course the gulf between capital and the land will never be bridged.

There are two conflicting pictures of what may be the future of South Africa. On the one hand we see the mines worked out, Johannesburg an unpicturesque ruin (remember Zimbabwe!), the Boer triumphant, feeding his flocks and bossing the niggers on his farm, the British element engulfed or eradicated. On the other we have the optimist view of a country in which the mines feed the land and the land feeds the mines. Both prosper together, race feud is for-

gotten in prosperity, and the whole country—irrigated, afforested, cultivated, with prosperous cities and smiling farms—becomes a great and happy nation. The first picture, if ever realised, can only be so at a date too far distant to exercise our emotions in these days of short views. The second, despite exaggeration, is not, I believe, unattainable if—the great If—a number of conditions can be fulfilled which I will not save the reader the trouble of supplying for himself by summarising the foregoing pages of this book. But *if* the capitalist does not descend from his platform, does not become Africander in spirit, does not cultivate sympathy and imagination, the picture will never be realised. He may continue to wring wealth from the rocks, but he will see the clouds of political and racial dissension gather more and more darkly round him, till he is at length fighting, back to wall, against numerical odds which cannot be eternally “jerry-mandered” or “salted.”

What part does Imperialism play in all this? The Dutch Africander believes it to be for practical purposes at one with Capital. Plain speaking is best. Imperialism is a new-born babe, and is having a hard tussle for life in South Africa. The Dutch and even many British are in spirit Republican, and, although the latter showed loyalty and devotion to the flag, their feeling for it is second to their love for their adopted country, while the Dutch are obstinately opposed to any form of British domination, on grounds of principle. There remains the non-Africander element, Johannesburg the alien, which by holding prosperity

in the hollow of its hand could paralyse all efforts to make the new era of Imperialism one of progress and contentment.

Even to suppose it capable of such a course is a strong argument as to capitalistic selfishness, I hear some one say, but business is business and it is too much to pretend that the prosperity of a great industry will not benefit the whole country ultimately. Here is the essence of the Milnerian policy. In three years he straightened out a tangled coil so that the country which was a chaos had resumed its normal life, was beginning to grow in many ways, and had the solid foundations for future self-government. This was done in the spirit and in the name of Imperialism. It might, say critics, have been better done in the spirit of Africanderdom. In a later chapter I shall endeavour to define that spirit and to show why supreme difficulties existed in the way of such a course. It is easy to find fault; mistakes were made from ignorance, from haste, from temperamental disabilities and from misrepresentation. The man who never made a mistake never made anything, and Lord Milner can never suffer from that criticism, since his constructive work has covered the new colonies with schools, roads, and railroads, and established law and order, besides many other beneficial works. His Imperialist bias is shown in this, that he endeavoured to make the country British in the spirit of its institutions, but more especially in the design attributed to him, although never publicly acknowledged, of working to secure a British pre-

ponderance in the Transvaal as an offset to the Dutch. It was this which gained him the enmity of the Dutch, and which also roused distrust in many British Africanders. He trod on Republican susceptibilities. The action of Lord Milner in backing the demand for Chinese labour is frequently spoken of as the capitulation of Imperialism to Capital.¹ I make no pronouncement on this point. I merely ask how it was possible to develop the new colonies without the mines, and how the mines could be worked without the capitalists. The latter made a good bargain, undoubtedly, but Lord Milner acted for the welfare of the whole of South Africa in considering the interest of her predominant and indispensable industry.

The Johannesburg element which was loudest in its outcries against Krüger was bitterest in its denunciation of Milner, but this element was not the capitalistic one. Already Capital and Labour are at variance in the Golden City, and it is the democratic faction which, finding itself more in keeping with the Dutch Africander than with the Imperialist factor, allied itself for a time

¹ The practical side of the Milnerian policy, as regards the mining industry, was and is based on what he himself called the theory of the "over-spill." In public speeches he laid this down fearlessly, that the mining industry must not be checked—shareholders must get fair profits—but with this in view the State must take from the mining wealth, by all the various channels of taxation, as much as the mining industry can bear. This he called the "over-spill," to be used to develop the country and to give it, out of revenue and not by loans or by pledging the future, the "plant" of a civilised and progressive State. As noted already, from every £20,000,000 dug from the mines barely £4,500,000 is available for shareholders; the rest goes in wages and in taxation (direct and indirect) to the State, and the taxation borne by the mining employés is in fact borne by the mines in the form of higher wages.

to *Het Volk* and the Responsible party. A marked feature in the growth of the Labour party, not only in Johannesburg but in all the seaport towns, has been the influence of Australians, many of whom came over during or just after the war. Grave misgivings have been felt as to the growth of this influence, and the temporary alliance between Labour leaders and *Het Volk* opened a vista of untoward possibilities to those who realise the bond of Republicanism between these two widely different factors in political life. It is only just to the Labour party to say that there is a leaven of British origin and sympathies which is by no means favourable to the Australian propaganda. The aims of these three components in one of the strangest of political combinations are diametrically opposed to each other. Their common platform is anti-Imperialist and anti-Capitalist. Now, apart from high officials who come and go, the Imperialist faction in South Africa is small. I have said that the prevalent feeling is for Republicanism. But capital has thrown in its lot with Imperialism, partly as a counterpoise to the racial predominance and partly also because the Capitalist party has contained some men of really wide views and ambitions, like Cecil Rhodes. The combination is not necessarily an unholy one and, having regard to the racial question, is not unnatural. Capital is always in every country on the side of law, order, and progress.

Where in all this medley do the true interests of the country come in? What are to be the plain man's politics, who is neither Rand millionaire, Labour agitator, Republican, nor Bondsman, but just an honest

Africander? He is told that capitalists are robbing the land and defiling its politics; that Imperialism is a cloak for interference from Downing Street, for pampering the natives and flooding the country with Asiatics, for autocratic rule and further capitalist aggression; that the Bond and the Dutch generally are intriguing to turn the tables on the British and make South Africa a Dutch-speaking, Dutch-dominated confederacy of would-be independent States, which would "cut the painter"; and among all this general dirt-throwing he looks sorrowfully back to a time when he and the country were poorer but there was more peace. South Africa, he says, is perishing from too much politics and his cry as a rule is, "Oh, do let us alone!"

Well, as long as there is any strength left in race-feeling these conflicting elements cannot be laid but, if Africanders had only a wider conception of their common future, a platform might be found on which all could combine to bring order out of chaos. If the capitalist were less selfish, the Imperialist more sympathetic, the farmers more progressive and open to ideas, the religious world less given to bigotry, the British and Dutch alike less prejudiced and with a more enlightened patriotism for their great country—and if, failing all these moral improvements, they were all a little more practical in trying to promote the general, and not the sectional, interests of the country—then we might hope, not for the millennium but for some measure of that happiness and prosperity for this beautiful country which she might reasonably expect to see.

Part III —On the Knees of the Gods

CHAPTER I

NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

IT is only natural that, in examining the conditions of South Africa and estimating the forces which will mould her future, frequent comparisons should be made between this portion of the Empire and two of the other sections which are already self-governing. And yet, unless we remember the fundamental conditions which differentiate South Africa from Australasia or Canada, these comparisons may well be misleading. No parallel can safely be drawn, for instance, between Australia, a continent sparsely inhabited on the coast line by a white race (the natives being a negligible quantity) and South Africa, with its heart at the centre of a region ringed round with a black population. Again, the similarity of conditions between Canada and South Africa in possessing a conquered white population of extreme racial tenacity is discounted by the fact that, whereas the French are concentrated almost entirely in one province of the Dominion, the Dutch are scattered throughout British South Africa. There is no necessity to elaborate these distinctions. The paramount importance of the Black

Problem is enough in itself to render the conditions of South African development entirely different from, and in a sense independent of, the evolution of the two great oversea possessions, which seem to be regarded by some people as the only possible precedents and models.

The constitutional development of the South African colonies must, nevertheless, follow certain conventional lines, and by reason of the pressure from within will show its distinct character more in the spirit than in the form of government. In the next chapter, the "Spirit of Africanderland," I shall trace some of the moulding influences at work to produce this effect, but at present we must turn to the less speculative side of the question.

There is some popular misconception as to how South Africa is governed at present. Briefly it is a group of colonies and dependencies presenting almost every form of government from that of full local responsibility to entire dependence on the Crown. Cape Colony and Natal have full responsible government, their Governors, appointed by the Crown and responsible only to it, being, in fact, only the heads of the Executive as far as the colonies are concerned. Each colony, moreover, has certain native territories dependent on it: British Bechuanaland, Pondoland, East Griqualand, and the Transkei on the Cape; Zululand, Gazaland, and Amatongaland on Natal. The Governor of Natal is supreme chief of Zululand, which gives him a special position as regards the natives there. The Transvaal and Orange River Colonies are

at present (1905) Crown colonies, but are on the eve of a representative system which is to be the stepping-stone to full responsibility.¹ Rhodesia is not a colony, although there appears to be a popular superstition that it is, as shown by the prevalent idea that it comes within the Imperial penny postage system. The Administrator is Paramount Chief of all natives, and is supreme both in the executive and administrative departments subject to the control of the Board in London, the High Commissioner exercising a sort of superior power over ordinances which practically amounts only to the right of veto. There remain the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Basutoland, and Swaziland under the direct administration of the High Commissioner, though the last is under the Transvaal Government for financial and judicial purposes. The native chiefs enjoy considerable discretionary powers, and the system resembles that of the protected native states of India. The High Commissioner is thus seen to occupy an important but anomalous position as the viceroy (practically) of the native territories of South Africa, and in a minor degree of Rhodesia. He is also (incidentally and not essentially) governor of the Transvaal and Orange River colonies. But he has no authority whatever in the Cape or Natal or over the native territories dependent on them, and as High Commissioner he has actually no functions even in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. The combination of the offices of Colonial Governor and

¹ See Part II., Chapter V., for a discussion of parties in the new colonies.

High Commissioner in the person of one man has been the result of political exigencies, and the powerful personality of Lord Milner gave a prestige to the latter office which is not inherent in the functions actually vested in it. It is frequently contended in South Africa that the High Commissioner should not be identified with the interests of any one colony, if he is to promote impartially the welfare of the whole sub-continent. The real difficulty of the situation, however, lies in the necessity for providing an official of sufficient status as the intermediary between the Crown and its native dependencies or protectorates, and with the growth of responsible governments and the increasing complexity of the political and social problems it becomes more and more evident that the system inaugurated at the Cape, whereby the Governor nominated by the Crown for one of the self-governing colonies should ex-officio have another set of much more important functions, is not compatible with the needs of the present situation. The inter-colonial jealousy aroused by this state of affairs is another argument in its disfavour.

We are, however, bound to look forward to great changes in the whole system. The most striking feature of the last half century has been the growth of Nationalism in the countries which we have been accustomed to call colonies. It becomes increasingly evident that the colonial period is not to be perpetuated in any country where a white race can be reared. Observe that I do not say "a white man's country." Queensland is not a white man's country, but Queens-

land, in conjunction with the rest of Australia, has passed out of the colonial stage, and the arguments I have advanced against regarding South Africa as a white man's country do not preclude a similar development. We have begun already to recognise a distinct Australian or Canadian type, and to realise that physical modifications are taking place in those of our race who are perpetuating themselves overseas. We ought not therefore to be astonished by the consciousness, which seems to be bursting like a revelation on some of us, that a sense of their own distinctive nationality has dawned on these people themselves. They have been especially stimulated by the American example, perhaps without due regard to the historical evolution of the United States, but still with a genuine ambition to achieve a similar success in founding great English-speaking nations. A great deal of misunderstanding has arisen between the mother and daughter countries over this rise of distinctive national feeling. The much abused word "loyalty" has been used with more zeal than discretion, and the result has been too often to mistake a blatant Jingoism for Imperialism and to discredit people who have the root of the matter in them. For the only true patriotism is that of the native-born. Beyond his love for the country of his birth he may feel the keenest sense of kinship for the cradle of his race and pride in his descent and history. These are his heritage; England is the land to which he turns for many of his national ideals; but if, as said a distinguished Africander, he does not love South Africa

which he has seen, how shall he love England which he has not seen? I have always felt and maintained that for Canadians, Australians, and Africanders alike the country of their birth must stand first and the Empire second, and this conscious identification of themselves with the country they occupy is an inevitable part of the evolution of a free people. When, as in the case of French Canadians and Boers, Great Britain is neither the homeland nor the source of national idealism, it is inevitable that the land of his birth should occupy an even larger share of the horizon of the native-born; but, even so, there are two circumstances which affect favourably his attitude towards the Empire. First, he is conscious, despite every asseveration to the contrary, that the connection with Great Britain will assist his national progress, and this has been driven home to French Canadians by the presence of the huge "melting-pot" of the United States on their borders. Second, in the development of colonial nationality a constantly reinforced British element is at work leavening the lump.

The American colonies revolted when as yet there was no American nation or type, and while fundamental disunion existed between the various States. Their revolt was against the unconstitutional aggressions of a monarch who was alien to the British people in ideas as well as in blood, and they did not achieve nationality in the true sense of the word until after the Civil War. It is obvious that a very different state of affairs now exists as regards the daughter States of Britain, and one striking instance is the fact that the mother-

country has actually pushed on the work of developing nationality within the constitutional borders of her colonies. As in the case of Lord Carnarvon in South Africa, Earl Grey was the unsuccessful pioneer of federation in Australia, while Canada owed its form of federal government largely to Lord Durham.

While there existed only groups of self-governing colonies, often with antagonistic interests or divergent ideas as to those interests, no real sense of nationality could arise, distinct from that of British origin and kinship; but in the case of Canada and Australia a common danger has greatly accelerated the pace at which national consciousness has developed. The constant pressure of the United States (particularly after the Civil War had settled internal problems for a time and left the North expansive and jubilant) was the cement which made all forces combine in Canada and over-rode the racial difficulty of the French population; at a much more recent date the appearance of France and Germany in the Pacific and later the rise of Japan have given an immense impetus to the consolidation of the Australian colonies, despite conflicting interests.

The results of this growth of national feeling which are most evident to the average Englishman are somewhat misleading. He is aware that Canada and Australia enjoy full and free self-government, and that the Crown retains merely the right to regulate their foreign relations. He cannot understand the independence of their attitude, however, when he sees how many of the advantages of belonging to the Empire

they are prepared to share without taking an adequate part of its burden. The question of defence must remain a fundamental one, and at first sight the attitude of the oversea dominions is selfish and short-sighted ; but if due allowance is made for their feelings *as nations* we may be able to understand them better. No mere monetary contribution on their part, such as is already given by several colonies, would give them a sense of real proprietorship in the navy, which is, and must remain, an Imperial navy. The alternative (which is recommended by the fact that it seems consistent with the growing spirit of Nationalism) is that of colonial navies, which would, in fact, be squadrons concerned with coast defence and releasing Imperial ships from that duty. The argument of the inefficiency of such navies is based on the presumption that they would be separate or independent, which is not, however, an essential part of the scheme. The experience gained, during training, by the officers of the colonial fleets would broaden their view of naval strategy and would lead to an increasing desire for co-operation in the interests of efficiency. The formation of an effective Canadian militia is a first step towards solving the problem of land defences, and it is to be hoped that the Canadians will look far enough ahead to aim at making co-operation with Imperial troops possible in case of need. Some experience in organising and paying for these two arms of defence will be invaluable to Canadians and Australians alike in developing a sense of responsibility naturally lacking in young countries. They have

admirable material on which to draw, and should be able to form efficient if small forces. It must be recognised, however (and is already recognised in some of the colonies), that such local defences would not, for some time, to any appreciable degree lighten the Imperial burden, and that the real safety of every part of the Empire will continue to depend on the efficiency of the Imperial forces, especially the supremacy of her navy.

I have dwelt upon the question of defence because no congeries of states or group of colonies, however closely federated or independent, can lay claim to a national spirit or follow out a national destiny until they are organised for defence. South Africa, not yet federated for administrative purposes, much less defence, has a considerable distance to travel before she reaches the national stage. It may be argued that she will not have the necessity for defence so long as she is united within herself, but this is an old, out-of-date argument. The United States used it, and they are now building up a strong navy. No country is safe unless it is strong. Moreover the future of South Africa must be peculiarly dependent on sea-power.

As to commercial union as a prelude to colonial federation it must be observed that this question was one of the most burning in Australia, and the Commonwealth arose almost in the teeth of (supposed) conflicting interests. I do not regard the rivalries between the coast and inland colonies of South Africa as more serious than these, and indeed they have been partially met by the already existing customs union, while the

uniformity of gauge of the South African railways is another circumstance which compares favourably with the diversity found in the Commonwealth.

As regards the unity for administrative purposes of the white races of South Africa, I believe the obstacles to federation are by no means insuperable. When the four principal colonies have full responsible government the race line between British and Dutch will for a time coincide with that between political parties ; but this state of affairs cannot be permanent. In a short time, if the cause of Dutch nationalism triumphs, or a longer time, if the British element holds its own ("Time is with us," said Lord Milner), an Afrikaner nation will begin to develop and national will supersede colonial interests ; but the force and direction of this development cannot be computed by that of any of its sister nations.

The destiny of South Africa is no clear one, to be carved out by strong white hands and keen Teutonic brains. It is overshadowed at every turn by the portentous Black Cloud, whose influence is making itself felt in every phase. The common danger which should bind Afrikaners together comes not from without but from within, and is a thousandfold more pressing than the possibility of foreign invasion.

The common tendency of young states is towards democracy and, in distinction to the older countries, a young democracy is in some ways intensely conservative, the true heir of the old Tory party. Revolutionary Socialism has no hold either over the colonial nations or in the United States, because the distinctions between

the Haves and the Have-nots are so much less marked, and because every democrat is, or may be, a property-owner. State Socialism, on the contrary, is highly developed in all advanced democracies, though some parts of Europe are very little behind in this respect. But State Socialism is, in reality, an illogical outcome of democratic principles, since it aims chiefly at the obliteration of the individual factor in favour of the masses. It is essentially a doctrine only to be safely practised by a self-governing, self-taxing people.

It seems unlikely that the South African colonies will develop on these familiar lines. There are reasons (discussed more fully in the next chapter) why the spirit of *Africanderland* is not as essentially democratic as the spirit of the Canadian or Australian communities. It becomes, therefore, more difficult to predict the form in which the *Africander* colonies will eventually attain federation, and the difficulty lies, as I have indicated, not so much in the white racial situation as in the great problem of adjusting the Black population to any system of non-Imperial government.

The unification of South Africa for administrative purposes under a Federal government would involve a levelling, both up and down, in the political status of the Black races. This question was discussed in Chapter V. (Part I.), when we reached the point that a permanent form of control under non-political heads is an essential feature, and one which has been squared with democratic theories in other countries. Many *Africanders*—practically all the thoughtful and enlightened men—would subscribe to this suggestion.

The only scheme, however, which has been ventilated puts this permanent department under democratic control, either in the form of bureaus in each colony or as a great central bureau under Federal auspices. A method of governing subject races similar in principle to the latter can be studied to-day in the United States, and has proved open to many objections. The root of these is the fundamental fact that no form of democratic government is really adapted for the control of subject races.¹ It must never be forgotten that the subject races, whether in Africa or Asia, have the most deeply-rooted prejudice in favour of paternal rule and have never evolved a representative, much less a democratic, theory of government. Just so far as democracy attains its highest ideal in our eyes it becomes to them formless and ineffective.

The great majority of the South African natives are living under autocratic and paternal rule, as represented by a chain of headmen, chiefs, and officials, up to the High Commissioner (or the Natal Governor) as representative of the King. No scheme for the better government of such natives as are actually living in colonial territory should leave out of account the homogeneity of the Bantu races, and the fact that political divisions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of amalgamation. It is madness to treat one section of the race on principles which we are

¹ This assertion must be left here unsupported by facts, space not permitting discussion which, however, can be found in the author's *Mastery of the Pacific and Greater America*.

not prepared to extend to all. In detail the position of the native must vary, according to his circumstances and stage of civilisation, but it is of the most vital importance that there should be unity of principle on clearly defined lines. In accomplishing this unification it would, I believe, be highly prejudicial to disturb any of the native territories in the system of paternal rule which they at present enjoy. This system, it must be remembered, embraces the vast majority of the people. For this reason the establishment of colonial bureaus, however permanent and efficient, does not seem to provide a solution of the problem and might saddle the colonial governments with a number of difficulties. The Federal bureau meets some of these objections but not all. Unless its President was the Federal Governor appointed by the King the connecting link which is of so much moral value in ruling the natives would be lost ; but the Federal Governor would be a temporary official and might well find himself out of sympathy with colonial native policy. The great objection, however, lies in the question of defence. If the Imperial control were entirely removed, and an Africander Federal Government superseded it, the Federal Bureau would find itself at times in the awkward predicament of having no means at its command of enforcing a policy.

My own suggestion is thrown out with due deference to Africander opinion. My observations in various parts of the world lead me to believe that, imperfect as is the Imperial method of governing subject races, it has proved so far the best yet devised.

I know that it is the admiration of our continental neighbours, and that the United States, after an effort to evolve a brand-new system, are gradually assimilating their own methods to it. I have observed, moreover, that the man trained in the Imperial school is on the whole the most successful in dealing with native peoples. In the future development of the Empire I see many possibilities for the younger nations. I recognise their virility and superiority in some respects over the mother-race. But it does not seem certain that they are better fitted, as independent states or even federations, to deal with the problem of governing subject races than are we, who have, at all events, the advantage of experience. If, however, we look forward to a real Empire, organically united, we may imagine a more excellent way. A Great Central Council, on which all nations within the empire would meet on terms of equality, would be the arbiter of destiny to the subject races, just as it would decide all questions of Imperial policy. If such an Imperial Council existed we should not speak of the Black Problem as a purely "Africander affair"; it would take its true place as a wide Imperial issue without hurting Africander susceptibilities and without interfering with the paternal system of government by delegation.

There is one question on which, in connection with the subject of federation, no language can be too emphatic. If South Africa is ever to achieve nationality or unity her boundary must be the Zambesi. The movement towards equatorial Africa, involving a series

of entirely different problems connected with tropical forms of government, must be stopped. There are a few fine spots in East Africa, but can any man believe that these are worth the expenditure of life and treasure necessary to secure them to the Empire? In an insensate attempt to create a second—far inferior—India in the African wilds, we have taken over vast territories, and are administering them in the teeth of great difficulties and with indifferent success. This is an Imperial question and open to differences of opinion, but from the Africander point of view there is no doubt that the interests of the sub-continent will suffer as a whole if any attempt is made to tack these vast tropical territories, densely populated with blacks, on to the healthy sub-tropical region where the white man can live and breed. I have referred elsewhere to the spread of Islam, and a glance at a recent map of religions will give a powerful argument in favour of drawing a strict limit to our South African expansion, but on the other hand we might with advantage extend our influence, by friendly arrangement, over German South-west Africa so as to consolidate our position. We want the gates of East and West—the German and Portuguese outlets to Africanderland—and to obtain these, for fair equivalents elsewhere, ought not to be beyond our powers as an Empire with so many things in hand wherewith to bargain.

CHAPTER II

THE SPIRIT OF AFRICANDERLAND

IT is one thing to describe political machinery, racial traits, or geographical conditions—these are but dry bones—but when I come to that elusive, magical, nameless something which I have called the spirit of Africanderland, I feel inclined to lay down the pen in despair. For the spirit of this great sub-continent is not one but many, and in its various phases it has successfully eluded some of the ablest writers of the time. We have only one South African classic, the *Story of an African Farm*, and that gave only a vignette of the Karoo and was as unsuccessful in drawing the distinctive Africander type as it was marvellously accurate in catching the spirit of the wild bare country. Even the mere local colour, however, has eluded many picturesque writers, and Rudyard Kipling, who can bring the crowded East before us, and give the voice of the ocean in a few jingling lines, has failed to catch and imprison the sounds and colours of South Africa in his magical words.

The Africander is as incapable to define this spirit as any outsider, and he is averse to self-communings, to probings of the unseen, or to the many inquisitive processes in which we, in our desire to find the springs that move him, are inclined to indulge. There is a spirit of inertia in the land, a lotus-eating tendency, not confined to any race or any region. Nothing more antagonistic to the American spirit of keenness and hurry can be imagined, and the Australian or Canadian who models himself on the American type and wants to "hustle" the Africander is intensely disliked. Then there is that sense of class distinction which is inevitable in a country with a subject race. The Africander is very proud. But above all there is the sense of space, the physical luxuriance which comes of the sun-bathed climate, and the freedom from convention which, to a more sophisticated eye, sometimes seems to result almost in animalism.

Here I must do tardy justice to the British-descended Africander, who seems to me to show some of the finest physical developments of our race. These men came of good stock, such stock as the United Kingdom, no longer an agricultural country, cannot produce now except in the favoured upper classes.

The Africander spirit in social life makes for restraint, reserve, and many of the qualities we are accustomed to attribute to good-breeding. The self-assertion of the average democratic scion of the "younger nations" (which is peculiarly identified with the Americans) is lacking, as is also that frank

exposition of their own feelings which the bigoted Englishman condemns as "bad form." In these respects the Africander frequently compares favourably with the recent immigrants to his country. Nevertheless, life is not characterised by such a bright, cheerful, optimistic spirit as is found in Canada or Australia. The optimism of the Africander is too often the result of the gambler's belief in a lucky turn of Fortune's wheel, and is not the outward manifestation of sheer light-heartedness. The social life among the old population, British and Dutch alike, is more formal, less familiar, and even among the young people there is little fun and frolic compared to what the boys and girls of other colonial communities manage to get for themselves, while the urban society, as it becomes sophisticated, hankers too much after the social conventions of Europe.

In the new colonies a transition period is now being lived through. On the one hand we have the ancient pastoral class, the narrow range of interests and the stern materialistic creed. Political ideals in this class are reactionary in twentieth century eyes, for the remnants of a sort of feudal system linger among the old trekking families, whose conceptions of enlightened government scarcely reach beyond an oligarchical, or perhaps a monarchical, system in which the doctrine of divine right is vaguely recognised. This is the old order of *veld boer*, who is passing away before improved communications and education. His blood-cousin may be a man of the new school, representative of a growing class which recognises the intellectual and

material backwardness of his race as a whole and pushes forward on the path of progress. Education is the most potent factor in his development. The educated Africander is not to be described in general terms, since he must vary immensely with the circumstances of his birth and upbringing ; but some curious developments of the Boer type under European educative influences have been revealed, and in particular the keen judicial trend of his mind and a curious faculty of adaptiveness which is not in accordance with his traditional character.

Whether or no the levelling effects of education in bringing all Africanders intellectually into line will ultimately make a democratic basis of society possible it is too early to say. At present the trend of feeling is more republican than democratic, a distinction which can only be appreciated by those who have studied the early history of the United States. The Fathers of American Independence were not only mistrustful of the democratic principles of which they could only see the germs, but they endeavoured to frame a constitution which would guard against them, and so left a legacy which it has sorely taxed the American democracy to keep intact. The republican spirit is naturally strongest in the Dutch population, who have no sentimental attachment to the monarchy and not sufficient knowledge of world affairs to perceive its utility, but among British Africanders there is also a strong disposition in the same direction. It is often noticed that the immigrant classes have no "Africander spirit" for a few years

but then become (in popular British parlance) "worse than the Boers." Nevertheless, it must be clearly recognised that this trend of feeling is directly fed by the Nationalist propaganda of the Dutch Afrianders, and that it is to their influence that the republican ideal can be traced. The broader view of Nationalism urged by the more advanced school has not as yet displaced that old and cherished ideal of a group of allied republics, and in this respect the spirit of Africanderland is opposed to a true organic federation of its component States, and still more must fail to rise to the conception of federation within the Empire.

No discussion, however inadequate, of this subject can be closed without a reference to the Imperial stakes at issue. The Afriander spirit will mould an Afriander nation, and that nation will enjoy in South Africa the rights of the free and native-born. But the future of South Africa cannot be dissociated from that of Great Britain, and in this respect she differs in degree from Canada or Australasia. As a strategic position the Cape is a vital necessity to the Power which holds India, and is of the greatest importance to an Empire which includes Australasia and many tropical possessions in the Far East. We no longer regard the possession of an isolated naval base as sufficient for these particular needs, and if we must have a *hinterland* it will be difficult to say where that *hinterland* shall stop, short of the Zambesi. These facts and the presence of the native population, which will always need Imperial control in some form, are the

unalterable circumstances which should bind South Africa to the United Kingdom.

The bond may be weakened ; the Empire may fall to pieces ; England may return to her position as an island kingdom. There are many prophets who see this future looming before us. There are others who say that we should find safety in urging our oversea dominions along the path of national independence, and then make alliances with them, being content to sink our Imperial prerogatives for this. The school which, Cassandra-like, predicts the lopping off of limbs till only the parent-stem is left, is now less numerous, and has been succeeded by one which prates, in season and out of season, of "colonial loyalty." Space forbids that I should categorise these various phases of a much-debated question, but before closing this chapter on the Africander spirit let me, at least, give testimony of the faith that is in me of the Imperial spirit. This, after all, must be the guiding factor in the national life of forty-three millions, to whom the twelve millions over-seas look, and must continue to look for the basis of their own national life—safety to pursue the paths of progress.

The Imperial spirit denies that the energy of our people is spent. One daughter-nation is now asking for fresh blood from our ancient stock, being almost stagnant herself. Into the other great young nation, itself full of virility, we are pouring a steady stream of immigration, such as in earlier years went to fill up the waste spaces of the neighbouring republic. Both they and the Africander nation that is to be must look to

our Imperial navy to keep the paths of the ocean open to them.

Although we have in our midst all the terrible problems incident on an ancient civilisation, we have still many elements of power. Nor has our industrial development necessarily reached its zenith, although we have now to face a competition whose absence in the earlier periods of our history made us, perhaps, too carelessly sure of our supremacy. We are enormously rich—too rich, perhaps—but we shall need our riches in the time to come. The problem before us, is not how to retain our oversea dominions nor how to win the allegiance of colonies—there is no satisfactory answer to that question—but how to continue to progress in our national life. Our progress must be no one-sided thing ; defence, education, commercial organization—every branch of the national life must by degrees be placed on a sounder footing, and my great hope that this may be eventually accomplished lies in the awakening patriotism and increasing perception of the Imperial spirit which, despite all mistakes and misconceptions, I believe I can see in my countrymen. The heart of the Empire beats in this city of London, and beats strongly. Nevertheless the organic unity of the Empire can only be accomplished if we fully acknowledge the national aspirations of our kinsmen and gradually admit them to an equal voice in Imperial affairs. But we shall achieve no measure of unity, shall progress no further in our Imperial development unless the heart of the Empire remains sound. In retaining our vigour and developing our patriotism

we provide the best guarantees for the willing co-operation of the younger nations in a real Imperial union. The United Empire cannot be built in a day; it must grow link by link, for to rashly reconstruct our relations on a new model, or to force development in any way, might at the present immature stage of colonial nationalism sound the death-knell of Empire.

Africanders who read this book, have patience with a point of view which is not wholly Africander, for it is as part of a world-empire that your truest and freest destiny can be worked out.



APPENDIX

WHEN the Great Trek took place, in 1836, the emigrant farmers took with them not only the Bible, but their Church forms, and a sense of allegiance to their mother Church and the Cape Synod. For twelve years, however, they were without the ministrations of any qualified clergyman save those of the Rev. Mr. Lindley, of Natal, who visited the southern portion of the country that was to become the Transvaal. The first attempt of the emigrants towards founding a settled Government was made in 1844. Although this was only eight years after the Great Trek began they had lived through a wonderful amount of history in that time, had struggled upwards and eastwards to the coast of Natal, and, finding that even then they could not secure independence from Britain, the more determined spirits had made their way west over the mountains and founded Winberg and Potchefstroom, the latter place being the centre of the first attempt at government. The thirty-three articles then drawn up, although not accepted by all the districts, show the importance attached to Church matters, for no political rights were granted to any save members of the Dutch Reformed Church. Soon after this the Cape Synod sent missionaries to visit the emigrant farmers, but already the question of independence in ecclesiastical as well as political matters was agitating the farmers in the intervals of their deadly struggles with natives.

Fresh laws were enacted in the districts north of the Vaal in 1853 which show some moderation of religious zeal, the franchise being allowed to persons of any Protestant creed, though only those of the

Dutch Reformed Church could hold Government office. In this year a general meeting of the consistories was convened at Rustenberg, presided over by a missionary from Holland, Mr. Van der Hoff, at that time the only minister resident north of the Vaal. Owing largely to his influence it was decided that the local Church Synod should be independent of the Cape, that no other religious body should be permitted to build places of worship, and that a tax for Church purposes should be levied. Potchefstroom and Pretoria were in sympathy with this decision, and in favour of a political system of district governments, allied rather than united, while Lydenberg and the district of Utrecht (now in Natal) declined to accept either the political or ecclesiastical decision. Thus began that conflict between the eastern and western districts which actually led to civil war and the shedding of burghers' blood by burghers before the differences could be adjusted, as they were by the diplomacy of Paul Krüger. In the Orange Free State, in 1854, the Dutch Reformed Church was declared the State Church, but no restrictions were placed on other creeds. A couple of years later another meeting was held at Potchefstroom, in which the position of the Dutch Reformed Church as the Church of the Transvaal was laid down and defined, the Synod of Dordrecht being taken as the standard. Though liberty of conscience was proclaimed, no other ecclesiastical authority than that of the Transvaal Synod was acknowledged, no other churches were to be built, and no equality of coloured people was to be admitted in Church or State. Parts of this constitution were indignantly repudiated by Lydenberg and Zoutpansberg, and the republic of Lydenberg, whose Church owned allegiance to the Cape Synod, was declared.

A few years later another general Church Assembly met at Potchefstroom, at which Lydenberg and Zoutpansberg as well as the Orange Free State and Cape

Colony were represented, the majority of the ministers at the conference being Hollanders. It was decided to unite the Churches, and to arrange confirmation of credentials by the Cape Synod. A similar resolution was arrived at in Pretoria, where another assembly was held, but at this period a secession took place resembling that of the Free Church from the United Free Church of Scotland. This was headed by a young missionary named Postma from the Separatist Church in Holland, who had taken charge of a congregation at Rustenberg; he had been only about a year in the country but had met with much support. The particular feature of the dissenting body which he represented was the objection to the singing of hymns other than the paraphrases of Scripture sanctioned by the Synod of Dordrecht; but the tendency of this sect of the Dutch Reformed Church was to uphold the Calvinistic doctrines, to oppose all innovations, and to insist on a literal reading of the Bible. The Potchefstroom assembly decided that Postma and his followers were orthodox, and made the singing of hymns optional in congregations; but Postma refused to accept any such compromise, and seceded from the main body of the Church, founding the sect known as the Gereformeerde Kerk, and nicknamed the Dopper or "round head" Church. Paul Krüger, whose paternal farm was close to Rustenberg, was probably one of Postma's earliest adherents.

In 1860 the republic of Lydenberg joined the federation afterwards known as the South African Republic, retaining, however, its independence in Church matters and adherence to the Synod of Cape Colony. But, the Supreme Court of the Cape having decided that no clergyman or elder from outside the colony could sit on the Synod, a few years later the republics decided to have their own assembly, and from that time till 1881, when a fresh secession took place, the two sections of the Church continued side by side, though

with considerable antagonism. The Doppers established branches in the Orange Free State and Transvaal, and became a flourishing body, chiefly in the western and central divisions. The secession of 1881 took place (again resembling the disruption of the Scottish Church) owing to an attempt, partially successful, to unite the two sections. A question concerning Church lands (with political undercurrents) caused a certain number of the Hervormde section, influential out of proportion to their numbers on account of their position, to leave the United Reformed Church; and, as a large number of Doppers never joined the movement, the Transvaal now contains three branches of the Dutch Reformed Church.

A striking instance of the extent to which Church matters influence political life in the Transvaal is afforded by the election of 1893. General Joubert, who was the candidate of a small progressive party, lost the election, which was largely fought on ecclesiastical questions; but he polled 7,000 votes out of 14,800, a result which was undoubtedly greatly due to his connection with the Reformed Church, then in opposition to Krüger and the Dopper Community. Even at the height of his power, as is well known, Krüger could never make the Dopper Church that of the State, and when he was to be buried there was no question, despite the ruinous condition of the old State Church in Pretoria, of his lying in state or being received in the gorgeous Dopper Church in which he had worshipped.

The division between east and west Transvaal is not a thing of the past. The Dopper Church is still chiefly dominant in the west, and the United Reformed Church, which now includes eighty per cent. of the Boer population, in the east and north, while the small but rich section of the Transvaal Reformed Church is found in the central and west-central districts. The Church of the Orange River Colony has preserved its distinct character and the Dopper sect has found little support there.

INDEX

AFFORESTATION, 348

Africander, meaning of, *see* "Foreword"; Dutch, in private life, 199; unpicturesqueness of, 200; popular conceptions of, 202; true character, 203 *et seq.*; resemblance to Scots, 211; religion of, 212; physical characteristics, 217; intellectual capacity, 219; the town, 220, 222; family pride, 221; the Bywoner, 222; public life, 228; leaders' post-bellum policy, 234; Bywoner in politics, 240; different classes of, 241; Transvaal leaders, 242

Africander and party politics, 407

Africanderland, true limit of expansion the Zambesi, 421; the spirit of, 423 *et seq.*

Agriculture, Government measures in new colonies, 277, 287; and taxation, 281; interests neglected under Krüger, 286; history of, in South Africa, 339 *et seq.*; local markets, 341; agricultural banks, 341; views of Colonel Thomas on, 347, 351; credit banks, 351; dependence on mineral resources, 396

American Methodist Episcopal Church, 29 *et seq.*; Bishop Turner's mission, 33; charges against, 34

American negro, Tuskegee and Booker Washington, 48; education in Southern States, 49;

comparison with African natives, 81; present position, 111; should not be allowed to visit Africa, 112

Asiatic question, the British Indian, 128

Australia and Canada, comparisons with, 408

BANTU, in native state, 14; under European influence, 16

Beit, Mr., gifts by, 357, 361

Bond, Africander, 253 *et seq.*

Botha, Louis, 242, 248

British Indian, 128; under South African Republic, 129; grievances of, 130; Africander attitude, 136; and Rand, 331

Bywoner, 222 *et seq.*; and land settlement, 276; Krüger's treatment of, 240; in politics, 240

CANADA and Australia, comparisons with, 408

Cape University, language question, 157; position, 356

Capitalism, Imperialism and land, 390 *et seq.*; and press, 391; and brains, 393; and taxation, 401; selfishness, 404; and labour, 405

Chinese, on Rand, 316 *et seq.*; the coolie and the white workman, 328

Chinese labour, home politics, 332; international relations, 335

- Church Separatist movement, 30 *et seq.*; effect on native labour, 75
- Climate, 2
- Coal, 386
- Coloured question, 121
- Commercial Union, 416
- Copper, 389
- Cotton, 354
- DEFENCE, the Cape and the Hinterland, 427; naval, colonial, 415
- Delagoa Bay, railway question, 366
- Democratic government and subject races, 419
- Diamonds, 387
- "Dopper" sect, founded, 187; political affinities, 189
- Dutch, High, relation to Taal, 142; teaching of in South Africa, 143; difficulty of writing, 144; revival of, 149; made compulsory in Transvaal, 158
- Dutch, provisions for teaching, 182
- Dutch Reformed Church, historical summary, 185; influence of ministers, 187; attitude of, 189; and education, 193
- EDUCATION, religious and secular, 39; native, 41; expenditure on, 42; missionary part in native, 43; industrial training, 45; of American negro, 49; (native) eagerness for, 50; native college, 52; industrial training, 56; language in schools, 153 *et seq.*; race problem in school, 162; historical summary, 162 *et seq.*; Cape Education Bill, 165; Orange Free State, school management in, 168; effects of war, 169; importation of teachers, 171; policy in new colonies, 172; school committees established, 163; limitations of their power, 173; controversy on religious instruction, 175; language question, in new colonies, 178; in Nationalist schools, 179; provision for teaching Dutch, 182; Dutch Reformed Church, 193; denominational *v.* government schools, 194; higher, 355; Cape university and language, 157; position of, 356; Johannesburg Technical Institute, 356; secondary, 358; university schemes, 359; millionaires wanted, 361
- Expansion, true northern limit the Zambezi, 421; west and east, 422
- FARRAR, SIR GEORGE, 390
- Federation, retarded by native question, 77; South African, 417
- GERMANY, stake in Johannesburg and South Africa, 394
- Gold industry, and agriculture, 395 *et seq.*
- Government, system of, 409
- HET VOLK, 236, 244 *et seq.*, 250, 288; and education, 172 *et seq.*, 197
- High Commissioner, functions of, 410
- Hofmeyr, Mr., 254, 257
- IMPERIALISM, capitalism, and land, 390 *et seq.*
- Imperialism, 403; and the Afrianders, 406; and Nationalism, 408 *et seq.*
- Industrial competition, 377
- Industrial questions, 372 *et seq.*; protection at the Cape, 372; in Orange River Colony, 374; depression, 375; trade statistics, 375
- Industrial training for natives, 56
- Intercolonial Council, railways, 363
- Iron, 388
- Irrigation, 342; Sir W. Willcocks on, 343

- JOHANNESBURG, brains of, 393; share of Germany in, 394; growth of, 394; and Imperialism, 403
 Johannesburg Technical Institute, 356
- KRÜGER, PRESIDENT, Hollander influence on, 189; relations with Nationalism, 229; and agricultural interests, 286; and the gold laws, 400
- LABOUR, shortage of native, 61; domestic, 64; demand for, 68; how to increase supply, 68; effects on native character, 72; effects of war, 73; effect of Church Separatist movement, 74; difficulty for farmers, 269; natives on mines, 324
- Labour problem, Chinese coolie, moral objections to, 316; white labour on Rand, 328; Chinese labour and home politics, 332; Chinese and international relations, 335; capitalists and, 405
- Land, natives and, 93; conditions of tenure, 94; proposal of Native Affairs Commission, 96; native, ancestral, 115; and capitalism, 395
- Land settlement, 264; philanthropic, 265; difficulties of, 267; price of, 271; in Orange River Colony, 272; money spent on, 274; Transvaal, 275; and Bywoner, 276; Government attitude towards, 279 *et seq.*; the man wanted, 289
- Language question, 140; necessity of English in Cape Colony, 146; in new colonies, 148; historical summary, 151; attitude of Orange Free State, 159; in new colonies, 178
- Lovedale, Dr. Stewart, 19; influence of Scottish Presbyterian Mission, 23; Mzimba's secession, 32
- MALAN, MR., 250, 257
- Milner, Lord, on native problem, 92; his views on native question, 79; his views on Asiatics, 135; and the Transvaal Boers, 205; and President Krüger, 232; and reconstruction, 233; effects of administration of, 233; and Chinese labour, 333; and irrigation, 342; and afforestation, 348; railway policy, 363; and Intercolonial Council, 363; his *kindergarten*, 380; and the capitalists, 405
- Missions, character of work, 19 *et seq.*
- NATIONALISM, relations with Dutch Reformed Church, 191; Krüger's views, 229; and Imperialism, 232; growth of American, 233; fresh phase of, 250; two divisions of, 259; strong points of, 262; and Imperialism, 408 *et seq.*; growth and character of, 411
- Native Affairs Bureau, suggestions for, 89
- Native Affairs Commission, 17; plan for franchise, 77; alternative plan, 84; proposal *re* land, 96
- Native college, 358
- Native, how to make him work, 68; trades open to, 71; government of, 75; definition of, 85; the mission, 112
- Native question, natives and mines, 324; and democratic government, 419
- Native races, civilisation of, 4 *et seq.*; rights of, 5; our attitude to, 11; distribution and proportions, 12; missionary influence, 19; attitude of Dutch Afrianders, 21; training native ministers, 28, 31; education, 41; industrial training, 45; eagerness for education, 50; native college, 53; economic value of, 59; labour, 61; political aspirations, 75; suggestion for giving

- political rights, 77 ; Lord Milner's views, 79 ; alternative plan, 84 ; rights *versus* privileges, 82 ; definition of term "native," 85 ; and Throne, 91 ; ownership of land, 93 ; conditions of tenure, 94 ; future of, 104 ; tribal organisation, 105 ; legal position of, 106 ; position of women, 106 ; achievements of, 108, 113 ; limitations of, 110 ; future of, 115 ; taxation, 116 ; relation to whites, 119, 123 ; position of educated men, 120 ; segregation, 125
- Naval defence, colonial, 415
- ORANGE RIVER COLONY, land settlement schemes in, 272
- PARKIN, Dr. G. R. (quoted), 126
- Press, 391
- Protection, at Cape, 372
- RACE PROBLEM, in school, 162
- Railways, Intercolonial Council, 363 ; railway questions, 365 ; *modus vivendi* with Portugal, 368 ; development of country, 371
- Rand, characteristics of, 382 *et seq.* ; capitalism and land, 395 *et seq.*
- Religious instruction, controversy, 175
- Rhodes, 6, 293, 304, 307, 315 ; the scholarship legacy, 361, 401
- Rhodesia, 292 ; influence of Rhodes, 304 ; finding "alluvial," 306 ; conditions of land purchase, 308 ; railway policy, 309 ; company's point of view, 311 ; potential value, 314 ; size and characteristics of, 294 ; gold, 295 ; the company's policy, 297 ; Rhodes and the Rhodesians, 300 ; tobacco, 302 ; stock-farming, 303 ; method of government, 303
- SARGANT, E. B., suggestion by, 359
- Selborne, Lord, and Chinese, 321 ; and railway policy in Transvaal, 366
- Separatist movement, in native church, 30 ; missionary view of, 35
- Smuts, Mr., 243
- Spirit of Africanderland, 423 *et seq.*
- Stock-farming, diseases, 341 ; Colonel Owen Thomas on, 347, 351
- TAAI, description of, 140 *et seq.* relation to High Dutch, 141 ; social position of, 146 ; will survive, 183
- Taxation, Transvaal, 378 ; borne by mining industry, 381 ; and capitalists, 401
- Tengo Jabavu, 113
- Theal, Mr., histories, 199
- Thomas, Colonel Owen, opinions on agriculture and stock-farming, 347, 351
- Tobacco, 353
- Transvaal, Dutch leaders, 242 ; attitude after the war, 245 ; land settlement, 275 ; taxation, 378 ; mineral wealth, 385 *et seq.* ; cost of living, 381 ; taxation borne by mining industry, 381
- WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY, meaning of, 2
- Willcocks, Sir W., on irrigation, 343
- Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, 61

TRANSVAAL PROBLEMS: SOME NOTES ON CURRENT POLITICS. By LIONEL PHILLIPS. Demy 8vo. 12s. net.

"A most candid and yet sympathetic survey, scrupulously moderate in tone, and yet inspired with an optimism which is all the more effective in that it is so free from rhetoric. For any Progressive politician during the next few months these chapters will be invaluable. Mr. Phillips sees quite clearly what many well-meaning people are apt to miss."—*The Times*.

FROM THE CAPE TO THE ZAMBESI. By G. T. HUTCHINSON. With an Introduction by Colonel FRANK RHODES, C.B., D.S.O. With many Illustrations from Photographs taken by Col. Rhodes and the Author. Square demy 8vo. 9s. net.

"The whole book is really an enlightening one on South Africa, and is worthy of careful attention by statesmen, politicians, economists, and general readers."—*The Daily Telegraph*.

THE EMPIRE AND THE CENTURY. A SERIES OF ESSAYS ON IMPERIAL PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES. By Fifty Writers eminent in Letters, Commerce, Politics, and Action. Edited with an Introduction by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN, and containing a Poem by RUDYARD KIPLING entitled "The Heritage." With 7 Maps. Medium 8vo. 21s. net.

"Mr. Goldman and his fellow contributors have done well to provide us with admirable material for that thorough knowledge and quiet, careful reflection which is the essential preliminary to the sure development of the priceless heritage, the treasures and responsibilities of which every British subject the wide world over shares in common."—*Standard*.

AN EXPEDITION INTO THE CENTRAL TIAN SHAN MOUNTAINS. CARRIED OUT IN THE YEARS 1902-1903. By DR. GOTTFRIED MERZBACHER. Published under the authority of the Royal Geographical Society. With Illustrations and a Map. Demy 8vo. 12s. net.

"The narrative is of wonderful interest. . . . Geologists, especially glacialists, will find in this volume matter of supreme interest."—*Manchester Courier*.

THE FIRST VOLUMES OF THE INDIAN RECORDS SERIES. PUBLISHED FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

BENGAL IN 1756-7. A SELECTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PAPERS DEALING WITH THE AFFAIRS OF THE BRITISH IN BENGAL DURING THE REIGN OF SIRAJ-UDDAULA. Edited, with Notes, and an Historical Introduction, by S. C. HILL, B.A., B.Sc. 3 Vols. Demy 8vo. 12s. net each vol.

"The first fruits of a series that promises to be so exhaustive and authoritative that there will be no word left to say of India, old or new."—*Evening Standard*.

JAPAN IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY.

Compiled by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce in the Japanese Government. Demy 8vo. 25s. net.

"Will convince the most sceptical that Mr. Harnki Yamawaki, who is responsible for the work, can write clear, vigorous English . . . contains a wealth of information on points of interest . . . the whole work is a monument of interest and care, reflecting high credit on its producers."—*Morning Post*.

THE BRITISH TRADE YEAR-BOOK. (First Issue.) Covering the 25 Years 1880-1904. By JOHN HOLT SCHOOLING. With 191 Tables and 46 Diagrams. 10s. 6d. net.

* * This is the only work that shows the *Course of Trade*.

"Mr. Holt Schooling is not a statistician who seeks to make figures subserve party interests. His sole aim is to collate them in order to ascertain what they prove. This elaborate survey of the British trade position. . . . Hard facts set forth in a business-like way."—*Saturday Review*.

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

THE FRIENDS OF ENGLAND. By the Hon. GEORGE PEEL, Author of

"The Enemies of England." Demy 8vo. 12s. net.

"The subjects with which Mr. Peel deals are of the deepest interest, and he shows wide reading on every page."—*Athenæum*.

MAKERS OF MODERN HISTORY. NAPOLEON III. CAVOUR.

BISMARCK. By the Hon. EDWARD CADOGAN. Demy 8vo. 8s. net.

"His work is in all respects so capable that his name may fairly be added to those of the few writers of the day who shew genuine ability in the critical discussion of men and affairs."—*Globe*.

ESSAYS ON FOREIGN POLITICS.

BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS. By the late LORD SALISBURY. Large Crown 8vo. With Portrait. 2 Vols. 6s. net each.

"Their intrinsic merit and their personal interest are alike beyond dispute."—*The Times*.

THE VICEROY'S POST BAG. By MICHAEL MacDONAGH, Author of

"Daniel O'Connell, the Irish Tribune." Demy 8vo. 12s. net.

"The author of this remarkable contribution to Anglo-Irish history deserves to be doubly congratulated. In the first place, for having with a quick sense of its supreme value laid his enterprising hands on the Hardwick correspondence, and in the next place for having made such skilful literary use of the materials which he was the first to discover. . . . Altogether a valuable and engaging addition to our Anglo-Irish political literature."—*Pall Mall Gazette*.

THE GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. PREPARED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF, BERLIN.

PART I.—From its Commencement in 1899 to the Capture of General Cronje's Forces at Paardeberg. Translated by Colonel W. H. H. WATERS, R.A., C.V.O.

PART II.—The Advance to Pretoria, the Upper Tugela Campaign, etc., etc. Translated by Colonel HUBERT DU CANE, R.A., M.V.O. With Maps and Plans. Demy 8vo. 15s. net each.

THE MILITARY LIFE OF H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE.

Written under the authority of the late Duke from Documents in his own possession. By Col. WILLOUGHBY VERNER, assisted by Captain ERASMUS DARWIN PARKER. With Portraits. Two Vols. 36s. net.

"The book will also increase the respect, already high, in which the Duke's memory is held among all those who have any knowledge of the history of our military administration during the Queen's reign. The 'devotion to his profession,' which was commonly attributed to him, is shown to be no empty phrase. We have said enough to indicate the great interest of these volumes, and to show that the Duke was a devoted, strenuous, and by no means unenlightened soldier, who worked hard for the interests of the Queen, the Country, and the Army."—*The Times*.

FURTHER MEMOIRS OF THE WHIG PARTY, 1807-1821.

By HENRY RICHARD VASSALL, 3rd Lord Holland. Edited by the EARL OF ILCHESTER. With Portraits. Demy 8vo. 18s. net.

" . . . A fascinating record of a most important time . . . written with thorough knowledge and yet with a singular absence of vanity, egoism, or self-assertion."—*The Times*.

THE HIGH ROAD OF EMPIRE. Reproductions in Colour of 47 Water-Colour Drawings and numerous Pen-and-Ink Sketches made in India. By A. H. HALLAM MURRAY. Dedicated by gracious permission to H.R.H. the Princess of Wales. Medium 8vo. 21s. net. (Also a limited edition on large paper at £2 2s. net.)

This is a companion volume to Mr. Hallam Murray's "On the Old Road through France to Florence," which met with great success last year.

ON THE OLD ROAD THROUGH FRANCE TO FLORENCE.

Reproductions in Colour of 48 Water-Colour Sketches by A. H. HALLAM MURRAY. With Text by H. W. NEVINSON and MONTGOMERY CARMICHAEL. Second Edition. Medium 8vo. 21s. net.

"Mr. Murray's sketches are exceedingly clever, and his choice of subjects is particularly felicitous . . . a work conspicuous no less for its literary excellence than for its artistic merit."—*Glasgow Herald*.

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

